The release of seriously ill prisoner Mehmet Sait Yıldırım has been postponed for the third time by the Prison Administration and Observation Board. Following the board hearing, Yıldırım suffered a heart attack, underwent an angiogram, and had two stents fitted in his heart.
Held at İzmir Kırıklar No. 1 F-Type Closed Prison, Mehmet Sait Yıldırım (75), a seriously ill prisoner who has spent 33 years behind bars, has had his release blocked for a third time by the Prison Administration and Observation Board.
According to his lawyers, Yıldırım suffered a heart attack on August 24 after appearing before the Prison Administration and Observation Board. He was taken to hospital and yesterday (August 25) underwent an angiogram, during which two stents were placed in his heart.
According to bianet’s report, Yıldırım’s lawyers, Aryen Turan and Ali İhsan Güven, met with him for five minutes at around 4:40 p.m. today in the Coronary Intensive Care Unit on the 6th floor of İzmir City Hospital.
According to information conveyed to bianet by lawyer Ali İhsan Güven, Yıldırım appeared before the Administration and Observation Board at around 10:00 a.m. on August 24. Güven said the hearing was tense, adding that Yıldırım was once again pressured to “show remorse,” as in previous board hearings, and that an argument ensued.
Güven said that after Yıldırım returned to his cell he suffered a heart attack, and that he was transferred to hospital after his cellmate, Rohat Caruş, alerted prison staff.
According to Güven, Yıldırım was first taken to a hospital in Buca but, because it had no ward for prisoners, he was transferred to İzmir City Hospital. At around 11:00 a.m. yesterday he underwent an angiogram and had two stents fitted in his heart. According to bianet’s report, one of the main arteries leading to his heart was blocked, and Yıldırım narrowly survived a serious, life-threatening condition. Lawyer Güven said his health was now stable and that they had been told he could be discharged today.
According to his lawyers, Yıldırım’s release has been postponed for another three months.
Yıldırım: “Be honest and hang me”
Güven also told bianet that during the board hearing, Yıldırım had said the following:
The State Security Court sentenced me to death. It was commuted to life imprisonment. Now you, as the board, want to carry out the death sentence handed down by the State Security Court. Be honest, build a gallows here in the morning and hang me.
His release had already been postponed twice
Mehmet Sait Yıldırım was detained in 1993 on charges of PKK membership and sentenced to life imprisonment in 1995. Suffering from cardiovascular disease, COPD, hypertension, and other chronic conditions, he is classified among the seriously ill prisoners, and despite his grave health problems he has remained in prison for 33 years.
During the 2013–2015 peace process, Yıldırım was part of a five-member group of prisoners formed at the request of Abdullah Öcalan and publicly known as the “İmralı secretariat.” Owing to his health problems, he stayed on İmralı Island for only nine days before being transferred to another prison. He later recounted his experiences in a book titled Nine Days on İmralı. He spent a significant part of his imprisonment in a single-person cell, held in isolation.
Although Mehmet Sait Yıldırım’s prison term ended on February 27, 2025, he was not released, with the Prison Administration and Observation Board citing that he was not of “good conduct” and “showed no remorse.” Reconvening on November 25, the board once again blocked his release. It set a date nine months later (August 25, 2026) for the next assessment.
After his release was postponed for a second time in November, Yıldırım gave the following statement to bianet through his lawyer Demirer:
“My death sentence, which I received in 1996, was commuted to life imprisonment. After 30 years, I should have been released by now, but they won’t let me go. My release is being postponed for a second time on the pretext that I am not of good conduct. I said it when I appeared before the board too, in effect, you want to carry out the death sentence. If you are so determined to apply the death penalty, be honest: take me out to the yard and hang me on the gallows. Let me know I was sentenced to death, and you, too, say it openly, ‘we executed him.’”
Ayşegül Doğan’s parliamentary question
DEM Party Şırnak MP and Party Spokesperson Ayşegül Doğan submitted a written parliamentary question to the Speaker’s Office on July 28, to be answered by Justice Minister Akın Gürlek, concerning prisoner Yıldırım, whose health has been steadily deteriorating.
In her applications and in the question submitted to Parliament, Doğan noted that Yıldırım, who has not been released even though his conditional release period expired months ago, suffers from numerous chronic illnesses including heart disease, COPD, hypertension, and lung ailments, and that a blood clot had formed in his right eye in early July. The question stated that Yıldırım had been subjected to a demand for examination while handcuffed during his transfer, that his treatment had been delayed, and that his vision problems were ongoing.
Doğan also applied to the Parliamentary Human Rights Inquiry Commission, requesting answers on whether Yıldırım’s release would be reassessed, whether an investigation had been launched into the alleged handcuffed examination during his hospital transfer, and the number of ill prisoners whose release has been postponed on “good conduct” grounds. She further called for an on-site review of Yıldırım’s health conditions, a determination of whether it is medically appropriate for him to remain in prison, and the assurance of uninterrupted access to health services.
Unidentified individuals in Raqqa are abducting Kurds and demanding money from their families. These individuals take those they abduct to unknown locations and subject them to severe torture. As a result, tens of thousands of Kurdish families have been forced to flee Raqqa.
A view from Raqqa during the period it was under SDF control, Photo: Hawarnews
Some time ago, at around 11:00 a.m., Elî Mihemed was abducted in front of his home in Raqqa. When Mihemed stepped outside, he saw several people waiting for him in a black car with no license plate. These men were armed and resembled those who have recently been abducting Kurds in Raqqa. They ordered Mihemed to come with them. Making him leave behind his belongings and his phone, they put him in the car and took him away.
Mihemed is just one of nearly 10 people abducted in Raqqa over the past month and a half.
