Data from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT) regarding the most common names in Turkey and the most popular names for newborns indicates that nationalist names are replacing traditional-religious ones. While Kurdish names are often not recorded due to legal and practical obstacles, it remains impossible to access any information regarding Kurdish names within TURKSTAT’s data system.
Image: Niha+
TURKSTAT has released data on the most frequently used and newborn names in Turkey for 2025. According to the institute’s data, the most common names for men are Mehmet, Mustafa, Ahmet, and Ali, while for women, they are Fatma, Ayşe, Emine, and Hatice. The records show that these four names in each category have maintained their rankings since 2018.
Among newborns, Alparslan ranks first among the most preferred male names. A total of 7,509 newborn boys were given this name by their families. Göktuğ, Metehan, Yusuf, and Kerem share the top spots. For newborn girls, the most preferred names are Alya, Defne, Gökçe, Zeynep, and Asel. TURKSTAT’s website provides data dating back to 2018, with rankings provided for the top 30 in each category.
“Visibility” in Baby Girl Names (2025)
Alya
8,739
Defne
7,716
Gökçe
7,582
Zeynep
6,228
Phonetic Barriers in the Registry System
While modern names like Alya and Defne have climbed to the top for baby girls, names embedded in cultural memory such as Rozerîn, Bêrîvan, and Zîlan continue to be relegated to the “unknown” or “converted” categories in official statistics. This situation is a statistical reflection of a century-old language policy.
Based on this data, it is possible to state that since 2018, nationalist names such as Alparslan, Göktuğ, and Metehan have begun to be preferred over traditional-religious names like Ahmet, Mehmet, and Mustafa for boys. While names like Mehmet and Mustafa still rank at the top of the overall “most used” list in Turkey, we see that these names have been used significantly less for newborns since 2018. This points to a clear societal shift.
The Transformation of Names in Data (2025)
Newborn Boy Name Preferences (By Number)
Alparslan
7,509
Göktuğ
6,029
Miran
3,751
Mustafa
2,407
Ahmet
2,280
Traditional Heritage: Mehmet still ranks 1st across Turkey with over 1.2M people, but fell to 11th among newborns.
New Trend: Miran rose to 6th place in 2025, surpassing long-established names like Ömer and Miraç.
Phonetic Barriers in the Registry System
While modern and nationalist names have climbed to the top, Kurdish names like Jan, Ciwan, and Arîn remain “invisible” in official statistics due to bureaucratic and phonetic barriers.
Source: TURKSTAT 2018-2025 Dataset. Chart by Niha+ Special News.
The “Outlier” hame on the list
There is, in fact, an “outlier” name among TURKSTAT’s top 30: Mîran. This name entered the Turkish naming landscape primarily through the television industry.
Mîran, which means “Mirs” or “Lords” in Kurdish, ranks 6th on the 2025 list. While Mîran was not among the top 30 names in 2018, it made an entry at 8th place in 2019. This rise is clearly linked to the influence of the TV series Hercai, which began airing in 2019 and featured a lead character named Miran Aslanbey. Following this series, the name Mîran experienced a rapid surge among male names in Turkey. Between 2020 and 2023, it fluctuated within the top 30, ranking 12th in 2024 and reaching 6th place in 2025.
This example serves as a case study for several reasons: the reliance on information in some circles that the name has Persian origins, the ease of acceptance for a name that has become a popular culture element, and the fact that it does not contain the distinctive letters of the Kurdish alphabet such as “X, Q, W.” This situation demonstrates that through popular culture, the name has been stripped of its “ethno-political” context and has become an aesthetic choice for parents from diverse backgrounds.
Kurdish names hitting the “Letter” barrier
However, beyond the name Mîran, there is a blind spot in the mirror held by official statistics. In that blind spot lies the reality of families whose chosen Kurdish names for their children hit a “letter barrier” and who must engage in a legal struggle to obtain identification documents.
Article 66 of the Constitution states, “Everyone bound to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk.” Yet, it is well known that people of many ethnic backgrounds other than Turkish live in Turkey, and these individuals give their children names in their own mother tongues. Due to legal and practical obstacles in Turkey, no official records are kept regarding ethnic and linguistic origins, and thus no concrete data is available. Nevertheless, daily practices show that Kurdish parents frequently give their newborns Kurdish names—a situation that has become much more visible in recent years.
Names like Bêrîvan, Zîlan, Baran, Sosin, Rojbîn, and Rojhat are heard more frequently in streets, cafes, and universities. Despite this, official statistics do not mention these names. Since TURKSTAT only provides the top 30 names, there is no information regarding names below that rank. Therefore, while conducting an objective assessment is naturally difficult, certain daily practices and obstacles bring to the fore several possibilities regarding why Kurdish names do not appear in the top 30.
Are these names absent simply because they are fewer in number, or is it because population registries—despite various amendments over time to Law No. 1353 on the Adoption and Application of Turkish Letters—still prevent such names from being recorded on IDs?
Lives with two names
While there haven’t been many reports in the press recently, news stories from a few years ago detailed the many difficulties faced by families giving their children Kurdish names.
During the research for this report, we learned the story of a father who went to the registry office years ago wanting to name his child “Rojhat.” The official at the registry office said of the name Rojhat, “This name is not allowed; it must be another name,” and forced the father to accept the official’s own name as the child’s name for the ID.
Consequently, there are people whose real names are Rozerîn or Rojbîn but are officially recorded as Ayşe or Zeynep. There are individuals who are Rozerîn, Botan, or Rojbîn at home but are Zeynep, Ayşe, or Ahmet in schools and government offices. In one case, a woman named Ayşe, whose real name was Rojbîn, took out a loan despite her poor financial situation to change her name through the courts. However, she passed away while the court case was still ongoing and was buried under the name Ayşe.
“Jan” or “Can”?
An incident in 2022 provides clues regarding the “gray areas” in TURKSTAT’s data. (The names of the family have been withheld for security reasons). A. and C. wanted to name their newborn Jan Arvîn. They went to the registry office in their province. The official asked, “What language is Jan?” The family replied that it is both Kurdish and Circassian. The official responded, “No, it’s not possible; we cannot accept Kurdish,” but stated they could accept it if it were a Turkish name.
When the family insisted on Jan, noting that a famous person had recently used a Kurdish name, the official replied, “They are artists; they have long arms; they can do it.” He then gave another example: “For instance, someone else came last week. Their name was Ciwan. We solved the problem by writing it as Civan. Come, let’s change your J to a C and make it Can. Look, this child will face many problems in the future in school and among friends because of this name.” When the family remained persistent, they were sent to a higher official and were eventually allowed to use the name Jan only after signing a document stating they took all responsibility.
Kurdish Names: A Century-Old Struggle
The process of “naming by signing a waiver” is a lingering consequence of Turkey’s language and identity policies over the last 100 years. Here is the chronology filled with bans, circulars, and “alphabet” barriers:
1925Law on Maintenance of Order and Reform Plan for the East
With the proclamation of the Republic, the use of languages other than Turkish was prohibited. Under Article 41 of the Reform Plan for the East, penalties were imposed on those using non-Turkish languages in public spaces and government offices.
1928Law No. 1353 on the Adoption and Application of Turkish Letters
The law transitioning to the Latin alphabet became the primary justification for blocking the registration of Kurdish names (specifically due to characters like q, w, x).
1980 – 1991Law No. 2932: Absolute Prohibition
Following the September 12 coup, the use of Kurdish was completely banned. Although repealed in 1991, the reality of “dual naming” (official vs. traditional) persisted in bureaucracy.
2002 – 2003EU Harmonization and “Conditional” Naming Rights
Through a Ministry of Interior circular, the ban on names was lifted under the condition of “compliance with the Turkish alphabet.”
During this period, civil registry offices continued to reject Kurdish names on grounds such as “general morality.”
2006Civil Registry Services Law No. 5490
The new law guaranteed the right to name children; however, bureaucratic obstacles and the “character ban” remained in effect.
Present DayThe Alphabet Wall and Legal Battles
Names like “Awin, Bawer, Xunaw” are still subject to bureaucratic hurdles and lawsuits due to letters not present in the official Turkish alphabet.
Constitutional Obstacles
Article 3: “The language of the State of Turkey is Turkish.” (Barrier to official recognition)
Article 42: “No language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue.” (Educational barrier)
*Infographics were created by the AI tool Gemini. Some names have been changed due to individual requests and security reasons.
While the ceasefire reached between Iran and its rivals in 2026 may have reduced tensions in the region, the situation is different for the Kurdish opposition. This “silent war,” continuing with drones and operations along the border, proves that the ceasefire is not peace but merely a change of strategy.
A drone strike in Sulamaniyah (Rudaw)
The ceasefire announced on April 8, 2026, between Iran and its external opponents was seen by many as a sign of lower tension in the region. However, for Iran’s Kurdish opposition movements, it did not mean sign of peace. In the area between Rojhelat, Eastern Kurdistan, and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, the conflict did not end; it just changed its form.
While international attention focused on Iran, the United States, and Israel, another conflict continued along the Iran-Iraq border. After the ceasefire, Iranian military operations appeared to focus more directly on Kurdish opposition groups. These groups were targeted with drones, missiles, arrests, and security pressure.
This is why the situation can be called a “silent war.” It is not an official war, and there is no formal declaration. But attacks, pressure, fear, and deaths continue. It is “silent” because it receives much less international attention than other conflicts in the region.
From ceasefire to targeted attacks
After the ceasefire, Iran’s military focus seemed to shift toward Kurdish opposition groups based in Iraqi Kurdistan, including the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, PDKI, Komala, and PAK.
Reports by human rights and regional monitoring organisations indicate that violence did not end after the ceasefire but shifted toward Iranian Kurdish opposition groups. CPT Iraqi Kurdistan recorded 48 attacks between 8 and 24 April 2026, of which 37 targeted Iranian Kurdish opposition camps and bases, compared with only four attacks on U.S. diplomatic or military facilities. The same report stated that 75 percent of post-ceasefire attacks were carried out directly by the IRGC, while 25 percent were attributed to affiliated groups. Human rights organisations such as the Kurdistan Human Rights Network and Hengaw also documented deadly IRGC attacks on PDKI and Komala-linked sites, including the killing of Kurdish opposition members and civilians.
The Kurdistan Regional Government’s Media and Information Office announced that between February 28 and April 20, the Kurdistan Region was targeted in a total of 809 attacks, despite not being a party to the war.
This pattern points to a clear shift in Iran’s security focus. Tehran sees these Kurdish groups as both an internal and cross-border threat because they are linked to Kurdish areas inside Iran and are also based in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. For Kurdish groups, the ceasefire did not bring real security. It only changed the direction of Iran’s pressure.
This conflict mainly takes place along the mountainous Iran-Iraq border, especially around Hewler and Sulaymaniyah, where Iranian Kurdish opposition groups have had bases for many years.
In mid-April 2026, a drone attack hit the Surdash area near Sulaymaniyah. The attack seriously injured Ghazal Mawlan Chaparabad, a young Kurdish female peshmerga affiliated with Komala Toilers of Kurdistan, who later died from her injuries. According to a HANA Human Rights Organization legal team report, she first received only initial emergency care at Shorsh Hospital and then needed urgent higher-level treatment, including advanced imaging, specialist trauma care, and intensive care support. HANA also reported serious allegations that her admission or transfer to other hospitals was delayed or refused, and that her condition worsened during these delays. This case shows that Kurdish opposition camps and nearby remote areas may be especially vulnerable after drone attacks, not only because of the strikes themselves, but also because wounded people may face delays in reaching advanced medical care.
Ghazal Mawlan Chaparabad (hana.org)
A few days later, another attack hit the Jezhnikan camp near Hewler. Rudaw reported that a drone attack killed Shahin Azarbarzin, the son of a Peshmerga fighter, and seriously wounded his father. Kurdistan24 also reported that the camp housed civilians and that women and children were among the injured in related attacks. This shows that these camps are not only military or political spaces; families and civilians also live there. Together with the case of Ghazal Mawlan, this raises concern about whether wounded people in remote camp areas can reach advanced emergency care quickly after drone or missile attacks.
The danger was not limited to fighters or military sites. Civilian areas were also at risk. As a result, many Kurdish camps and nearby communities now live with constant insecurity.
Rojhelat under internal pressure
At the same time, pressure inside Iran’s Kurdish regions also increased. Hengaw reported that Iranian authorities increased the presence of plainclothes forces and created new checkpoints at city entrances, on inter-city roads, and on rural roads around Sine. It also reported that security-linked forces were deployed in several Kurdish border areas to create fear, prevent possible protests, and control public space. The report mentioned Hashd al-Shaabi forces, tanks, and armored vehicles in some Kurdish border areas. A Washington Kurdish Institute digest also described expanded military and proxy-force deployment in Kurdish areas. Together, these reports suggest that Kurdish areas were under stronger public security control after the ceasefire.
For Kurdish people, this meant more surveillance, less freedom of movement, and constant pressure. Human rights reports from the same period mentioned arrests without warrants, detention without family contact, and the execution of a Kurdish political prisoner. For example, KHRN reported that Yousef Karimi, a Kurdish man from Bukan, was arrested without a warrant and held without contact with his family. Separately, Hengaw reported that Kurdish political prisoner Naser Bakrzadeh was executed in May 2026 after his death sentence had been upheld by Iran’s Supreme Court.
These actions show that Iran was using two strategies at the same time: outside Iran, it tried to weaken Kurdish opposition groups in Iraqi Kurdistan; inside Iran, it tried to stop political mobilisation in Rojhelat.
Why Is Iran doing this?
Image: Rudaw
Iran’s strategy seems to be based on fear of instability. During the wider crisis in early 2026, Chatham House reported that Kurdish opposition groups faced pressure and uncertainty because of mixed U.S. messages about a possible Kurdish uprising. It also noted that Kurdish groups based in Iraq could, in theory, create space for wider opposition activity inside Iran, but that this would be very risky because Iranian security forces still had strong capacity for violence.
The attacks after the ceasefire can therefore be understood as a warning. Iran wanted to stop Kurdish groups from reorganising, weaken their cross-border networks, and prevent Kurdish mobilisation inside Rojhelat and across the border in Iraqi Kurdistan. In this sense, the post-ceasefire attacks were not random. They were part of a security strategy aimed at controlling Kurdish political activity both inside and outside Iran.
The Conflict has changed, not ended
The April 2026 ceasefire may have reduced the risk of a larger regional war, but it did not bring stability everywhere. For Kurdish opposition movements and the wider area between Rojhelat and Iraqi Kurdistan, the conflict continued without being officially recognised.
It was not a traditional war with large battles. It was a conflict fought through drones, surveillance, arrests, and targeted attacks. For this reason, the situation in Rojhelat was not real peace, but a transformed conflict.
The Kurdish question in Iran is no longer only an internal issue. It has become part of a wider regional security struggle. The conflict has not ended; it has only become quieter, less visible, and easier for the world to overlook.
128 years ago, Mîqdat Mîdhad Bedirxan lit the torch of Kurdish journalism by publishing the Kurdistan newspaper in Cairo, Egypt. Despite all hardships, torture, murders, and exiles, this tradition continues.
From its inception, Kurdish journalism has been more than just an information tool; it has served as a mirror of national identity, an arena for linguistic struggle, and a political platform for a stateless nation. In all four parts of Kurdistan, every publication has simultaneously represented the press, resistance, and cultural memory. The character of this journalism distinguishes it from many other forms of media and makes it a vital source for political and cultural research.
From Kurdistan to Rojî Kurd, Jiyan, Hawar, Ronahî, Rojname, Welat, Azadiya Welat, and many others, Kurdish journalism continues its journey despite hardships, torture, assassinations, and exiles.
History of Kurdish Journalism (1898–2026)
From its inception, Kurdish journalism has been more than just a tool for information; it has served as a mirror of national identity, a sphere of linguistic struggle, and a political platform for a stateless nation. Every publication in all four parts of Kurdistan has simultaneously represented the press, resistance, and cultural memory.
