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Who are the Saral and Şahin families reconciled by the MHP leader?

MHP leader Bahçeli has reconciled the Saral and Şahin families. In a statement, the MHP referred to them as “two esteemed families.” What is the history of these two families whose names have been linked to organized crime?

Photo: @MHP_Bilgi/X

The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) announced via its social media account that its Chairman, Devlet Bahçeli, had met with the Saral and Şahin families at the MHP Headquarters.

The MHP announced the reconciliation of these families, long at odds, with the statement: “Two esteemed families of our country, the Saral and the Şahin, came together at our headquarters with our Chairman, Mr. Devlet Bahçeli, in a historic meeting and embrace.”

So, who are the Saral and Şahin families reconciled by the MHP leader, and how are they known to the public?

“The Sarals are the second-largest criminal organization”

The Saral family originates from the Of district of Trabzon. Although the MHP has referred to them as a “distinguished family,” the public knows them as an organized crime group, a gang, or a mafia. According to 2021 data and police reports, the family is the second-largest organized crime group in Türkiye, with 347 armed members, ranking only behind Alaattin Çakıcı’s organization.

The group was led by Hüseyin Saral from the 1990s until 2005. It is alleged that Hüseyin Saral was killed by Mehmet Ali Büyüksarıoğlu and Sedat Şahin in 2005. On January 30, 2017, Hüseyin Saral’s son, Hüseyin Mert Saral, killed Mehmet Ali Büyüksarıoğlu.

Prosecutor’s indictment: A vast structure comprising 35,000–40,000 people

A report by Serdar Kulaksız of Habertürk, dated January 15, 2017, based on an indictment prepared by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, states that the gang was a vast organization comprising 35,000 to 40,000 members.

The indictment prepared following the investigation into the July 19, 2016, killings of Veysel Salihoğlu and Tufan Gedik in Beşiktaş, Istanbul, alleges that Zafer Saral was a member of an armed criminal organization driven by profit motives and attempted to acquire a high-value share in a fuel storage facility owned by Veysel Salihoğlu for a price below market value. It is stated that suspect Yaşar Necmi Dardağan acted as an intermediary, but when Salihoğlu could not be persuaded, Dardağan alerted Zafer Saral and his associates, arranging for them to come to the scene.

Between 2004 and 2017, 23 people were killed in the conflicts between the Saral and Şahin factions. Among the deceased were Hüseyin Saral, Sedat Şahin’s brother Vedat Şahin, and Kenan Şirin, the leader of the Şirinler gang. Additionally, Atalay Cebesoy, a lawyer for grey-wolf mafia figures such as Sedat Şahin, Alaattin Çakıcı, Erol Evcil, and Haluk Kırcı, was killed during this period.

Numerous operations were conducted against the group between 2022 and 2024. Hundreds of individuals were arrested as members of the organization. Journalist Tolga Şardan of T24 reported that friction had arisen between the then-Minister of the Interior, Süleyman Soylu, and the then-Istanbul Police Chief, Zafer Aktaş, as a result of these operations.

According to a report dated November 11, 2022, Soylu asked Aktaş why he had not been informed about the operation targeting the Sarals. In response to Soylu’s criticism, Aktaş replied, “Whenever we told you, there were leaks.”

A plot of assassination attempt against Şahin using a rocket launcher was announced

Most recently, on September 10, 2026, an operation was conducted against the Sarals on the grounds that they were plotting an assassination targeting Sedat Şahin. A statement issued by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office regarding the matter reported that a location operating as a landscaping site in Beykoz, Istanbul, had been identified and that a large quantity of ammunition was seized during a search involving detector dogs.

The seized ammunition is as follows:

  • One rocket launcher,
  • Three rocket launcher propellant charges,
  • Three anti-tank rocket rounds,
  • Two Kalashnikov (AK-47) long-barreled weapons,
  • Two MP5 automatic weapons,
  • Numerous magazines and rounds of ammunition for the weapons,
  • One stolen motorcycle,
  • One BMW vehicle with foreign license plates, assessed to be intended for use in an attack.

It was determined that Yakup Kerem Saral, a fugitive member of the Saral criminal organization who was previously the subject of an Interpol Red Notice, had planned an attempt on the life of Sedat Şahin, the leader of the Şahinler criminal organization, and that the seized criminal materials had been transported to a container at the site one day prior to the operation for use in this planned attack.

Şahins are the third-largets mafia group in Turkey

Like the Saral group, the Şahins also hail from the Black Sea region. The group’s leader, Sedat Şahin, is from Samsun’s Bafra district. According to 2021 police data, the group, with its 257 armed members, ranks as Türkiye’s third-largest mafia organization, following the Alaattin Çakıcı and Saral groups.

Sedat Şahin was released on July 20, 2023, from Izmir Buca Prison, where he had served eight years for charges including “unauthorized possession or transfer of hazardous materials,” “armed robbery of multiple persons via highway interception,” and “intentional homicide.” His release sparked controversy.

On July 19, the day before the judicial recess began, Şahin’s lawyers appealed the court’s decision to continue his detention. Duty judge Hakan Türkön and two other presiding judges, who had stepped in for the regular panel that went on recess on July 20, reviewed the appeal, resulting in the release of Şahin and three other defendants. Türkön, who also issued the release order for Alaattin Ilyas Saral (detained as the leader of the Saral gang) the next day, was appointed to the Supreme Court on July 26. Following his release, Şahin’s first visit was to Bahçeli.

Sedat Şahin’s name was linked to drugs for the first time

Sedat Şahin, whose criminal record involving drugs dates back to 1984, was supported by Alaattin Çakıcı from the early 1990s through the 2000s. However, their relationship later soured after Şahin clashed with Erol Evcil, another mafia figure and close associate of Çakıcı.

Although held responsible for the 1994 killings of Hüseyin Temurtaş and his son Çetin Temurtaş, Şahin was released pending trial in 1997. When the Istanbul Police moved to arrest him that same year, he fled to Germany.

In 1998, he was apprehended in Berlin while visiting his wife, who had just given birth, carrying a forged Italian passport. He remained in custody in Europe for two years before being extradited to Turkey in 2000. He was subsequently imprisoned alongside his brother, Vedat Şahin. Findings that Mustafa Bülent Arslan, Bilal Akın, Oktay Cincioğlu, and Okan Öztürk had also been killed by the Şahin faction were added to the case file, holding him responsible for a total of seven deaths. Despite this, he was released in October 2000; it is alleged that his release was secured through his connections to Alaattin Çakıcı.

Following operations in 2005 that resulted in the detention of 102 individuals across eight provinces, Sedat Şahin was sentenced to three life terms plus 40 years and 5 months in prison for crimes including establishing a criminal organization, instigating intentional homicide, extortion, and unlawful confinement. In 2011, while the case at the Istanbul 9th ​​High Criminal Court was ongoing, Sedat Şahin’s lawyers applied for his release, citing Article 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK), which regulates detention periods, on the grounds that his time in custody had exceeded five years. Sedat Şahin and his associates were released.

12 trans women detained in Istanbul’s Bayram Street

The trans women detained on the night of September 26 were released in the morning following police processing.


A police operation was conducted late last night (September 26) on the homes of trans women located on Bayram Street in Beyoğlu, Istanbul.

Twelve trans women were detained as a result of the operation. Kaos GL announced that the detained trans women were released following police processing.

The “We Want Freedom” Campaign Group condemned the raids, noting that lawyers were present with the trans women during the detention process.

“Trans kadınların yaşamlarına el uzatmayı bırakın!”

The campaign group’s statement is as follows:

“The government’s repression and persecution of LGBTI+ individuals continue. We have received reports that police raided the homes of trans women on Bayram Street in Istanbul and detained 12 trans women. Lawyers were present with their trans women clients during the detention process.

This wave of operations—launched under the banner of ‘My Family is Safe’—far from protecting those trapped in a cycle of poverty, violence, and insecurity, deeply impacts the homes, living spaces, friends, and loved ones of trans women.

The detentions and operations must cease immediately. We issue this warning: Stop encroaching upon the lives, homes, and streets of trans women under the pretext of morality!”

What happened?

By the decision of the Istanbul 7th Criminal Judgeship of Peace (Decision No. 2026/9559), access to the websites and social media accounts of numerous LGBTI+ organizations, media outlets, student groups, rights defenders, and activists was blocked on the night of September 12–13. That same night, raids were conducted on associations, homes, and venues in 15 provinces, most notably Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Mersin, and Kuşadası.

Minister of Justice Akın Gürlek described these operations as the “My Family is Safe” operations. Gürlek added that these operations were carried out within the scope of the “Family and Population Decade.” As a result of the operations, many individuals were detained, and 82 people were arrested.

Following the operations conducted on September 12, 2026, which targeted nine civil society organizations, including two associations working in the field of HIV, and resulted in the arrest of 82 people, the “We Want Freedom” Campaign Group announced its formation with the slogan: “Everywhere is a dungeon; we want freedom!”

