The Kurdish Question: Ankara’s changing actors over 48 years

The Kurdish question, discussed under the heading of the PKK and leaving its mark on the last 48 years of Turkey, has outlasted numerous presidents, dozens of prime ministers, governments, ministers of interior and foreign affairs, and chiefs of general staff. Throughout this period, spanning from 1978 to February 27, 2025, Abdullah Öcalan has remained the unchanging actor on the other side of this issue.

Photo: Niha+

Despite having a history of over a century, the Kurdish question—debated alongside the PKK’s prominence in the last fifty years of Turkish history—is not merely a chronology of conflict; it serves as a mirror reflecting how the state’s institutional structure and mode of governance have transformed.

Consequently, the recent political history of Turkey, covering this 48-year span, is on one hand the history of the transformation of the Kurdish question—oscillating between “denial,” “annihilation,” “dialogue,” and the “securitarian status quo”—and on the other, a history of statistics showing the turnover of countless governments, presidents, prime ministers, and ministers.

Throughout these 48 years, which the state has characterized in official discourse primarily through the rhetoric of “terrorism” rather than as the Kurdish question, the common point of almost all ministers from various parties has been the emphasis on “fighting until the last terrorist.” From the day the PKK was founded—an event Süleyman Demirel described as the “29th Kurdish Rebellion” and widely viewed as a result of the Kurdish question—until the day it announced its dissolution, the issue was portrayed by the state as “terrorism.” From the military boots of September 12 to today’s cross-border doctrine utilizing UCAVs (SİHAs), there has been a consistent effort to squeeze the Kurdish issue into a parenthesis of “annihilation and public order.”

THE ANKARA RECORD & MEMORY ARCHIVE: 1978 – 2026

Focal & Process Actors
Abdullah Öcalan
1978 – Present Abdullah Öcalan
The focal point of the process from Fis to İmralı. In 2025, he issued the historic call for the organization’s dissolution.
Devlet Bahçeli
1997 – Present Devlet Bahçeli
Untied the 48-year-old knot in late 2024 with his move: “Let İmralı address the Parliament.”
Presidency and Leadership
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
2003 – 2026 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
The primary executive who steered the issue from “The Kurdish problem is my problem” to a “Survival issue,” leading to the 2025 finale.
Turgut Özal
1989 – 1993 Turgut Özal
The first civilian move to break the taboo. The first leader to discuss the possibility of dialogue with the PKK at the state level.
Süleyman Demirel
1991 – 2000 Süleyman Demirel
The state mind who acknowledged the “Kurdish Reality” yet became the architect of OHAL and rigid security-oriented policies.
Security & Responsibility Milestones
Mehmet Ağar
1996 Mehmet Ağar
The era of “a thousand operations.” Central figure in dark networks and the famous “If I pull one brick, the wall collapses” metaphor.
Süleyman Soylu
2016 – 2023 Süleyman Soylu
The figure who prioritized security over the ballot box through the trustee regime and the “neutralization beyond borders” doctrine.
Hakan Fidan
2010 – 2026 Hakan Fidan
The most critical political mind in back-door diplomacy, overseeing both the peace attempts and operations from Oslo to the present.
* This chart is a summary of political records compiled from NihaPlus’s official archives.

From Fis to September 12: Ankara’s Public Order’ parenthesis

The foundation of one of the most significant periods of the Kurdish issue in modern history was laid on November 27, 1978, with the establishment of the PKK in the village of Fis in Diyarbakır’s Lice district. Abdullah Öcalan and 21 founding members from the structure known as the “Apocular” (Apoists) before 1978 attended this meeting, which is considered the PKK’s first congress. The ideological roots of the PKK are based on the political line Öcalan shaped at Ankara University in the 1970s. Öcalan’s organizational background began in 1974 with the Ankara Democratic Higher Education Association, a Marxist structure.

During this period, Turkey was debating an agenda dominated by economic crises and clashes between right-wing groups and a strong revolutionary structure led by students. At that time, Ankara was in a climate of crisis under the supervision of President Fahri Korutürk, where political will was constantly shaken. The 42nd government led by Bülent Ecevit, followed by the 43rd led by Süleyman Demirel, treated the Kurdish issue as a technical file within the scope of “separatist activities” during their short-lived administrations, just as their predecessors had. Interior Ministers İrfan Özaydınlı and Hasan Fehmi Güneş (Ecevit era) handled the Kurdish people’s search for rights and increasing pressure in the region within the framework of “separatist activity” and “public order issues.” It was not accepted in the “official” agenda of the state or the government that these events were a result of the Kurdish question.

In 1979, when activity on the Urfa-Siverek line caught the attention of the security bureaucracy, the Interior Ministry in Demirel’s cabinet was held by Mustafa Gülcügil, while the Foreign Ministry was held by Gündüz Ökçün and later Hayrettin Erkmen. During this period, an intense conflict broke out between the PKK and certain tribes in the region associated with political powers in Ankara. The “Apocular,” as they were known then, began to appear in newspaper headlines daily and became the primary agenda item for civil and military administrators.

The political spectrum was alternating between Ecevit and Demirel governments. At the very center of this political circulation, every moment civilian politics failed to produce solutions, the space for military tutelage—represented by Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren—expanded further. While Ankara’s actors presented the matter as “marginal groups associated with the dissolution of feudalism,” democratic channels were rapidly closing, and Turkey was drifting toward the darkness of September 12—a period that would be etched into memory with grave rights violations like those at Diyarbakır Prison No. 5. As this half-century parenthesis opened and actors in Ankara changed, the dimensions of the problem and the official approach deepened.

The 1980s: Coup, denial, and the Atrocity of Diyarbakır No. 5

The military coup of September 12, 1980, represents more than a breaking point in Turkey’s political history; it is a dark milestone where the Kurdish question was completely severed from the ground of democratic solutions. The administration of General Kenan Evren, who took over the junta leadership, positioned Kurdish identity not just as a “public order” issue, but as a direct “political threat” to the survival of the state. This period turned into a systematic process of oppression where the most fundamental human rights of Kurds were suspended, the mother tongue was banned, and identity demands were put through severe torture racks.

During these years when democratic politics were liquidated, Prime Minister Bülend Ulusu and Interior Minister Selahattin Demircioğlu took their places in history as the executive figures of this oppressive regime built by military tutelage. In this phase, where Kurds were redefined as “Mountain Turks” in the state’s core memory, the bureaucracy under Ulusu and Demircioğlu attempted to justify rights violations on the ground as “state discipline.” However, every repressive practice implemented by these administrations only deepened the problem.

The real center of tragedy during this period was the Diyarbakır No. 5 Military Prison, which functioned not just as a prison but as a “radicalization laboratory.” While the inhuman tortures carried out under the orders of Kenan Evren and the junta administration left indelible marks on the memory of the Kurdish political movement, Ankara’s actors reported this brutality under the heading of “discipline.” İlter Türkmen held the Foreign Ministry seat, and the coup administration sought “understanding for the coup” from the international community. The efforts of the coup administration, both inside and outside Turkey, served to transform denial into a constitutional text (the 1982 Constitution) rather than solving the problem.

Throughout the 1980s, the names passing through these seats signed off on decisions banning Kurdish identity, thereby preparing not for a solution, but for the most violent phase of the conflict (the 1984 Eruh-Şemdinli attacks). The wreckage handed over from Bülend Ulusu to Turgut Özal was not just a public order file, but a reality of a Turkey where millions were uprooted and the sense of democratic belonging was severely damaged. While these “temporary” cadres of Ankara tried to negate identity under the boots of September 12, they took their places in the dusty pages of history as the primary architects of that massive parenthesis that remains unresolved today.