I. EARLY PERIOD: CAIRO and EXILE (1898–1908)
Kurdistan — The First Kurdish Newspaper
On April 22, 1898, Mîqdad Midhat Bedirxan published the first Kurdish newspaper, Kurdistan, in Cairo.
[Visual: First Issue of Kurdistan Newspaper, 1898]
“Each time, I will talk to the Kurds a little about the benefits of reading and science. Through reading and science, one understands everything. Our Kurds are not as educated as other nations. Therefore, they are unaware of the world’s situation.”
Printing locations: Cairo (1–5), Geneva (6–19), Cairo again (20–23), London (24), Southern England (25–29), Geneva (30–31).
II. THE ISTANBUL PERIOD (1908–1918)
Rojî Kurd and Hetawî Kurd (1913–1914)
On June 6, 1913, the Hêvî association published the magazine Rojî Kurd. Following its closure, it continued under the name Hetawî Kurd.
[Visual: Cover of Rojî Kurd Magazine]
Jîn and Kurdistan (1916–1918)
In 1916, Süreyya Bedirxan published the Turkish-language weekly Jîn (Life) in Istanbul, advocating for Kurdish independence. This publication is entirely distinct from Pîremêrd’s Jîn newspaper in Sulaymaniyah.
III. THE SOUTH AND THE SOVIETS (1919–1932)
Pêşkewtin and Sulaymaniyah
The first newspaper published within the Kurdistan region itself, Pêşkewtin (1920–1922), was released in Sulaymaniyah. Later, Jiyan (1926), edited by Pîremêrd, became the symbol of this era.
Riya Teze (1930–) — Voice of Soviet Kurdistan
It began publication in Yerevan on March 25, 1930, serving as the Kurdish organ of the Communist Party of Armenia.
[Visual: Masthead of Riya Teze Newspaper]
IV. THE HAWAR ERA (1932–1943)
Celadet Alî Bedirxan and Hawar Magazine
In May 15, 1932, Hawar was published in Damascus. Celadet implemented the Latin-based Kurdish alphabet through this magazine, which remains the standard today.
[Visual: Hawar Alphabet and Magazine Issue]
Principal Writers: Celadet and Kamûran Bedirxan, Rewşen Bedirxan, Cegerxwîn, Osman Sebrî.
V. THE REPUBLIC OF MAHABAD (1945–1946)
Kurdistan Newspaper
Established in Mahabad on January 11, 1946. Although the Republic of Mahabad lasted only 11 months, it held a special place in Kurdish media history as a period of institutional statehood.
VI. & VII. THE FREE PRESS TRADITION (1990–2016)
Özgür Gündem and Apê Musa
On May 30, 1992, Özgür Gündem began publication. The Kurdish intellectual Musa Anter (Apê Musa) was assassinated in Diyarbakır on September 20, 1992.
[Visual: Musa Anter – Apê Musa]
Bombing of Buildings (1994)
On the night of December 2-3, 1994, the headquarters of the Özgür Ülke newspaper were bombed. Ersin Yıldız lost his life.
Newspaper Name
Year
Status
Özgür Gündem
1992
Closed (1994)
Özgür Ülke
1994
Bombed
Azadiya Welat
2006
Closed (2016)
VIII. THE ROLE OF WOMEN
Gurbetelli Ersöz (1965–1997)
The first female editor-in-chief of a daily newspaper in Turkey (Özgür Gündem). October 8th is celebrated as Kurdish Women Journalists Day.
Modern Institutions: JINNEWS and JIN TV (The first all-female satellite channel, 2018).
IX. THE SATELLITE REVOLUTION: MED TV
MED TV (1995–1999)
The first Kurdish satellite channel. It began broadcasting in March 1995, representing a media revolution for Kurds and a turning point for language standardization.
X. CONCLUSION AND HISTORICAL CHRONOLOGY
Historical Milestones
Date
Event
1898
Kurdistan, Cairo (First Newspaper)
1932
Hawar, Damascus (Alphabet Revolution)
1946
Kurdistan, Mahabad
1995
MED TV, Europe (First Satellite TV)
2018
JIN TV
Kurdish journalism is a 128-year tradition of resistance, stretching from exile to the digital age.
Sources: Wikipedia, Encyclopaedia Iranica, KurdîLit, CPJ, RSF, Cambridge History of the Kurds.
I. Kurdistan, the first Kurdish hewspaper
On April 22, 1898, Mîqdad Midhat Bedirxan (1858–1915), son of Bedirxan Pasha of Botan, published the first Kurdish newspaper under the name Kurdistan in Cairo. Under the shadow of Ottoman censorship, it was printed abroad in Geneva, London, and Folkestone, with a total of 31 issues released. The final issue was published in 1902.
In the first issue, Mîqdad Midhat Bedirxan stated his purpose with these words:
“Each time, I will talk to the Kurds a little about the benefits of reading and science. Through reading and science, one understands everything. Our Kurds are not as educated as other nations. Therefore, they are unaware of the world’s situation.”
The printing locations were as follows: Cairo (1–5), Geneva (6–19), Cairo again (20–23), London (24), Southern England (25–29), and Geneva (30–31). His brother, Abdurrahman Bey, took over the responsibility of publication in the later periods.
Kurdistan was not merely a source of information but an ideological platform. By establishing Kurdish as a medium for intellectual expression and resistance, it laid the foundation for the century to come.
II. The Istanbul period (1908–1918)
Rojî Kurd and Hetawî Kurd (1913–1914)
On July 27, 1912, the Kurdish Student Association Hêvî (Hope) was founded in Istanbul. On June 6, 1913, the association published the magazine Rojî Kurd (Kurdish Day). It was shut down by the government after four issues. During the same period, Yekbûn (1913, 3 issues) was published. On October 24, 1913, the magazine changed its name to Hetawî Kurd. It was essentially the same publication, continuing under a different name. The etymology of the names is interesting: Roj in Kurmanji and Hetaw in Sorani both mean “Sun.”
Jîn and Kurdistan (1916–1918)
In 1916, Süreyya Bedirxan published the Turkish-language weekly Jîn (Life) in Istanbul, which demanded Kurdish independence. Between 1917 and 1918, he published the weekly Kurdistan. It is important to clarify: this Istanbul-based Jîn was in Turkish and was entirely different from the Jîn newspaper published by Pîremêrd in Sulaymaniyah.
III. The South and the Soviets (1919–1932)
Pêşkewtin and Sulaymaniyah
The first Kurdish newspaper published within the geography of Kurdistan itself, Pêşkewtin (Progress), was released in Sulaymaniyah between 1920 and 1922 under British administration. 118 issues were printed. This was followed by a series of publications:
Bangê Kurdistan (1922, 14 issues)
Rojî Kurdistan (1922–1923, 15 issues)
Jiyanewe (1924–1926, 56 issues)
Jiyan (1926–1938, 556+ issues, under the editorship of Pîremêrd)
Zarî Kurmancî (1926–1932, Rawanduz, 30 issues)
Pîremêrd and Jiyan-Jîn: Born in Sulaymaniyah, Tewfîq Mehmûd Hemze, known by his pen name Pîremêrd (1867 – June 19, 1950), became the editor-in-chief of Jiyan in 1926 and its manager in 1932. In 1938, he changed the name of Jiyan to Jîn and continued publishing it until his death on June 19, 1950. He also founded the first private Kurdish school, Qutabxaney Zanistî.
Riya Teze (1930–) – The Voice of Soviet Kurdistan
On March 25, 1930, it began publication in Yerevan using the Marogulov and Shamilov alphabet. It was the Kurdish organ of the Communist Party of Armenia. Initially managed by three Armenian Kurdologists (Kevork Paris, Hrachya Kochar, and Harutyun Mkrtchyan), the Kurdish Kurmanji scholar Cerdoy Gênco became the editor-in-chief in 1934. It was suspended during the Stalin era but resumed in 1955 with a Cyrillic alphabet. Mîroyê Esed (1919–2008) managed the newspaper until 1989.
IV. The Hawar era (1932–1943)
Celadet Alî Bedirxan and Hawar Magazine
After being exiled from Turkey, Celadet Alî Bedirxan published Hawar in Damascus on May 15, 1932. A total of 57 issues were released between 1932-1935 and 1941-1943.
Hawar holds special significance as the first media outlet published in Kurmanji Kurdish. For this reason, May 15 has been celebrated as Kurdish Language Day since 2006.
Celadet created a Latin-based alphabet for Northern Kurmanji, known as the “Hawar Alphabet” or “Bedirxan Alphabet,” which remains the standard today. Its purpose was: “Hawar is the voice of science. Science is for a person to know themselves; knowing oneself opens the path to freedom and happiness.”
Key writers: Celadet and Kamûran Bedirxan, Rewşen Bedirxan, Qedrî Can, Cegerxwîn, Osman Sebrî, Nûredîn Zaza, Ekrem Cemîl Paşa, Ahmed Namî.
Roja Nû and Stêr were published in Beirut by Kamûran Bedirxan. Nûdem (1992–2001, Stockholm, 40 issues, edited by Firat Cewerî) was referred to as the “Second Hawar.”
Rewşen Bedirxan
In a field largely dominated by men, Rewşen Bedirxan took her place as an active writer among the contributors of Hawar. She stands as a pioneering example.
V. The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad (1945–1946)
On January 11, 1946, during the brief existence of the Republic of Mahabad, the newspaper Kurdistan was established as the first Kurdish newspaper of the region, releasing a total of 113 issues. Alongside it, the literary magazine Kurdistan (16 issues) was also published.
When the Iranian army entered Mahabad on December 15, 1946, the Kurdish printing press was closed, Kurdish education was banned, and all Kurdish books, including school textbooks, were burned. Qazi Muhammad was executed on March 31, 1947. The Republic of Mahabad lived for only 11 months but secured a unique place in Kurdish media history.
VI. The South (1950–1990)
South Kurdistan
Between 1950 and 1963, numerous publications emerged in Baghdad and Sulaymaniyah:
Hîwa (1957–1963, Baghdad, 36 issues)
Xebat (1959–1961, Baghdad, 462 issues)
Ray Gel (1959–1962, Kirkuk, 34 issues)
Azadî (1959–1961, Rawanduz, 56 issues)
After 1968 and the Baathist occupation, the Kurdish press came under intense pressure. The Enfal and Halabja chemical attacks in 1988 signaled a period of extreme suppression for Kurdish media.
Diaspora
From the 1970s onwards, Kurdish media shifted its center to Europe (Germany, Sweden, France, Belgium). These publications were mostly party-affiliated and primarily political in content.
“Rojname” Newspaper (May 8, 1991)
In the early 90s, when the ban on the Kurdish language was slightly relaxed, Kurdish intellectuals and journalists sought to step into daily news reporting. This newspaper is recognized as the first trial of a daily newspaper based on “Kurdish Reality” in the history of Northern Kurdistan and Turkey after a long silence. Rojname was only able to print one issue. On the very day it was released, it was confiscated and banned by the State Security Court (DGM).
VII. The northern free press (1992–2016)
Özgür Gündem (1992–1994)
On May 30, 1992, under the leadership of Ragıp Duran, Özgür Gündem began publication, reaching a circulation of 60,000. During Ocak Işık Yurtçu’s tenure, circulation reached 100,000.
Systematic Murders (1990–1995):
Between 1990 and 1995, dozens of journalists, mostly from the Kurdish free press, were killed. Within this historical context, 76 victims are remembered as “martyrs of the free press.”
The Assassination of Apê Musa, September 20, 1992
Musa Anter (1920 – September 20, 1992) was born in the village of Zivinge, Nusaybin, Mardin. Known as “Apê Musa,” he was a prominent Kurdish writer and intellectual; he wrote for Özgür Gündem, Yeni Ülke, and Welat. He had been prosecuted in the “Trial of the 49s” for Kurdish propaganda. On September 20, 1992, he was murdered in an ambush in Diyarbakır. His murder remained a “perpetrator unknown” case. In 2008, the European Court of Human Rights convicted Turkey.
The Bombing of Buildings, December 2–3, 1994
Özgür Gündem was closed on April 14, 1994. Two weeks later, Özgür Ülke was launched. On the night of December 2–3, 1994, the technical center in Kadırga, Istanbul, the Çağaloğlu bureau, and the Ankara bureau were bombed simultaneously. Transport coordinator Ersin Yıldız lost his life, and more than 20 employees were injured.
Chronology (1992–2016):
Name
Start
Outcome
Özgür Gündem
1992
Closed on April 14, 1994
Özgür Ülke
1994
Bombed on Dec 2–3, 1994
Gündem
1995
Closed
Ülke
1996
Closed
Özgür Gündem (New)
2011
Closed in August 2016
Welat and Azadiya Welat
Launched as a weekly in Istanbul on February 22, 1992, it was the first Kurdish-language newspaper in Turkey after the 1991 ban was lifted. In 1996, it became Azadiya Welat. In 2003, it moved its headquarters to Diyarbakır, and in 2006, it became a daily newspaper. It was closed on August 8, 2018, by a statutory decree (KHK) under the State of Emergency.
VIII. The role of women
Rewşen Bedirxan
She was an active writer in the Hawar ekol and served as a pioneering example in the early periods of the Kurdish press.
Gurbetelli Ersöz (1965–1997)
A chemist born in Elazığ/Palu. She was arrested in 1990 for political activities and spent two years in prison. On April 23, 1993, she began working at Özgür Gündem and became the editor-in-chief, making her the first female editor-in-chief of a daily newspaper in Turkey, not just in Kurdish media. On December 10, 1993, the newspaper building was besieged; Ersöz was detained along with 17 colleagues. After being held for 13 days, she was sent to Sağmalcılar Prison. At the trial, the prosecutor sought 15 years; Harold Pinter, Noam Chomsky, and the CPJ supported her. She was sentenced to 3 years and 9 months and released in June 1994. Since she was not allowed to work as a journalist, she joined the PKK in 1995. She lost her life in a clash on October 8, 1997. October 8 is celebrated as Kurdish Women Journalists Day.
Jinha, Jinnews, and Jin TV
JINHA began its operations as the Women’s News Agency. It was closed by the Turkish state in 2016 and subsequently continued as JINNEWS. On March 8, 2018, on International Women’s Day, JIN TV began broadcasting as the first satellite channel with an all-female staff.
IX. The Satellite revolution: MED TV and beyond (1995–2010)
MED TV (1995–1999)
In 1994, it received a license from the UK Independent Television Commission (ITC) and began test broadcasts in March 1995. It was the first Kurdish satellite channel and represented a media revolution for Kurds during a period of extreme state pressure. In the West, satellite dishes were in every Kurdish home, and dozens of families would gather in the evenings to listen to the news in their own language. At the request of the Turkish state, MED TV‘s license was revoked on April 23, 1999. Following this:
Medya TV was launched but closed by French authorities.
Roj TV (2003, Denmark) was closed.
Nûçe TV, Stêrk TV, and others were launched in succession.
European News Agencies
The first Kurdish news agency, Dam, was founded in Germany in 2000, later becoming the Mesopotamia News Agency (MHA) in Frankfurt. After MHA was closed by German police, the Firat News Agency (ANF) was founded in Belgium in 2005.
X. Rojava (2011–2019)
On January 21, 2014, the Democratic Autonomous Administration was announced in Qamishlo on the anniversary of the Mahabad Republic. That same year, when ISIS attacked Sinjar, Kurdish journalism played a key role in bringing the voice of the Yazidi community to the world. During the siege of Kobanê, the Dengê Kobanî radio became the voice of the resistance.