Ailem Güvende Operasyonları

Attorney Furkan Yurt: Concepts such as “public morality” are being used as legal grounds

LGBTI+ individuals detained as part of the “My Family is Safe” operations were subjected to various rights violations during their detention and imprisonment. Lawyer Furkan Yurt reported that terms open to interpretation, such as “public morality” and “sense of decency and modesty”, were used directly as legal grounds in the investigation files, and that lawyers were prevented from accessing their clients for an extended period due to confidentiality orders imposed on the cases.

Photo: Serra Akcan / csgorselarsiv.org

The Kaos GL Association has announced that their friends, who were sent to Sincan Prison as part of the “My Family is Safe” (Ailem Güvende) operations, which began with access restrictions and home raids on September 13, have been subjected to various rights violations.

The rights violations documented by Kaos GL include: forced drug testing, physical violence, and forced hair cutting during detention; the imposition of strip searches in prison; insults and threats targeting sexual orientation and gender identity; intentional isolation and the forced separation of the individuals from one another; denial of access to essential medication, clean water, hygiene products, and clean clothing; and threats to personal safety within the prison.

On September 16, 20 people (at least nine of whom were members of LGBTI+ associations) were arrested out of the 35 individuals detained in Istanbul as part of the “My Family is Safe” operations. In its request for arrest, the prosecutor’s office cited the “best interests of the child,” the “Turkish family structure,” and “public morality” as grounds.

According to a press statement issued yesterday (September 20) by the Istanbul Bar Association’s Human Rights, Lawyers’ Rights, and Women’s Rights Centers, simultaneous operations were carried out against numerous associations and venues on the night of September 12–13; digital devices belonging to associations and individuals were confiscated, and law enforcement officers ransacked certain association offices and private homes. Noting that charges such as “establishing an organization for the purpose of committing a crime,” “drug-related offenses,” “obscenity,” “prostitution,” and “violating the Law on Associations” were leveled in the investigations, the bar association also highlighted Justice Minister Gürlek’s statement that funds received from abroad by certain associations were being examined by Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK).

Attorney Yurt: Concepts open to interpretation are being used as grounds

According to Lawyer Furkan Yurt from the Social Policy, Gender Identity, and Sexual Orientation Studies Association (SPoD), the charges brought in these investigation files are primarily based on allegations of “violating the Law on Associations,” “inciting or mediating prostitution,” “using narcotic substances,” and “establishing an organization for the purpose of committing crimes.”

Attorney Furkan Yurt

Yurt stated that the documents referring to the case for arrest contained no concrete evidence regarding charges other than the alleged violation of the Law on Associations; consequently, the proceedings were effectively being conducted solely on the basis of Article 32/p of the Law on Associations. Explaining that the prosecution and judicial documents cited Articles 13 and 33 of the Constitution to argue that the freedom to form associations could be restricted on grounds such as “public morality,” “public order,” and “prevention of crime,” Yurt further noted that the documents included allegations, based on Article 89 of the Turkish Civil Code, that the association’s purpose had become “contrary to law or morality.”

Yurt also pointed out that, particularly in arrest requests, highly open-ended and broad concepts, such as “public morality,” “sense of decency and modesty,” “society’s moral values,” and the “weakening of the Turkish family structure”, were directly employed as legal grounds by referencing Article 41 of the Constitution, which concerns the “Protection of the Family and Children’s Rights.”

“A confidentiality order has been issued for the case file“

Yurt described the difficulties encountered regarding access to legal counsel during the detention and arrest phases of the “My Family is Safe” operation:

“Following the initial detention procedures, a confidentiality order was issued for the case file; indeed, this order is explicitly cited in the defense statements submitted by the lawyers. Consequently, we were unable to meet with our clients for a long period and were very late in even learning their whereabouts; naturally, access to legal counsel was impossible during this time. Furthermore, because we received much of the information late or incompletely, we were unable to conduct legal consultations at the necessary times. In particular, the process of identifying which prison they had been transferred to and visiting them became a complete ordeal. Currently, our colleagues have been taken to Silivri Prison, and our ability to access a facility located so far outside the city is severely limited.”

Noting that the Kaos GL Association learned of the rights violations through reports from individuals held at Ankara Sincan Prison, Yurt shared the following details regarding the situation in Istanbul:

“As reflected in the interrogation records, some of the suspects personally declared to the court that they had been in custody for four days and were struggling significantly to access medication or medical examinations for serious health issues, such as heart disease. Although the process unfolded somewhat more favorably in other respects, there was a long delay in providing water during the detention period, which approached 72 hours, and their commissary needs have still not been met. It is fair to say that our colleagues were severely underserved regarding nutrition, as their needs for food and other basic provisions were not met immediately upon their admission to Metris Prison.”

“Doctors are acting in violation of the Istanbul Protocol”

Pointing out that such violations ought to be identified during both pre-detention and post-detention medical examinations, Yurt stated, “Unfortunately, because doctors have adopted attitudes contrary to the Istanbul Protocol, we do not know the extent to which these violations have been detected. Moreover, the confidentiality order on the case file prevents us from pursuing legal action regarding any violations that may have been identified. To date, we have utilized the necessary legal and administrative recourse mechanisms regarding rights violations occurring specifically in Istanbul.”

Istanbul Bar Association: Rights defenders criminalized on vague grounds

The Istanbul Bar Association’s Centers for Lawyers’ Rights, Human Rights, and Women’s Rights shared a report with the public yesterday (September 20) at a press conference regarding the operations conducted against LGBTI+ organizations, activists, and journalists, as well as the detentions that took place during protests, between September 12 and 16. The statement outlined the details regarding the 107 individuals detained during a planned press conference in front of the Çağlayan Courthouse, held to protest the “My Family is Safe” operations, as follows:

“Actions were taken against six civil society organizations in Istanbul, and executives and members of these organizations were detained. The Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office linked the investigation to grounds such as the ‘best interests of the child,’ ‘protection of the family,’ and ‘shared moral values ​​of society.’ It was reported that 35 people were detained and 20 arrested in Istanbul, and that six associations and ten businesses were included in the scope of the operation. While digital devices belonging to the associations and individuals were seized, access bans constituted the digital component of the operation.

Through access ban decisions issued almost daily since September 12, 2026, numerous websites and social media accounts belonging to LGBTI+ organizations, associations, activists, and human rights defenders have been blocked. In addition to the websites of 11 LGBTI+ associations, 32 Twitter/X accounts and 419 other social media accounts were blocked, and access bans were requested for a further 107 accounts. The blocked accounts included those belonging to university LGBTI+ groups, rights organizations, media outlets, journalists, and institutions such as the Ankara Bar Association’s LGBTI+ Rights Center. The scope of these access bans indicates a large-scale intervention targeting the LGBTI+ movement’s spheres of organizing, communication, and expression.”

A confidentiality order was issued for the investigation files, preventing lawyers from accessing the case records. The statement noted that, contrary to this, the principle of the confidentiality of the investigation was disregarded and the contents of the case file were shared with the press, thereby violating individuals’ “right not to be stigmatized.”

The statement further included the following remarks:

“Attempts have been made to criminalize associations and human rights defenders based on abstract and vague grounds; furthermore, the issue of detention and judicial control measures being imposed on individuals, despite the absence of the conditions prescribed by law, has once again come to the fore, highlighting how the measure of detention in Turkey has ceased to be an exception.”

Human rights violations in police custody

Noting that seven of the 107 individuals detained in front of the Çağlayan Courthouse were lawyers affiliated with the Istanbul Bar Association, the center reported that detention proceedings against them continued in violation of the law, despite the lawyers pointing out this fact.

Based on information in the press release, drawing on accounts from eyewitnesses, observers, and defense counsel, the following rights violations were identified:

  • “The citizens who were detained were not given any announcements by law enforcement to disperse, contrary to national and international legislation, nor was a safe corridor created for them to disperse. In the preliminary interview conducted before the statements were taken, the detained citizens stated that they were directly surrounded by law enforcement, beaten within the circle, had their throats squeezed, and were handcuffed with their hands behind their backs.
  • A citizen who was put on a bus from the press conference area was severely slapped, had their head slammed against the window, was beaten, and subjected to insults by a police officer inside the bus.
  • One of the detained citizens had their arm bitten by the police, and another was subjected to such disproportionate police violence that her arm bone was dislocated from their shoulder socket, yet they were not taken to the hospital.
  • It has been reported to us that citizens whose right to a defense and effective legal assistance is obstructed are not provided with food or water until lawyers arrive at the police station.
  • Furthermore, regarding the lawyers, it was observed that defense counsel wishing to meet with their detained clients at the Istanbul Provincial Security Directorate were prevented from entering for approximately nine and a half hours, from 15:00 to 00:24; that at 00:24, entry was obstructed by requiring them to enter one by one; and that lawyers were subjected to ill-treatment personally, such as one lawyer being made to wait outside in the cold.
  • During this process, at all three police departments where detainees were being held, the delivery of outside food was blocked and food provision was delayed; it was stated that the authorities would supply the rations. Furthermore, the provision of dietary alternatives for vegan and vegetarian activists was obstructed by law enforcement.
  • Following interviews with clients, it was determined that all of the detained citizens were subjected to reverse handcuffing. Three interviewees at the Küçükçekmece Police Station stated that they remained in reverse handcuffs from 12:30 PM until 7:00 PM after being put on the bus,
  • The protesters, who were being held at the Istanbul Provincial Police Department’s Security Branch, stated that during the initial medical examination, the attending physician did not record the citizens’ claims of ill-treatment on the forensic examination form, that the use of reverse handcuffs continued even at the police station, and that it was only temporarily stopped when they went to the toilet,
  • Furthermore, they stated that although some of the detained citizens used prescription medication, and had informed law enforcement of this fact, their medications were not provided to them, and requests from female detainees for sanitary pads were not met.”