According to eyewitnesses and sources in Raqqa familiar with the matter, the group in question has for some time been operating at around 11:00 a.m., using the same method by which they abducted Mihemed. They subject those they abduct to severe torture, photograph them, send the photos to their families, and demand money from them.
According to the information available, all of those abducted are Kurds.
According to information given to Niha+ by two witnesses to the events in Raqqa, many Kurdish families have left the city since the abductions began. According to the sources, they allege that the aim of this is to cleanse Raqqa of Kurds.
Citing security concerns, these sources did not want their names disclosed. For the same reason, we have also changed the names of those who were abducted.
70 percent of the Kurdish neighborhood has fled
Raqqa lies in northern Syria on the banks of the Euphrates River. A strategic city, Raqqa is located 160 km east of Aleppo. It has been home to many civilizations.
Between 2014 and 2017 the city was under the control of ISIS, which described it as its “capital.” In 2017 the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), with the support of U.S. forces, liberated it from ISIS. Thousands of ISIS members surrendered. Those who surrendered were placed in camps.
Raqqa city map
Raqqa remained under SDF control until January 2026, but at the end of 2025 and the beginning of 2026, following attacks on the Kurdish neighborhoods of Aleppo and on Rojava, it was handed over to the interim Damascus administration.
According to the census conducted between 2011 and 2021, close to 60,000 Kurds lived in Raqqa. However, in the process that began after the Syrian war, many Kurds were forced to migrate from there. When the SDF took control of Raqqa, some of them returned. With the clashes at the start of 2026, it is reported that all the residents of the city’s Kurdish neighborhood fled. Afterward, some returned to the homes they had abandoned.
With the recent abductions, 70 percent of the Kurds in that same neighborhood have been forced to flee. In the past, Raqqa as a whole was estimated to have a Kurdish population of 40 percent and an Arab population of 60 percent. At present, however, the proportion of Kurds remaining in the city is reported to be between 5 and 10 percent.
“They say the Kurds are guests here”
After being abducted, Mahmûd Derwîş was released once he paid the money demanded of him. He, too, left Raqqa after his release, like the others. His abductors had threatened him, saying either you leave the city, or we kill you.
Some of those abducted are threatened with the abduction of their family members.
A significant portion of those who flee are forced to sell their goods and property at far below their value. Derwîş, too, had to sell his house, worth 60,000 dollars, for 40,000 dollars.
One of the sources who did not want to be named said that people are selling their shops, their harvests, and their cars and leaving Raqqa: “People think, ‘Let me lose my property rather than my life.’”
According to another source, the thinking of those carrying this out is that “the Kurds are guests here” and that they should therefore migrate away.
Recalling the “Arab Belt” project of the Baath regime era, under which Arabs were settled in Kurdish areas, the same source noted that what is being done now is similar to it. He said the aim behind it is to bring about a demographic change in the areas where Kurds live.
According to information provided by this source, in the past week to ten days three more people in Raqqa have been contacted and asked to leave the city.
What is the interim government doing?
One source says that only a single group is carrying this out, while another says there are two or three separate groups.
According to the allegations, these individuals identify themselves as members of the security forces (asayish), and for this reason they claim that no one can interfere with them.
These individuals call people from hidden numbers or from foreign country numbers.
When they abduct someone, they demand close to 250,000 dollars. However, some are only able to escape their hands for 20,000 or 30,000 dollars.
The money in question is sent through a digital currency system called Sham Cash. This is a system that the interim Damascus administration has accepted for paying the salaries of its civil servants.
As thousands of public-sector workers in Syria tried to collect their salaries this April, ahead of the Eid al-Fitr holiday, many found that they could not access a faulty application they had been asked to download a few months earlier.
The application, called Sham Cash, has become the Syrian government’s preferred method for distributing salaries, paying bills, and transferring money. But users say the app does not work, and experts say it is far from secure.
Made mandatory for public-sector workers, the Sham Cash app raises urgent concerns about digital security.
In January, Syrian public-sector workers were quietly instructed to download an app called “Sham Cash” in order to receive their salaries.
The Sham Cash app can only be downloaded from its own website and is not available in the iOS store (App Store). This means the app is not secure, because it has not passed the strict security-verification tests that apps listed in official stores must undergo.
Reports that appeared in the press in January also indicate that the app is linked to transfers coming from the “Cham Bank” in Idlib — an internationally unrecognized currency exchange registered in Turkey. Funds transferred through Sham Cash do not pass through the Central Bank of Syria or the global banking system.
By April, the app had been made entirely mandatory. But it is overshadowed by technical failures, questionable financial links, and an alarming lack of transparency. As frustration grew among users, SMEX’s Digital Forensics Unit investigated what was actually happening behind the scenes.
The unknown developer behind Sham Cash
The absence of any publicly available information about the company behind Sham Cash raises serious concerns about transparency and accountability. Because there is no known or officially registered developer, there is no party to be held responsible in cases of data breaches, fraud, or financial loss.
The app also contains no clearly stated Terms of Use, Privacy Policy, or any indication of legal jurisdiction, which makes seeking legal recourse nearly impossible.
Because Sham Cash has no connection to any legal or verifiable company, its security protocols cannot be assessed. This significantly increases the risk that malware or spyware could compromise users’ devices.
Since it has no officially registered owner, the misuse or sale of sensitive user data, including personal information, financial details, and transaction histories, cannot be tracked or audited.
A source who provided information to Niha+ noted that this app is one accepted by the interim Damascus administration, so when money is sent through it, the government ought to be able to trace it.
A committee has been formed
According to the information available, a three-member committee has been formed to deal with the matter and find solutions to the problems facing Kurds in Raqqa. According to information provided by this committee, 4,000 families have so far fled Raqqa. Some of them went to Kobanê, and others to Hasakah.