XI. Principal figures
The Bedirxan Family
Name
Life
Contribution
Mîqdad Midhat Bedirxan
1858–1915
Kurdistan (1898) — Founder
Süreyya Bedirxan
1883–1938
Jîn (1916), Kurdistan (1918)
Jeladet Alî Bedirxan
1893–1951
Hawar (1932–1943), Alphabet
Kamûran Bedirxan
1895–1978
Roja Nû, Stêr (Beirut)
Rewşen Bedirxan
—
Writer of the Hawar ekol
Pîremêrd (1867–1950)
Real name: Tewfîq b. Mehmûd Hemze. Born in the Gwêje neighborhood of Sulaymaniyah. He was a poet, writer, and journalist. He became the editor-in-chief of Jiyan in 1926 and its manager in 1932. In 1938, he renamed Jiyan to Jîn. He founded the first private Kurdish school, Qutabxaney Zanistî. He passed away in Sulaymaniyah on June 19, 1950.
Musa Anter — Apê Musa (1920–1992)
Born in the village of Zivinge, Nusaybin, Mardin. He was convicted in the “Trial of the 49s.” He wrote for Özgür Gündem and Yeni Ülke. He was killed by JÎTEM in Diyarbakır on September 20, 1992.
XII. Hardships and obstacles
Systematic Bans
In Turkey, publishing in Kurdish was explicitly banned from 1924 to 1991. Subsequently, Kurdish journalists were prosecuted under Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law and later Article 314.
The 2016 Mass Shutdowns
During the State of Emergency (2016–2018), via Decree Laws (KHK):
Azadiya Welat was closed (August 2016)
JINHA was closed (2016)
IMC TV was closed (2016)Dozens of journalists were arrested and sentenced.
XIII. The digital age (2010–2026)
Digital media brought three major changes:
Proliferated: Social media, websites, and Kurdish podcasts increased.
Weakened: The financial model of print media collapsed; many newspapers closed.
Renewed:ANHA, ANF, Rudaw, Kurdistan 24 developed a global Kurdish digital media model, though most remain affiliated with political parties or governments.
Conclusion
Date
Event
April 22, 1898
Kurdistan, Cairo — Mîqdad Midhat Bedirxan
June 6, 1913
Rojî Kurd, Istanbul
March 25, 1930
Riya Teze, Yerevan
May 15, 1932
Hawar, Damascus — Jeladet Alî Bedirxan
January 11, 1946
Kurdistan, Mahabad — Republic of Mahabad
May 30, 1992
Özgür Gündem, Istanbul
February 22, 1992
Welat, Istanbul
September 20, 1992
Assassination of Apê Musa
Dec 2–3, 1994
Bombing of Özgür Ülke
March 1995
MED TV — First Satellite TV
October 8, 1997
Assassination of Gurbetelli Ersöz
March 8, 2018
JIN TV
2026
The journey continues
Kurdish journalism has faced oppression and obstacles for over 128 years. From Cairo to digital platforms, from exile to war, and from the Bedirxan family to the generation of Jinnews and Jin TV, this tradition endures.
Evaluating the revival of the Gülistan Doku case after six years as a “political reckoning,” lawyer Gülan Çağın Kaleli stated, “The reopening of the file today is not an act of judicial courage, but rather a consequence of the responsibility created by the evidence that has been suppressed for six years.”
Gülistan Doku’s family (Photo: Birgün)
The murder investigation of university student Gülistan Doku, who disappeared in Dêrsim six years ago, has seen significant developments with numerous individuals, including former Tunceli Governor Tuncay Sonel and his son, being detained or arrested. The Doku family remains hopeful following the detention and arrest of new suspects.
Minister of Justice Akın Gürlek, speaking after a Cabinet Meeting on April 20, announced the establishment of a unit for unsolved murders and stated that files would be examined individually. Gürlek noted, “There is naturally an expectation after Gülistan, but that doesn’t mean every file will turn out that way.” He also announced that search efforts for Gülistan Doku’s body are ongoing.
We spoke with lawyer Gülan Çağın Kaleli—a jurist and women’s rights defender—about the reopening of the Gülistan Doku file and its potential impacts. Kaleli also serves as the lawyer for the family of İpek Er, who reportedly committed suicide after being raped by Sergeant Musa Orhan.
Lawyer Çağın Kaleli suggests that the reopening of the Gülistan Doku file could be a “new beginning.” According to Kaleli, “this situation emerged as a result of a political reckoning.” Stating that the subjection of Kurdish women’s bodies to harassment and rape cannot be considered independently of the “special war policies conducted in Kurdistan,” Kaleli recalled similar events from the 1990s. She noted that the male-dominated system views the bodies of Kurdish women as a territory to be “conquered.”
Gülistan Doku disappeared in 2020
Gülistan Doku, a second-year student at Munzur University’s Department of Child Development, disappeared on January 5, 2020, after leaving her dormitory. Her family filed a missing person report with the Provincial Police Department the following day.
Camera footage showed Doku boarding a minibus, but where she got off could not be determined. Following her disappearance, extensive searches were conducted in the Munzur River and the Uzunçayır Dam Lake in Dêrsim, where her phone last emitted a signal. Despite the lake being drained, no trace of Gülistan was found.
The last person Gülistan Doku met, her former boyfriend Zeinal A., was detained in Antalya in 2022, two years after the incident, but was released under judicial control. Another suspect, stepfather of Zeinal A., Engin Y., a police officer, was sentenced to two years and six months in prison for unlawfully obtaining and sharing Gülistan Doku's personal information on social media.
No further progress was made in the investigation over the last six years. According to lawyers examining the file, this was because the incident was treated as a "suicide." In 2024, Chief Public Prosecutor Ebru Cansu, appointed to the Tunceli Chief Public Prosecutor's Office, reopened the file.
According to media reports, earlier this year, a secret witness testified against the governor's son, leading to progress in the investigation. Reports stated the secret witness accused the governor’s son of raping and fatally shooting Gülistan Doku. Following this, simultaneous operations were carried out in seven provinces on April 13, 2026.
Justice Minister Akın Gürlek, who took office in February 2026, stated that the "investigation must be pursued to the end." At the time of Doku's disappearance, Süleyman Soylu held the Ministry seat, followed by Ali Yerlikaya.
Case Summary
Gülistan Doku Investigation: Detention and Arrest List
Homicide and Sexual Assault
Mustafa Türkay Sonel (Son of former Governor Tuncay Sonel) – Arrested
Erdoğan E. (Former Personnel of Provincial Special Administration) – Arrested
Hiding and Destroying Evidence
Tuncay Sonel (Former Tunceli Governor) – Judicial Control / Ministry Investigation
Zeinal A. (Former Boyfriend) – Arrested
Engin Y. (Dismissed Police / Stepfather) – Arrested
Cemile Y. (Mother) – Arrested
Çağdaş Ö. (Former Chief Physician) – Arrested on suspicion of deleting hospital records
Şükrü E. (Governor’s Bodyguard) – Arrested
Celal A. and Nurşen A. (Parents of Umut A.) – Arrested
Judicial Control / Released Under Terms
Savaş G. and Süleyman Ö. (University Technical Staff) – Suspicion of deleting camera records / International travel ban
* Data compiled from operation and court records dated April 13-20, 2026.
Lawyer Kaleli: “For 6 years, all evidence held by the state was suppressed”
The Gülistan Doku murder file has been reopened after six years. It has become a major headline in recent days. How do you interpret the developments of the past few days? What kind of picture do you see considering those detained so far?
I think the process that has been reflected to the public—which the Justice Minister claims to have accelerated today—should be interpreted as follows: All information, documents, and evidence held by the state for 6 years were effectively suppressed. These issues are too precious to be sacrificed to the state’s internal reckonings or conflicts between groups within the state, especially in cases of violence against women. Therefore, I believe the current picture should be characterized not as an act of courage by the Ministry of Justice, but as a fulfillment of responsibility.
Gülan Çağın Kaleli, Photo: Özgür Politika
The matter of hiding, altering, or deleting so much information and evidence over 6 years by mobilizing all state resources once again reveals a ground where there is no legal security, where the state can interfere with the judiciary in every aspect, and where no one feels safe.
“Conflict Between ‘In-Norm’ and ‘Out-of-Norm’ Structures”
What do you mean by political reckoning?
I believe there are power balances within the Ministry of Interior. We are witnessing the definition of “in-norm” (norm içi) and “out-of-norm” (norm dışı) structures within the state quite vividly in this period. On one side, there are structures defending the functionality of the law; on the other, there was—and still is a representation leaning towards tyranny, oppression, and massacre, fostering polarization. We have gone through historical processes where “in-norm” structures played a bigger role depending on the political conjuncture, and periods where “out-of-norm” structures came to the fore.
The era when Süleyman Soylu played his role was a period when these “out-of-norm” structures fully held the state administration. Regarding the current process, I see it as a war between these structures. One side tries to create a “window dressing” by bringing concepts like human rights and justice to the forefront, while the opposition fights for a genuine ground for rights. These “out-of-norm” structures are not independent of the state; they are intrinsic to it.
It is known that the so-called “political will” must act in such cases. From this perspective, do you observe that these perpetrators could be the ones to truly shed light on the case?
We have seen many files where only the “visible face” of the curtain was touched while those with higher responsibility were not detained. The detention of high-ranking officials like the governor, deputy governors, and police officers under his command is a result of responsibility. This is positive. However, it doesn’t end with arrests. There is a risk that during these 6 years, critical information was destroyed. It is too early to comment on whether a fair trial will be conducted. At present, I can say at least part of that chain of responsibility is visible, as this appears to be a systematic and organized crime within the state. We must not “heroize” those simply doing their duty. The subject of this file is Gülistan: Her experiences, the violence, and the rape she was subjected to.
Do you expect or see signs that previous Ministers of Justice or Interior might be included in this chain of responsibility? Süleyman Soylu’s name is frequently mentioned.
During Süleyman Soylu’s term as Interior Minister, very hostile policies were produced against groups outside the hegemony, and he voiced these himself. His term left a serious wreckage, from raining instructions on every level of the judiciary to the police. However, the issue is not just Soylu as an individual, but the mentality he represents. Historically, the state has never touched those it assigned a specific mission until that mission was complete. Soylu did not act solely on his own thoughts; his role was shaped by forces within the state. Today, that role is finished. Now, a different path is being tried, and a “state reality” is attempting to polish itself through these cases. If we are to judge based on justice and equity, we saw what happened when these individuals held power previously. I personally doubt these figures will truly be affected.
You were also the lawyer for the family of İpek Er. The women’s movement and jurists evaluate such crimes in the Kurdish region as crimes committed by state officials, described as “perpertrators in uniform.” Do you evaluate the Gülistan Doku murder within this scope?
We certainly can. Following the curfews, the state deepened the wreckage using “special war policies.” These were not just against the body, but against the mind and emotions. The harassment and rape of many Kurdish women by police, soldiers, governors, or their relatives—as seen in the Gülistan Doku example—is not independent of these policies. The examples of Gülistan Doku and İpek Er are very similar. In a society that has been made precarious and impoverished, a process began where the state offered its own system as the only means of existence. It is important to highlight that women were emotionally manipulated by these perpetrators with promises of marriage before being subjected to sexual violence or forced into drug use and prostitution.
Gülistan Doku
“The law was weaponized”
The judiciary was also made a “useful apparatus” for these perpetrators. Law, which failed to mobilize to uncover the truth, was used to protect perpetrators through “good conduct” discounts or symbolic arrests to cool down public reaction. For example, after Musa Orhan raped İpek Er, no action was taken until İpek’s suicide attempt. Then, a symbolic one-week arrest was made only to decrease public reaction. Musa Orhan was sentenced to 10 years, and the case is still at the Court of Cassation. He is still being tried without arrest. Buoyed by such decisions, others in state positions feel emboldened. This is a form of psychological war.
“There is a horrific trend called ‘conquest’ targeting single women”
In the intense war environment of the 1990s, such situations were witnessed in the Kurdish region. What is the connection between the 2000s and the 1990s?
In the ’90s, there were many applications regarding sexual assault in custody, but fair trials did not occur. It was used as a war tactic that forced everyone into silence. Today, we are in a period where we have the advantage of being organized. One can express their experience to institutions, the press, or lawyers’ organizations. Historically—from the Armenian Genocide to the Dersim Massacre—the female body has been treated as a battlefield. In the ’90s, women were raped during village raids. Today, the same “rape culture” continues through emotional manipulation.
Within the gendarmerie and police in the Kurdistan region, there is a horrific orientation we call “conquest” toward single women—an attempt to “possess.” They signaled this during the curfews through graffiti or videos targeting the female body. Now, they have put this into practice in the field.
You made a connection between the female body and “conquest.” What do you mean by this?
The Kurdish movement has proven itself under women’s leadership. Therefore, an attack on Kurdish women is an attack on the Kurdish people. There is a male-dominated mindset at play; while the woman is seen as “honor” (namus), there is also a woman seeking freedom. The attempt to “possess” the body of the woman seeking freedom is a multi-layered attack on a land, a people, and a culture.
University students protesting for Gülistan Doku
“These are the results of the women’s struggle”
The Narin Güran case also returned to the public agenda. Considering the “political reckoning” you mentioned, is there a possibility that other “dark” files, such as Rojin Kabaiş or Gülistan Doku’s close friend Rojwelat Kızmaz, might resurface?
It is certainly possible. The Justice Minister called this a beginning and made a promise. However, this hope stems not just from ministers’ words, but from a powerful women’s struggle that has refused to give up for years. Women are the primary motor force here. The Gülistan Doku file is a beginning; these are domino tiles. If genuine courage is shown to touch the primary responsible parties, it could impact other files. But I believe this courage is drawn from lawyers and women’s organizations rather than state officials.
Mazlum Özdemir, one of the coordinators of Kurdish Monitoring, divides demands regarding the Kurdish language under two heading directed at the state and at Kurdish society: “Demands directed at the state can quite clearly be formulated as the removal of all legal and practical barriers placed before the Kurdish language in the public sphere.”
*Kurdish Language Day event in Şırnak / Photo: Yeni Yaşam Newspaper
Mazlum Özdemir, one of the coordinators of the Kurdish Monitoring platform, which is established in 2024 to track bans and restrictions on the use of Kurdish in the public sphere, spoke about the assimilation policies that have persisted in Turkey since the founding of the Republic, as well as the initiative’s goals. Özdemir said that the state structure shaped around Turkish national identity has systematically disregarded Kurds and the Kurdish language, and that they therefore view all violations as a serious matter that must be documented.
Kurdish Monitoring, launched in 2024 by a group of journalists, records the pressures exerted against the Kurdish language. Noting that the assimilation policy applied since the founding of the Republic has targeted Kurds, Özdemir says: “In order to institutionalize the Republic of Turkey’s structure, which was built upon the Turkish ethnic nation, all other ethnic, religious, and cultural identities were disregarded, subjected to assimilation, and exposed to massacre. Kurds and the Kurdish language received their share of this as well.” In this context, Özdemir recalls that the Law on the Maintenance of Order and other laws enacted during the Republican era denied the very existence of Kurds and banned Kurdish from the public sphere, adding: “The aim was to assimilate and eliminate Kurdish, just like all other languages spoken on these lands.”
This policy effectively continues to this day
Mazlum Özdemir emphasizes that despite some legal adjustments made after the 1990s, the use of Kurdish remains banned: “Starting from the 1990s, certain legal regulations were made and some of the barriers before Kurdish were lifted — but both legally and in physical, practical terms, the use of Kurdish in Turkey is banned. People are attacked and killed for speaking Kurdish in the street. Artists and attendees are detained and arrested for singing Kurdish songs at weddings. Kurdish-language concerts are banned by governors or mayors. The ‘right of mothers to speak Kurdish with their children in prison,’ which President Erdoğan has repeatedly claimed to have lifted and boasted about, is still banned. Kurdish publications cannot enter prisons; books written in Kurdish are blocked by prison administrations and cannot be sent outside.”
We aimed to make systematic repression visible
Describing how the initiative came about, Özdemir says: “We want the barriers to the use of Kurdish in Turkey to become visible, and to show that a systematic policy of obstruction is being applied.” He notes that while this situation is known to the public, it is often forgotten amid the intensity of the daily news agenda: “In the chaos of the day, these things often remain as stories we read and move past. Yet this is a serious violation against a language, and they need to be brought together in a systematic way — because the obstruction itself is systematic. It is not isolated or sporadic. These barriers and bans arise as the result of a policy and an ideological approach.”