What happened?

By a decision of the Istanbul 7th Criminal Judgeship of Peace (Decision No. 2026/9559), access to the websites and social media accounts of numerous LGBTI+ organizations, media outlets, student groups, rights defenders, and activists was blocked on the night of September 12–13. That same night, raids were conducted on associations, homes, and venues in 15 provinces, most notably Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Mersin, and Kuşadası.

Justice Minister Akın Gürlek announced via his X account that judicial proceedings had been initiated against 162 individuals, 9 associations, and 13 businesses as part of the operation. Gürlek added that these operations were carried out within the scope of the “Family and Population Decade.”

Following police raids on the Kaos GL association and the homes of its members, the association’s principal and substitute supervisory board members were detained. Police also searched the association’s office and seized digital data and materials.

In Izmir, 16 people were arrested, and in the Kuşadası district of Aydın, 5 people were arrested on charges of “obscenity” and “prostitution.”

As part of the operation targeting Kaos GL, conducted on charges of “obscenity” and “violation of the Law on Associations”, freelance journalist Tuğba Tekerek and seven principal members of the Kaos GL Association’s executive and supervisory boards were arrested.

In Istanbul, the “Istanbul Labor, Peace, and Democracy Forces” and LGBTI+ individuals gathered in front of the Istanbul Courthouse in Çağlayan to protest the operations. A total of 106 people, including BirGün reporter Sarya Toprak, journalist Sener Azak from the German public broadcaster ARD, and several lawyers, were detained following police intervention. Operations were conducted against a total of 54 locations, including 10 businesses and 6 LGBTI+ associations, under the coordination of the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office. Of the 35 suspects referred to the courthouse, 20 were arrested and 14 were placed under judicial control, while one individual was released following their statement to the prosecutor. Arrest warrants were issued for 13 individuals reported to be abroad.

Berlin’s elections have concluded: Left Party’s Elif Eralp has won

Die Linke (Left Party) candidate Elif Eralp made history in Berlin State Elections, winning 25.7 percent of the vote. With this result, the party has, for the first time in its history, has the chance of putting a governing mayor of immigrant backgrounds in office. In the election dominated by the talk of the far-right AfD’s rise, the victory of the Left Party labeled as the “extreme left” by the public discourse was met with jubilation.

Photo: Wikimedia

Polls closed in Berlin’s state election on September 20, with the Berlin State Electoral Board announcing provisional official results at 3.33 am on September 21. Die Linke’s Elif Eralp more than doubled the party’s 2023 results, lifting its vote share from 12,2 percent to 25,7 percent, and finishing first in Berlin.

The ruling party CDU, which had topped the 2023 election with 28,2 percent, dropped 9,4 points to 18,8 percent, falling to second place on Berlin’s state election. The AfD settled for the third place, but still gained 7,2 more points than the previous Berlin elections.

In the campaign she ran for Berlin, Elif Eralp, politician from Turkiye, focused on social justice policies such as solving the housing crisis through expropriation, making public transportation improvements, and addressing the city’s waste management issue.

Who is Elif Eralp?

She was born in Munich in 1981 after her family settled in Germany as political refugees following the September 12, 1980, coup. Eralp explains that coming from a family of active trade unionists and socialists in Turkey, and growing up as the child of a refugee family, led her to encounter issues of justice, equality, and state violence at a very young age; she says she has always been deeply involved in politics.

At the age of 12, after witnessing the injustices his family had also experienced, he decided to become a human rights lawyer and completed his law degree at the University of Hamburg between 2001 and 2007. After moving to Berlin in 2010, he joined Die Linke (The Left). In 2021, he was elected to the Berlin House of Representatives. She retained her seat in the 2023 elections. Since 2024, she has served as deputy chair of the parliamentary group, and since 2025, as deputy state chair of the party. She was nominated as the lead candidate for the 2026 Berlin state elections.

Eralp, who is married and the mother of two children, says that, like many Berliners, she lives in rented housing. The most talked-about aspect of her campaign in Berlin was her proposal to nationalize large housing companies in response to the housing crisis plaguing Berliners. Elif Eralp—who is often compared to New York’s Democratic Mayor Zohran Mamdani due to her implementation of social justice policies, her background as a member of an immigrant family, and her practice of going door-to-door in the city to listen to voters’ concerns—had already begun to shape the course of the election with her strong showing in polls leading up to the Berlin election. “If a socialist candidate can win in New York, why not in Berlin?” said Eralp, who achieved the victory she had aimed for in this election. She emphasizes the importance of greater political and social participation by this diverse population in Berlin, where more than 40 percent of the residents have an immigrant background.

“Left Party politics in Berlin is stronger”

“On the one hand, Die Linke’s politics is stronger in Berlin. Perhaps the party’s shortcomings seemed more clearly in Saxony-Anhalt. On the other hand, Berlin is a different kind of city, where a different kind of politics is possible. Saxony-Anhalt does not have many big cities; it is a state made up mostly of rural areas. With employment levels also much lower than in Berlin, people’s needs there take a different shape. For example, people do not move to Saxony-Anhalt for work, quite the opposite, a large number of people are leaving. There is no similar infrastructure or employment. What is really needed is something that can give voice to the problems people are struggling with and to more people’s demands and wishes there. What is needed there is more strength and more organizing.”

Die Linke’s policies in Berlin, on de-privatizing housing and tackling the waste collection chaos found more resonance, because Berlin is a large, complex city where good politics occur. It is not made up of small villages, and that difference shapes things on its own. Still, the responsibilities of Die Linke has to be to keep winning ground in these smaller towns and smaller provinces too, to genuinely earn people’s trust. The party needs to offer a stronger systemic alternative to the existing establishment politics. And I think that, for now, we have managed to do that somewhat better in Berlin.

The election results were celebrated with great enthusiasm

In his victory speech, Eralp said, “Starting today, we will change Berlin together and make it a better place.” Expressing his gratitude to the 19,000 members of his party and the voters of Berlin, Eralp noted that history had been made with this election and that voters had given the Left Party the mandate to form a new government.

Eralp, who ran a campaign focused on the socio-economic issues facing the people of Berlin, continued, “I advocate for a social policy—a policy that includes everyone. Our priority now is to make Berlin affordable.” The historic election result was celebrated with great enthusiasm on Sunday night. The celebrations continued with songs by Tarkan and traditional halay dances. Eralp also joined in the celebrations, chanting the slogan “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî.”

Election results: The Left Party won 47 seats

The Left Party came in first with 47 seats. The reason some parties failed to win seats is this: For a party to enter the Berlin State Parliament, it must receive at least 5% of the votes statewide.

Since Berlin is a city-state, voters in this Berlin election are electing the State Parliament. The State Premier of Germany is determined by the new State Parliament, which is formed once the number of representatives in the State Parliament is finalized based on the election results. Since no single party typically exceeds 50 percent of the vote, coalition talks begin, and a coalition government is formed in the Berlin State Parliament once a coalition secures 80 seats—that is, an absolute majority. Currently, for the Left Party to form a government, it must form a coalition with both the Greens and the SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany).

Although there is currently no information regarding potential coalitions, the SPD’s candidate, Steffen Krach, stated at an event organized by the Berlin Jewish Community before the election that “if anti-Semitic incidents occur, it’s over,” while the Greens’ candidate for mayor, Werner Graf, said he would not join a government that includes anti-Semites or relies on their support.

Meanwhile, Eralp objected to a resolution adopted by his party’s Lower Saxony chapter months before the election, which contained harsh rhetoric directed at Israel. Eralp described the resolution as “wrong,” noting that the text did not sufficiently take into account the October 7 Hamas attack and the Jewish people’s right to live in safety. In statements to the Berliner Zeitung, he emphasized that “Israel’s right to exist and the Jewish people’s right to self-determination” were non-negotiable for him.

“Gate of Tears” closes to oil: Houthi blockade of the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb

The Strait of Bab el-Mandeb, which separates Africa from the Arabian Peninsula and serves as an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz for oil trade, effectively came under Houthi control as of September 2026.

The naval blockade against Saudi Arabia declared in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in July 2026 turned into concrete military control as of September 2026, following a ground operation launched by the Houthis (Ansarullah Movement)—who hold de facto control in Yemen—along the coastline.

On September 10, 2026, the process—which began with the capture of the Zübab district of the port city of Muha, located at a strategic distance from the strait, as well as Perim Island and the Hanish Islands, continued to spread and expand toward the hills that make control of the strait possible. The Yemeni government confirmed the fall of Muha to Reuters.