One source claims that the number of those abducted and threatened is far higher. According to this source, some do not share their cases publicly because they do not want their names made known.
The possibility of social peace has been discussed for two years, and various steps have been taken. However, the mourning at Koşuyolu Park reminds us that the past is not completely behind us.
Photo: Yekta Armanc Hatipoğlu / niha+
The city is quite still for a Friday. Yet, upon entering Koşuyolu Park, it is as if the entire movement of the city has flowed here. Hundreds of people, families of guerrillas, their friends, comrades…
Small groups of people are in different areas of the park. Some are talking to each other, some are showing others something on their phone, and others sit quietly for a long time. Despite the mobility in the area, there are no loud conversations.
The news of guerrillas who had earlier lost their lives was received these days. They are being mourned these days, when the possibility of social peace is being discussed.
Mass condolence gatherings were held in İstanbul, Van, Diyarbakır, Mardin, and many other places. Among them was Koşuyolu Park in Diyarbakır’s Bağlar district. Condolence ceremonies for 49 PKK members were held there.
Diyarbakır, in the last two years since peace was discussed, is more hopeful than in previous periods. However, there is also doubt. The insecurity created in past years, the state’s delayed steps, and the fact that politicians, especially Selahattin Demirtaş, are still being held in prison add doubt to the hope.
Almost two years have passed since the President of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Devlet Bahçeli, shook hands with Tuncer Bakırhan, the Co-President of the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Parti), in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) on October 1, 2024.
Most recently, on August 10th, the “Law on Strengthening National Solidarity and Social Integration,” publicly known as the “Framework Law,” was accepted by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and published in the Official Gazette on August 18th.
Those who come to the condolence tents visit the families, then move on to other parts of the park. Food is distributed from hand to hand. Those present take on a part of the necessary tasks.
Almost everyone has the same dignified expression on their faces. While condolences are offered to the families, alongside the sorrow, gratitude for the struggle their children endured is also palpable.
Families sit at a table, with photos of their children in front of them and a rose in front of each photo, accepting condolences amid chants of “Şehîd Namirin.” In a covered area featuring banners reading “Em şehîdên azadiyê bi bîr tînin,” signed by MEBYA-DER, and “Our martyrs are our honor,” in a covered area.
The photographs standing side by side depict different faces and different life stories, yet they are all united by the same struggle.
The police are there, too. Armored vehicles marked “TEM,” water cannons, police buses… Unlike what we’ve been used to in previous years, they’re waiting a little “further back.” Despite this, there’s a stark contrast between the armored vehicles and the condolence gathering inside the park. On one side, the state’s law enforcement apparatus; on the other, tables where families who have lost their children are sitting.
The possibility of social peace has been discussed for two years, and various steps have been taken. However, the mourning at Koşuyolu Park serves as a reminder that the past has not been fully left behind.
Attorney Erdal Kuzu, noting that there is public expectation that cases involving unsolved political murders will be retried, stated, “Although the Ministry of Justice’s statements include phrases such as ‘there will be no unsolved cases left,’ it is understood that these statements apply only to cases that have not yet been barred by the statute of limitations. There is no indication that JİTEM cases or cases of unsolved murders will be reopened as a result of the ongoing negotiations between the current Kurdish political movement and the government.”
*The Dargeçit JİTEM Case
Following Akın Gürlek’s appointment as Minister of Justice by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, “unsolved murders” have returned to the public agenda. According to Gürlek’s statement, investigations will be conducted into 638 cases and 693 murders across 75 provinces. The Ministry, which until now has primarily focused on criminal cases, recently met first with the family of journalist Uğur Mumcu and then with the family of journalist Musa Anter. This has led to public speculation that the next phase in the “unsolved murders” case will involve political cases.
Cases were filed in 2008
In 2008, during the Ergenekon Trials, the matter was brought before the courts based on the testimony of a confidential witness codenamed “Aydos,” and lawsuits were filed against the relevant government officials and individuals. Some of the cases known to the public as the JİTEM trials were consolidated in 2010 into the JİTEM Main Trial. The Kızıltepe JİTEM Trial, however, continued to be heard separately. However, following the termination of the previous “Peace Process” in 2015 and amid the shifting political climate, the policy of impunity continued to prevail in cases involving these murders committed against Kurds. The Kızıltepe JİTEM Case was dismissed in 2019 on the grounds of the statute of limitations, and all defendants were acquitted. The main JİTEM case was also dismissed in 2025 on the grounds of the statute of limitations. Many other cases related to JİTEM that were tried separately met the same fate.
The final hearing in the Kızıltepe JİTEM case took place in 2019 at the Ankara 5th High Criminal Court. At that hearing, the court announced that the case had been dismissed due to the statute of limitations and that all defendants had been acquitted. Thus, the case—which was initiated in 2014 while negotiations were still ongoing and was characterized as a “confrontation trial”—had turned into an example of impunity and exoneration with the acquittal ruling.
At the time, Erdal Kuzu, one of the case’s attorneys, stated in a statement regarding the case that 12 people had been found in the wells, adding, “This decision is related to shifts in the balance of power. A retrial depends on the political climate. Due to the new alliance the AKP has formed since 2015, cases of this nature are being closed.”
However, in 2024, when Devlet Bahçeli went to the benches occupied by DEM Party members of Parliament to shake hands with them, and subsequently, during his party’s caucus meeting, called for Abdullah Öcalan to lay down arms and expressed expectations that new legal regulations regarding the peace process would be implemented, this brought the unsolved murders and related cases back into the spotlight. The families of the missing continue to seek justice in this matter. This situation raises the question of whether the political climate in Turkey has shifted in favor of peace once again with this new process.