Stating that they currently share their reports with the public and the media, Özdemir adds that they will also share them with national and international institutions: “The issue has an international dimension as much as a national one. Turkey is a country that has for years sought to become a member of the European Union and has undertaken certain efforts toward that goal. It is important to present, in the form of systematic reports, how a country seeking membership in the Union approaches human rights and language rights.”
Mazlum Özdemir emphasizes that they collect their data entirely from open sources: “News published in conventional media and social media, along with statements and reports released by civil society organizations, make up our sources.” However, he adds that the pressures faced by the Kurdish language are far greater than what appears in these outlets: “We also know from our daily experience that the reactions shown to people speaking Kurdish among themselves on the street or on the phone, or speaking Kurdish at school, at the grocery store, or at the hospital, are very rarely reflected anywhere. There are barriers and pressures that arise from covert racism.” Despite this, Özdemir notes that their physical and technical infrastructure remains limited, saying they currently document violations under only four main headings: “We report violations in the areas of media, prisons, public space, and culture and arts.”
The state spread assimilation through all public instruments
Describing the tools of assimilation policy, Özdemir argues that the state denied the Kurdish language through schools, media, and academia. “The Republic’s assimilation policy was shaped around the premise that Kurdish did not exist — and when that could no longer be sustained, around the premise that it was not a language. Once that became the policy, its instruments had to be set in motion. Schools became an important tool for banning Kurdish from the public sphere. Media emerges as another instrument. And these have now merged with today’s digital technology,” he says.
He goes on to describe how this process operated:
“Schools, media, academia, and all other instruments spent years propagandizing this and putting this policy into practice. Kurdish was prevented from becoming a language of education; children who spoke Kurdish at home were unable to speak it at school, and when they did, they faced systematic pressure from teachers. Teachers would assign one student among their peers the task of finding out whether children were speaking Kurdish at home — and when that student heard or saw children speaking Kurdish at home, they would report it to the teacher, causing those other children to be punished and beaten.”
Özdemir notes that this mechanism of repression was also sustained through the media: “Universities and the publications they produced spent years propagandizing that Kurds do not exist and that Kurdish is not a language. The media was used as a platform through which these policies were reproduced and disseminated.”
The warning of ‘self-assimilation’
According to Özdemir, despite all these pressures, Kurdish resisted assimilation for many years. However, he says that in recent times the concept of “self-assimilation” has also entered the conversation. “Particularly over the last 20 years, Kurds have begun using the concept of self-assimilation almost as much as assimilation itself,” he says. He explains the reason as follows: “For many years, Kurdish put up serious resistance to assimilation. Yet, particularly over the last 20 years — though it existed before as well — Kurds have begun using the concept of self-assimilation almost as frequently as assimilation. Because for some time now, certain voices have been suggesting that assimilation has been ‘successful,’ and it is acknowledged that self-assimilation is also being observed on a significant scale.”
Noting that even in villages, parents speaking Turkish with their children illustrates the extent of self-assimilation, Özdemir says: “When there is no Kurdish-language education in schools, when Kurdish television and digital media are banned and blocked, and when extra effort is made to ensure Turkish-language media reaches everywhere in response — it should come as no surprise that such an outcome would follow.”
Demands: To the state and to society
Mazlum Özdemir groups the demands regarding the Kurdish language under two headings: those directed at the state and those directed at Kurdish society. He lists the responsibilities that fall to the state as follows:
“Demands directed at the state can quite clearly be formulated as the removal of all legal and practical barriers placed before the Kurdish language in the public sphere. That is: Kurdish must become a language of education and be present at all levels of schooling; official space must be opened for Kurdish in all public institutions and organizations; barriers before Kurdish-language media must be eliminated; and the obstruction of cultural and artistic activities must come to an end. In short, all barriers must be removed and active encouragement must be provided so that Kurdish is officially recognized, becomes widespread, and can be learned and taught.”
He also draws attention to the responsibilities of Kurdish society and politics: “In parallel with these steps, Kurds themselves must use Kurdish in every area of their daily and public lives and resist assimilation as they have in the past. As for Kurdish politics — beyond reminding the state of its duties and responsibilities on this matter, it must also be criticized for not using Kurdish more within its own internal mechanisms, and public pressure must be built to push it toward taking steps in that direction. Because while the state bears responsibility for assimilation, Kurdish society and the political movement bear responsibility for self-assimilation.”
Nearly 40 years ago, in an era where “Kurdish börek” was being rebranded as “Küt börek,” a lawsuit was filed against a baker named Yusuf in İzmit simply because he wrote “Kurdish börek” on his shop sign.
Photo: Ferid Demirel
In Frankfurt, at the intersection of Battonstrasse and Langestrasse, sits a modest establishment: Dağlayan Börekçilik. It is run by Yusuf Dağlayan, a man from Bingöl. His life offers a striking window into the ongoing debates regarding Kurds in Turkey—and even into a matter as seemingly simple as the name of a pastry.
One morning in Frankfurt, while searching for an open breakfast spot, I noticed a place with “Börekçilik” written on its sign right at the junction of two streets. I stepped inside. It was still early; the shop was empty.
Behind the counter stood a middle-aged man—balding, with a slight belly—who greeted me in German. After a brief exchange, he mentioned he was from Bingöl. I ordered a börek and sat down. Once he finished his work behind the counter, the owner came over and sat across from me.
After the usual introductions, I brought up a debate that had recently resurfaced in Turkey: I asked what he thought about the attempts to rename “Kurdish börek” as “Küt börek.”
Yusuf immediately began telling a story from his past:
“I am Yusuf Dağlayan,” he said. “I am from the hamlet of Bağkıyan, in the village of Bilece, between Kiğı and Pülümür. You can’t just call it Bingöl. Kiğı used to belong to Dersim; it was only attached to Bingöl after 1948. Pülümür and Dersim are closer to us anyway. I was detained in 1982. Tortured. This was the September 12 period. Both my father and I. Back then, it was the left-right conflict; it was before the PKK. My older brother was a student, but he fled abroad. The state put pressure on us and took us in. Because of this, at the end of 1984, I had to move to İzmit.”
Unable to find steady work, he took matters into his own hands:
“I started selling börek from a mobile cart in front of the SEKA paper factory. We had no money. Just börek. So we made Kurdish börek. On the first day, they beat me. ‘You can’t stay here, you can’t sell here,’ they said. The next day, a massive fight broke out, but eventually, we took control of that spot.”
According to Yusuf, the factory provided a constant flow of people ten thousand entering and ten thousand exiting:
“Then we expanded the business. We opened a shop. We had five mobile carts and our own production facility.”
As we spoke, an acquaintance of his entered. After exchanging greetings, he sat with us, and Yusuf continued:
“In İzmit, they used to call me ‘Kurdish Yusuf.’ This was around 1987. After I opened the shop, I received a court summons one day. I went to court. The judge asked: ‘Why did you write Kurdish börek on your sign and your menu?”
Photo: Ferid Demirel
“I said: There is a man named Mehmet from our village who went to Istanbul. Among us Kurdish Alevis, we make “perğe” every New Year for Hızır. It is an oily bread that we share with people. Muslims sacrifice animals; we do this. The judge told me, ‘You are being divisive.’”
Yusuf smiled.
“I said: There is Laz börek, Circassian, Bosnian… why shouldn’t there be Kurdish börek?”
From there, Yusuf moved into another story one he also told in court about “Kurdish Mehmet the Porter,” a figure who has since become part of the pastry’s folklore:
“Mehmet was Kurdish. He was poor. He went to Istanbul, to Kasımpaşa, by ship. He worked as a porter. He had made perğe at home and took it with him to eat near the Galata Bridge. People saw what he was eating. They liked it. They gave him money and bought the kilor (rings) from him. He ended up going hungry that day but realized he had made good money.”
So, he began making more.
“He started selling them. A hundred, two hundred a day. He saw he was earning more than he did from portering. He rented a shop in Karaköy from someone from Trabzon. That shop is still there. He built a bakery. That oven is still running. He passed away long ago. His name was Kurdish Mehmet. People called him Rengo. This was 250 years ago.”
After Yusuf told this story and made his defense, the judge took a ten-minute recess. When the session resumed, he simply said, “You may go.” The case was dropped.
However, months later, another summons arrived. “This time it was a different judge,” Yusuf said. “He said: ‘You are spreading separatism. Your cart has yellow, red, and green colors; these are separatist colors. This is PKK propaganda.’”
“I said: If these colors are separatist, then from Thrace to Kars, from Trabzon to Antalya and Izmir… is the state separatist too? The judge frowned. ‘How so?’ he asked. I told him: I see traffic lights everywhere. Those colors are beautiful. That is why I used them on my shop. If I am a separatist, then the state is a separatist too.”
The judge paused and then said: “You may go.” The file was closed.
Yusuf continued working in İzmit until 1993. Eventually, as political cases persisted and an arrest warrant was issued, he became a fugitive. He lived underground
The Mezopotamya Women Journalists Association (MKG) and the Dicle Fırat Journalists Association (DFG) released a statement on April 6, the “Day of Killed Journalists,” saying:“It is our duty to expand the struggle for truth of the murdered journalists, to honor their memory, and to continue the line of a free press.”
MKG and DFG issued a joint statement marking April 6 “Day of Killed Journalists.”
Their collective statement reads as follows:
April 6 is a day of commemoration for journalists in Turkey who were killed because of their journalistic activities. The date was chosen because journalist and writer Hasan Fehmi Bey was assassinated on April 6, 1909, on the Galata Bridge, making him one of the first losses of this job.
The Turkish Journalists Association (TGC) designated April 6 as the “Day of Martyred Journalists” in 1997; in 2005, the name was changed to the “Day of Killed Journalists.” April 6 commemorates journalists who were killed for pursuing the truth. Targeted for exposing facts, being the voice of the people, and revealing darkness, these journalists continue to live on in the memory of the struggle for a free press.
Once again, through the memory of killed journalists, we emphasize: with every journalist whose pen was meant to be broken, the truth itself was intended to be silenced. However, pressures, threats, massacres, and policies of impunity have not been able to stop the tradition of a free press. In these lands, those who pursue the truth have always paid a price—but they have never abandoned the truth. Today, we commemorate all murdered journalists with respect and gratitude. The legacy they left behind, their resistance, and their struggle for truth continue to illuminate our path.
The pens of murdered journalists have not fallen silent, and will not. It is our responsibility to grow their struggle for truth, to uphold their memory, and to continue the line of a free press.
Mezopotamya Women Journalists Association – the Dicle Fırat Journalists Association
The DFG had also published a monthly report on April 2, regarding violations of rights against journalists in March. The report included the following data:
5 journalists were detained
2 journalists were arrested
1 journalist was subjected to ill-treatment
2 journalists were threatened
1 journalist was targeted
Investigations were launched against 3 journalists
Lawsuits were filed against 5 journalists
3 journalists were sentenced
Cases of 24 journalists are ongoing
5 news coverages were blocked
Access bans were imposed 6 times
53 social media accounts and 75 pieces of content were blocked in digital media
Representatives of PJAK and PDKI denied Trump’s statements that the Kurds received weapons sent by the US.
According to a news report broadcast on Fox News on April 5, 2026, US President Donald Trump said, “We sent weapons through the Kurds after the Iran protests. I think the Kurds took the weapons themselves.”
As Niha+, we asked Zegrus Enderyarî, a member of the PJAK Foreign Affairs Committee, whether Trump’s April 5 statement was accurate. Enderyarî stated that they had no information whatsoever regarding the truth or falsity of this matter. He further noted that there is no relationship of this kind between PJAK and the US.
When asked whether the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan (CPFIK) had such communication with the US, Zegrus Enderyari similarly replied, “There is no such thing for the coalition either.“
PDKI also denied
Meanwhile, Hejar Berenji, the US Representative of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), also said in a statement on his social media account, “The information currently reported by Fox News does not accurately reflect the situation.“
The information currently being reported by Fox News does not accurately reflect the situation. The coalition of Kurdish parties in Iranian Kurdistan will be issuing an official statement shortly to provide clarification.
Berenji also announced that the Coalition of Kurdish parties will issue an official statement shortly to clarify the situation.
Trump had previously made a statementas well
A few days after the attacks on Iran began on February 28, Trump said on March 5 regarding the discussions about the Kurds’ involvement in the war, “If the Kurds want to launch an attack on Iran, let them do it. It would be great if they wanted to do so.“
On March 8, in response to a question about the possibility of the Kurds establishing a new autonomous region in Iran and whether they would join the war, Trump replied, “We are very friendly with the Kurds, but we do not want to make the war any more complicated than it already is. I decided that I don’t want the Kurds going in there.“
The developments occurring since January 2026 involving attacks on Rojava in Syria as well as the strikes launched by Israel and the US against Iran starting on February 28 are also impacting the process reportedly ongoing in Turkey between Abdullah Öcalan and state or government authorities.
PKK guerrillas at a symbolic weapon burning ceremony / Photo: Channel8
Approximately one and a half years have passed since MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli’s statement on October 22, 2024, in which he referred to PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan by saying: “If the isolation is lifted, let him come and speak at the DEM Party group meeting in the TBMM, and let him shout that terrorism has completely ended and the organization has been disbanded.”
Since that date, in the period that the Turkish state has called “Terror-Free Turkey” and that is referred to in public discourse as the “Second Solution Process,” “Peace Process,” or simply “the Process,” the Kurdish side has come to the fore with concrete steps such as the dissolution of the PKK and the burning of weapons. On the state side, however, no concrete progress has yet been made regarding the legal regulations stated to be necessary for the continuation of the process. The establishment of a “process commission” with the participation of all parties in the Parliament except one party with a group, and the report prepared by this commission after a long working schedule, is the only concrete step that has stood out so far.
On the other hand, Bahçeli’s statement on March 24, 2026, at the TBMM group meeting — “There is no point in suffocating the process, rushing it, or inflaming the debates” — and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s harsh messages, especially after the Newroz celebrations, have increased the question marks regarding the course of the process.
DEM Party sources point to April and May while expressing their expectations for legal regulations, and the latest developments are bringing a comprehensive assessment of how the process has progressed from the past to the present back onto the agenda.
The 2015 Breaking Point: From the Solution Process to Security Policies
In fact, Öcalan and the PKK have repeatedly stated since 1993, and more intensively from 2000 onwards, that they wanted to solve the Kurdish issue through political means with a radical ideological transformation, and they declared that they regarded peace as a strategic issue. However, because Turkey approached a solution to the Kurdish issue due to internal and external conjunctural reasons, the dialogues and processes conducted so far have not reached a permanent solution.
Photo: ANF
In this context, the most remarkable period is the solution process carried out between 2012 and 2015. This solution process effectively ended with President Erdoğan’s statement on March 22, 2015: “I do not find the Dolmabahçe Consensus correct,” after the Syrian Kurds defeated ISIS in Kobani and it became clear that the AKP government would not be able to form a government in the June 2015 elections and that an agreement with the Kurdish political movement on “presidency” could not be made. Subsequently, in line with the “Collapse Plan” decision taken at the National Security Council (MGK) meeting in October 2014, comprehensive security operations were launched against the PKK and the Kurdish political movement in general. In the following nine years, not only North Kurdistan but also the South (Federated Kurdistan) and West (Rojava) parts were included, and the Kurdish people and the PKK became the target of an all-out war waged with all its might by the Turkish state.
While the state’s policies of “ending terrorism” that it had been pursuing for years in the Kurdish issue continued, unexpected statements came from the state front towards the end of 2024, and a meeting was held with Öcalan, who had been held under heavy isolation for 43 months. Thus, a new process in the Kurdish issue began to be discussed again.
AKP officials and the Imralı Delegation meeting at Dolmabahçe Palace, 2025
Signals of the New Period
October 1, 2024Bahçeli shakes hands with DEM Party members in the Parliament.