Another critical milestone in the Houthi advance was the capture on September 11 of Mayun, a small volcanic island at the entrance to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The force controlling this island, which divides the strait in two, gains a strategic advantage over every passing ship.

Bab al-Mandab means “Gate of Tears.” It is known by this name due to its treacherous navigation conditions. The strait lies between Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula and Djibouti and Eritrea on the African coast.

Speaking to Al Jazeera, Austrian politician Wolfgang Pusztai stated that if Muha were captured, the Houthis would completely cut off Yemen’s access to the Red Sea and, consequently, would be able to control the Bab el-Mandeb Strait more easily. Pusztai, highlighting the strait’s 20-kilometer width, described the capture of tactical positions around the strait as a strategic advance that would paralyze Red Sea shipping without the need for missiles. He added that the Houthis’ advantageous position would disrupt international trade, particularly with Saudi Arabia.

As military tensions escalate in the region, people in the port city of Muha—who make their living from the sea and have already been living with war for years—remain caught in the crossfire. It was reported that approximately 1,400 Yemenis have fled to Djibouti.

After the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb is next

The importance of the strait—which offers a route between Yemen and Djibouti and carries a large portion of the oil coming from the Middle East—had increased due to the unavailability of the Strait of Hormuz as a result of the conflict between the U.S. and Iran. With this route also being cut off, ships are expected to divert to the Cape of Good Hope, leading to even higher costs. Brent crude hit $100.

Experts in the region interpret the situation as an attempt by the Houthis to monopolize maritime trade. The Houthis are not only attacking ships but also deciding which vessels will pass through the strait, who will be attacked, and who will receive preferential treatment. This transforms the strait from a military front into a political lever.

The war has reached the coast

The crisis in Yemen has been ongoing for over 10 years. In 2014, the Ansarullah movement, riding a wave of public anger, took control of the capital, Sana’a, and then advanced southward.

Following the clashes, the ceasefire signed in April 2022 under the auspices of the United Nations failed to establish either a state of war or peace, as the parties were unable to reach a political agreement.

In 2023, citing solidarity with the Palestinian people in the face of attacks on Gaza, the Houthis began targeting commercial ships linked to Israel, the U.S., and the U.K. passing through the Red Sea and the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb with missiles and drones.

The latest development that ignited the conflict was Saudi Arabia’s airstrike on the airport in Sana’a. The Houthis had announced the Bab el-Mandeb blockade as a direct act of retaliation: declaring “a siege for a siege, an escalation for an escalation,” they imposed a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia on July 20.

Today, however, Houthi sources claim that life in the city has returned to normal following the withdrawal of Saudi forces from Muha. According to an AFP report, however, people fleeing with their children say they cannot find a single home in the city and that there are no shelters left.

Turkey and Pakistan are waiting to see

Amid this situation, the status of the Mecca Agreement—signed on August 7, 2026, between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan—is a matter of curiosity. Under the agreement, an attack on one of the three countries will be considered an attack on the other member states. Turkey and Pakistan have not yet clearly announced whether they will take action against the Houthis’ blockade of Saudi Arabia.

Islamabad has asked Iran to use its influence over the Houthis and ensure that the attacks cease. Iran, meanwhile stated that it does not control the Houthis. Pakistani Defense Minister Havace Asif said in a statement that if attacks against Saudi Arabia continue, the trilateral security agreement could be activated.

On the Turkish side of the agreement, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan held a phone call with his Saudi counterpart, Faysal bin Ferhan Al Suud.

Since Riyadh has not yet put the pact into effect, Turkey and Pakistan have not taken any action.

Who are the Houthis?

As the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which has been ongoing since October 7, escalates, the risk of a “regional war” is growing by the day. We have compiled what is known about the Houthis in Yemen, who on October 31 targeted Israel with ballistic missiles and drones “in support of the Palestinian resistance.”

The Ansarullah Movement, also known as the Houthis, which operates in Yemen, takes its name from its founder, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi. The Houthis belong to the Zaidi branch of Shia Islam, which is estimated to make up about one-third of the country’s population.

The Zaidis fought against the Ottomans at various intervals from 1538, when Yemen came under Ottoman rule, until 1918. Following the Ottomans’ withdrawal from Yemen in 1918, the Zaidis maintained their dominance in the region until 1970.

Between 1962 and 1970, the pro-monarchy Zaidis fought against the republicans led by Abdullah al-Sellal, who were backed by the Egyptian army. Although the republicans won the war, Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, citing the loss of thousands of soldiers by his army, described his intervention against the rebels in North Yemen as “Egypt’s Vietnam.”

The Houthis, one of the leading Zaidi tribes, were a group influenced by the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution. The leaders of the Houthi tribe, which is primarily located in the Amran and Saada regions—Bedreddin al-Houthi and his son Hussein al-Houthi—lived in Iran for a time.

The Ansarullah Movement, founded in the early 1990s under the leadership of Hussein al-Houthi, waged an active struggle against Ali Abdullah Saleh, who served as President of Yemen from 1990 to 2012.

The Houthi uprising, which began in 2004 following the killing of Hussein al-Houthi by the Yemeni army, continued intermittently until 2011, when—fueled in part by the Arab Spring—it evolved into a widespread popular uprising, culminating in Ali Abdullah Saleh’s resignation on February 21, 2012.

The Houthis and the Saudis

While the appointment of Saleh’s deputy, Abdurabbu Mansur Hadi, as his successor failed to quell the unrest in the country, clashes broke out in 2014 following the security forces’ intervention against a wave of protests led by the Houthis. This process culminated in the Houthis seizing the capital, Sana’a, on September 21, 2014, and taking control of the government.

Saudi Arabia, Yemen’s northern neighbor, launched operations against the Houthis in March 2015 on the grounds that they were supported by Iran. During this period, the Houthis were driven out of Aden, the country’s “capital” in the south, which they had briefly seized. Nevertheless, the Houthis carried out numerous operations against Saudi border posts during this period and targeted oil facilities with missiles and drones.

Who controls what areas?

The Houthis control the capital, Sana’a, and the surrounding governorates of Zemar, Ibb, Raymah, Mahwit, and Amran, as well as the centers of the Sada, Hajjah, and Hodeidah governorates and parts of Bayda and Jawf.

The Saudi-led coalition forces and the Yemeni Presidential Council maintain control over all coastal cities along the Arabian Sea, stretching from the strategic Bab al-Mandab district in Taiz province in the southwest to the Omani border.

These forces, which maintain control over the southern governorates of Taiz, Abyan, Lahij, Hadramaut, and Mahra—including the temporary capital of Aden—also control the oil-rich city of Marib, as well as parts of Jawf and the governorates of Dali and Shabwa.

Forces affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council—which the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has trained and supported under various names in parallel with the Aden administration—are actively prominent in the western part of the country, starting from the coastal districts of Taiz and extending to the coastal regions of Aden, Abyan, Shabwa, and Hadramaut in the south.

Al-Qaeda is one of the parties to the conflict in Yemen. The organization, which has one of the strongest networks on the Arabian Peninsula, continues to operate primarily in desert regions and some coastal cities.

The 6 month ceasefire and the humanitarian situation

Under the auspices of the United Nations, the parties reached a ceasefire on April 2, 2022. The six-month ceasefire ended on October 2, 2022. Since then, fighting has continued, albeit at a low intensity.

Approximately 377,000 people have lost their lives in the years-long conflict. According to a United Nations report dated April 19, 2023, more than two-thirds of Yemen’s population (21.6 million people) are in need of humanitarian aid, while 4.5 million people, including 2 million children (14 percent of the population), have been internally displaced.

The war has led to a deepening economic crisis and triggered a famine in the country.

According to a December 12, 2022, report by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), approximately 2.2 million Yemeni children are at risk of dying from diseases such as cholera and measles due to malnutrition and a lack of vaccines, and half a million of these are 0-5 years old.

Reactions to operations targeting LGBTI+: “We will not yield to this September 12 mentality!”

Politicians, legal professionals, political parties, and rights advocates have reacted to the operations targeting LGBTI+ associations, venues, and activists. Statements issued asserted that the operation was political and that the existence of the LGBTI+ community was being targeted.

Last night, police conducted simultaneous operations targeting LGBTI+ associations, venues, and activists under the name “My Family is Safe.”

In a post on his social media account, Justice Minister Akın Gürlek announced that the operations were centered in five provinces and covered a total of fifteen provinces, and that legal proceedings were initiated against 162 individuals, nine associations, and thirteen businesses.

Politicians, legal professionals, political parties, and rights advocates reacted to the operations targeting LGBTI+ associations, activists, and venues.

DEM Women’s Assembly: We will never remain silent in the face of attacks!

The Women’s Assembly of Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) stated, “We do not accept the attacks—involving detentions, searches, seizures, and access blocks—targeting LGBTI+ associations, rights defenders, and digital media outlets.”