JİTEM Trials
Main JİTEM Trial
The 11-defendant indictment prepared in 1999 and the 5-defendant indictment prepared in 2005 were merged in 2010 and came to be known as the “Main JİTEM Trial.” This case was later joined with the trial initiated in 2013 regarding the murder of writer-journalist Musa Anter, as well as the trial launched in 2019 concerning the tortured murder of Ayten Öztürk. There were 18 defendants in total in the main trial.
During the hearing held in Ankara on January 27, 2025, the court ruled to dismiss the JİTEM, Musa Anter, and Ayten Öztürk trial due to the statute of limitations, citing that 30 years had passed since the dates of the disappearances.
Kızıltepe JİTEM Trial
In 2014, a lawsuit was filed regarding the unlawful arbitrary execution or forced disappearance of 22 people in the Kızıltepe district of Mardin between 1992 and 1996. The charges of “establishing or managing an armed organization, membership in an armed organization, and premeditated murder” were brought against retired Colonel Hasan Atilla Uğur, then-Diyarbakır Provincial Gendarmerie Commander Colonel Eşref Hatipoğlu, Gendarmerie Commando Company Commander Ahmet Boncuk, Sergeant Major Ünal Alkan, and village guards Abdurrahman Kurğa, Mehmet Emin Kurğa, Ramazan Çetin, Mehmet Salih Kılınçaslan, and İsmet Kandemir.
The final hearing of the case involving nine defendants—four military personnel and five village guards—was held on Monday, September 9, at the Ankara 5th Heavy Penal Court. The court panel announced that the case was dismissed due to the statute of limitations and acquitted all defendants.
Dargeçit JİTEM Trial
In May 2026, the 1st Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation dismissed the “Dargeçit JİTEM Trial”—which was filed regarding 8 people and Sergeant Major Bilal Batırır who were forcibly disappeared in custody and killed in the Dargeçit district of Mardin between 1995 and 1996—on the grounds of the statute of limitations.
Other Trials
Other trials filed concerning JİTEM and unsolved murders that concluded with acquittals: the Derik Trial, the Nezir Tekçi Trial, the Görümlü Trial, the Vartinis Trial, the Cizre Trial, the Kızılağaç Trial, the Kulp Trial, the Lice Trial, and the Ankara Trial.
Has the political climate changed?
Speaking to Niha+ on the subject, attorney Erdal Kuzu highlighted the shift in the political climate between 2019 and 2024:
“It is impossible to say that the political climate at the time of the Kızıltepe JITEM trial is the same as that of 2019 and 2024. While in 2019 the state’s policies were shaped with the aim of eliminating Kurdish political movements, by 2024 steps had been taken toward resolving the Kurdish issue through nonviolent means, and a basis for communication had been established between the government and Kurdish political movements. Therefore, it is not possible to say that these two periods are the same. This situation is confirmed by information reflected in the public sphere.
It is possible to say that the state’s approach to the Kurdish issue changed in 2024. We can speak—at least at the level of rhetoric—of a process in which the elimination of armed struggle has expanded the political arena and paved the way for democratization. Whether this will materialize in practice, however, remains to be seen in the coming days. Yet we will see what concrete steps will be taken, to what extent the political arena will expand, and how much leeway the state will allow in this area through the practical measures to be implemented and the laws to be enacted in the coming period. In this sense, significant public expectations have been raised.”
*Attorney Erdal Kuzu
Expectations of people
In 2025, the Directorate for the Investigation of Unsolved Crimes was established within the Ministry of Justice. However, there are no signs that this newly established institution will launch a new investigation into the dismissed JİTEM cases. Attorney Kuzu made the following remarks on this matter:
“There is as yet no outward indication that the state will establish a new judicial mechanism regarding unsolved crime case files and matters related to JİTEM. Although the Ministry of Justice’s statements include phrases such as ‘there will be no remaining unsolved cases,’ it is understood that these statements apply only to cases that have not yet been barred by the statute of limitations. There is no indication that JİTEM cases or unsolved murder cases will be reopened as a result of the ongoing negotiations between the current Kurdish political leadership and the state authorities. However, if the process normalizes, weapons are completely removed from circulation, and political negotiations continue, the issue of coming to terms with the past will come to the forefront.”
However, it is also a well-known fact that as the situation and life return to normal, families will voice their demands for justice on this issue more forcefully, and their struggle in this regard will escalate.
“The state cannot remain silent”
Stating that the state cannot remain indifferent to the expectations of justice held by the relatives of the missing, Kuzu added the following:
“The perpetrators have still not been found, and the bodies remain unaccounted for. Expecting families to forget this pain goes against the natural course of life. It is well known that in countries where conflict resolution has taken place on a global scale, mechanisms for coming to terms with the past have been established. It would be natural for a similar situation to unfold in Turkey. We do not expect the political establishment to remain indifferent to demands that develop in this direction. However, we will all see in the coming days what method will be used and how this will unfold.
In 2019, we stated that the state had closed the files on unsolved murders and JİTEM cases within the framework of a political compromise, and that this was a political decision. In the process that has unfolded since 2024, it has become evident that this alliance within the state, while not yet beginning to dissolve, has undergone significant changes in certain respects. It can be said that bringing perpetrators—who hold no value for the state but are believed to have committed crimes against humanity—back before the courts would not come as a surprise in terms of the state’s efforts to restore public trust.”
Civan Akbulut, Chair of the Information Center on Anti-Kurdish Racism (IAKR), who stated that racism against Kurds is not officially recognized in Europe, noted that what is not named remains invisible and unpunished. Akbulut, noting that Kurdish asylum seekers face high rejection rates from European countries, said, “ The closer the political rapprochement with Ankara, the harder it becomes to have a Kurdish history of persecution recognised at all.”