A remarkable contact that took place on October 1, 2024, at the opening of the new legislative year of the TBMM, was interpreted as a harbinger of a “new political climate” in public opinion. Bahçeli went to the DEM Party rows and shook hands with Co-Chair Tuncer Bakırhan and other deputies. This gesture created wide repercussions both in the Parliament hall and in public opinion. When journalists asked about the meaning of this handshake, Bahçeli said, “We are entering a new era. While we want peace in the world, we must also establish peace in our own country.”
On the same day, in his speech at the General Assembly of the Parliament, President Erdoğan also used the expressions: “It must now be accepted as a fact. Today, against Israeli aggression, both at home and abroad, grounds for reconciliation must be brought to the fore rather than fields of conflict.”
October 22, 2024Bahçeli’s call to Öcalan at the group meeting.
Following these statements, on October 22, 2024, at his party’s group meeting, Bahçeli directly addressed Öcalan and made the following call: “If the isolation is lifted, let him come and speak at the DEM Party group meeting in the TBMM, and let him shout that terrorism has completely ended and the organization has been disbanded. If he shows this determination and resolve, the way for the legal regulation regarding the use of the right of hope will be opened wide… Here is the challenge, we are ready for it.”
October 24, 2024Ömer Öcalan shares message from İmralı.
On October 24, 2024, DEM Party Urfa MP Ömer Öcalan announced that they had met with Abdullah Öcalan in İmralı the previous day and shared Öcalan’s message: “The isolation continues. If the conditions are formed, I have the theoretical and practical power to pull this process from the ground of conflict and violence to the legal and political ground.”
A Process Under the Shadow of Trusteeships and Bans!
October 30, 2024Ahmet Özer’s arrest and trustee appointment.
However, these signs towards a solution and peace in the Kurdish issue were overshadowed by ongoing trustee appointments and ban decisions. The practices of the Ministry of Interior once again raised the question: “Is a solution really wanted in the Kurdish issue?”
Ahmet Özer, who was elected Mayor of Esenyurt within the scope of the “urban consensus” made between the CHP and the DEM Party in the local elections, was arrested on October 30, 2024, on charges of “membership in the PKK/KCK armed terrorist organization.” The next day, Istanbul Deputy Governor Can Aksoy was appointed as trustee in his place.
November 2024Trustees appointed to DEM Party municipalities.
Subsequently, in November 2024, trustees were appointed one after another to the DEM Party municipalities of Mardin, Batman, Urfa Halfeti, Dersim, and Van Bahçesaray, on the grounds of “terrorism” sentences against the co-mayors.
November 21, 2024New ban on lawyer visits to Öcalan.
On top of all this, on November 21, 2024, the lawyers of the Asrın Law Office, who had requested a meeting with Öcalan, learned that a new six-month ban on lawyer visits to their client Öcalan had been imposed on November 6.
November 26, 2024Bahçeli repeats his call.
On November 26, Bahçeli said at his party’s TBMM Group Meeting: “We stand exactly behind what we have said since our group meeting on October 22, 2024. We expect face-to-face contact between İmralı and the DEM Group without delay, and we repeat our call with determination.”
DEM Party Delegation in İmralı
December 28, 2024DEM Party MPs visit İmralı.
After a long period, on December 28, 2024, DEM Party MPs Sırrı Süreyya Önder and Pervin Buldan met with Öcalan in İmralı. The next day, the delegation shared Öcalan’s message with the public: “Strengthening Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood again is a historic responsibility.”
December 30, 2024KCK’s statement on the solution will.
Then, on December 30, 2024, KCK Executive Council Co-Chair Besê Hozat, in her statement to Medya Haber, said: “We stand behind the solution will shown by our Leadership. The Turkish state, the AKP-MHP government, the government and the opposition as a whole, the state itself must show a real solution will.”
January 2025İmralı Delegation holds meetings in parliament.
Throughout January 2025, the İmralı Delegation held meetings with the parties with groups in the TBMM: MHP, AKP, CHP, Future Party, DEVA Party, Felicity Party, and New Welfare Party. After these meetings, the delegation met with Öcalan for the second time on January 22, 2025.
February 13, 2025KCK announces letter from Öcalan.
On February 13, 2025, KCK Executive Council Co-Chair Cemil Bayık stated that they had received a letter from Öcalan and said, “We are carrying out a work to pull the Kurdish issue from the ground of war to the ground of democratization.” However, two days after this statement, on February 15, on the anniversary of Öcalan’s capture in Turkey, the Ministry of Interior appointed a trustee to Van Metropolitan Municipality.
February 18, 2025Operations and arrests against HDK.
While these developments were taking place, on February 18, 2025, operations were carried out against the Peoples’ Democratic Congress (HDK). A total of 52 people, including political party executives, unionists, artists, and journalists, were detained; 30 of them were arrested on February 21. HDK Co-Spokesperson Meral Danış Beştaş criticized these operations by calling them “a conspiracy against peace.”
Öcalan’s “Call for Peace and Democratic Society”
February 27, 2025Öcalan’s “Call for Peace and Democratic Society”.
The DEM Party delegation met with Öcalan in İmralı on February 27, 2025. After the meeting, the delegation shared Öcalan’s message with the public in Istanbul.
In the message titled “Call for Peace and Democratic Society,” Öcalan used the following expressions: “In this climate formed by Mr. Devlet Bahçeli’s call, Mr. President’s demonstrated will, and the positive approaches of other political parties to the known call, I am making a call to lay down arms and I take on the historic responsibility of this call. Like every contemporary society and party whose existence has not been forcibly terminated, convene your congress and decide for integration with the state and society; all groups should lay down their arms and the PKK should dissolve itself.”
March 1, 2025PKK announces a ceasefire.
Following Öcalan’s call, the PKK announced a ceasefire on March 1. In its statement, the PKK said: “To open the way for the implementation of the Call for Peace and Democratic Society, we declare a ceasefire effective from today. Beyond that, matters such as laying down arms can only be realized with the practical leadership of Leader Apo. We are ready to hold the party congress in the way Leader Apo wants. However, for this to happen, a secure environment must be formed and Leader Apo’s personal guidance and execution are required for the success of the congress.”
March 21, 2025Newroz celebrations with millions of participants.
Afterwards, Kurds celebrated Newroz 2025 on March 21 with the participation of millions of people in four parts of Kurdistan and many cities around the world. The intensity of participation in Newroz was interpreted by the Kurdish press as support for Öcalan’s call.
Imamoğlu’s Arrest, Sırrı Süreyya’s “Suspicious” Death
March 19, 2025Ekrem İmamoğlu detained and arrested.
After Newroz, the agenda was shaken by the arrest of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality President Ekrem İmamoğlu. İmamoğlu, who was detained on March 19, 2025, within the scope of investigations initiated on charges of “terrorism” and “corruption” regarding the “urban consensus,” was arrested on March 23, 2025. The Kurdish movement evaluated İmamoğlu’s arrest as a “provocative intervention” in the process.
April 15, 2025Sırrı Süreyya Önder hospitalized and passes away.
Shortly after, DEM Party Istanbul MP and İmralı delegation member Sırrı Süreyya Önder was taken to the hospital on April 15 due to a heart condition he suffered in Istanbul. Önder fought for life in intensive care for 18 days but could not be saved and passed away on May 3, 2025. Thousands of people bid farewell to Önder on his final journey with the slogan “Our word to Sırrı will be peace.”
May 8, 2025DEM Party statement on assassination suspicion.
Five days after the funeral, the DEM Party made a statement: “On April 2, the parking attendant noticed a sound coming from the tires while using Sırrı Süreyya Önder’s vehicle and took the vehicle to the service. In the examination, a sharp metal device made of iron that could puncture the left rear tire was found placed there.” After this information was shared, the question “Was an assassination carried out against Sırrı Süreyya?” began to be discussed in public opinion.
The PKK Dissolved Itself, Weapons Were Burned
May 12, 2025PKK decides to dissolve itself and lay down arms.
During the days when Önder’s mourning was observed, on May 12, 2025, the PKK announced that it had dissolved itself and laid down its arms. In its statement, the PKK said: “Our congress was held safely despite the difficult conditions in which conflicts continued, aerial and ground attacks continued, and the siege on our areas and the KDP embargo continued… The PKK has completed its historic mission. The 12th Congress of the PKK has decided to dissolve the organizational structure of the PKK and end the armed struggle method, thus ending the activities carried out under the name of the PKK.” Following this decision, many discussions for and against began in different circles, and the question “What steps will the state take?” settled on the agenda of society. In the statement from the KCK, it was announced that many forces that did not want the PKK to lay down arms wanted to meet with the KCK.
July 9, 2025Öcalan’s first video call since 1999.
Öcalan made a new call on July 9, 2025. This time, however, his call was a video call. This was Öcalan’s first video appearance since 1999. In the video, Öcalan said, “I continue to defend the Call for Peace and Democratic Society dated February 27, 2025,” and stated, “As a general aspect of the process, the voluntary laying down of arms and the comprehensive commission work to be established by law in the TBMM are important.”
July 11, 2025Peace and Democratic Society Group burns their weapons.
Based on Öcalan’s words in this video message — “Without falling into the sterility of ‘you first, me first,’ attention and sensitivity must be shown in taking steps” — the KCK took the first step. Under the leadership of KCK Executive Council Co-Chair Besê Hozat, the “Peace and Democratic Society Group,” consisting of 30 guerrillas, 15 of whom were women, burned their weapons on July 11, 2025, in a ceremony attended by many journalists and representatives of civil society organizations.
August 5, 2025First meeting of the parliamentary commission.
Following this ceremony, a 51-member commission chaired by TBMM Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş, which included political parties with groups in the Parliament (except the İYİ Party), held its first meeting on August 5 regarding the solution process. The name of the commission was determined as the “National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission.”
Developments from August 2025 to the Present
August 10, 2025Bahçeli’s statement on TV100.
On August 10, speaking to TV100, Bahçeli stated that the process would be completed by the end of the year and that the PKK’s burning of weapons carried a strong message, saying, “Weapons can be dug up again if buried; burning them means ‘we will never lay our hands on weapons again.’”
August 19, 2025White Toros incident in front of the TBMM.
On August 19, a white Toros car was set on fire in front of the TBMM before the fourth meeting of the “National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission.”
August 28, 2025DEM Party İmralı Delegation meets with Öcalan.
On August 28, the DEM Party İmralı Delegation met with Öcalan. In the statement, it was stated that Öcalan said in the meeting, “Democratic society, peace, and integration are the three key concepts of this process, and a result can be reached on this basis,” and that he emphasized “the need for a new stage in which steps are taken urgently in all dimensions.”
September 25, 2025DEM Party statement on the legal phase.
On September 25, in its statement, the DEM Party said that the commission in the Parliament was about to complete the listening phase and stated, “With the opening of the Parliament, the first phase, which we can describe as the political and social phase, will give way to the second phase, which we describe as the legal phase.” The DEM Party announced that in the second phase of the process, the commission would focus on legislative work and that they had prepared proposals on issues such as the Transitional Period Law, Enforcement Law, changes in the TMK, TCK, and CMK, trustee regulations, democratization of local governments, combating discrimination, and education in the mother tongue.
October 1, 2025President Erdoğan’s message of thanks.
On October 1, at the Opening Meeting of the 4th Legislative Year of the 28th Term of the TBMM, President Erdoğan thanked Devlet Bahçeli and the DEM Party for conducting the process.
October 7, 2025Bahçeli proposes a delegation to meet Öcalan.
At the MHP Parliamentary Group Meeting on October 7, Bahçeli suggested that a delegation of commission members meet face-to-face with Öcalan and asked Öcalan to make a call for the SDF to lay down arms.
October 13, 2025Asrın Law Office visits İmralı.
On October 13, lawyers from the Asrın Law Office visited Abdullah Öcalan on İmralı Island. Öcalan said, “The principle of hope is a step that the state must take. It needs to remove this burden. This is an issue that affects thousands of people.”
October 26, 2025KÖH announces withdrawal to Media Defense Areas.
On October 26, at a press conference organized in Kandil under the name of the Kurdistan Freedom Movement (KÖH) Administration because the PKK had dissolved itself, it was announced that all guerrilla forces posing a conflict risk within Turkey’s borders were being withdrawn to the “Media Defense Areas.” On November 17, it was announced that the armed forces had also withdrawn from the Zap area in northern Iraq. The KÖH Administration stated that it believed “this new step would serve peace and democratization in Turkey.”
November 18, 2025Bahçeli announces his intent to go to İmralı.
On November 18, Bahçeli announced in his MHP group speech that if no one met with Öcalan, he would go to İmralı with three of his friends.
November 21, 2025CHP objects as the commission votes “Yes”.
On November 21, the CHP announced that it was against the commission’s meeting with Öcalan. On the same day, the commission’s eighteenth meeting was held. In the closed session of the meeting, the proposal to meet with Öcalan was accepted with the “Yes” votes of the AK Party, MHP, DEM Party, TİP, and EMEP.
November 24, 2025Committee visits İmralı.
On November 24, a committee formed by the AK Party, MHP, and DEM Party from the “National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission” went to İmralı and met with Öcalan.
August 2, 2025First clashes between SDF and Syrian transitional government forces.
Meanwhile, from August 2025 onwards, many developments with a high probability of affecting the process in Turkey took place in Syria and Rojava. The first clashes between armed forces affiliated with the Syrian transitional government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), whose backbone is formed by Kurds, occurred on August 2, 2025, near Deyr Hafir and El-Kefse. The clashes intensified in September around Aleppo and its surroundings.
December 26, 2025Clashes begin in Şêx Meqsûd and Eşrefiye.
On December 26, clashes began between armed forces affiliated with the Syrian transitional government and Kurdish security forces in the Şêx Meqsûd and Eşrefiye neighborhoods. The parties had signed an agreement on April 1, 2025, foreseeing that only Kurdish security forces would remain in the Kurdish neighborhoods and that the SDF would withdraw from the areas it controlled in Aleppo. However, afterwards, the Damascus side accused the SDF of not complying with the agreement and deployed Syrian army tanks near the neighborhoods.
December 27, 2025SOHR reports Syrian government closing additional roads.
On December 27, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that the Syrian government had closed the additional roads leading to Şêx Meqsûd and Eşrefiye and was preventing civilians from accessing these areas.
January 4, 2026SDF and Damascus administration meeting.
On January 4, 2026, a Kurdish delegation headed by SDF General Commander Mazlum Abdi met with officials of the temporary administration in Damascus. US-led international anti-ISIS coalition commander Kevin Lambert also attended the meeting. After the meeting, it was announced that the issue of SDF integration had been discussed and that meetings would continue until a conclusion was reached.
Early January 2026Simultaneous meetings in Paris.
During the days when meetings with the SDF were held in Damascus, important meetings were also taking place in Paris. The meetings were represented by Syrian Foreign Minister Esad Şabani and Intelligence Chief Hussein Salameh for Syria, and by a delegation headed by Israel’s Washington Ambassador Yechiel Leiter for Israel. On behalf of the US, US Syria Special Envoy Tom Barrack and Trump’s advisors Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner attended the meetings. Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s presence in Paris at the same time drew attention. After the meetings, it was announced that agreements had been reached between Israel and Syria on some issues.
A few days laterSDF statement on the sabotaged Damascus meeting.
A few days later, SDF General Command member Sipan Hemo announced that the January 4 Damascus meeting had been sabotaged. Hemo said: “It was a very positive meeting. Because both sides had accepted the articles. Even the international powers wanted this development to be announced to the public. While we were talking about these, a state official whose name I will not mention entered. Seeing that the meeting was going positively, he took the intelligence officer and the Defense Minister with him and left. When they returned, they said, ‘We will not make any statement at this stage. Let’s leave it to the 7th or 8th.’ It was clear that a game was developing. But whether it was Şêx Meqsûd or another place was not yet clear. There was a smell of a game.”
Beginning of January 2026Reuters reports on the Israel-Syria deal.