The statement continued as follows:

“This operation, dubbed ‘My Family is Safe,’ is—as the name implies—an operation aimed at subjugating society. It is clear evidence of the persistent pursuit of policies rooted in monism and sexism.

Every day, women are subjected to violence and murdered within families that are labeled ‘safe.’ Diverse sexual identities do not constitute a security threat to this country, to families, or to society.

The real security issue is the violence, impunity, and discrimination that threaten the lives of women and LGBTI+ individuals.

You cannot keep society safe by silencing human rights defenders, stoking hate crimes, blocking broadcasts, and targeting the freedom of association.

Justice must be for everyone, not just for a single individual or group. The duty of the Ministry of Justice is not to suppress human rights defenders, journalists, LGBTI+ individuals, and democratic organizations, but to safeguard the rights and freedoms of all.

Societal security is achieved not through repression and bans, but by guaranteeing equality, freedom, justice, and the right to life.

As advocates of a shared and equal life together, we will never remain silent in the face of attacks against LGBTI+ individuals!

Those detained must be released immediately!

Justice for all, freedom for all, an equal life for all!”

DEM Party MPs Saki and Konukçu issued statements on their social media accounts, reacting to the state’s “policy of impunity.”

In a post on X, DEM Party Istanbul MP ​​Özgül Saki said, “You attack people and the spaces where they show solidarity using fabricated charges.”

Stating that the common denominator among the associations and individuals targeted is their opposition to the “familialist, moralistic, and hate-generating policies” imposed by the government, Saki remarked that, under the guise of “protecting the family,” the government seeks to confine society to a single way of life, target LGBTI+ individuals, and criminalize those fighting for their rights.

DEM Party Istanbul MP ​​Kezban Konukçu also stated that the government, under the guise of “protecting the family,” paves the way for the killing of women and LGBTI+ individuals and encourages this through policies of impunity.

She declared, “Despite hate, Long live life!”

IHD: We will not yield to the September 12 mentality!

In a statement regarding the operations, the Central LGBTI+ Commission of the Human Rights Association (IHD) declared, “We will not yield to the September 12 mentality.”

Stating that the current situation is not a judicial investigation but rather a political operation—one that aims to eliminate LGBTI+ individuals and independent civil society while forcing society into a monolithic family model under the guise of “protecting the family and children”—the IHD emphasized this “continuity,” noting: “The state mindset of September 12—which shut down associations, banned publications, and demonized those who were different—is being perpetuated today under the name ‘My Family is Safe’ (Ailem Güvende).”

The association concluded: “We stand with LGBTI+ individuals, people living with HIV, and human rights defenders! We will not yield to the September 12 mentality!”

New Party Member Gökçen: It harms social peace

New Party Izmir Deputy Gökçe Gökçen expressed her reaction with the following words:

“The targeting of LGBTI+ rights defenders amounts to both the penalization of identities and existence and the simultaneous implementation of two bills that failed to pass in parliament. The ‘agent of influence’ law did not pass, and the law against ‘promoting homosexuality’ (!) did not pass.”

“A cheap copy-and-paste example of hate campaigns devised and planned in other countries is being staged in our country, causing great harm to social peace.”

“The banning of a band you listen to, the targeting of an artist whose concert you plan to attend, your child being exposed to workplace fatalities by the ministry, the arrest of a politician you voted for, and the raids conducted on these associations are not isolated incidents; on the contrary, the legitimacy established for one reinforces the others. Therefore, a holistic struggle for rights and freedoms is vital today—and is, in truth, a struggle for dignity.”

Karaca: The Minister of Justice is fueling hatred and discrimination

EMEP Deputy Chairperson and Antep MP Karaca reacted to Akın Gürlek, stating, “Imagine a Minister of Justice who criminalizes the constitutional right to organize, personally fuels hatred and discrimination, and spearheads the state-sponsored escalation of hatred and hostility!”

Stating that these operations are conducted to force society into the mold of the “acceptable family” and “acceptable citizen,” Karaca said, “Defending the rights of LGBTI individuals to live and organize means defending the rights and freedoms of everyone in this country.”

Karaca affirmed that they would continue to defend the right to life, equality, constitutional freedoms, and the right to organize against the politics of hatred, repression, and the usurpation of the right to organize, and demanded the release of those detained.

ÖHD and ÇHD also shared their reactions

The Association of Lawyers for Freedom (ÖHD) stated that the detentions constitute a violation of fundamental rights and freedoms, particularly the freedoms of expression and association.

Noting that the operations coincided with the anniversary of the September 12 coup, the ÖHD remarked, “These events serve as a reminder of just how alive the state’s practices of repression and criminalization directed at diverse identities and lifestyles remain.”

“Defending LGBTI+ rights is not a crime; on the contrary, it is a requirement of a democratic society,” the ÖHD said, calling for an end to the detentions and repressive measures.

The Istanbul Branch of the Progressive Lawyers Association (ÇHD) also stated in a post on its X account: “Members serving on the executive and supervisory boards of LGBTI+ associations have been detained in home raids. Association offices are being raided. We stand with LGBTI+ individuals against these attacks that usurp the freedom of association through hate-stoking, moralistic, and family-centric policies!”

SKM: Those detained should be released immediately

In a statement, the Socialist Women’s Assemblies (SKM) asked, “Which family?”

“The male-dominated, heterosexist state is attempting to bring into line—through attacks involving detentions and arrests—anyone who does not fit into the ‘family’ structure where women and LGBTI+ individuals are murdered, subjected to violence, and exploited every day,” the SKM stated, adding, “You cannot erase our existence through detentions, arrests, or bans.”

They called for the immediate release of those detained.

Simultaneous police operations were conducted against the Kaos GL Association and LGBTQ+ venues

A police operation was conducted against the Kaos GL Association during the night. As a result of the operation, members of the executive and supervisory boards, along with alternate members, were detained at their homes. Dozens of websites and social media accounts belonging to LGBTQ+ associations and activists were blocked.

A police operation targeting the Kaos GL Association and its members was carried out late last night. As a result of the operation, members of the supervisory and executive boards, along with alternate members, were detained.

Kaos GL reported that nearly 50 LGBTQ+ activists were detained at their homes and that police also entered the association’s office.

Operation “My Family is Safe”

On the night of September 12–13, successive operations targeting LGBTQ+ associations, LGBTQ+ activists, and certain venues were carried out across 15 provinces, including Ankara, Mersin, Kuşadası, Istanbul, and Izmir.

According to a statement posted on X by Justice Minister Akın Gürlek, judicial proceedings were initiated against 162 individuals, 9 associations, and 13 businesses across 15 provinces as part of the “My Family is Safe” (Ailem Güvende) operations, which were conducted under the coordination of the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Offices of Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Aydın, and Mersin.

“Obscenity” accusation against the association

In an investigation conducted by the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office Cybercrimes Bureau, the Kaos GL Association faced accusations of “obscenity” regarding content published on its website and social media accounts. In a decision dated September 11, 2026, the Ankara 4th Criminal Judgeship of Peace noted the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office’s allegations that “posts containing obscenity” had been shared on Kaos GL’s website and social media accounts in a manner accessible to children; consequently, the prosecution initiated an investigation under the crime of “obscenity” as defined in Article 226 of the Turkish Penal Code.

The fact that the content in question was shared via the association’s official website and social media accounts was also cited as grounds for the investigation. Asserting that the posts were made “using the association’s official web pages and social media accounts as part of the activities of a civil society organization operating under the association’s umbrella,” the prosecution requested an assessment regarding a violation of the Law on Associations.

According to Kaos GL, the decision also authorized the seizure of any evidence, photographs, or printed materials related to the investigation. The judgeship ordered the examination of desktop and laptop computers, mobile phones, tablets, portable storage devices, CDs, DVDs, and other digital materials belonging to the activists. Authorization was also granted to seize the devices if passwords could not be cracked or digital data could not be accessed.

Simultaneous raids on LGBTI+ venues

Coordinated by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, teams from the Istanbul Provincial Security Directorate and the Provincial Gendarmerie Command conducted simultaneous operations on numerous venues in Beyoğlu and Şişli, alongside the operation targeting Kaos GL. Raids were carried out at various locations, including nightclubs and massage parlors in Taksim, Cihangir, and on Istiklal Avenue.

This operation, conducted under the coordination of the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, was also mentioned in the documentation regarding the police operation against the Kaos GL Association.

Access to websites and social media accounts blocked

Dozens of websites and social media accounts belonging to LGBTI+ associations and activists have been blocked by a decision of the Istanbul 7th Criminal Judgeship of Peace, dated September 12, 2026, and numbered 2026/9559.


It was notable that the decisions to block access were issued on a Saturday, outside of standard business hours.

Websites blocked from access: Kaos GL Association, 17 May Association, ÜniKuir, Pembe Hayat Derneği, SPoD, Genç LGBTI+ Derneği, Lambdaistanbul, Muamma LGBTI+ Derneği, velvele.net.