The 1990s: Peak of conflict, OHAL, and evacuated villages

The 1990s constituted the bloodiest period of the Turkey-PKK conflict. This decade was marked by the premierships of Süleyman Demirel and Tansu Çiller, and the term of Doğan Güreş as Chief of General Staff. Within the framework of the State of Emergency (OHAL) applications covering the Kurdish geography, the state resorted to large-scale security operations. During this period, many names passed through the Ministry of Interior, from İsmet Sezgin to Mehmet Ağar and Meral Akşener.

This decade witnessed politicians developing a new concept alongside “security bosses.” The interior ministry seat, handed from İsmet Sezgin to Mehmet Ağar, was now the headquarters for “extra-routine” operations. The evacuation of 3,428 villages and “unsolved” extrajudicial murders showed that Ankara approached the matter with a policy of “annihilation.” Ağar’s famous later words, “If I pull one brick, the wall will collapse,” summarized the state memory of that era.

According to a report prepared by the TBMM (Grand National Assembly of Turkey) in 1998, it was documented that 3,428 villages and hamlets were evacuated and approximately 500,000 people were forcibly displaced. According to some political parties and NGOs, these figures are higher: 4,000 settlements evacuated and nearly 3.5 million citizens forced into internal migration. The Human Rights Association (İHD), in a report submitted to a commission established in the TBMM in 2025, documented that a total of 36,409 people, including 9,454 civilians, lost their lives in the conflict process covering the 1991-2024 period.

One of the most important political ruptures of this picture occurred in 1993. Turgut Özal was in the presidency. On one hand, Özal represented a pragmatic dilemma: he activated traditional public order language and securitarian instruments like village guards by labeling the group as “a handful of bandits,” while on the other, he pushed taboo dialogue channels with an emphasis on “Kurdish reality.” Özal went down in history as one of the rare leaders who did not publicly exclude the possibility of dialogue with the PKK. The PKK declared a ceasefire in March. However, this window closed with Özal’s sudden death in April. Immediately after Özal’s death, on May 24, 1993, 33 unarmed soldiers in civilian clothes were killed on the Bingöl-Elazığ highway. The incident effectively meant the end of the unilateral PKK ceasefire declared up to that date. With Tansu Çiller (50th Government) taking the Prime Ministry, security policy shifted to a harsher line. The wave of “unsolved” murders that began after Çiller’s statement, “We have a list of Kurdish businessmen who help the PKK,” became the dark legacy of the 1990s.

The 2000s: EU Process, “Democratic Opening and Oslo Talks

The year 1999 became a multi-layered turning point where the Kurdish issue evolved on both legal and political levels. During the 56th and 57th governments led by Bülent Ecevit, the bringing of Abdullah Öcalan to Turkey slowed the pace of conflicts on the ground but left Ankara’s democratic solution capacity facing a new test. When the trial system established on İmralı Island combined with the pressure created by the EU membership process, Turkey undertook a radical legal transformation, such as the abolition of the death penalty. While Interior Ministers Sadettin Tantan and Rüştü Kazım Yücelen, along with Foreign Minister İsmail Cem, tried to bring the legal framework of the issue closer to international standards, the lifespan of their politics was not yet enough to turn these reforms into a social peace project.

The AKP coming to power in 2002 created a pragmatic curve in the state’s traditional securitarian language. Following President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, Abdullah Gül’s ascent to the Çankaya Mansion initiated a new climate where the term “Kurdish issue” was articulated at the highest level in Ankara. The “Democratic Opening,” which materialized with Gül’s March 2009 statement that “Good things will happen,” was presented as a comprehensive policy package under the coordination of Interior Minister Beşir Atalay. However, this civilian search could not avoid colliding with the ancient tension between the status quo in the state’s core structure and the demands for democratic reform.

During the same period, behind the scenes, a secret diplomatic traffic with KCK executives—which included MIT Undersecretary Hakan Fidan and reached the public as the “Oslo Talks”—documented Ankara’s search for an interlocutor for a solution. While the entry of 34 PKK members through the Habur Border Gate on October 19, 2009, welcomed by tens of thousands of people, revived hopes for social peace, the failure of political actors to ground this process on a constitutional basis deepened the crisis. While the echoes of Habur were still ongoing, the Constitutional Court’s closure of the Democratic Society Party (DTP) in December 2009 meant the blocking of democratic political channels through judicial intervention.

In this ten-year process, names like Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, Hilmi Özkök, Yaşar Büyükanıt, and İlker Başbuğ, who changed in the seat of the Chief of General Staff, along with the interior ministry seat handed from Abdülkadir Aksu to Beşir Atalay, left their places to new ones as “temporary actors” at the end of their terms. Although Ankara tried to expand the field of rights with European Union harmonization laws, every reform step, to the extent it was not crowned with a democratic constitution, was abandoned once again to securitarian reflexes and judicial obstacles.

2013–2015: Solution Process and the Dolmabahçe Agreement

At the beginning of 2013, a new link in state-PKK negotiations began. This time, the process was conducted more transparently: HDP’s İmralı delegation held meetings with Öcalan. On March 21, 2013, Öcalan’s letter was read at the Diyarbakır Newroz. The most concrete output of the process featured Deputy Prime Minister Yalçın Akdoğan and Interior Minister Efkan Ala at the center of the dialogue traffic with the HDP delegation. The Dolmabahçe Agreement, announced on February 28, 2015, was the most concrete threshold in these actors’ search for a solution. However, President Erdoğan’s announcement that he did not recognize the agreement and the shifting political balances after the June 2015 elections brought an end to the policies carried out by these names. As Efkan Ala and Yalçın Akdoğan were gradually moved away from decision-making mechanisms with the end of the solution process, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu also became part of this circulation by handing his seat to Binali Yıldırım.

Post-2016: Anatomy of the trustee (Kayyım) policy

The State of Emergency (OHAL) declared after 2016 and the change in the system initiated a period where Ankara reinforced its “securitarian” doctrine with new names. Süleyman Soylu, who took the Interior Ministry seat, operated the regulation added to the Municipality Law via Decree-Law (KHK) No. 674, continuing the policy of appointing trustees (kayyım) in place of elected mayors for seven years. During the Soylu era, the tension between the right to democratic representation and the security bureaucracy was managed through judicial and operational processes. After Soylu handed over the duty to Ali Yerlikaya in 2023, Ankara continued cross-border operations with military strategies under the management of Minister of National Defense Hulusi Akar and Chief of General Staff Yaşar Güler.

The registration of the local will in the region in favor of the DEM Party as a result of the 2024 local elections showed that despite the dozens of prime ministers, interior, and foreign ministers who changed over this 48-year process, the issue maintained its ground of social legitimacy. Today, the process under the management of Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and Interior Minister Ali Yerlikaya constitutes the most current link of that historical parenthesis where actors have changed rapidly since 1978, but solution methods have failed to achieve constitutional status.

2025 and beyond: The Dissolution” call and the question remaining uncertain

The autumn of 2024 was a turning point where a new political language, diverging from the state’s traditional security policies, was established in Ankara. The move by MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli from the parliament podium went down in record as an initiative that moved the ground of interlocution for the decades-long conflict directly to İmralı. Following this declaration of political will, on February 27, 2025, Abdullah Öcalan made an open call to the PKK to end the armed struggle and dissolve the organizational structure. Responding to this call at its 12th Congress held on May 5–7, 2025, the organization announced the decision to terminate activities carried out under the name “PKK” since November 27, 1978.