According to Reuters, a series of high-level closed-door meetings were held in Damascus, Paris, and Iraq at the beginning of January. In the Paris meeting, Syrian officials asked the Israeli side to cut its support for the SDF. It was stated that the Syrian government also brought up the idea of a limited operation in some areas controlled by the SDF and that it did not encounter any reservations. In return, it was claimed that Israel had made the Damascus administration accept a series of demands, especially the demilitarization of southern Syria. Neither Syria nor the US confirmed or denied Reuters’ report.
January 7, 2026Kurdish security points declared military targets.
On January 7, 2026, the Syrian transitional government declared all Kurdish security points in the Şêx Meqsûd and Eşrefiye neighborhoods as “military targets,” and attacks on the neighborhoods increased. A major humanitarian crisis was experienced due to war crimes committed by armed persons affiliated with the Syrian Arab Army. The images of the lifeless body of Kurdish women’s security officer Deniz Çiya being thrown from a building with “Allahu Akbar” slogans created outrage among Kurds and drew strong reactions from human rights organizations.
January 8 – 11, 2026Syrian Army takes control of Aleppo province.
Following the intense clashes, the Syrian Army entered the Eşrefiye Neighborhood on January 8, 2026, and the Şêx Meqsûd Neighborhood on January 11, 2026, declaring that control in Aleppo province was in the hands of the Syrian army.
January 9, 2026EU delegation visits Damascus.
On January 9, 2026, EU Council President António Costa and EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen went to Damascus and met with Ahmed Şara. Von der Leyen announced a 620 million euro support package for Syria. While attacks on Kurdish neighborhoods continued, the EU’s visit to Damascus drew criticism in public opinion.
January 17, 2026DEM Party delegation meets with Öcalan.
On January 17, 2026, the DEM Party delegation met with Öcalan in İmralı. Öcalan, stating that he was extremely concerned due to the clashes, evaluated this situation as an attempt to undermine the Peace and Democratic Society Process.
January 17, 2026Syrian government declares a closed military zone.
On the same day, the Syrian government declared the area west of the Euphrates, including Raqqa under SDF control, a “closed military zone” and launched an attack on some areas of Tabqa. With the SDF’s announcement that it would withdraw to the east of the Euphrates, the Damascus administration announced that its forces had begun entering the city.
January 17, 2026Meeting in Erbil.
On January 17, Mazlum Abdi, Autonomous Administration Foreign Relations Co-Chair İlham Ahmed, Tom Barrack, and KDP Chairman Mesud Barzani met in Erbil. In the statement made by the Kurdistan Regional Government Presidency after the meeting, it was stated that “Both sides agreed that the only way to solve the problems peacefully and to ensure peaceful coexistence among the components of the new Syria is dialogue.”
January 18, 2026Syrian army enters Tabqa and Raqqa.
On January 18, the Syrian army took Tabqa, the Tabqa Dam, and the Tabqa Air Base. It also seized the entire eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor with all its towns and villages, as well as the oil and natural gas fields in the region. On the same day at noon, Arab tribal forces took control of Raqqa, and the Syrian army entered the city a few hours later.
January 18, 2026Ceasefire and integration agreement.
On January 18, the SDF and the Syrian transitional government agreed on a ceasefire. According to the ceasefire agreement, the Syrian transitional government would take over the military and administrative control of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa provinces. In addition, the SDF would hand over control of all oil and natural gas fields in northeastern Syria and international border crossings to the Syrian transitional government, and civilian institutions in Hasakah province would be integrated into the Syrian state.
January 19, 2026Rojava Delegation leaves the Damascus meeting.
On January 19, the Rojava Delegation headed by Mazlum Abdi met in Damascus with the Damascus Administration headed by Ahmed Şara and the US Syria Special Envoy Tom Barrack. The Rojava Delegation stated that they did not accept the new articles attempted to be added to the ceasefire agreement announced the previous day and the style attempted to be imposed as a fait accompli, and left the meeting.
January 20, 2026Global solidarity actions for Rojava.
In his statement after the inconclusive meeting, Mazlum Abdi emphasized that protecting Kurdish regions against attacks by Damascus forces was a “red line.” With the Rojava administration’s decision to resist, Kurds took to the streets on January 20 in cities across the four parts of Kurdistan and Europe, and around the world. Solidarity actions with Rojava continued uninterrupted until February, with demands for Kurdish unity marking the actions.
January 22, 2026Braid video circulates and sparks global protests.
Meanwhile, on January 22, a highly controversial video circulated on social media. In the video, Ramî El Deheş, who was in HTS, ISIS, and Turkey-backed paramilitary structures, said he had cut the braid of a deceased YPJ female fighter in Raqqa and “gifted it.” The video was met with anger and reaction in many parts of the world. Women launched a braid protest worldwide. Some women participating in the protest in Turkey were detained and arrested.
January 30, 2026Comprehensive integration agreement announced.
On January 30, a statement was published regarding the meeting that Mazlum Abdi and İlham Ahmed held with transitional government officials in Damascus. The statement announced that a comprehensive agreement had been reached including gradual military and administrative integration between the Syrian transitional government and the SDF, the establishment of a military division consisting of three brigades affiliated with the SDF, the formation of a separate brigade within a division affiliated with Aleppo province for Kobani forces, the deployment of Interior Ministry forces in Hasakah and Qamishli, the integration of local institutions into the state, guarantees of civil and educational rights for Kurdish society, and the return of displaced persons.
February 16, 2026Öcalan’s evaluation of the process.
On February 16, the DEM Party İmralı Delegation met with Öcalan. In the statement made by Öcalan through the delegation, he said: “The process we have left behind has proven our ability and power of negotiation to ensure the transition from a politics of violence and separation to democratic politics and integration in essence. The TBMM Commission report must be compatible with the basic social realities. In the future progress of the process, this quality of the commission report will be extremely important. A politics that approaches with the logic of ‘eliminating terrorism’ does not express a solution, but a lack of solution.”
February 17, 2026Commission’s 60-page report is released.
On February 17, in the 60-page report prepared by the “National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission,” topics such as the dissolution of the PKK and the process of laying down arms, and social integration were included. It was stated that legal regulations were tied to the condition of “the actual finalization of the PKK’s laying down of arms and its detection by the executive organ.”
February 28, 2026US and Israel launch air strikes on Iran.
On February 28, 2026, the US and Israel launched large-scale air strikes on Iran. In the strikes, many high-level Iranian officials, including Iran’s religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, were killed. In response, Iran’s missile attacks on US bases in the region and Israeli territory turned the war into a regional and multidimensional crisis.
February 22, 2026Formation of the Iranian Kurdistan Political Forces Alliance.
On February 22, Kurdish parties in Iran united under the name “Rojhilat Political Forces Alliance” (Iranian Kurdistan Political Forces Alliance) and formed a common front against the Iranian regime. The coalition, which included structures such as PJAK, KDP-İ, PAK, Komala, and Xebat, increased the number of parties to 6 with the participation of the Iranian Kurdistan Revolutionary Workers’ Community on March 4. Meanwhile, while claims that the US and Israel were seeking a possible alliance with the Kurds were confirmed by US sources, the Kurdish political movement’s distant and cautious statements so far drew attention.
March 4, 2026DEM Party delegation’s meeting in Ankara.
On March 4, the DEM Party delegation held a meeting in Ankara with Interior Minister Mustafa Çiftçi and Justice Minister Akın Gürlek on legal regulations.
March 11, 2026Passing of Salih Müslim.
On March 11, PYD Co-Presidency Council member Salih Müslim passed away in a hospital in Hewler where he had been receiving treatment for some time due to kidney failure. A funeral ceremony with the participation of thousands of people was held for Müslim in Qamishli.
March 21, 2026Newroz celebrations and Erdoğan’s reaction.
On March 21, Kurds celebrated Newroz with the participation of millions in many cities around the world. Öcalan’s message was read at the celebrations. In his message, Öcalan emphasized that religious, sectarian, and cultural wars had continued in the Middle East for a thousand years, and stated that “the divisions created by policies of suppression, denial, and enmity in the region today provide an excuse for imperialist interventions.” Öcalan said, “On the occasion of Newroz, it is in our hands to turn this year into a real year of freedom for all the peoples of the Middle East and to make the tradition of friendship and solidarity among peoples dominant.”
On the other hand, before and after the Newroz celebrations, a total of 170 people were detained in 15 cities on charges of “making propaganda for an organization” and “violating the Law on Meetings and Demonstrations,” and 12 of those detained in Istanbul were arrested. President Erdoğan defended the detentions and arrests by calling them “provocations trying to undermine the process.” Erdoğan described the opening of posters of Abdullah Öcalan at the celebrations and the carrying of yellow, red, and green colors in the areas as “playing with the sensitive nerves of the nation.”
March 27, 2026Öcalan evaluates the Iran crisis.
On March 27, the DEM Party İmralı Delegation met with Öcalan. Öcalan said: “This great problem we are trying to solve should not be approached narrowly. Because there are deep hegemonic plans over the Middle East. While positive developments have been experienced to some extent along with the painful situation in Syria, now the Iran war is on the agenda. Three lines have emerged in the Iran war: The first is the US-Israel line. The second is the line aimed at protecting the status quo led by Britain and some international and regional powers. The third is the line of democracy and common life that we have developed with the Peace and Democratic Society Process we defend. The developments in Iran have once again revealed the justification and importance of the process being carried out in Turkey.”
March 28, 2026AKP’s preparation for a legal commission.
On March 28, it was announced that a commission consisting of lawyers would be established under the chairmanship of AKP Group Deputy Chairman Abdulhamit Gül. AKP officials stated: “A temporary code law is targeted to be brought to the Parliament’s agenda in June or July; it will not be a general amnesty or omnibus law.”
Hegemony Competition in the Middle East
The process, which has spread over 1.5 years, began with Bahçeli’s handshake that broke the mold. As in previous periods when the possibility of a solution to the Kurdish issue increased with the start of the dialogue process, a tense picture emerged in this process as well due to military operations, trustee appointments, and arrests that continued despite the ceasefire. Especially the attacks in Rojava by both HTS and Turkey-backed groups constituted the most fragile stages of the process. On the other hand, the Turkish state’s discourses towards ending the conflicts with the PKK also continued. While the question of why the process came to the agenda at this time continues to be discussed in public opinion, the answer to the question requires first looking at analyses regarding the third world war and the new balances taking shape in the Middle East.
During the opening of Parliament on October 1, 2024, MHP Leader Devlet Bahçeli went to the DEM Party benches and shook hands with their members.
According to evaluations, with the collapse of the real socialist system, the world entered the process of a third global war; a re-sharing and hegemony struggle began among global powers. In this struggle, the basic basis of the strategic moves of hegemonic powers lies in the reality of which power focus will have control over the energy and trade monopoly. The ongoing Iran war is not evaluated separately from this context.
On this basis, one of the main transmission routes of energy is the Middle East, and the region’s energy reserves still serve as a strategic depot on a global scale. Although the limited nature of fossil fuels directs dominant actors to follow different agendas, the Middle East energy and trade route continues to maintain its strategic value for global powers. The new developments and conflicts experienced in Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey also lie behind this strategic value.
The picture revealed by the wars experienced in the last 15 years, some of which are still ongoing (especially the war picture in Syria, which is the heart of the region in terms of energy geopolitics), shows that the US-Israel alliance, which has gained the upper hand in the hegemony war, prefers to establish influence over existing structures rather than drawing new borders or establishing new states as in previous world wars. In the new order that this alliance has envisioned for the Middle East, states that “act independently” with their military and economic capabilities (at this stage, Turkey and Iran) are being weakened, made dependent, and forced to accept the roles assigned to them. Ethnic and religious identities that have suffered for years from the pressure of these monist central states in the region are being tried to be turned into “useful instruments” in the process. As a result, while an “energy and trade control order operating under Israeli patronage” is being tried to be shaped in the Middle East, the complex and dynamic structure of the region also brings many impossibilities and possibilities into the realm of possibility.
Why Was the Door of İmralı Knocked?
While the cards are being reshuffled in the Middle East, it can be said that Turkey felt the need to meet with İmralı due to internal and external conjunctural reasons. However, the fact that the call came directly and for the first time from the MHP leader, who is seen as one of the protective elements of the state, brought to the agenda the comments that the call was made to İmralı because “the survival of the state” was in question.
Statement from Imrali Island by Abdullah Ocalan and the DEM Party Delegation dated February 27, 2025
While it is expressed in various media organs that the “state’s survival” problem stems from the new Middle East order being shaped, the reasons for Turkey’s entry into a dialogue process with İmralı are listed as follows:
The first and fundamental reason is that Turkey sees the possibility of the de-facto autonomy of Rojava in Syria gaining official status in the new regional order as a risk for itself (Turkey’s 100-year Kurdish paranoia). Because this means a Kurdistan that will extend 910 km along Turkey’s entire south. In Turkey, there is a concern that this situation will affect its own map in the future. The Turkish state therefore knew that it could not participate in a process where Rojava’s international dimension was discussed while at war with the Kurds.
The second reason is that Turkey, as a country that “acts independently” in the Middle East, is concerned that “after Iran, it will be our turn.” Because Turkey’s past actions such as breaking the economic embargo on Iran, and sometimes moving away from the Western pole in the Syrian war and doing business with Russia and Iran, are among the reasons for this concern.
On the other hand, the third reason is the failure of the “Collapse Plan” initiated after the “solution table” was overturned in 2015, which aimed to end the Kurdish movement. In this war process, especially after the July 2016 coup attempt, the Turkish state, which was criticized for putting aside all the rules that make a state a state, turned into a coalition of non-normative forces. Ultimately, while political and military balances in the Middle East were shaking, Turkey, having entered an economic, legal, and social crisis in the past 10 years and weakened, was caught in this earthquake. Turkey’s calculation is to overcome this earthquake with Kurdish peace and to put the state back in order.
The fourth reason is the “imperial goals” of the AKP wing of the state. Due to Syria’s multi-identity structure, the Sunni Shara government can only gain legitimacy by recognizing the Kurds. While the position of the Kurds within Syria is being discussed, the Sunni Turkish state, which wants to establish influence over the Sunni Syrian transitional government, also aims to form a Sunni region under its own leadership (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria) instead of the weakening “Shiite crescent” (Iran, old Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis in Yemen). However, the Turkish state is aware that as long as the war with the Kurds continues, this goal cannot go beyond a wish. Turkey guarantees that this Sunni region will not have problems with Israel (with the Abraham Accords), while also promising the US, which wants the region to be opened to trade, a stable region without war with the Kurds.
The fifth reason is that the construction bourgeoisie, which has grown around the AKP for 23 years, has reached its limits within Turkey and needs a conflict-free environment together with the AKP to open up to the virgin lands of Syria. Indeed, in May 2025, a strategic 7 billion dollar cooperation agreement was signed between the Syrian Energy Ministry and Turkey’s Kalyon Holding and Cengiz Holding, Qatar’s UCC, and the US’s Power International companies. On August 6, 2025, a 4 billion dollar agreement was also made for Damascus International Airport with a consortium including Kalyon Construction, Cengiz Construction, and TAV Construction with the Syrian Civil Aviation Authority.
Reasons on the Kurdish Side
On the other hand, the question “Why now?” is answered more clearly from the Kurdish side when looking at the period after Abdullah Öcalan was brought to Turkey in 1999. Öcalan states both in the books he wrote and in the İmralı meeting notes that the PKK carried the influences of real socialism and that the PKK also experienced an ideological crisis after the collapse of the Soviets. In this context, he expresses that the PKK’s struggle will be continued with a new paradigm.
This transformation, which Öcalan calls the “democratic, ecological, women’s freedom paradigm,” takes the struggle for “democratic modernity” against capitalist modernity as its basis. Within the framework of this understanding, Öcalan opens the goal of having a state to discussion; he emphasizes that overthrowing power will not bring freedom and that seizing the state does not liberate society. He now defines revolution not as overthrowing power but as transforming mentality and way of life. Öcalan states that they have given up establishing a state, that they will give weight to social organization, that they will take confederal organization as a basis, that they aim for a structuring based on democratic autonomy in every country where Kurds live, and that they propose a Middle East Peoples’ Confederation for the Middle East. He also defines armed struggle as no longer a basic method but as one of the “self-defense” tools.