Blocked X accounts: Levent Pişkin , Seyhan Arman, Zeynep Esmeray Özadikti, Yasemin Öz, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi LGBTİA+ Çalışmaları Kulübü, Cinsel Eğitim Tedavi ve Araştırma Derneği, Özgür Renkler Derneği, Queer Adana, Bilkent Üniversitesi resmi LGBTQIA+ öğrenci topluluğu, Velvele, İnter Dayanışma, Cinsel Şiddetle Mücadele Derneği, İzmir LGBTİ+ Onur Haftası.

Instagram accounts blocked from access but not yet rendered invisible from within Turkey: Yıldız Tar, 17 Mayıs Derneği, Seyhan Arman, SPoD, Pembe Hayat Derneği, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi LGBTİA+ Kulübü, Hacettepe Kuir Araştırmaları, Enes Hocaoğulları, HEVİ LGBTİ+ Derneği, İÜ Radar.

Source: KaosGL Association

Queer poets say “queer poetry exists to disrupt mainstream showcases”

Poets Deniz Erkaradağ and Ceren Avşar discussed how queer identity intersects with poetry, the imagery in queer poetry, how the Turkish language creates space for this kind of writing, and the censorship practices they encountered in publishing.

“[…] poetry is not a luxury. It is a vital necessity of our existence. It forms the quality of the light within which we predicate our hopes and dreams toward survival and change, first made into language, then into idea, then into more tangible action.“


-Audre Lorde

As Black lesbian feminist poet Audre Lorde reminds us, poetry is a way of “naming the nameless.” Queer poetry, in this respect, takes on an additional unique burden: to describe an “invisible” experience in a world constructed by the language in which it seeks to exist, while simultaneously challenging the normative boundaries of that language.

The roots of queer poetry in Turkey go back further than commonly believed. From the veiled themes of male desire explored in Divan literature, to Enderunlu Fazıl’s “Defter-i Aşk” (Book of Love) which was confiscated centuries ago, to the poems of Arkadaş Z. Özger, and to the often invisible framework that has grown around organizations like Kaos GL and Lambdaistanbul today, queer poetry has been almost entirely absent from the “mainstream” part of literary history and has had to be gathered from archives, oral history, or independent sources.

Speaking to Niha+, poets Ceren Avşar and Deniz Erkaradağ stated that poetry is not a theme or a subject, but rather a space where language is re-constructed, a space of images and perspectives. Avşar and Erkaradağ discussed both the unexpected freedoms inherent in the genderless nature of the Turkish language and the reality of censorship that still persists at the levels of publishing, distribution, and public visibility.

“Queer poetry is also political”

Deniz Erkaradağ

In Turkey, the category of “political poetry” has long excluded LGBTQ+ identities. Poet Deniz Erkaradağ explained this situation by saying, “There is a field called political poetry, and this field does not include LGBTQ+ identities in any way. When you talk about queer poetry, you encounter something like ‘that’s bourgeois poetry, it’s not political anyway.'” Stating that this distinction does not reflect the truth, Erkaradağ emphasized that both her poetry and queer poetry are political, saying, “My poetry is definitely political, and queer poetry is also political. It’s impossible for me not to reflect this in my writing.”

Ceren Avşar, speaking from a similar perspective, argues that for her, queer identity is not a theme added later to poetry, but a constitutive space at the center of her existence and, consequently, her language. Bringing Judith Butler’s idea of ​​performativity from Gender Trouble to poetry, Avşar explains that language itself is given through the language of power and norms, and that she re-bends, distorts, and reconstructs this while writing. Referring to Michel Foucault’s History of Sexuality, she defines writing poetry as a practice of “counter-discourse” against the discourse produced by power.

Ceren Avşar

Writing in a language without gender

Erkaradağ, interpreting the contributions of Turkish to poetry from a gender perspective, stated that she does not find Turkish “poor” in this regard and that it does not experience a language barrier in terms of identity or gender expression. Erkaradağ also emphasized that some theoretical concepts in academia (for example, “queer” or “gender”) may be controversial.

According to Avşar, who stated that the absence of masculine or feminine suffixes in Turkish opens up a space of freedom in the context of gender and queer existence, Turkish is a direct “opportunity” in this sense. She explained that in many languages, the subject is confined to a binary gender regime from the very first step, while Turkish offers “a neutral playground where ambiguity and fluidity prevail.”

Avşar also relates this to her own experience with dyslexia:

“As someone living with dyslexia, learning another language, penetrating its structure, and being able to write in it is extremely difficult, even impossible, for me. Therefore, the production, the refuge, and the entire universe of expression have become, in a way, necessary to be drawn to a single center: Turkish. However, this situation has transformed my connection with Turkish into an extremely deep and layered relationship. My inability to find resonance in other languages ​​has led me to delve deeper into the veins, flexibilities, and hidden spaces of this single language I can master.

The genderless nature of Turkish makes it easier for me to transcend the sexist boundaries of power and norms within this monolingual universe. I may be limited by the boundaries of a specific language; however, thanks to the timeless and genderless flexibility offered by Turkish, I can create an infinite world of imagery within those boundaries.”

“Queer poetry exists to disrupt mainstream showcases”

Erkaradağ, evaluating the censorship mechanisms targeting queer poetry, stated that they don’t write queer poetry invisibly, saying, “It’s so obvious that it’s being banned.” Erkaradağ also claimed that Kitapyurdu has deliberately started excluding queer books from its catalog, and that they can’t get into chains like D&R.

Therefore, she said, relying on independent publications and digital or independent distribution networks has become a necessity for queer poetry. “There’s a big difference between a bookstore receiving hundreds of copies of a book and boutique publishing houses trying to sell them individually,” she added.

Erkaradağ’s account isn’t just about one experience; there are hundreds of similar examples. The Turkish Publishers Association, PEN Turkey, and the Turkish Writers’ Union have repeatedly issued joint condemnations against the “obscene publications” mechanism, which operates under the Ministry of Family and Social Services and is used by the Board for the Protection of Minors from Obscene Publications. LGBT+ themed books have been repeatedly removed from digital sales platforms through this mechanism. One of the best-known examples is the Heartstopper series, removed from D&R due to its queer content. Sales of the book were halted in 2021 on the grounds that it was “of a nature that would have a harmful effect on the morality of those under 18.”

He explained that censorship manifests itself as either a “conservative state of ignoring that renders queer existence invisible” or a “fetishizing approach that views queer existence as a marketable ‘marginality'”:

“Sometimes censorship doesn’t manifest as the refusal to publish the text; it appears as an aesthetic intervention in editorial processes under the guise of ‘making the language more universal’ or ‘finding the image too direct.’ Fetishization, on the other hand, tends to perceive queer poetry not through the poetic power of the text itself, but solely through the label it carries, as an ‘interesting’ or ‘political appeal.’

It’s no coincidence that queer poetry establishes its own free space through independent publications, fanzines, and alternative platforms, in opposition to this restrictive, sterilizing, or meta-transforming structure of the mainstream, because queer poetry doesn’t need the approval of the mainstream or the showcases it creates to gain acceptance. On the contrary, it exists precisely to disrupt those showcases and boundaries.”

Erkaradağ also stated that fetishization can particularly manifest in “liberal and capitalized” forms of the queer movement, emphasizing that in the current climate of intense pressure on the LGBT+ movement (police intervention in Pride Marches, closure of associations, detention of volunteers), one should not speak of such a “fetish” atmosphere, but rather of a direct threat and a need for solidarity.

Arkadaş Z. Özger

Born in Bursa in 1948, Arkadaş Z. Özger (pseudonym) graduated from the Faculty of Political Sciences, Department of Press and Broadcasting at Ankara University. During a police raid on the Faculty of Political Sciences dormitory on January 24, 1971, and subsequent detention, Arkadaş was subjected to torture and suffered severe head injuries. In 1973, at the age of 25, he was found severely wounded on Meşrutiyet Street in Ankara. While the official cause of death was a brain hemorrhage, some believe that Arkadaş bore the marks of an attack stemming from his identity. His book, which he intended to title “The Tragedy of a Beardless Boy,” was only published under the same title in 2014, decades after his death.

Erkaradağ stated that Arkadaş is still not fully recognized for his queer identity, and that a state of “inability to accept” this identity persists, sometimes ignored or rejected by former leftist circles.

Whose voice is heard?

Avşar stated that, “no matter how hard she tries to be brave in her writings or public presence, the dark reality of the geography she lives inevitably imposes self-censorship on her.” Avşar described this self-censorship not as a “retreat,” but as “a survival reflex constantly clashing with a heavy sense of responsibility growing within her”:

“For every woman and LGBTQ+ person whose life has been taken and whose voice has been silenced, writing, speaking, and existing is no longer a personal choice for me, but an unavoidable duty. Therefore, despite the human anxiety and internal obstacles I experience, I see being visible as a necessity. It is our duty to be the voice of those who have been murdered, ignored, and targeted because of their identity and existence, to carry their cries into words and images. Pushing the suffocating boundaries of self-censorship again and again, saying ‘we are here’ at all costs, and being able to exist in the public sphere without compromising our own truth is our greatest responsibility towards those we have lost.”