Photo: The Amargi
Across Europe, “anti-Kurdish racism” remains one of the least acknowledged yet most pervasive forms of systemic discrimination. While general far-right sentiment and anti-immigrant hostility continue to rise, Kurds living in Europe face a double burden: a broader xenophobic climate as well as transnational persecution influenced by geopolitics and right-wing extremism.
In countries like Germany—home to the largest Kurdish diaspora in Europe, estimated at over one million people—this manifests in daily life, public institutions and on the streets. Incidents range from physical violence by ultranationalist groups to institutional neglect. In recent years, violent clashes and attacks targeting Kurdish community centers, cultural events, and individuals in cities such as Essen, Stuttgart, and Cologne have highlighted the growing threat posed by Turkish far-right networks, most notably the Grey Wolves (Bozkurtlar).
The Grey Wolves movement (Ülkü Ocakları) is decidedly anti-Semitic and anti-democratic and is combatively directed against Kurds, Armenians, Alevis, Ponto-Greek as well as other minorities and opposition members with a connection to Turkey.
Despite these growing dangers, attacks on Kurds are frequently filed simply as “foreign political disputes” or generic “politically motivated crime,” masking the specific anti-Kurdish nature of the violence. Furthermore, the persistent criminalization of Kurdish political expression in Germany is often enforced to maintain diplomatic alignments with Turkey. This criminalization may also cause tragic ends, for example, as the data shown in the press and public opinion, dozens of Kurdish refugees have ended their lives in Germany since 2023.
According to data from the “2024 Report on Anti-Kurdish Racism” presented to the Federal Parliament by the Information Center on Anti-Kurdish Racism (IAKR), which operates in Berlin, the capital of Germany, 217 documented cases of anti-Kurdish racism were recorded in 2024 alone. The report states that 37.8% of the incidents—including political acts, physical attacks, and discrimination (82 cases)—were linked to the symbols and rhetoric of far-right Turkish nationalist groups such as the “Ülkü Ocakları” (Grey Wolves).
To understand the mechanics of this phenomenon, lawyer and politician and chair of IAKR Civan Akbulut, who pointed out anti-Kurdish racism is a constitutional problem that functions across legal, political, and daily lives in Europe.
Chair of IAKR, Civan Akbulut, Photo: ANF
“Anti-Kurdish racism reaches everyday life”
According to Akbulut, anti-Kurdish racism begins with the fundamental denial of Kurdish identity, creating a baseline where verbal abuse, threats, and physical attacks become normalized.
Hightlighting that online platforms like TikTok and X have dropped the threshold for open hostility – by becoming almost part of the “normal tone” – which routinely spills over into schools, public offices, and workplaces, Akbulut also stresses that Kurds face a unique layer of risk.
Akbulut says that what is at stake are fundamental rights: Physical integrity in the face of attacks, and protection from discrimination.
“Anyone who visibly identifies as Kurdish has to reckon, in Europe, with none of this being guaranteed to them. Racism as a whole is a growing problem in Europe, one that has increased markedly in recent years. Anti-Kurdish racism is part of this development and intensifies along with it.”
“About 18,000 are attributed to Grey Wolves”
Akbulut points out that this domestic hostility is further interlocked by both European foreign policy, alongside immigration policy, which often overlooks the activities of ultranationalist groups out of geopolitical calculations toward Ankara, effectively allowing transnational racism to operate unpunished within European borders:
“The Grey Wolves are among the largest far-right movements in Germany and Europe; they are extremely capable of mobilising and prone to violence. In Germany alone, roughly 18,000 people are attributed to them, and for this movement Kurds are the central enemy. Added to this is a European politics that, out of geopolitical calculation towards Ankara, looks the other way. When the criminalisation and blanket suspicion propagated by the Turkish government seep, in part unquestioned, into European media, this shifts the public perception of Kurds. Anti-Kurdish racism operates transnationally, but its manifestation is a German and European problem. It takes place here, is permitted and applied by domestic politics, and largely goes unpunished.”
Anti-Kurdish Racism in Germany
IAKR Special Report No. 1 (January 2026) • Key Findings
The report argues that developments in Syria have significantly intensified hate speech, digital attacks, and discrimination targeting Kurdish communities in Germany, demonstrating the direct impact of international conflicts on the Kurdish diaspora.
43
People killed during the attacks on Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah
25
Civilian fatalities
155,000
Displaced civilians
1,500
Reported ISIS members who escaped following the Al-Shaddadi prison attack
400,000+
Population of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah before the attacks
10,000
ISIS detainees held in prisons across Northeast Syria
40,000+
ISIS-linked individuals and family members held in camps
54
Years of Assad family rule before its collapse
Key Findings of the Report
Alleged Bombardment of Civilian Areas
According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, residential neighborhoods and hospitals were deliberately targeted during the offensive.
Mass Displacement
Even the Syrian state news agency SANA acknowledged that at least 155,000 civilians were forced to flee their homes.
Violence Against Women
The report documents that videos showing the abuse of Kurdish female fighters triggered widespread international solidarity campaigns.
Regional Security Risks
Attacks on detention facilities reportedly enabled ISIS detainees to escape, creating significant international security concerns.
Impact on the Kurdish Diaspora
According to the report, military developments in Syria contributed to an increase in anti-Kurdish hate speech and digital attacks in Germany.
January 2026 Timeline
10 January
Following the collapse of negotiations between the Syrian transitional government and Kurdish forces, military operations intensified.
11 January
Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah were captured. According to the report, 43 people were killed, including 25 civilians.
Following Days
Videos documenting torture, executions, and abuse circulated widely on social media, prompting international condemnation.
13 January
The offensive expanded into DAANES-controlled areas. Following the attack on Al-Shaddadi Prison, approximately 1,500 ISIS members were reported to have escaped.