KCK Co-Chair Besê Hozat and a group of guerrillas at a weapon burning ceremony
At the stage reached, Öcalan evaluates the struggle for existence and the struggle for freedom as struggles that require different tools. Both Öcalan and the PKK state that the PKK, which proved the existence of the Kurds, has completed its duty and that the PKK has therefore been dissolved. They express that the weapon is not needed in order to deepen and spread the free sociality that they think was insufficient due to the war. In this framework, the basic reasons based on 25 years of past for Öcalan and the PKK to start this dialogue process are ideological.
The conjunctural reasons on the Kurdish side can be listed as follows:
First, while the Middle East is once again a battlefield, non-normative state forces are in the field, and Turkey does not recognize any war convention, Öcalan and the PKK are trying to eliminate the risk of Kurds suffering a massacre like the Tamils in Sri Lanka or the Palestinians in Gaza. In this regard, they want to prevent armed struggle from leading to a massacre by being used as a “terrorism” pretext in this process.
Second, Öcalan does not want the de-facto autonomous status that Rojava has had since 2012 to be blocked on the grounds of the PKK, which is on the “terrorism list” of many countries. He aims to prevent the “terrorism” pretext from being brought up in the negotiations to be held with the Damascus government so that the 14-year canton experience can be transferred to the democratic structuring of post-Assad Syria.
Third, seeing the tendency of dominant powers to use the ethnic and religious identities oppressed in the region in the new Middle East design, Öcalan and the PKK want to prevent the Kurds from being used as a “card.” In this direction, they aim to position the Kurds as a “third way” with intervention power in a chaotic environment. The Kurdistan Freedom Movement defines this “third way” not as taking sides in the fight between dominant powers, but as the construction of an alternative democratic society in the name of the peoples. Öcalan frequently states through the İmralı Delegation that he wants to protect the Kurds from war.
Fourth, Öcalan and the PKK think that Kurdistan, which was divided between four countries after the First World War (Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria), and the Kurds, who were put in a disadvantaged position by this division, have been politicized with 52 years of PKK struggle, and that this people with high mobilization can turn the division into an advantage and democratize the four countries where Kurds live. For this reason, they see a disarmed environment as essential.
What Is Turkey Waiting For?
Many sociologists, politicians, and journalists from the region who follow the Middle East and the Kurdish movement state that the nature of the Turkish state’s response to the steps taken by Öcalan has become more visible in the developments in Rojava and Syria. In the evaluations made, Turkey’s attitude adopted in the political and military picture that emerged in Syria after Assad is interpreted as preventing the formation of a new Kurdish status area that may arise against regional developments.
In the analyses, it is expressed that the reason for the state not taking steps in the process is the developments in Rojava, but after the formation of a consensus ground between the Rojava Autonomous Administration and Damascus, the issues of Shengal and Mexmûr were brought to the agenda this time. It is commented that these areas are used as a reason in Turkey’s policy production in terms of both political position and field military and diplomatic mobility. In recent times, it is stated that the agenda of Turkish officials includes the developments in Rojhilat Kurdistan and Iran, and in some evaluations, it is mentioned that steps regarding the Kurdish issue will not be taken until the course of the conflicts in Iran becomes clear. In this context, according to sources close to the government in Türkiye newspaper, unnamed sources conveyed that President Erdoğan spoke with US President Trump on the phone immediately after the Iran War and conveyed Turkey’s message that it “would not allow ‘terrorist organizations’ to be used for an attack on Iran.”
Difficulties and Risks of the Process
First of all, as can be seen, the peace in Öcalan’s mind and the peace in Turkey’s mind are different from each other. Öcalan’s approach to peace is not tactical but strategic. The Kurdistan Freedom Movement is also in synchronization with Öcalan in this approach. However, Turkey expresses the “peace” discourse for pragmatic and conjunctural reasons. When the possibility of sabotage by non-normative state forces clustered within the Turkish state and regional powers is also taken into account, this process turns into a process that must be carried out very carefully.
Head of the Syrian Transition Management Shara and SDF Commander in Chief Abdi signing the March 10 agreement / Photo: SANA
In the past few months, against the attacks in Rojava, the Kurdish base has expressed the importance of unity in every platform. Many politicians warn that if the Kurds do not develop common alliances and do not institutionalize their national unity permanently, their gains will be in danger.
On the other hand, according to Öcalan, peace is not only the silencing of weapons; it also means the construction of a democratic, ecological, and gender-liberatory way of life. In this sense, the Kurdish movement faces the test of demonstrating the ability to carry out peace negotiations and the struggle for democracy simultaneously; and at the same time, to carry out the social construction struggle that Öcalan mentioned. Social problems that Kurdistan is struggling with today, such as poverty, unemployment, and the increasing use of drugs among young people, are the most difficult stages of this test.
Immediately after the 2026 Newroz, Devlet Bahçeli’s statements regarding the legal regulations related to the process that they should not be rushed once again raised question marks in public opinion, and now the eyes have turned to the content of the legal regulations expected to be issued in April and May.
Note: This news is a direct translation from GROK AI.
İstanbul Newroz celebrations 2026 / Photo: Ömer Demir, Ajansa Welat
It has been nearly a year and a half since MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli made his statement referring to Abdullah Öcalan, calling for him to “come to the TBMM and speak at the DEM Party group meeting, and declare that terrorism has ended and the organization has been disbanded, provided his isolation is lifted.” Since that day, although many issues have been discussed in this process—which the government calls a “Terror-Free Turkey,” but which is generally referred to by some as the “Second Solution Process,” by others as the “Peace Process,” and by some simply as the “Process”—so far, only the Kurdish side has taken steps. Aside from the state and ruling wing establishing a “process” commission with the participation of all parties with parliamentary groups except one, and this commission preparing a report following a long-term working schedule, there have not yet been any concrete developments regarding the legal regulations stated to be necessary for the continuation of the process.
Many developments have taken place under the heading of the “process” from October 1, 2024, to March 31, 2026. Below, we present the comprehensive chronological information we have prepared on the subject.
Signals of the New Period
October 1, 2024Bahçeli shakes hands with DEM Party members in the Parliament.
A remarkable contact that took place on October 1, 2024, at the opening of the new legislative year of the TBMM, was interpreted as a harbinger of a “new political climate” in public opinion. Bahçeli went to the DEM Party rows and shook hands with Co-Chair Tuncer Bakırhan and other deputies. This gesture created wide repercussions both in the Parliament hall and in public opinion. When journalists asked about the meaning of this handshake, Bahçeli said, “We are entering a new era. While we want peace in the world, we must also establish peace in our own country.”
On the same day, in his speech at the General Assembly of the Parliament, President Erdoğan also used the expressions: “It must now be accepted as a fact. Today, against Israeli aggression, both at home and abroad, grounds for reconciliation must be brought to the fore rather than fields of conflict.”
October 22, 2024Bahçeli’s call to Öcalan at the group meeting.
Following these statements, on October 22, 2024, at his party’s group meeting, Bahçeli directly addressed Öcalan and made the following call: “If the isolation is lifted, let him come and speak at the DEM Party group meeting in the TBMM, and let him shout that terrorism has completely ended and the organization has been disbanded. If he shows this determination and resolve, the way for the legal regulation regarding the use of the right of hope will be opened wide… Here is the challenge, we are ready for it.”
October 24, 2024Ömer Öcalan shares message from İmralı.
On October 24, 2024, DEM Party Urfa MP Ömer Öcalan announced that they had met with Abdullah Öcalan in İmralı the previous day and shared Öcalan’s message: “The isolation continues. If the conditions are formed, I have the theoretical and practical power to pull this process from the ground of conflict and violence to the legal and political ground.”
A Process Under the Shadow of Trusteeships and Bans!
October 30, 2024Ahmet Özer’s arrest and trustee appointment.
However, these signs towards a solution and peace in the Kurdish issue were overshadowed by ongoing trustee appointments and ban decisions. The practices of the Ministry of Interior once again raised the question: “Is a solution really wanted in the Kurdish issue?”
Ahmet Özer, who was elected Mayor of Esenyurt within the scope of the “urban consensus” made between the CHP and the DEM Party in the local elections, was arrested on October 30, 2024, on charges of “membership in the PKK/KCK armed terrorist organization.” The next day, Istanbul Deputy Governor Can Aksoy was appointed as trustee in his place.
November 2024Trustees appointed to DEM Party municipalities.
Subsequently, in November 2024, trustees were appointed one after another to the DEM Party municipalities of Mardin, Batman, Urfa Halfeti, Dersim, and Van Bahçesaray, on the grounds of “terrorism” sentences against the co-mayors.
November 21, 2024New ban on lawyer visits to Öcalan.
On top of all this, on November 21, 2024, the lawyers of the Asrın Law Office, who had requested a meeting with Öcalan, learned that a new six-month ban on lawyer visits to their client Öcalan had been imposed on November 6.
November 26, 2024Bahçeli repeats his call.
On November 26, Bahçeli said at his party’s TBMM Group Meeting: “We stand exactly behind what we have said since our group meeting on October 22, 2024. We expect face-to-face contact between İmralı and the DEM Group without delay, and we repeat our call with determination.”
DEM Party Delegation in İmralı
December 28, 2024DEM Party MPs visit İmralı.
After a long period, on December 28, 2024, DEM Party MPs Sırrı Süreyya Önder and Pervin Buldan met with Öcalan in İmralı. The next day, the delegation shared Öcalan’s message with the public: “Strengthening Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood again is a historic responsibility.”
December 30, 2024KCK’s statement on the solution will.
Then, on December 30, 2024, KCK Executive Council Co-Chair Besê Hozat, in her statement to Medya Haber, said: “We stand behind the solution will shown by our Leadership. The Turkish state, the AKP-MHP government, the government and the opposition as a whole, the state itself must show a real solution will.”
January 2025İmralı Delegation holds meetings in parliament.
Throughout January 2025, the İmralı Delegation held meetings with the parties with groups in the TBMM: MHP, AKP, CHP, Future Party, DEVA Party, Felicity Party, and New Welfare Party. After these meetings, the delegation met with Öcalan for the second time on January 22, 2025.
February 13, 2025KCK announces letter from Öcalan.
On February 13, 2025, KCK Executive Council Co-Chair Cemil Bayık stated that they had received a letter from Öcalan and said, “We are carrying out a work to pull the Kurdish issue from the ground of war to the ground of democratization.” However, two days after this statement, on February 15, on the anniversary of Öcalan’s capture in Turkey, the Ministry of Interior appointed a trustee to Van Metropolitan Municipality.
February 18, 2025Operations and arrests against HDK.
While these developments were taking place, on February 18, 2025, operations were carried out against the Peoples’ Democratic Congress (HDK). A total of 52 people, including political party executives, unionists, artists, and journalists, were detained; 30 of them were arrested on February 21. HDK Co-Spokesperson Meral Danış Beştaş criticized these operations by calling them “a conspiracy against peace.”
Öcalan’s “Call for Peace and Democratic Society”
February 27, 2025Öcalan’s “Call for Peace and Democratic Society”.
The DEM Party delegation met with Öcalan in İmralı on February 27, 2025. After the meeting, the delegation shared Öcalan’s message with the public in Istanbul.
In the message titled “Call for Peace and Democratic Society,” Öcalan used the following expressions: “In this climate formed by Mr. Devlet Bahçeli’s call, Mr. President’s demonstrated will, and the positive approaches of other political parties to the known call, I am making a call to lay down arms and I take on the historic responsibility of this call. Like every contemporary society and party whose existence has not been forcibly terminated, convene your congress and decide for integration with the state and society; all groups should lay down their arms and the PKK should dissolve itself.”
March 1, 2025PKK announces a ceasefire.
Following Öcalan’s call, the PKK announced a ceasefire on March 1. In its statement, the PKK said: “To open the way for the implementation of the Call for Peace and Democratic Society, we declare a ceasefire effective from today. Beyond that, matters such as laying down arms can only be realized with the practical leadership of Leader Apo. We are ready to hold the party congress in the way Leader Apo wants. However, for this to happen, a secure environment must be formed and Leader Apo’s personal guidance and execution are required for the success of the congress.”
March 21, 2025Newroz celebrations with millions of participants.
Afterwards, Kurds celebrated Newroz 2025 on March 21 with the participation of millions of people in four parts of Kurdistan and many cities around the world. The intensity of participation in Newroz was interpreted by the Kurdish press as support for Öcalan’s call.
Imamoğlu’s Arrest, Sırrı Süreyya’s “Suspicious” Death
March 19, 2025Ekrem İmamoğlu detained and arrested.
After Newroz, the agenda was shaken by the arrest of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality President Ekrem İmamoğlu. İmamoğlu, who was detained on March 19, 2025, within the scope of investigations initiated on charges of “terrorism” and “corruption” regarding the “urban consensus,” was arrested on March 23, 2025. The Kurdish movement evaluated İmamoğlu’s arrest as a “provocative intervention” in the process.
April 15, 2025Sırrı Süreyya Önder hospitalized and passes away.
Shortly after, DEM Party Istanbul MP and İmralı delegation member Sırrı Süreyya Önder was taken to the hospital on April 15 due to a heart condition he suffered in Istanbul. Önder fought for life in intensive care for 18 days but could not be saved and passed away on May 3, 2025. Thousands of people bid farewell to Önder on his final journey with the slogan “Our word to Sırrı will be peace.”
May 8, 2025DEM Party statement on assassination suspicion.
Five days after the funeral, the DEM Party made a statement: “On April 2, the parking attendant noticed a sound coming from the tires while using Sırrı Süreyya Önder’s vehicle and took the vehicle to the service. In the examination, a sharp metal device made of iron that could puncture the left rear tire was found placed there.” After this information was shared, the question “Was an assassination carried out against Sırrı Süreyya?” began to be discussed in public opinion.
The PKK Dissolved Itself, Weapons Were Burned
May 12, 2025PKK decides to dissolve itself and lay down arms.
During the days when Önder’s mourning was observed, on May 12, 2025, the PKK announced that it had dissolved itself and laid down its arms. In its statement, the PKK said: “Our congress was held safely despite the difficult conditions in which conflicts continued, aerial and ground attacks continued, and the siege on our areas and the KDP embargo continued… The PKK has completed its historic mission. The 12th Congress of the PKK has decided to dissolve the organizational structure of the PKK and end the armed struggle method, thus ending the activities carried out under the name of the PKK.” Following this decision, many discussions for and against began in different circles, and the question “What steps will the state take?” settled on the agenda of society. In the statement from the KCK, it was announced that many forces that did not want the PKK to lay down arms wanted to meet with the KCK.
July 9, 2025Öcalan’s first video call since 1999.
Öcalan made a new call on July 9, 2025. This time, however, his call was a video call. This was Öcalan’s first video appearance since 1999. In the video, Öcalan said, “I continue to defend the Call for Peace and Democratic Society dated February 27, 2025,” and stated, “As a general aspect of the process, the voluntary laying down of arms and the comprehensive commission work to be established by law in the TBMM are important.”
July 11, 2025Peace and Democratic Society Group burns their weapons.
Based on Öcalan’s words in this video message — “Without falling into the sterility of ‘you first, me first,’ attention and sensitivity must be shown in taking steps” — the KCK took the first step. Under the leadership of KCK Executive Council Co-Chair Besê Hozat, the “Peace and Democratic Society Group,” consisting of 30 guerrillas, 15 of whom were women, burned their weapons on July 11, 2025, in a ceremony attended by many journalists and representatives of civil society organizations.
August 5, 2025First meeting of the parliamentary commission.
Following this ceremony, a 51-member commission chaired by TBMM Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş, which included political parties with groups in the Parliament (except the İYİ Party), held its first meeting on August 5 regarding the solution process. The name of the commission was determined as the “National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission.”