Erkaradağ, however, underlined another point. Erkaradağ, commenting on the inequality within the queer literature field itself, stated that a “gay male poet” can have the chance to be visible in the mainstream, appear on television, and even become “mainstream” to some extent, but queer female poets who refuse to enter the male-dominated environment cannot achieve the same visibility in Turkey.

Images of identity in poetry

Both poets explained that they wove their identities into imagery in their poetry.

Erkaradağ stated that she did not use a recurring, fixed symbol in her poetry, but occasionally incorporated fantastic elements from her reading of fantasy/science fiction, while for Avşar, the central image was “the house.”

Avşar took Bachelard’s idea of ​​the house as “the dwelling place of the soul” and, moving beyond a heteronormative, fixed structure, defined it as “a house with bendable walls, doors open to uncertainty, constantly being rebuilt.” She also defined the motifs accompanying this image—body, water, shell, shadow, echo, and threshold—as parts of the same fluid existence.

Poems from each poet: “Parla” and “Anneannem öldü”

Erkaradağ shared her poem titled “Parla,” stating that her own experiences found political meaning in the poem and that it carries a fantastic theme.

Parla

ürkütücü söylemsel, dönüştürücü bir an

Sihirbaz büyülendiğinde Tek Boynuzlu At nasıl lanetlenir

ruhaniliğime asla karşı konulamaz, komplona inandığın gibi

bu gece son denemen olacak

bu kahramanca taç, garip, ben ufuk

vizyonunu genişlet biraz,

bıçak bulundu !

devlerle dost karahindiba

Krallıklar örgüye döndüğünde

yaprakların ruhu mu satılan yoksa Ejderhalar mı?

sorgularsanız Goblininiz çıkar

biri bu hikâyeleri anlatacak, kırmızı elma pembe değil

aşağıda halsiz titreme

ezici çoğunluk çiçek kocasının altında

ben postu korurum, genellikle barış daha derindir

görev değil ama korkunç bir şekilde, düşen çığlığı bilir

onların öpüşmesi yarığa geliyor

dramatik inançlar, felaket aroması

bu büyüleyici kar

şarkı söylemek geriye dönük

günahlarım büyülendi.

Avşar shared her poem titled “Anneannem öldü,” expressing its meaning for her as follows:

“This poem is not just a lament for my grandmother, but a story of one woman helping another, of that unyielding female solidarity where even absence transforms into presence. It is the poem of all women whose grandmothers have died, who hear their mothers’ silence, who understand through their aunts’ eyes, who touch their sisters’ wounds, because we are women wounded by the paper cut of the past, but who have given birth to our own language, our own refuge, and our own truth from that wound. My grandmother died, but she is always present because the secret knowledge she whispered continues to live on in these lines and everywhere we look into each other’s eyes. I always say, woman is woman’s homeland.”

Anneannem öldü


Bunun ne demek olduğunu
anneannesi ölen kadınlar anlar

Bana bi şeyler anlatırdı
anneannem gizli gizli
Gizli gizli anlatırdı
çünkü erkek doğmamıştı
ve bizim topraklarımızda
kadınların bi şeyler bilmesi ayıptı

Bizim dışımızdaki bütün sülale eşrafı erkekti sanki
sanki bilgiye bi biz vakıftık
Anneannem bana bilgiyi aramanın
bilginin kendisinden daha önemli olduğunu anlattı

Öldükten sonra da bana bi şeyler anlattı anneannem
Mezar taşına yazdı
ben taştan okudum
yokluğun doldurulabildiğini
gözün geleceği görebildiğini
geçmişin kağıt kesiği olduğunu
erkekleri anlayamamayı
anlamayı başka şeyleri
kadınları sevmeyi
aşk üzerine konuşulmaması gerektiğini
konuşunca porçöz görmüş kireç gibi cozurdayıp
yok olacağını anlattı

Kuzuların kuru üzüm sevdiğini
Sinamekinin bağırsaklara iyi geldiğini
Seçmeyi en güzel karpuzu
Nevresimi ütülü gibi katlamayı
Resimde zıt renklerin bir arada kullanılması gerektiğini

Anneannem anlatmadı kendini
nerede doğduğunu nerede öldüğünü neden öldüğünü

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10 years of the legal struggle of academics for peace

Only 18 of the Academics for Peace have had the irreinstatement finalized


Academics for Peace declared that in the 10 years since being expelled from public service under State of Emergency Decree-Laws (OHAL KHK), 385 of their applications were rejected, 189 lawsuits were dismissed and 173 were ruled in the applicants’ favor. Out of hundreds of applications, only 18 of the scholars were granted to be reinstated to their posts.


The Academics for Peace, who were dismissed under the State of Emergency Decree-Law after issuing a “Statement forPeace,” released a declaration detailing the events that have unfolded since the first expulsions ruled a decade ago.

Through the announcement on their social media account, the Academics for Peace shared statistical data covering the periodfrom 2016 to 2026. According to this data, 10 State of Emergency Decree-Laws issued between 2016 and 2018,resulted in the expulsion of 406 academics, and 385 of the applications made to the Inquiry Commission on State of Emergency Measures (OHAL İşlemleri İnceleme Komisyonu) were rejected.

The commission, established in 2017, did not finish announcing its rejection decisions until the end of 2021. Only after this date could applications be filed with the courts. Emphasizing this barrier, Academics for Peace stated, “Access to justice was blocked for nearly 5 years.”

189 Rejections from the Administrative Courts

Alongside the data on the administrative courts and regional administrative courts, the announcement provided information regarding the Council of State (Danıştay) and Constitutional Court (Anayasa Mahkemesi).

Accordingly, of the lawsuits brought before the administrative courts, 189 resulted in rejection while 173 were accepted. As for the regional administrative courts, the appeals in 124 cases resulted either in the acceptance of the appeal or the reversal of the decision, both against the applicant.

In contrast, 147 of the cases concluded with a reversal or an acceptance in favor of the applicant, while no decision was reached in 91 cases.

As for the 5th Chamber of the Council of State (Danıştay 5.Daire), where the cases of the Academics for Peace were brought, 18 cases resulted in a favorable upholding decision, finalizing their reinstatement to office. In 4 cases, an unfavorable upholding decision was issued, leading them to be brought before the Constitutional Court. In one case, an unfavorable reversal decision was issued; since this ruling differed from the regional administrative court’s judgment, the case is currently being reconsidered by the regionaladministrative court (BİM).

In an additional 29 cases, the process resulted in favorable reversal. However, as the rulings differ from the Regional Administrative Court’s decisions, they are being re-evaluated by the regional court. In 9 of the cases, the regional administrative court insisted on its original decision to accept the appeal against the applicant. The cases were subsequently brought before the Plenary Session of Administrative Law Chambers of the Council of State (Danıştay İdari Dava Daireleri Kurulu).

Meanwhile, 219 cases remain pending without a decision.

4 Cases are currently before the Constitutional Court

The 4 cases brought before the Constitutional Court by the Academics for Peace are currently being heard. 9 case files are pending before the Plenary Session of Administrative Law Chambers of the Council of State.

Background

The 406 academics who signed the declaration titled “We will not be a party to this crime!” on January 11, 2016, were expelled under Decree-Laws signed by then-President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on September 1, 2016. In addition, 822 of the signatory academics stood trial before the Heavy Penal Court.

Although the Heavy Penal Court issued acquittals, ruling that the petition fell under freedom of expression, the Academics for Peace were still not reinstated to their posts. This was because, regarding the applications the scholars had pending before the European Court of Human Rights during this period, it was ruled that “domestic remedies must first be exhausted.”

Following the coup attempt on July 15, 2016, the State of Emergency (OHAL) Commission was established to handle all case files related to the Academics for Peace and the Gülenmovement. This commission issued rejection decisionsregarding the reinstatement of nearly all Academics for Peace. Because it took until 2021 for the commission to announce these rejection decisions, the academics’ access to a higher court was delayed by approximately 5 years.

As a result, the Regional Administrative Court proceedingsbegan in 2019. The legal process, which has now spanned nearly 10 years, is still ongoing.

As of June 2023, it was reported that numerous Academics for Peace, who had been dismissed under the decree-laws, were still not reinstated by universities, despite court rulings ordering their return to work.

According to the report regularly published by the Academics for Peace, while some courts rule in favor of the actions for annulment filed for their reinstatement, others might reject.

Furthermore, scholars of every level are being subjected to renewed security clearances, which include everything from screening social media accounts to reviewing memberships in foundations, associations, and similar organizations. As a result,the reinstatement processes take even longer, progressively restricting the academics’ active and critical production of knowledge.

84-year-old war criminal dies

Reactions to Ratko Mladić’s death

Reactions poured in from many sides following the death of Ratko Mladić, convicted of war crimes committed during the Bosnian War. Serbia’s justice minister said the convicted general would be buried “with the highest state honours.”

Ratko Mladić during a court hearing in The Hague. Photo: UN-IRMCT/Leslie Hondebrink-Hermer

Ratko Mladić, the Bosnian Serb general found responsible for crimes committed during the Bosnian War amid the breakup of Yugoslavia, died on August 27 (yesterday) at the age of 84. Since 2024 he had been held under United Nations (UN) custody in a hospital in The Hague, in the Netherlands.