With the announcement of dissolution, although the matter was moved back to the parliamentary floor, the tension between political will and the state’s institutional memory persisted. The text prepared by the commission established within the Parliament and tasked with reporting the process could not step outside the traditional state language regarding the naming of the solution. The fact that the definition “Kurdish issue” was not included in the report was evaluated by human rights defenders and political subjects as an institutional obstacle to meeting the issue on constitutional grounds. Abdullah Öcalan, in a message published on the first anniversary of the dissolution decision (February 2026), emphasized that the February 27, 2025 call was a declaration that the choice was clearly made in favor of politics.

In this 48-year process stretching from 1978 to 2026, Turkey outlasted many prime ministers and dozens of interior ministers before reaching the final stage under the administration of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Interior Minister Ali Yerlikaya, and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. This half-century record, where political actors changed rapidly and various discourses—from the promise of “fighting until the last terrorist” to the “call for dissolution in parliament”—were tried, has once again confirmed the transience of names. Today, in the new picture formed after the dissolution of the PKK, Ankara continues to face the reality that the solution lies not just in the change of names and offices, but in that democratic and constitutional transformation of mindset that dozens of governments have postponed.

Written but unimplemented reports

The recent political history of Turkey is also a history of “written but unimplemented” reports. Historian Mehmet Bayrak describes the Kurdish question from the state’s perspective as: “The state mind is a denier and refuser on the official plane, but a confessor and acceptor on the secret plane.” From the public order bulletins of the Ministry of Interior since 1978 to the thousands of pages of minutes from Parliamentary Research Commissions, every document actually offers an anatomy of a non-solution. These reports, prepared by the state’s own institutions, also reveal what has been sacrificed under the heading of “combating terrorism.”

The 1990s were years when the state took to the field not only with weapons but with “extra-routine” structures. The Parliamentary Commission for the Investigation of Unsolved Murders established in 1993 reflected only the tip of the iceberg. The data reached by the commission documented the field equivalent of Mehmet Ağar’s “thousand operations” remark. However, the true symbol of the Ağar era was that famous metaphor describing the web of dark relations within the state: “If I pull one brick, the wall will collapse.” The Ministry of Interior shelved the files investigating structures like JİTEM behind this wall by placing them under the scope of “state secrets.”

According to the report, a large portion of the murders in the region, especially between 1992 and 1994, were committed by “uncontrolled forces within the state.” However, instead of taking action on these reports, the Ministry of Interior shelved the files targeting structures like JİTEM by classifying them as “state secrets.” These reports today still demonstrate the significance of the Saturday Mothers’ search for justice at Galatasaray Square.

Reports prepared in the second half of the 1990s revealed the social cost of the Ministry of Interior’s “secured zone” strategy. Village evacuations, which gained momentum after Turgut Özal’s death, resulted in more than 3,000 settlements being wiped off the map by 1997. According to the TBMM Migration Commission Report (1998), approximately 1 million people were displaced. While the Interior Ministers of the period tried to present this wave of migration as “voluntary,” the reports of NGOs (İHD, MAZLUMDER) recorded for history the burned crops, the shot livestock, and the imposition of “either become a village guard or leave.”

Work carried out under the coordination of Beşir Atalay during the AKP era’s “Democratic Opening” process acknowledged that the problem was not just a public order issue, yet it did not turn into a concrete result. Concepts like “integration,” “cultural rights in the mother tongue,” and “strengthening local governments” appeared in these studies. However, when these concepts collided with the state’s traditional red lines (concerns over the unitary structure), they were replaced by “operational” reports again starting from 2011. The “Wise People Delegation Reports” prepared during the 2013-2015 Solution Process showed that a large part of society was ready for peace, but the “trust” issue could not be overcome.

Post-2016, the content of reports was entirely built upon “justifying the appointment of trustees.” During the Süleyman Soylu era, attempts were made to legalize the trustee regime by defining elected mayors as “logistics support units.” While these studies formed the basis for thousands of pages of indictments, international institutions such as the Council of Europe Congress of Local and Regional Authorities stated in their reports that this situation was a “usurpation of the right to elect and be elected.”

The Foreign Ministry’s defense line

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was managed by 26 different names during this process. International reports show that 70% of Turkey’s conviction files at the ECtHR consist of “Kurdish issue-oriented rights violations” (right to life, freedom of expression, property rights). In the Hakan Fidan era, diplomacy reports are now built on the “export of the problem beyond borders.” Operation reports regarding northern Iraq and Syria signal a strategic shift that moves the problem from the streets of Ankara to the mountains of Erbil and Sulaymaniyah.

The Statistical memory of the Interior Ministry

In these 48 years, more than 30 different names occupied the interior ministry seat. Statistics show that changes in ministers did not lead to a change in “method.” The 15-year continuous State of Emergency (OHAL) regime from 1987 to 2002 is the most concrete and darkest data of this statistic.