Developments from August 2025 to the Present
August 10, 2025Bahçeli’s statement on TV100.
On August 10, speaking to TV100, Bahçeli stated that the process would be completed by the end of the year and that the PKK’s burning of weapons carried a strong message, saying, “Weapons can be dug up again if buried; burning them means ‘we will never lay our hands on weapons again.’”
August 19, 2025White Toros incident in front of the TBMM.
On August 19, a white Toros car was set on fire in front of the TBMM before the fourth meeting of the “National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission.”
August 28, 2025DEM Party İmralı Delegation meets with Öcalan.
On August 28, the DEM Party İmralı Delegation met with Öcalan. In the statement, it was stated that Öcalan said in the meeting, “Democratic society, peace, and integration are the three key concepts of this process, and a result can be reached on this basis,” and that he emphasized “the need for a new stage in which steps are taken urgently in all dimensions.”
September 25, 2025DEM Party statement on the legal phase.
On September 25, in its statement, the DEM Party said that the commission in the Parliament was about to complete the listening phase and stated, “With the opening of the Parliament, the first phase, which we can describe as the political and social phase, will give way to the second phase, which we describe as the legal phase.” The DEM Party announced that in the second phase of the process, the commission would focus on legislative work and that they had prepared proposals on issues such as the Transitional Period Law, Enforcement Law, changes in the TMK, TCK, and CMK, trustee regulations, democratization of local governments, combating discrimination, and education in the mother tongue.
October 1, 2025President Erdoğan’s message of thanks.
On October 1, at the Opening Meeting of the 4th Legislative Year of the 28th Term of the TBMM, President Erdoğan thanked Devlet Bahçeli and the DEM Party for conducting the process.
October 7, 2025Bahçeli proposes a delegation to meet Öcalan.
At the MHP Parliamentary Group Meeting on October 7, Bahçeli suggested that a delegation of commission members meet face-to-face with Öcalan and asked Öcalan to make a call for the SDF to lay down arms.
October 13, 2025Asrın Law Office visits İmralı.
On October 13, lawyers from the Asrın Law Office visited Abdullah Öcalan on İmralı Island. Öcalan said, “The principle of hope is a step that the state must take. It needs to remove this burden. This is an issue that affects thousands of people.”
October 26, 2025KÖH announces withdrawal to Media Defense Areas.
On October 26, at a press conference organized in Kandil under the name of the Kurdistan Freedom Movement (KÖH) Administration because the PKK had dissolved itself, it was announced that all guerrilla forces posing a conflict risk within Turkey’s borders were being withdrawn to the “Media Defense Areas.” On November 17, it was announced that the armed forces had also withdrawn from the Zap area in northern Iraq. The KÖH Administration stated that it believed “this new step would serve peace and democratization in Turkey.”
November 18, 2025Bahçeli announces his intent to go to İmralı.
On November 18, Bahçeli announced in his MHP group speech that if no one met with Öcalan, he would go to İmralı with three of his friends.
November 21, 2025CHP objects as the commission votes “Yes”.
On November 21, the CHP announced that it was against the commission’s meeting with Öcalan. On the same day, the commission’s eighteenth meeting was held. In the closed session of the meeting, the proposal to meet with Öcalan was accepted with the “Yes” votes of the AK Party, MHP, DEM Party, TİP, and EMEP.
November 24, 2025Committee visits İmralı.
On November 24, a committee formed by the AK Party, MHP, and DEM Party from the “National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission” went to İmralı and met with Öcalan.
August 2, 2025First clashes between SDF and Syrian transitional government forces.
Meanwhile, from August 2025 onwards, many developments with a high probability of affecting the process in Turkey took place in Syria and Rojava. The first clashes between armed forces affiliated with the Syrian transitional government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), whose backbone is formed by Kurds, occurred on August 2, 2025, near Deyr Hafir and El-Kefse. The clashes intensified in September around Aleppo and its surroundings.
December 26, 2025Clashes begin in Şêx Meqsûd and Eşrefiye.
On December 26, clashes began between armed forces affiliated with the Syrian transitional government and Kurdish security forces in the Şêx Meqsûd and Eşrefiye neighborhoods. The parties had signed an agreement on April 1, 2025, foreseeing that only Kurdish security forces would remain in the Kurdish neighborhoods and that the SDF would withdraw from the areas it controlled in Aleppo. However, afterwards, the Damascus side accused the SDF of not complying with the agreement and deployed Syrian army tanks near the neighborhoods.
December 27, 2025SOHR reports Syrian government closing additional roads.
On December 27, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that the Syrian government had closed the additional roads leading to Şêx Meqsûd and Eşrefiye and was preventing civilians from accessing these areas.
January 4, 2026SDF and Damascus administration meeting.
On January 4, 2026, a Kurdish delegation headed by SDF General Commander Mazlum Abdi met with officials of the temporary administration in Damascus. US-led international anti-ISIS coalition commander Kevin Lambert also attended the meeting. After the meeting, it was announced that the issue of SDF integration had been discussed and that meetings would continue until a conclusion was reached.
Early January 2026Simultaneous meetings in Paris.
During the days when meetings with the SDF were held in Damascus, important meetings were also taking place in Paris. The meetings were represented by Syrian Foreign Minister Esad Şabani and Intelligence Chief Hussein Salameh for Syria, and by a delegation headed by Israel’s Washington Ambassador Yechiel Leiter for Israel. On behalf of the US, US Syria Special Envoy Tom Barrack and Trump’s advisors Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner attended the meetings. Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s presence in Paris at the same time drew attention. After the meetings, it was announced that agreements had been reached between Israel and Syria on some issues.
A few days laterSDF statement on the sabotaged Damascus meeting.
A few days later, SDF General Command member Sipan Hemo announced that the January 4 Damascus meeting had been sabotaged. Hemo said: “It was a very positive meeting. Because both sides had accepted the articles. Even the international powers wanted this development to be announced to the public. While we were talking about these, a state official whose name I will not mention entered. Seeing that the meeting was going positively, he took the intelligence officer and the Defense Minister with him and left. When they returned, they said, ‘We will not make any statement at this stage. Let’s leave it to the 7th or 8th.’ It was clear that a game was developing. But whether it was Şêx Meqsûd or another place was not yet clear. There was a smell of a game.”
Beginning of January 2026Reuters reports on the Israel-Syria deal.
According to Reuters, a series of high-level closed-door meetings were held in Damascus, Paris, and Iraq at the beginning of January. In the Paris meeting, Syrian officials asked the Israeli side to cut its support for the SDF. It was stated that the Syrian government also brought up the idea of a limited operation in some areas controlled by the SDF and that it did not encounter any reservations. In return, it was claimed that Israel had made the Damascus administration accept a series of demands, especially the demilitarization of southern Syria. Neither Syria nor the US confirmed or denied Reuters’ report.
January 7, 2026Kurdish security points declared military targets.
On January 7, 2026, the Syrian transitional government declared all Kurdish security points in the Şêx Meqsûd and Eşrefiye neighborhoods as “military targets,” and attacks on the neighborhoods increased. A major humanitarian crisis was experienced due to war crimes committed by armed persons affiliated with the Syrian Arab Army. The images of the lifeless body of Kurdish women’s security officer Deniz Çiya being thrown from a building with “Allahu Akbar” slogans created outrage among Kurds and drew strong reactions from human rights organizations.
January 8 – 11, 2026Syrian Army takes control of Aleppo province.
Following the intense clashes, the Syrian Army entered the Eşrefiye Neighborhood on January 8, 2026, and the Şêx Meqsûd Neighborhood on January 11, 2026, declaring that control in Aleppo province was in the hands of the Syrian army.
January 9, 2026EU delegation visits Damascus.
On January 9, 2026, EU Council President António Costa and EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen went to Damascus and met with Ahmed Şara. Von der Leyen announced a 620 million euro support package for Syria. While attacks on Kurdish neighborhoods continued, the EU’s visit to Damascus drew criticism in public opinion.
January 17, 2026DEM Party delegation meets with Öcalan.
On January 17, 2026, the DEM Party delegation met with Öcalan in İmralı. Öcalan, stating that he was extremely concerned due to the clashes, evaluated this situation as an attempt to undermine the Peace and Democratic Society Process.
January 17, 2026Syrian government declares a closed military zone.
On the same day, the Syrian government declared the area west of the Euphrates, including Raqqa under SDF control, a “closed military zone” and launched an attack on some areas of Tabqa. With the SDF’s announcement that it would withdraw to the east of the Euphrates, the Damascus administration announced that its forces had begun entering the city.
January 17, 2026Meeting in Erbil.
On January 17, Mazlum Abdi, Autonomous Administration Foreign Relations Co-Chair İlham Ahmed, Tom Barrack, and KDP Chairman Mesud Barzani met in Erbil. In the statement made by the Kurdistan Regional Government Presidency after the meeting, it was stated that “Both sides agreed that the only way to solve the problems peacefully and to ensure peaceful coexistence among the components of the new Syria is dialogue.”
January 18, 2026Syrian army enters Tabqa and Raqqa.
On January 18, the Syrian army took Tabqa, the Tabqa Dam, and the Tabqa Air Base. It also seized the entire eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor with all its towns and villages, as well as the oil and natural gas fields in the region. On the same day at noon, Arab tribal forces took control of Raqqa, and the Syrian army entered the city a few hours later.
January 18, 2026Ceasefire and integration agreement.
On January 18, the SDF and the Syrian transitional government agreed on a ceasefire. According to the ceasefire agreement, the Syrian transitional government would take over the military and administrative control of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa provinces. In addition, the SDF would hand over control of all oil and natural gas fields in northeastern Syria and international border crossings to the Syrian transitional government, and civilian institutions in Hasakah province would be integrated into the Syrian state.
January 19, 2026Rojava Delegation leaves the Damascus meeting.
On January 19, the Rojava Delegation headed by Mazlum Abdi met in Damascus with the Damascus Administration headed by Ahmed Şara and the US Syria Special Envoy Tom Barrack. The Rojava Delegation stated that they did not accept the new articles attempted to be added to the ceasefire agreement announced the previous day and the style attempted to be imposed as a fait accompli, and left the meeting.
January 20, 2026Global solidarity actions for Rojava.
In his statement after the inconclusive meeting, Mazlum Abdi emphasized that protecting Kurdish regions against attacks by Damascus forces was a “red line.” With the Rojava administration’s decision to resist, Kurds took to the streets on January 20 in cities across the four parts of Kurdistan and Europe, and around the world. Solidarity actions with Rojava continued uninterrupted until February, with demands for Kurdish unity marking the actions.
January 22, 2026Braid video circulates and sparks global protests.
Meanwhile, on January 22, a highly controversial video circulated on social media. In the video, Ramî El Deheş, who was in HTS, ISIS, and Turkey-backed paramilitary structures, said he had cut the braid of a deceased YPJ female fighter in Raqqa and “gifted it.” The video was met with anger and reaction in many parts of the world. Women launched a braid protest worldwide. Some women participating in the protest in Turkey were detained and arrested.
January 30, 2026Comprehensive integration agreement announced.
On January 30, a statement was published regarding the meeting that Mazlum Abdi and İlham Ahmed held with transitional government officials in Damascus. The statement announced that a comprehensive agreement had been reached including gradual military and administrative integration between the Syrian transitional government and the SDF, the establishment of a military division consisting of three brigades affiliated with the SDF, the formation of a separate brigade within a division affiliated with Aleppo province for Kobani forces, the deployment of Interior Ministry forces in Hasakah and Qamishli, the integration of local institutions into the state, guarantees of civil and educational rights for Kurdish society, and the return of displaced persons.
February 16, 2026Öcalan’s evaluation of the process.
On February 16, the DEM Party İmralı Delegation met with Öcalan. In the statement made by Öcalan through the delegation, he said: “The process we have left behind has proven our ability and power of negotiation to ensure the transition from a politics of violence and separation to democratic politics and integration in essence. The TBMM Commission report must be compatible with the basic social realities. In the future progress of the process, this quality of the commission report will be extremely important. A politics that approaches with the logic of ‘eliminating terrorism’ does not express a solution, but a lack of solution.”
February 17, 2026Commission’s 60-page report is released.
On February 17, in the 60-page report prepared by the “National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission,” topics such as the dissolution of the PKK and the process of laying down arms, and social integration were included. It was stated that legal regulations were tied to the condition of “the actual finalization of the PKK’s laying down of arms and its detection by the executive organ.”
February 28, 2026US and Israel launch air strikes on Iran.
On February 28, 2026, the US and Israel launched large-scale air strikes on Iran. In the strikes, many high-level Iranian officials, including Iran’s religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, were killed. In response, Iran’s missile attacks on US bases in the region and Israeli territory turned the war into a regional and multidimensional crisis.
February 22, 2026Formation of the Iranian Kurdistan Political Forces Alliance.
On February 22, Kurdish parties in Iran united under the name “Rojhilat Political Forces Alliance” (Iranian Kurdistan Political Forces Alliance) and formed a common front against the Iranian regime. The coalition, which included structures such as PJAK, KDP-İ, PAK, Komala, and Xebat, increased the number of parties to 6 with the participation of the Iranian Kurdistan Revolutionary Workers’ Community on March 4. Meanwhile, while claims that the US and Israel were seeking a possible alliance with the Kurds were confirmed by US sources, the Kurdish political movement’s distant and cautious statements so far drew attention.
March 4, 2026DEM Party delegation’s meeting in Ankara.
On March 4, the DEM Party delegation held a meeting in Ankara with Interior Minister Mustafa Çiftçi and Justice Minister Akın Gürlek on legal regulations.
March 11, 2026Passing of Salih Müslim.
On March 11, PYD Co-Presidency Council member Salih Müslim passed away in a hospital in Hewler where he had been receiving treatment for some time due to kidney failure. A funeral ceremony with the participation of thousands of people was held for Müslim in Qamishli.
March 21, 2026Newroz celebrations and Erdoğan’s reaction.
On March 21, Kurds celebrated Newroz with the participation of millions in many cities around the world. Öcalan’s message was read at the celebrations. In his message, Öcalan emphasized that religious, sectarian, and cultural wars had continued in the Middle East for a thousand years, and stated that “the divisions created by policies of suppression, denial, and enmity in the region today provide an excuse for imperialist interventions.” Öcalan said, “On the occasion of Newroz, it is in our hands to turn this year into a real year of freedom for all the peoples of the Middle East and to make the tradition of friendship and solidarity among peoples dominant.”
On the other hand, before and after the Newroz celebrations, a total of 170 people were detained in 15 cities on charges of “making propaganda for an organization” and “violating the Law on Meetings and Demonstrations,” and 12 of those detained in Istanbul were arrested. President Erdoğan defended the detentions and arrests by calling them “provocations trying to undermine the process.” Erdoğan described the opening of posters of Abdullah Öcalan at the celebrations and the carrying of yellow, red, and green colors in the areas as “playing with the sensitive nerves of the nation.”
March 27, 2026Öcalan evaluates the Iran crisis.
On March 27, the DEM Party İmralı Delegation met with Öcalan. Öcalan said: “This great problem we are trying to solve should not be approached narrowly. Because there are deep hegemonic plans over the Middle East. While positive developments have been experienced to some extent along with the painful situation in Syria, now the Iran war is on the agenda. Three lines have emerged in the Iran war: The first is the US-Israel line. The second is the line aimed at protecting the status quo led by Britain and some international and regional powers. The third is the line of democracy and common life that we have developed with the Peace and Democratic Society Process we defend. The developments in Iran have once again revealed the justification and importance of the process being carried out in Turkey.”
March 28, 2026AKP’s preparation for a legal commission.
On March 28, it was announced that a commission consisting of lawyers would be established under the chairmanship of AKP Group Deputy Chairman Abdulhamit Gül. AKP officials stated: “A temporary code law is targeted to be brought to the Parliament’s agenda in June or July; it will not be a general amnesty or omnibus law.”