In 2017 Mladić was found guilty of war crimes and the Srebrenica genocide and sentenced to life in prison by the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT), the successor to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The sentence was upheld on appeal in 2021.

According to the Serbian press, about a week before Mladić’s death, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić had asked the Hague court to let Mladić spend his final days in Serbia, citing his deteriorating health, but the request was denied.

News of Mladić’s death was first confirmed late yesterday afternoon by Lidija Pavićević, State Secretary of Serbia’s Ministry of Human and Minority Rights.

Reactions came from many different sides.

Suljagić: His death does not turn a criminal into a historical figure

Part of the statement by Emir Suljagić, head of the Srebrenica Memorial Center, posted on his X account, reads as follows:

Ratko Mladić is dead, and there is not much to say. Nor does that fact change much. It does not bring back the dead. It does not erase mass graves. It does not change verdicts. It does not turn a criminal into a historical figure.

Izetbegović: Mladić will go down in history as a war criminal

Bakir Izetbegović, son of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s first president Alija Izetbegović and chairman of the right-wing Party of Democratic Action (SDA), said on his X account that Mladić would be remembered by history exactly as the final judgment of the Hague tribunal defined him: as a war criminal sentenced to life imprisonment for the gravest crimes committed on European soil since the Second World War.

Hotić: He died in disgrace

Kada Hotić, 82, whose husband and son were killed by Serb forces in 1995, said: “I am grateful to the Tribunal because it sentenced Mladić to life and has not released him. Justice was served on the day he was sentenced to life. He died in disgrace, because he killed so many people.”

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Justice Minister Zukan Helez, in a statement on his Facebook account, described Mladić as a convicted perpetrator of genocide and one of the most notorious war criminals Europe has seen since the Second World War.

Helez said that death brings no absolution, that mass graves will not be erased, that murdered children and parents will not return, and that all that remains is shame, the verdict, and the bloody trace of the crimes.

Justice minister: He will be buried with the highest state honours

Serbia’s Justice Minister Nenad Vujić announced that Mladić would be buried in Serbia, at a place to be determined by his family, “with the highest state honours”:

“General Mladić is a general and the protocols are known. His role is also known, but whatever belongs to General Mladić will certainly be honoured.”

However, despite the justice minister’s claim, it remains unclear whether a “state funeral” can legally be held for Mladić, who died while serving a life sentence and who, under the law, should have been discharged from military service and stripped of his rank because Article 110 (1/11) of Serbia’s Army Act provides that “unconditional imprisonment of more than one year results, on the day the judgment becomes final, in the termination of service,” and Article 185 (1/3) provides that “the same sentence results, on the day it becomes final, in the loss of rank; along with the rank, all rights tied to the rank are also lost.”

You can access the Serbian Army Act, published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia under No. 116/2007 and last amended by No. 109/2025 of 4 December 2025, here.

Aleksandar Šapić, mayor of Belgrade and a member of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) led by President Vučić, shared a photo of Mladić on his personal Instagram account with the caption “Rest in peace, general. May you have eternal glory and gratitude.”

In a statement on 28 August, President Vučić said, “We have received nothing from The Hague.”

Saying that “they had now seen that The Hague wanted Mladić to die behind bars,” Vučić added, “They did not allow the general to die in Serbia, where he wanted to die. That is uncivilised behaviour, without precedent or justification,” thereby also confirming the Serbian press reports that there had been an intention to bring Mladić to Serbia.

Vučić further stated that Serbian authorities would help arrange a dignified burial for Mladić in Serbia if his family requested it. However, he made no comment on the justice minister’s claim that Mladić would be buried “with the highest state honours.”

In addition, the President of Montenegro’s parliament, Andrija Mandić, posted on his official X account that he had conveyed his condolences to Mladić’s son.

Commemorated at football matches

At the match yesterday at 8:00 p.m. in which Serbia’s Red Star football club (FK Crvena Zvezda) lost 5-1 away to Czechia’s Viktoria Plzeň in the second leg of the UEFA Europa League play-off round, a banner reading “General, eternal glory and gratitude” in tribute to Mladić was unfurled by Red Star’s supporters’ group Delije and shared from the club’s official X account.

Željko Ražnatović, known as Arkan, the mafia and terrace leader who founded the Delije supporters’ group, was also one of the influential figures of the era of Yugoslavia’s breakup and the Bosnian War. Arkan, who also headed the Serb paramilitary force known as the Serb Volunteer Guards or “Arkan’s Tigers,” was indicted by the ICTY for crimes against humanity after the war. He was assassinated in January 2000.

Before the match yesterday at 9:30 p.m. in which Borac, the football club from Banja Luka, the capital of Republika Srpska (one of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s two entities), beat Iceland’s representative Vikingur 3-1 in the second leg of the UEFA Conference League play-off, applause rose from the stands when it was announced in the stadium that Mladić had died. A song praising Mladić was also sung, and a banner was unfurled reading “The earthly is a small kingdom; the heavenly is forever and ever. Eternal glory to the greatest defender of the Serbian people.*”

* The words on the banner draw on the defeat of the Serbian kingdom at the First Battle of Kosovo in 1389. According to legend, on the night before the battle, Serbian Prince Lazar was visited in a dream by an angel of God and asked to choose between an earthly kingdom and a heavenly one. Lazar, who chose the heavenly kingdom, lost the battle and died on the battlefield.

According to an 28 August report by The Athletic, the sports section of The New York Times, UEFA announced that it had opened disciplinary proceedings against Red Star on three separate counts. These counts include “racist and/or discriminatory behaviour”, “transmitting a message that is not fit for a sports event” and “improper conduct of the team.”

Following the match, the Srebrenica Memorial Center had contacted UEFA to state that the banners that were unfurled “cannot be reduced to the behaviour of fans.”

The statement of the Srebrenica Memorial Center includes the following:

“A club that consciously uses its official communication channels to spread messages glorifying a man legally convicted of genocide cannot reduce such behavior to the behavior of fans.

This is no longer just a question of the fans, but of the club’s institutional relationship to the values on which UEFA bases European football.”

UN Secretary-General: I stand in solidarity with the victims

UN Secretary-General António Guterres, in a statement through his spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric, said he stands in solidarity with the victims, survivors and their families who suffered the crimes for which Mr. Mladić was found guilty.

Stating that the facts conclusively established by the judicial findings form part of the historical record, Guterres reiterated his call on all those in positions of power to refrain from denying the seriousness of the crimes that have been adjudicated.

Guterres also said he strongly condemns any denial of the Srebrenica genocide as a historical event, and any actions that glorify those convicted of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide by international courts.

Dodik: This is a murder

Milorad Dodik, chairman of Republika Srpska’s Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), former president of Republika Srpska, one of the leading figures of Serb nationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and currently banned from politics, said of Mladić’s death: “It is a murder. He was respected by the Serbian people. As a commander he stood to defend Serbs.”

Šešelj: Mladić fought against villains

The far-right convicted war criminal Vojislav Šešelj* said of Mladić: “Mladić fought against those villains for a long time; they expected his death two or three years ago, but he did not give up… They killed him.”

* Vojislav Šešelj is the founder of the far-right Serbian Radical Party (SRS). Indicted by the ICTY in January 2003 over war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina during the breakup of Yugoslavia, Šešelj went to The Hague and surrendered in February 2003 after a judge confirmed the charges. He remained in ICTY custody for 11 years and 9 months. In 2014 he was allowed to return to Serbia for cancer treatment. Later also a member of parliament, Šešelj was acquitted in 2016, but the acquittal was overturned on appeal in 2018. Šešelj, however, did not return to prison.

Russia: Mladić’s right to health was violated

Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a statement via Facebook, and the Russian Embassy in Belgrade via its X account, regarding Mladić’s death.

The Russian Foreign Ministry said: “The Russian side has consistently pointed out that Mladić’s trial in The Hague and the conditions of his imprisonment were accompanied by disregard for his basic rights, including the right to health and adequate medical care.” The Russian Embassy in Belgrade, for its part, offered “Its sincere condolences to Mladić’s family and loved ones on the passing of General Ratko Mladić.”

Who was Ratko Mladić?

Ratko Mladić was born in 1942 in the village of Božanovići in Bosnia and Herzegovina and rose to the rank of general in the Yugoslav People’s Army. With the outbreak of the Bosnian War, he became the commander-in-chief of the newly formed Bosnian Serb army (Vojska Republike Srpske-VRS). He was among the most senior military figures responsible for the army’s actions, including the nearly four-year siege of Sarajevo and the genocide at Srebrenica. After the war he spent years in hiding as a fugitive and was captured only in May 2011 in Serbia, then handed over to The Hague.

In 2017, Mladić was found guilty by the ICTY of the Srebrenica genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of the laws of war, and sentenced to life imprisonment. The sentence was upheld on appeal in 2021. While serving his sentence, Mladić died on 27 August 2026 in a hospital under UN custody in The Hague, following long-standing health problems.

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