THE ANKARA RECORD: COMPLETE 48-YEAR LIST (1978 – 2026)
PRESIDENTS
1973 – 1980
Fahri Korutürk
1980 – 1980
İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil (ACTING)
1980 – 1989
Kenan Evren
1989 – 1993
Turgut Özal
1993 – 1993
Hüsamettin Cindoruk (ACTING)
1993 – 2000
Süleyman Demirel
2000 – 2007
Ahmet Necdet Sezer
2007 – 2014
Abdullah Gül
2014 – PRESENT
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
PRIME MINISTERS
1978 – 1979
Bülent Ecevit
1979 – 1980
Süleyman Demirel
1980 – 1983
Bülend Ulusu
1983 – 1989
Turgut Özal
1989 (OCT 31 – NOV 9)
Ali Bozer (ACTING)
1989 – 1991
Yıldırım Akbulut
1991 – 1991
Mesut Yılmaz
1991 – 1993
Süleyman Demirel
1993 (MAY 16 – JUN 25)
Erdal İnönü (ACTING)
1993 – 1996
Tansu Çiller
1996 – 1996
Mesut Yılmaz
1996 – 1997
Necmettin Erbakan
1997 – 1999
Mesut Yılmaz
1999 – 2002
Bülent Ecevit
2002 – 2003
Abdullah Gül
2003 – 2014
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
2014 – 2016
Ahmet Davutoğlu
2016 – 2018
Binali Yıldırım
2018 – PRESENT
Presidential Government System (Office Abolished)
MINISTERS OF INTERIOR
1978 – 1979
İrfan Özaydınlı / Hasan Fehmi Güneş
1979 – 1979
Vecdi İlhan
1979 – 1980
Mustafa Gülcügil
1980 – 1980
Orhan Eren
1980 – 1983
Selahattin Çetiner
1983 – 1984
Ali Tanrıyar
1984 – 1987
Yıldırım Akbulut
1987 – 1987
Ahmet Selçuk
1987 – 1989
Mustafa Kalemli
1989 – 1991
Abdülkadir Aksu
1991 – 1991
Mustafa Kalemli
1991 – 1991
Sabahattin Çakmakoğlu
1991 – 1993
İsmet Sezgin
1993 – 1993
Beytullah Mehmet Gazioğlu
1993 – 1995
Nahit Menteşe
1995 – 1996
Teoman Ünüsan
1996 – 1996
Ülkü Gökalp Güney
1996 – 1996
Mehmet Ağar
1996 – 1997
Meral Akşener
1997 – 1998
Murat Başesgioğlu
1998 – 1999
Kutlu Aktaş
1999 – 1999
Cahit Bayar
1999 – 2001
Sadettin Tantan
2001 – 2002
Rüştü Kazım Yücelen
2002 – 2002
Muzaffer Ecemiş
2002 – 2007
Abdülkadir Aksu
2007 – 2007
Osman Güneş (ACTING)
2007 – 2011
Beşir Atalay
2011 – 2011
Osman Güneş (ACTING)
2011 – 2013
İdris Naim Şahin
2013 – 2013
Muammer Güler
2013 – 2015
Efkan Âlâ
2015 – 2015
Sebahattin Öztürk (ACTING)
2015 – 2015
Selami Altınok (ACTING)
2015 – 2016
Efkan Âlâ
2016 – 2023
Süleyman Soylu
2023 – 2026
Ali Yerlikaya
2026 (FEB 11) – PRESENT
Mustafa Çiftçi
MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1978 – 1979
Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün
1979 – 1980
Hayrettin Erkmen
1980 – 1983
İlter Türkmen
1983 – 1987
Vahit Melih Halefoğlu
1987 – 1990
Ahmet Mesut Yılmaz
1990 – 1990
Ali Hüsrev Bozer
1990 – 1991
Ahmet Kurtcebe Alptemoçin
1991 – 1991
İsmail Safa Giray
1991 – 1994
Hikmet Çetin
1994 – 1994
Mümtaz Soysal
1994 – 1995
Murat Karayalçın
1995 – 1995
Erdal İnönü
1995 – 1995
Ali Coşkun Kırca
1995 – 1996
Deniz Baykal
1995 – 1996
Emre Gönensay
1996 – 1997
Tansu Çiller
1997 – 2002
İsmail Cem
2002 – 2002
Şükrü Sina Gürel
2002 – 2003
Yaşar Yakış
2003 – 2007
Abdullah Gül
2007 – 2009
Ali Babacan
2009 – 2014
Ahmet Davutoğlu
2014 – 2015
Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu
2015 – 2015
Feridun Sinirlioğlu (ACTING)
2015 – 2023
Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu
2023 – PRESENT
Hakan Fidan
CHIEFS OF GENERAL STAFF
1973 – 1978
Semih Sancar
1978 – 1983
Kenan Evren
1983 – 1983
Nurettin Ersin
1983 – 1987
Necdet Üruğ
1987 – 1990
Necip Torumtay
1990 – 1994
Doğan Güreş
1994 – 1998
İsmail Hakkı Karadayı
1998 – 2002
Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu
2002 – 2006
Hilmi Özkök
2006 – 2008
Yaşar Büyükanıt
2008 – 2010
İlker Başbuğ
2010 – 2011
Işık Koşaner
2011 – 2015
Necdet Özel
2015 – 2018
Hulusi Akar
2016 (JUL 16 – 19)
Ümit Dündar (ACTING)
2018 – 2023
Yaşar Güler
2023 (JUN 5 – AUG 16)
Musa Avsever (ACTING)
2023 – 2025
Metin Gürak
2025 (AUG 18) – PRESENT
Selçuk Bayraktaroğlu

Being a journalist in Diyarbakır: “What you don’t write is also your responsibility”

Veysi Polat, Öznur Değer, Murat Bayram ve Faruk Balıkçı, the journalists worked in Diyarbakır for years facing various pressures, assessed limitations and challenges of being a journalist in Diyarbakır.

140journos’ documentary “Şeytantepe,” about the Narin Güran murder, has reignited an old debate about what it means to practice journalism in Diyarbakır.

The Narin Güran murder case refers to the killing of 8-year-old Narin Güran, who lived in the rural Tavşantepe neighborhood of the Bağlar district in Diyarbakır province. Narin’s family reported her missing on August 21, 2024, and her body was found on September 8, 2024, inside a sack in the Eğertutmaz stream near the village. Many television channels and newspapers presented claims such as “forbidden relationship,” “the sister was also killed,” “brother was a drug user,” and “Hezbollah connection” as definitive information to the public without concrete evidence, but many of these were refuted in the judicial process, leading to the perpetrator’s identity remaining unknown.

Throughout the 1990s, journalists in Diyarbakır and the surrounding region were victims of “unsolved” murders, detained, tortured, and imprisoned; and the distribution of newspapers was banned. While “unsolved” murders were no longer as common in the 2000s, the judiciary and law enforcement agencies made it difficult for journalists to report from the field. Arrests, forced exile, and house arrests kept journalists away from their profession; newspapers, TV channels, radio stations and websites were shut down, leaving hundreds of journalists unemployed. Journalists who have been reporting from this region for years recounted the hardships they faced and the price of being present in the field.

Veysi Polat: The reality in field is harsh

Veysi Polat started journalism on 1991 in Diyarbakır. He and his uncle, who was a reporter at Özgür Gündem newspaper, were together attacked with a gun. He had to go to İstanbul continue his profession there. Polat who worked for many years in press organizations that came from the Özgür Gündem tradition, returned to Diyarbakır after 21 years and built a local news platform called Aborî.

Journalist Veysi Polat at Hafız Akdemir commemoration. Source: Aborî

Polat, stating security politics, judgement processes, social sensitivities and local dinamics in Diyarbakır severely restricts the journalist’s freedom of movement, told that the reality in the field was harsh and that the space to convey that reality was limited. stated that practicing journalism in a city directly affected by the Kurdish issue, requires every news to be thought for at least few times, every sentences to be regulated, and said “Not only what you write, but also what you do not write is becomes a responsibility.”

Polat explaining the difference between doing journalism in Diyarbakır and in Western cities through the lens of “the weight of the profession,” stated that when he returned to Diyarbakır from Istanbul after 21 years, he realized that the meaning, risks, and burden of journalism had changed when the geography changed.

How is a local new is altered to another?

Polat stated that he believes information transferred from the local to the central level is often either diminished or transformed, emphasizing that this transformation often passes through political, institutional, and ideological filters:

“Especially in central media, the reflex of not harming the relationship between the institutions and government can prevent the news from being reported as it is. This leads either to overt censorship or a more sophisticated form of ‘cover-up’. As a result, the news may reflect not the event itself, but the version that the center wants to see.”

Polat reminding an example happened on 90s, “When the news of a citizen, a shepherd in the rural area of ​​Cizre, being killed in a security forces operation reached the center, it was transformed into a completely different identity and presented as ‘a PKK member neutralized in the operation.’ However, information and photographs from the field show that the truth is much more stark and shocking. The image of a person being dragged behind an armored vehicle, tied by their feet, is a document of the truth. But that image is ignored because it doesn’t fit the narrative constructed by the center. Our decision to publish it with the headline ‘Humanity is being dragged’ at that time was actually to show the truth as it was,” he said.

Hacı Lokman Birlik was killed during a conflict between him and the Turkish army on October 3, 2015 in Cizre, Şırnak. His dead body was tied to an armoured police vehicle and he was dragged to death behind the vehicle. One of the pro-AKP newspaper Sabah claimed the dragging of a body was a universally acceptable procedure to verify whether a bomb was attached to the body.

News about dragging and killing of Hacı Lokman Birlik on Özgür Gündem, with the headline “Humanity is being dragged”. Source: X/@Code644

The reality in local is experienced more rawly and more directly, while the mainstream media often softens this harshness, and sometimes makes it completely invisible.