Source: Informationsstelle Antikurdischer Rassismus (IAKR), Special Report No. 1 – Incidents of Anti-Kurdish Racism in Germany, January 2026.
“Kurds learned to never rely on the state”
Akbulut defined the underlying problem in addressing this discrimination is the lack of official recognition:
“The category is missing, the awareness is missing. Kurdish society is under considerable pressure and is itself subjected to criminalisation, while Turkish right-wing extremists can run their associations and events largely undisturbed, which act as a catalyst against Kurds. This imbalance extends into the authorities themselves. Kurds have historically learned that they could never rely on the state, and this mistrust continues in Europe when complaints come to nothing or threats are not taken seriously.”
Akbulut drew attention to “one of the most powerful, and therefore most dangerous” one is that anti-Kurdish racism expresses itself is criminalisation, because it provides the justification for oppression and violence. “When Kurdish activism is sweepingly placed in the vicinity of ‘terror,’ a climate emerges in which every form of Kurdish self-organisation falls under blanket suspicion. Once someone has been marked as a security risk, almost anything can be legitimised against them” he continued.
Akbulut stated that in Europe, this criminalisation shows in raids on associations, in bans on flags and symbols, and in the fact that talks and events are cancelled on alleged security grounds or venues are withdrawn at short notice. He stressed the outward effect of this is those who constantly have to explain that they are not a security risk never even get to speak about the discrimination they face.
“Criminalisation reverses the roles: those affected are turned into suspects. That is a major problem” he said.
“Asylum assessments are not neutral”
Akbulut explains that Kurdish asylum seekers face exceptionally high rejection rates because European authorities routinely classify Turkey as a “safe country of origin” and falsely claim that Kurds face no group-based repression there. Akbulut, saying “They are granted protection considerably less often than other applicants”, highlighted this is not coincidental but structural:
“In the decisions, the finding recurs again and again that Kurds face no repression in Turkey on account of being Kurdish. This is simply false and contradicts reality, but it provides the basis for rejecting protection claims. These assessments are not neutral. The closer the political rapprochement with Ankara, the more favourable the official evaluation of the situation in Turkey turns out to be, and the harder it becomes to have a Kurdish history of persecution recognised at all. This does not only concern Kurds from Turkey. Kurds from Syria, Iraq and Iran also have a considerably harder time. And above all of this lies the general development. In the face of the shift to the right, agitation and an ever harsher policy of sealing off borders, refugees across Europe find it harder overall to obtain protection. Kurds stand at a point where all of these constrictions converge.”
“Anti-Kurdish racism interplay with sexism”
The impact of this discrimination is particularly severe for Kurdish women, who experience what Akbulut identifies as a textbook example of intersectional oppression. According to Akbulut, the hostility directed at Kurdish identity intersects with structural sexism, creating compounded dynamics of devaluation:
“Anti-Kurdish racism can therefore occur simultaneously and in interplay with sexism, ableism, queerphobia or classism. What is decisive is that these are not merely different experiences of oppression sitting side by side, but that they influence and reinforce one another. With Kurdish women this becomes very concrete: the racist enemy image of Kurds carries over into a devaluation of Kurdish women that is at once racist and sexist. Several logics of devaluation interlock here, and precisely for this reason the intersectional perspective is so important for our work.”
Because anti-Kurdish racism relies on the same core mechanisms as other forms of group-focused enmity—such as institutional neglect and criminalization—Akbulut emphasizes that cooperation is structurally necessary, as he further stated “Racism does not occur in isolation. Anyone fighting racism almost always encounters the same mechanisms that affect other groups too: devaluation, criminalisation, the looking-away of institutions.”
He also drew attention to the Kurdish self-organisation being a long history, since Kurds have learned to help themselves when the state does not, and this is precisely a pattern that many marginalised groups know.
“Consistent anti-racism is needed”
To dismantle these systemic barriers, Akbulut outlines three essential political and legal actions:
“First, anti-Kurdish racism must be recognised as a distinct form of racism. Without a category of its own, authorities, schools and courts cannot even record the relevant incidents, and what is not named remains invisible and unpunished.
Second, what is needed is consistent anti-racism instead of looking away. Racist actors must no longer be allowed to operate unchecked, and the Grey Wolves must be treated as what they are: a far-right movement. This cannot be separated from the larger picture. Anti-Kurdish racism grows in a climate in which racism as a whole is being normalised and the shift to the right is gaining momentum across Europe.
Third, and this is decisive, politics must stop adopting anti-Kurdish narratives itself. When criminalisation and blanket suspicion seep into European administrative practice and media language, racism is not being fought but administered and perpetuated.”
Twelve years have passed since ISIS, after capturing Mosul on August 3, 2014, turned its attention to Sinjar (Shingal), massacring thousands of Yazidis and abducting Yazidi women and children. According to data from May 4, 2026, 3,595 Yazidis abducted by ISIS have been rescued, while the fate of approximately 2,500 remains unknown.
It has been 12 years since the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) attacked Shingal, home to approximately 550,000 Yazidis, on August 3, 2014. Thousands of civilians were executed on the spot, tens of thousands were displaced, and Yazidi women and girls were abducted and raped. The Yazidis, who had endured 72 massacres by 2014, describe ISIS’s 2014 attacks and massacres against them as the “73rd ferman.”
Yazidis who fled the region following the attack sought refuge in camps in many areas, including Turkey, Syria, and the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq. According to a report by Rûdaw, approximately 2,500 homes have been built so far at the foot of Mount Sinjar (Shingal) for Yazidis who wish to build their homes there rather than in the valley. Although tens of thousands of Yazidis have returned to Shingal and the surrounding area, many still continue to live in camps far from their homeland.