The Narin Güran case: Being the one who reports correctively, not just first

Polat states that how cases like Narin Güran are reported directly affects the geography, language, and framing of the news. “If a similar incident had occurred in Istanbul, the news flow would likely have proceeded in a more institutional, distant, and controlled manner,” he said. Noting that media headquarters in major cities have stronger editorial oversight mechanisms, better access to diverse sources, and faster fact-checking processes, Polat explained that in a place like Diyarbakır—where political and social sensitivities are intense—the process works differently:

“We saw reports that began as a simple missing child case in the early days evolve into a different dimension within a short time through various allegations, dark connections, and leaked information. Specifically, the leaking of certain information and documents from law enforcement and judicial sources to specific media outlets revealed a picture where relationship networks, rather than journalistic reflexes, were the determining factor.”

Polat highlighted two fundamental issues at this point: “First, the lack of a healthy distance in the relationship between the journalist and the news source strengthens a practice based on transmission rather than interrogation. This can turn the journalist into a producer of information rather than just its carrier. Second is information pollution and manipulation. Especially in sensitive cases, information served piece-by-piece can serve to direct public opinion rather than enlighten it. This creates serious perceptual confusion in society.”

Stating that both the political atmosphere and the source structure in Diyarbakır can create a ground more open to such interventions, Polat emphasized that the issue boils down to the core principle of journalism: Being the one who reports correctly, not just the one who reports first.

“Journalism was a struggle for survival”

Comparing today’s conditions with those of the 1990s and early 2000s, journalist Polat noted that Diyarbakır existed within an extraordinary atmosphere during the periods when the Kurdish issue was most intense. Describing a process in the early 90s where human rights were suspended and life was devalued, Polat explained that journalism then was not just a profession but a struggle for survival:

“People were being shot in the back of the head in broad daylight, villages were being burned, forced migrations were occurring, and enforced disappearances and torture were becoming part of daily life. Practicing journalism in such an environment was truly like wearing a ‘shirt of fire.’ The fact that on June 8, 1992, while walking from home to the newspaper office with my uncle, journalist Hafız Akdemir, we were attacked and he lost his life, is enough to explain the darkness of that era.”

Polat noted that while journalists could be massacred in the middle of the street in those years, the primary difference today is that such an overt and large-scale practice of physical elimination no longer exists. Pointing out that things are possible today that were not in the 90s, Polat said, “Thanks to digital media, news can spread much faster, and opportunities arise to make one’s voice heard through alternative channels. It is not as easy as it once was to completely blackout a story.”

Journalism is now a more heavily monitored profession

However, he explained that this situation has not eliminated pressure; rather, the methods have changed, and journalism is restricted today through different tools:

“Obstructions while following news in the field, detentions, lawsuits, long judicial processes, digital access bans, and pressures exerted through social media have come to the forefront. Direct violence has been replaced by a monitoring mechanism that appears more ‘legal’ and ‘administrative’ but has an undeniable impact. Today, while journalism is faster and more accessible on one hand, it is a profession that is more closely watched and more easily targeted on the other.”

Öznur Değer: Diyarbakır, a city that turns written fate into struggle

Öznur Değer began her career as a female journalist six years ago in Diyarbakır. For her, practicing journalism in Diyarbakır means extracting a new story from every inch of a city that has been the center of special warfare policies and state pressure since the 90s.

Journalist Öznur Değer. Source: Yeni Yaşam Newspaper

Değer states that Diyarbakır is a place where there is an attempt to alter the city’s sociology—politically, socially, economically, and culturally—ranging from drugs and prostitution to assimilation and moral decay. She also notes that it is a place where the consequences of the Kurdish issue manifest in their severest form:

“From children collecting scrap paper on the streets to the Peace Mothers crying out for peace; from families waiting for their loved ones in front of prisons to mothers searching for the bones of their children; from mothers keeping watch over their children’s graves so they won’t be desecrated to women arrested for shouting ‘Jin, jiyan, azadî’ (Woman, Life, Freedom) in the field—Amed is a deeply political place.”

“The journalists most obstructed by police are women journalists”

For Değer, being a female journalist in Diyarbakır means overcoming walls of fear with courageous pens:

“While many of our colleagues were massacred in the 90s just for reporting the truth, and more recently, while Nagihan Akarsel in Sulaymaniyah and Cihan Bilgin in Rojava were murdered for their persistence in the truth, we are practically shuttling between the police headquarters, the courthouse, and the prison. On one hand, we reveal the dimensions of ‘special warfare’ through our reports on the women most affected by it; on the other, we are investigated and prosecuted because of those very reports.”

Emphasizing that many female journalists, herself included, have been tried and arrested due to the stories they uncovered, Değer noted that they are also subjected to numerous restrictions:

“Our agency, JINNEWS, which serves as an example to the world as a women’s news agency, has been blocked by the BTK (Information and Communication Technologies Authority) numerous times, and its digital media accounts have been shut down.”

Attack on journalists in 2024, Diyarbakır. Source: MLSA

Değer also stated that as female journalists, they are engaged in a tough struggle against other journalists to counter the increasingly masculinized language of the press, noting that the journalists most obstructed by police in the field are, once again, women. Having worked as a journalist in Ankara for a period, Değer explained that Ankara is the place where the policies implemented in Diyarbakır are decided:

“I saw both the memory, the legacy, and the values of a people in Amed -along with the struggle to protect them- and I saw Ankara as the place where the decisions for the policies produced there are made. For me, one was a city writing a fate (giving the orders), while the other was a place turning that written fate into a struggle.”

“MKG makes the labor of women journalists visible”

In Diyarbakır, a city with a dense population of Kurdish and politically active people, Değer says the greatest solidarity network for female journalists is the Mesopotamia Women Journalists Association (MKG):

“MKG not only puts a spotlight on the difficulties, pressures, and problems faced by women journalists and prepares monthly reports on them, but it also works to establish a female language in the press and make the labor of women journalists -who are often marginalized- visible. In this sense, it transforms their experiences into solidarity by giving presence to women’s voices and colors, weaving together the organized struggle of women journalists.”

“Many facts were distorted in the Narin case”

Değer notes that the Narin Güran case has turned into a sensationalist soap opera—a result of the sociological decay bred by “special warfare.” She states, “Rather than uncovering how and by whom Narin was murdered, many journalists, especially those coming from outside, focused on allegations of a ‘forbidden affair’ between Narin’s mother and uncle, evolving the incident into a dimension that veils the truth.”

Değer argues that if the same situation had occurred in Istanbul, the identity of a child’s killer would not remain in mystery, and the judiciary would display a different, more analytical stance:

“The fact that this happened in Kurdistan and has a political background has significant impacts. Indeed, Galip Ensarioğlu’s words in the early days of the incident, which exonerated the event and potential perpetrators, remain fresh in our memory. In Istanbul, the media—which in Amed pursued tabloid sensationalism day and night—would have focused on the perpetrators. Here, many facts were distorted by prioritizing historical, cultural, and tribal factors. Instead, the incident should have been handled as a social problem from the very beginning, pursuing the truth and all the power dynamics and elements in the background.”

Stating that journalists carry historical responsibility and conscientious obligations, Değer said the only way forward is to shout the truth fearlessly.

Murat Bayram: There is a special police group in Diyarbakır that only deals with journalists

Murat Bayram began his journalism career in 2010. After years of working for both international media and outlets broadcasting from the Kurdistan Region, Bayram now manages Botan International, which provides training for journalists and produces news in Diyarbakır. According to Bayram, practicing this profession in Diyarbakır inevitably means acquiring a political identity:

Journalist Murat Bayram

“It starts with the assumption among social, religious, and other groups that you are directly a propaganda tool. Both Kurds and the government perceive you as highly partisan. They may perceive you as a potential propaganda tool or a terrorist.”