SINJAR / YAZIDI GENOCIDE — IN DATA
12-Year Toll
According to official data from the Office for Rescuing Abducted Yazidis, the fate of 2,500 out of 6,417 Yazidis abducted in Shingal by ISIS remains unknown.
Attack date: August 3, 2014Latest data update: May 4, 2026
6,417
Total Abducted Yazidis
3,595
Rescued from Captivity
~2,500
Fate Still Unknown
Current Status of the 6,417 Abducted Individuals
56%
39%
5%
Rescued (3,595) Fate unknown (~2,500) Other cases known to be killed/missing
Source: Official data from the Dohuk-based “Office for Rescuing Abducted Yazidis” (as of May 4, 2026). Percentage calculations were made based on the total number of abducted individuals (6,417).
Documents related to the Yazidis are kept on file in the archives of the United Nations (UN) ISIS Crimes Investigation Team (UNITAD)—established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2379—as well as in the archives of the Ministry of the Interior of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq and the Office for the Rescue of Those Abducted by ISIS.
In the Yazidi faith, the term “ferman” is used to describe the waves of massacres and forced displacement they have faced throughout history, effectively serving as a “death warrant.” The Yazidis say that, up until 2014, they had been subjected to similar persecution and massacres 72 times throughout history. For this reason, ISIS’s August 2014 attack on Shingal is referred to in various sources—and in the words of the Yazidis—as the “73rd Ferman.”
The Shingal Defense Forces
On June 10, 2014, ISIS seized Mosul without encountering any resistance. Having reinforced itself with military supplies left behind by the Iraqi army, it targeted the villages south of Mount Sinjar—where the Yazidis lived—on the night of August 3 of the same year. During the attack, thousands of Yazidis were killed, and women and children were taken captive and sold in slave markets; according to current data, 93 mass graves have been identified in Shingal and the surrounding area to date.
To rescue the hundreds of thousands of Yazidis trapped on Mount Sinjar as a result of ISIS’s attacks, members of the People’s Defense Forces (HPG) went to the region to fight, leading to the rescue of many Yazidis. Tens of thousands of Yazidis were able to escape thanks to a corridor opened by a 12-member HPG unit, after days of fighting, HPG fighters repelled ISIS and succeeded in evacuating the Yazidis to northern and eastern Syria.
The YBŞ (Yekîneyên Berxwedana Şengalê / Şengal Resistance Units) was founded by Yazidi youth within the same month after they were resettled in safe zones. During the Campaign to Liberate Shingal, women within the YBŞ announced at a conference in 2015 that they had organized themselves under the name YPJ-Şengal (Yekîneyên Parastina Jin ê Şengalê / Shingal Women’s Protection Units) to empower themselves.
Yazidis remaining in camps in Turkey
According to a report titled “Access to Services for Yazidis Living in Mardin and Batman,” published by the Hayata Destek Association in May 2020, 22,062 Yazidis sought refuge in Turkey between August and October 2014; following the continuation of ISIS attacks, this number exceeded 30,000. The report’s data indicates that the Yazidis settled either with relatives in Şırnak (5,675 people), Batman (2,857 people), Diyarbakır (5,360 people), Siirt (1,686 people), and Mardin (5,471 people), or in camps established by municipalities.
Following the appointment of a trustee to the Diyarbakır Municipality in 2016 and the subsequent closure of the camp in December 2016, some Yazidis returned to Shingal or Iraq, while others went to Germany, as a result, there are currently only a small number of Yazidis in Turkey.
The European Parliament had called it “genocide”
The European Parliament was the first to recognize ISIS’s attacks on the Yazidis as genocide in February 2016. UNITAD, established by a UN Security Council resolution, explicitly determined that the crimes committed in Shingal constitute the most serious international crimes, including genocide. Nearly 20 countries, including the United States, Ireland, Canada, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Armenia, the United Kingdom, and Portugal, have recognized the Yazidi genocide.
However, the “73rd ferman” has not yet been recognized as genocide by any international criminal court.
The Çilê Havînê festival before the attack
In the Yazidi faith, the 40-day fasting period that begins on June 25 ends on August 1. During this period, which is regarded as a symbol of patience, spiritual purification, and gratitude, the Yazidis devote themselves to worship by abstaining from food and drink from dawn until sunset during the hottest days of the year. This fasting period is known as Çilê Havînê (Summer Fast) in the Yazidi calendar. Another 40-day fasting period is Çilê Zivistanê (Winter Fast), observed during the winter months.
The festival celebrated on August 2, following the end of Çilê Havînê, was held just one day before August 3, 2014—the day ISIS launched its attack on Shingal.
Forensic Medicine Specialist Dr. Nevin Küçükçallı stated that in protecting juvenile delinquents, the state must fulfill its obligations as well as its social and moral responsibilities, and that there should be centers that include restorative and therapeutic measures to remove children from the cycle of violence.
Image: psikolektif.com
In Turkey, the number of juvenile delinquents has been increasing day by day in recent years. According to 2024 data, the number of cases reported to security forces reached 612,000. It appears that groups referred to as “new generation gangs” primarily exploit children.
Dr. Nevin Küçükçallı, a Forensic Medicine Specialist and member of the Turkish Medical Association, stated that the preconceived notion that children involved in crime are “criminals” must be abandoned, adding, “Moreover, we must stand against the language used in the media regarding children, which dehumanizes them.”
Reminding the state of its responsibilities in protecting children, Küçükçallı noted that there are societal and moral responsibilities, and that society should not dehumanize children.
“Our primary goal should never be to punish children, but to consider their best interests and protect them,” said Dr. Nevin Küçükçallı, answering niha+’s questions regarding juvenile delinquents and related practices.