As he worked in Istanbul for a time, Bayram noted that one can blend into the crowd while following news there. In Diyarbakır, however, he noted that there is a specific police group that only deals with journalists, who are attending every press conference, photographing journalists, knowing them by name, knowing where they work, and knowing which stories they cover, and that the pressure is more intense:

“When I first started in 2010, we would go to a story with 40-50 people. With so many journalists, you didn’t stand out much. Now, when we go to a press briefing, only 3-5 cameras show up. Everyone handles their work by gathering news from social media and agencies. This causes the existing pressure to be felt more clearly.”

“The Press Advertising Agency does not support the Kurdish language”

Bayram, who also prepares reports on the structure and problems of Kurdish media in Turkey, stated that while there are over 20 million Kurds in Turkey, there is only one news agency and only four websites broadcasting daily in Kurdish. He noted that before the end of the resolution process in 2015-2016, there were 9 television channels in Diyarbakır producing Kurdish programs, with at least 4 broadcasting exclusively in Kurdish. Currently, only Zarok TV and one local newspaper broadcast in Kurdish in Diyarbakır. Pointing out that TRT has the largest presence in Diyarbakır with over 40 media representatives, Bayram said, “It is understandable that TRT exists; what is not understandable is that only TRT exists. The only television making Kurdish news programs is the state’s television.”

Bayram mentioned that the Press Advertising Agency is the biggest sponsor of local media, yet all local newspapers are exclusively in Turkish. He explained that this is because Kurdish is not among the languages supported by the agency for publishing.

“For a Kurdish media institution to survive, it needs an economic resource,” says Bayram. According to his accounts, Google Ads does not support Kurdish in Turkey, and Kurdish media cannot receive payments from the Press Advertising Agency:

“When it’s in Kurdish, you cannot receive the advertisements that the state publishes using our own taxes. Kurdish podcasts were listed among Turkish podcasts. Kurdish music is still evaluated in the Turkish music category.”

Bayram expressed that producing Kurdish content is devalued as if it were mere volunteer work: “Reporters for Kurdish media are not exempt from rent, food costs, or vehicle costs. But while they are putting in the labor, they are exempted from receiving the wages for that labor.”

Faruk Balıkçı: In local media, you are in the ‘kitchen’ of the work

Faruk Balıkçı, who began his career at Anadolu Agency, has served as the Diyarbakır representative for outlets such as Milliyet and Hürriyet newspapers, IMC TV, and Doğan News Agency. Having worked for both national and local media for many years, Balıkçı stated that Diyarbakır is the regional center for journalism. He noted that due to the impact of wars in Iraq and Syria and the long-standing environment of conflict, Diyarbakır journalists have, in a sense, become ‘war correspondents’:

“Because of its central location and being a place where news prioritized by Turkey occurs, journalists do not just do local journalism. They simultaneously do international journalism. This makes the journalists here more effective.”

Journalist Faruk Balıkçı. Source: bianet

Balıkçı, who previously worked in mainstream media, explained that the readership and sphere of influence change between national and local newspapers:

“When you voice a local problem or negativity, officials take it into account and correct it the next day. This is important for the local area and makes one happy from a journalistic perspective. In a national newspaper, because you report on more general news, you have to access more restricted information. But if you are a local journalist, you have to exert more effort to voice the many problems experienced in the locality or region.”

Balıkçı stated that a local journalist reporting on local issues also serves a supervisory role by pointing out shortcomings.

Explaining that a journalist working for media that appeals to the general public only produces the news, while centers like Istanbul shape it, Balıkçı said: “It’s not like that in local media. In local media, you are in the kitchen of the work. You can write and present what you see in the format you want. Nothing else touches your story.”

“In this regard, local media provides more alternatives. You are freer in local media because you are in the kitchen of the work.”

Rojhelat under pressure: Politics and protest in Iran’s Kurdish regions

Deniz Xelat Büyükkaya discusses how Rojhelat has once again become the frontline of Iran’s war against its Kurdish population, amid nationwide protests and economic collapse.

Photo of protests in Iran.

by Deniz Xelat Büyükkaya

Rojhelat (Eastern Kurdistan) or the Kurdish regions of western Iran, have once again become a key site of political tension, state repression and regional security concern. Over the past few years, Rojhelat has faced intensified government repression, increased protest activity, and rising geopolitical pressure related to regional conflicts. Latest developments show that Rojhelat remains one of the most politically sensitive regions inside Iran.

Iran has been facing nationwide protests since late 2025 because of economic collapse, rising inflation, and shortages of basic goods, fueling growing anger toward the government. The government has responded to protests with extreme repression: mass arrests, shootings of protesters, internet shutdowns, executions and death sentences.

Rojhelat: A Centre of Protest Movements

Rojhelat—especially the provinces of Kurdistan, Kermansah, West Azerbaijan, and Ilam—has long been considered by Tehran a politically sensitive border region. As a result, the Iranian state has often approached Kurdish activism through a security-focused framework shaped by fears of separatism and cross-border insurgency. Also, the region was already the centre of the nationwide “Jin, Jiyan Azadi (Woman, Life, Freedom)” movement that erupted in late 2022 after the death of Kurdish woman Jina (Mahsa) Amini in police custody.

By late 2025, Kurdish monitoring organisations reported that Iranian security forces had intensified surveillance and arrest campaigns across Rojhelat, targeting activists, journalists, and ordinary citizens. The Washington Kurdish Institute’s 2025 Annual Report notes that in November 2025 alone, 51 Kurds were detained in Iran, representing 45 percent of all recorded arrests nationwide that month.

According to Kurdistan Tribune, Kurdish regions have long been centres of anti-government protest, and state responses have often been violent. During the recent demonstrations, Rojhelat was among the most heavily affected, with security forces responding aggressively.

Many people were arrested without clear charges or proper legal procedures. This has drawn concern from international human rights organisations about fairness and legal rights in Iran’s response to political opposition. Kurdish cities often show strong political mobilisation. This is partly because of ethnic marginalisation, economic difficulties, and long-standing political grievances. In addition, Rojhelat is considered one of the less economically developed parts of Iran.

Cross-Border tension

The situation in Rojhelat cannot be completely understood without considering cross-border dynamics between Iran and Başur (Iraqi Kurdistan). While repression in Rojhelat increased, developments across the border in Başur also made the situation more tense. In March 2026, Iranian forces carried out drone strikes targeting Kurdish opposition positions in Iraqi Kurdistan, including an attack on an opposition headquarters in the town of Dekala that wounded members and damaged facilities.

These attacks were part of a broader campaign against Kurdish groups that Iran accuses of operating across the border. According to regional media reports, several Kurdish opposition sites in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah provinces, including the Koya district and nearby mountain areas, were targeted during the escalation.

Iranian officials justified these operations as necessary responses to “separatist groups” threatening national security.

Human rights concerns

Human rights organisations report that Iran has significantly increased its use of the death penalty in recent years. According to Iran Human Rights (IHR), in 2024, at least 975 executions were recorded. The number reportedly increased to around 1,500 executions in 2025, the highest level in decades.

Ethnic minorities seem to be affected more by these policies. According to a report by Hengaw around 150 Kurdish prisoners were executed in 2025. In early 2026, Hengaw also reported that at least 257 Kurdish civilians were killed during a crackdown linked to protests, including 20 children and 19 women. Many of them were accused of security-related crimes, but human rights groups often criticise the lack of fair trials and transparency in Iran’s judicial system.

Because of these numbers, many Kurds believe that the Iranian government treats Kurdish regions mainly as a security issue instead of solving political and social problems.

Image: Fazel Hawramy/Rudaw

Economic marginalisation and the Kolbar

In addition to political repression, economic conditions in Kurdish border areas are also very difficult. Rojhelat has some of the highest unemployment rates in Iran, especially among young people. Because of this, many residents work as kolbars. Kolbars are Kurdish porters who carry goods across mountain borders between Iran and neighbouring countries. The work is very dangerous and often illegal, but many people rely on it to earn living.

According to the Kurdistan Human Rights Network (KHRN) dozens of kolbars are killed each year by Iranian border forces, while many others are injured or arrested. Kurdish activists say that kolbar work continues because there are not enough stable job opportunities in the region. For many Kurdish families in border cities, kolbar work has become a symbol of the broader economic marginalisation faced by Rojhelat.

An unresolved political question

Despite decades of political tension, the Kurdish question in Iran remains unresolved. Kurdish activists continue to demand cultural rights, Kurdish language education, economic development, and greater political representation. However, Iranian authorities have continued to restrict Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights. In 2025, expressions of Kurdish identity were often treated as security offences. The Kurdish language is still largely excluded from formal education, and cultural activists promoting Kurdish language or traditions have faced arrests and intimidation.

At the same time, the Iranian government continues to view Rojhelat mainly through a security perspective because of concerns about territorial integrity and armed opposition. As Iran faces both internal dissent and regional pressure, Rojhelat is likely to remain an important indicator of the country’s political stability. For now, the Kurdish regions of Iran remain caught between protest movements, state repression, economic hardship, and regional geopolitical tensions.

Kurds: Present in the headlines, absent in their own voice

A quantitative analysis of international media coverage of Iranian Kurds between February 28 and March 22, 2026, reveals a pattern that speaks less to increased visibility and more to the nature of that visibility: Kurds were covered more — but largely through the voices of others.

Foto: Rudaw

Following the February 28 launch of US-Israeli strikes on Iran, Kurdish political actors entered the international media agenda. The period was further amplified when, on March 5, President Donald Trump told Axios: “If the Kurds want to attack Iran, I think that’s wonderful. I’m totally in favor of it.” That statement turned global attention toward Iranian Kurdish organizations.

Yet Kurdish groups had already reached an agreement among themselves weeks earlier. The Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan — bringing together PJAK, IKDP, PAK, Komala and Xebat — was formed on February 22, thirteen days before Trump’s remarks. The coalition’s founding drew almost no attention from international mainstream media until Trump spoke. In March, the Komala Party joined, bringing the number of member organizations to six.

Once Trump’s statement focused international attention on the Kurds, coverage surged. Of more than fifty records analyzed, approximately seventy percent were published between March 1 and 8 — the first eight days of the war. Between March 9 and 22, independent Kurdish-focused coverage fell to single digits, with Foreign Policy’s March 17 analysis standing as a near-solitary exception.

The peak came between March 3 and 7. On March 3, CNN was the first to report — citing multiple anonymous sources — that the CIA was working to arm Kurdish forces. That same day, the Wall Street Journal noted that Trump was open to supporting armed militias, with Kurdish forces along the Iran-Iraq border described as holding significant military capacity. Reuters reported, citing three sources, that Iranian Kurdish militias were in discussions with the US about how and where to strike Iranian security forces. On March 5, Bloomberg reported that Israel was working to open the way for Kurdish forces to take positions in northwest Iran, citing a senior Israeli military official. Al Jazeera published a detailed explainer: “Which Kurdish groups is the US rallying to fight Iran?” On March 7, Chatham House published its analysis: “Kurdish groups in Iran face a risky dilemma amid an unclear US endgame.” The Kurdish-focused content published across those five days exceeded the combined total of the two preceding weeks and the two that followed.

Daily news intensity — Iranian Kurds

Feb 28 – Mar 22, 2026 · Estimated distribution based on dataset

Feb 28Mar 8Mar 15Mar 22
High (3+ reports)
Medium (1–2 reports)
Sparse / none

Then, on March 7–8, Trump reversed course. Asked about the possibility of Kurds establishing a new autonomous region in Iran and whether they would join the war, he said: “We’re very friendly with the Kurds, but we don’t want to make the war any more complex than it already is. I’ve decided I don’t want the Kurds going in.”

The conditions Kurdish groups themselves had put forward were central to this outcome. According to Axios, one Kurdish opposition official stated: “We cannot move until the skies above us are clear” — a demand for an arrangement comparable to the no-fly zone that enabled Kurdish autonomy in Iraq after 1991. CNN reported that Kurdish groups also sought political guarantees from the Trump administration before committing to action. Komala Secretary-General Abdullah Mohtadi summarized these conditions to Die Zeit: “We will not send our forces to the slaughterhouse.”

On March 4, Kurdish groups issued a joint denial directly contradicting media reports of a ground offensive. PAK stated: “Claims that our forces have crossed into Rojhilat are baseless. We categorically deny these reports — no such movement took place.” PJAK, PDKI and Komala issued similar statements the same day. The coalition’s first joint communiqué, released on March 2, was not a declaration of military action but a political appeal to Iranian armed forces in Kurdish regions: “Separate yourselves from the remnants of the Islamic Republic.” PDKI President Hijri had stated on March 1: “We will continue our struggle until free and democratic elections are held.” The Kurdistan Regional Government’s Interior Ministry also announced that its territory would not be used as a base for operations against neighboring countries. Trump’s reversal on March 7–8 confirmed that the conditions Kurdish groups had set would not be met.

Independence referendum and Rojava: a comparative frame

Two earlier turning points offer context for understanding Kurdish visibility in international media.

Three periods compared

How Kurds appeared in international media — 2017, January 2026, February–March 2026

Criterion2017 ReferendumJan 2026 RojavaFeb–Mar 2026
Visibility levelHighLowVery high
TriggerKurdish political demandKurdish civilian tragedyInclusion in great-power plans
Dominant frameGreat-power oppositionHumanitarian crisisStrategic instrument
Subject positionPolitical actor (shadowed)VictimObject / instrument
Kurdish voice weightLimitedVery limitedLimited but increased
Civilian dimensionPartly presentRelatively presentAlmost absent
2017Political actor — but in the shadow of international opposition
Jan 2026Humanitarian crisis — but with limited attention
Feb–Mar 2026Strategic instrument — and with great intensity

In 2017, the Kurdistan independence referendum drew extensive international coverage — but structured around the near-unanimous opposition of major powers (the US, Russia, the UK, Turkey, Iran) rather than around Kurdish political demands. An academic study published in the British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies documented that in Egyptian online media, the referendum was framed as “a Zionist plan directed by the US and Israel to redraw the region.” That framing was the dominant pattern across regional Arab media in 2017. By 2026, the dynamic had inverted: Israeli support was no longer presented as a threat but as an operational reality — yet Kurds remained objects of great-power planning rather than subjects of their own story.

In January 2026, the Syrian Transitional Government’s attacks on Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo — dozens killed, hospitals struck, tens of thousands displaced — drew comparatively limited international coverage. The gap in intensity and framing between that period and February–March 2026 is stark. What it reveals is a pattern: international media interest is triggered not by violence against Kurds, but by Kurdish inclusion in great-power plans.

The comparative picture across three periods: In 2017, Kurds were covered as political actors — but in the shadow of international opposition. In January 2026, as a humanitarian crisis — but with limited attention. In February–March 2026, as a strategic instrument — and with great intensity. Visibility and subject position took different forms in each period.

Coverage by outlet

US media formed the dominant block. CNN produced at least seven separate Kurdish-focused pieces, five of them concentrated between March 3 and 5. Axios published four reports. Reuters and AP each produced one critical exclusive. US media’s Kurdish coverage intensity outpaced the combined output of all other countries.

Israeli media — Haaretz, Times of Israel, Channel 12, i24NEWS, Ynet — formed the second largest block in both volume and substance, though with a markedly different editorial frame.

Coverage by outlet

Estimated Kurdish-focused report count and dominant editorial frame · Feb 28 – Mar 22, 2026

BlockOutletsEst. reportsDominant frame
USCNN, Axios, Reuters, Bloomberg, WSJ, AP, Fox News, CBS, PBS, WashPost~28Strategic instrument
IsraelHaaretz, Times of Israel, Channel 12, i24NEWS, Ynet~15Allied force
Arab (Eng.)Al Jazeera Eng., Al Arabiya Eng.~6Historical betrayal
EuropeDie Zeit, InsideOver, BBC WS, France 24, Atlantico~5Mixed
Think tanksChatham House, CFR, Atlantic Council, Foreign Policy, FPIF, Soufan~8Analytical
Not reachedFT, Economist, Guardian, Le Monde, NHK, Dawn, SCMP, etc.No access

In European media, BBC Persian’s Jiyar Gol interview with PJAK leadership — conducted inside tunnels near the border — and BBC World Service’s interview with a PAK fighter were the standout pieces. Die Zeit published an interview with Komala Secretary-General Abdullah Mohtadi; the piece’s reach came largely through citations in Chatham House and Al Arabiya. InsideOver conducted the most direct leader interview on the European continent, speaking with PDKI President Hijri on March 8.

Arabic-language media in this analysis was represented only by Al Jazeera English and Al Arabiya English. The Arabic-language services of both outlets, along with Asharq Al-Awsat, Al-Quds Al-Arabi, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, BBC Arabic, Sky News Arabia, and Gulf media, fell outside the scope of this study.

Who spoke, who was silenced

When all records in the dataset are coded by source type, approximately fifty percent relied on anonymous US or Israeli officials. CNN’s March 3 report cited “multiple people familiar with the plan”; Axios’s March 5 piece cited two separate US-Israeli officials; Reuters’s March 6 exclusive cited three anonymous sources.

Direct interviews with Kurdish leaders totaled nine over 22 days: Abdullah Mohtadi (CNN, IranWire, Die Zeit, Al Arabiya, Atlantico, Newsweek), PJAK Co-Chair Amir Karimi (CNN, Axios, AFP, Al Arabiya), PJAK Co-Chair Peyman Viyan (Channel 12), Khabat Secretary-General Babasheikh Hosseini (Al Jazeera), IKDP official Muhammed Azizi (Fox News), Komala Central Committee member Koosar Fattahi (CBS), PDKI President Mustafa Hijri (InsideOver, CSM). The distribution is telling: Mohtadi received the most direct coverage, while PJAK generated the most reporting — yet PJAK was most often reported through anonymous sources or US officials rather than its own leadership.

Iranian state media’s terminology passed into mainstream international coverage with almost no critical framing: “separatist terrorist forces.” In Al Jazeera’s March 5 report, Press TV’s characterization — “anti-Iran separatist forces” — and the IRGC statement carried by IRNA were presented side by side, directly and without contextual challenge.

Source breakdown: who spoke in the coverage?

Estimated distribution across all records · Feb 28 – Mar 22, 2026

Anonymous US/Israeli official50%
Kurdish leader written statement25%
Direct Kurdish leader interview15%
Iranian state/official sources10%
Thematic focus

Five themes emerge from the dataset.

The US-Israel-Kurdish strategic relationship was the dominant theme, accounting for approximately forty percent of all records. This framing positioned Kurds as objects of the story: coverage focused not on what they were doing, but on what great powers intended to do with them.

Military capacity and ground offensive speculation formed the second major theme — fighter numbers, arms levels, border crossing preparations. The retracted March 4 ground offensive story was this theme’s most concrete and most problematic example.

Historical betrayal and distrust was the third theme, structuring Haaretz’s March 7 analysis, the Chatham House report, the Atlantic Council assessment and France 24’s “pawn” piece.

The predicament of Iraqi Kurds was the fourth theme — the tension between the KRG’s declared neutrality and Iran’s actual strikes.

Kurdish civilian experience and human rights was the most conspicuous absence. Hengaw’s warnings about civilian casualties, strikes in Kurdish cities, women’s organizing — the presence of HPJ received a line or two. HPJ Commander Roken Nereda had not spoken on record to any international outlet before AFP’s March 8 field report.

Disinformation: one story, five outlets

March 4 disinformation chain

The origin, spread and retraction of the “ground offensive launched” story

1

Initial claim

i24NEWS reported — without footage, citing an unnamed CPFIK official — that PJAK fighters were taking positions in the mountains south of Marivan.

i24NEWS · March 4, 2026

2

Rapid amplification

Axios and Fox News ran the same story almost simultaneously. Jerusalem Post also reported similar claims citing an unnamed source.

Axios · Fox News · Jerusalem Post · March 4, 2026

3

Contradictory confirmation

Channel 12 correspondent Barak Ravid first confirmed the report citing a US official, then walked it back the same day: “There are conflicting reports.”

Channel 12 / Barak Ravid · March 4, 2026

4

Joint denial

PAK, PJAK, PDKI and Komala issued a joint denial the same day. KRG official Aziz Ahmed stated: “Not a single Iraqi Kurd has crossed the border.”

PAK · PJAK · PDKI · Komala · KRG · March 4, 2026

5

Retraction

Axios and Fox News removed the stories. The retraction did not reach the speed or scale of the original report.

Axios · Fox News · March 4–5, 2026

Five outlets published or amplified the same unverified claim. Reliance on anonymous sources, the absence of direct verification from Kurdish political actors, and the lack of real-time fact-checking mechanisms were the structural causes of this chain.

March 4 stands as this period’s best-documented media failure. i24NEWS reported — without footage and citing an unnamed CPFIK official — that PJAK fighters were taking positions in the mountains south of Marivan. Axios and Fox News ran the same story almost simultaneously. Channel 12 correspondent Barak Ravid first confirmed it citing a US official, then walked it back the same day: “There are conflicting reports.” All Kurdish parties denied it. Five outlets published or amplified the same unverified claim; the retraction did not reach the speed or scale of the original.

Notes

This study was compiled and organized using data gathered by the Claude AI model.

The analysis focused on English-language content and English-language media outlets. This methodological limitation creates several important gaps.

Non-English-language media fell outside the scope of the study. How outlets such as Le Monde, Libération, Le Figaro, Corriere della Sera, El País, NHK, Dawn, South China Morning Post and The Hindu covered — or did not cover — Kurds during this period was not examined.

Arabic-language media was represented in this study only through Al Jazeera English and Al Arabiya English. The Arabic-language services of both outlets, along with Asharq Al-Awsat, Al-Quds Al-Arabi, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, BBC Arabic, Sky News Arabia and Gulf media, fell outside the scope of this study.

English-language outlets behind paywalls — the Financial Times, The Economist, and certain Haaretz content — could not be fully accessed. For these outlets, the accurate description is "could not be reached," not "did not publish."

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