About Nevin Küçükçallı
A graduate of Dokuz Eylül University, she is a forensic medicine specialist and Assistant Professor specializing in human rights violations. Member of the Turkish Medical Association and the Society of Forensic Medicine Specialists.
I’d like to start with the question, “Who is a child?”
Every person is a child until the age of 18. Childhood is not a fixed moment, but an ongoing stage of development. Empathy, abstract thinking, and impulse control mature over time through genetic and environmental factors. Recent studies show that brain changes continue from pre-adolescence until the mid-twenties.
Do all children, for example, infants and adolescents, have the same rights and freedoms?
According to the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, all children have certain rights and freedoms simply by virtue of being children, and states are obligated to protect children.
So, who is a juvenile delinquents?
According to the Child Protection Law, which came into effect in 2005, a child is one who is under investigation or prosecution, or against whom a security measure has been imposed, on the allegation of committing an act defined as a crime under the law. The Child Protection Law defines a child not as a criminal, but as one “drawn into crime” by risk factors.
Could you discuss risk factors for children? What are they?
Deep poverty and inequalities in social distribution are the biggest risk factors for these children. School dropouts and low educational levels or broken family structures, which lead to isolation, often result in these children becoming estranged. These children then encounter neighborhood cultures and criminal organizations where crime is seen as prestigious, as a means of self-affirmation. For children living on the outskirts of cities, violence is often seen as a survival mechanism.
Can we say that the darkness mentioned in the words of Rakel Dink, the spouse of journalist Hrant Dink, who was murdered by 17-year-old Ogün Samast – “Nothing can be done without questioning the darkness that creates a murderer from a baby, my brothers and sisters…” – is among the risk factors?
Absolutely! We are talking about a system where poverty is deepening, no policies are being produced to address the inequality in social distribution, even providing a free meal for children isn’t being discussed, social rights are constantly being curtailed, access to education and healthcare is becoming increasingly difficult, and marginalization and violence are glorified. Without addressing the root causes that led the child to commit the crime, will the law solve the problem simply by imposing a 24-year prison sentence?
“We need to talk about the responsibilities of the state”
We see more juveniles pushed into crime in the media than before. Are their numbers increasing? What are the commonalities and differences between children who come to security forces as victims and those involved in crime?
In 2024, the number of children brought to security forces was 612,000, an increase of approximately 10% compared to 2023. However, what is striking is that while approximately 202,000 of these children were alleged to have been involved in crime, 279,000 entered the system as victims. In other words, the vast majority of children entering the legal system are not perpetrators of crime (33%), but victims (45%). The victimized children are the dark side of crime. Another interesting point is that the most frequent reason for children in both groups entering the system is through injury. So the real problem is the increasing violence.
On the other hand, instead of talking about victimized children, finding solutions for them, investigating the causes of increasing violence, and calling on the state to fulfill its responsibilities in these matters, people prefer to talk about these children. Taking responsibility and finding solutions is more difficult; blaming is easier.
Meanwhile, there’s also an effort lately to create a perception that the punishments for juvenile delinquents should be increased.
“Age alone is not enough”
How are sentences determined for the juvenile delinquents?
Article 31 of the Turkish Penal Code governs the determination of criminal responsibility based on age. Under this law, children under 12 have no criminal responsibility and cannot be prosecuted under any circumstances. For children aged 12-15 involved in crime, a forensic medical evaluation is required. If the forensic medical evaluation determines that the child has significant intellectual disability or mental illness, no criminal prosecution is initiated. If the forensic medical evaluation determines that the child does not have significant intellectual disability or mental illness, and that their perception and ability to direct their behavior are developed, the child is generally given a reduced sentence by half. For children aged 15-18, a reduced sentence of one-third is given without a forensic medical evaluation.
But is age alone sufficient to determine the criminal responsibility of a juvenile delinquents?
No, age alone is not sufficient for determining criminal responsibility. The child must also have reached the psychosocial maturity to intellectually understand the moral and legal consequences of their actions and the rules of society, and to direct their behavior accordingly.
If forensic medical assessments were conducted properly, the conditions and traumas that led the child to crime could be identified, and the child could receive timely psychosocial intervention. However, based entirely on subjective assessments, mostly printed evaluations are made stating that the child does not have a psychopathology that would affect their criminal responsibility, and children are sent to prison environments.
Considering that children are not adults, sending them to prison is not a solution. So what needs to be done to solve this problem?
We need to get rid of the preconceived notion that children who are drawn into crime are “criminals.” Moreover, we must stand against the language used in the media regarding children, which dehumanizes them.
Children are not adults. Their physical and psychosocial development is still ongoing. Before this development is complete, a child cannot and should not be expected to assume the legal consequences like an adult.
Once a child enters the system, we can encounter them again later because when a child enters prison, their role models are the people in the prison, and the primary language spoken is violence. Violence is a language learned and produced through exposure. In other words, sending children to prison environments perpetuates the cycle of crime. Our primary goal should never be to punish children, but to safeguard their best interests and protect them.
In addition to the state’s obligations in protecting children, we also have social and moral responsibilities. Children should not be demonized by society and should not be left alone within the system. It is much more difficult for isolated children to escape the cycle of violence.
In conclusion, the solution is not to punish the child. The solution is to eliminate the causes that push children into crime. This includes implementing social policies to prevent poverty, improving the quality of education and schools, conducting detailed and high-quality forensic medical and social service assessments, preventing children from being held in prison conditions, and prioritizing restorative and therapeutic measures to help children escape the cycle of violence. All of these are necessary for the child’s well-being, the protection of their future, and rescuing them from darkness.
FISA Chıld Rıghts Center
6 July 2026
In the first five months of 2026, at least 303 children died in Turkey from preventable causes
The FISA Children’s Rights Center has published an information note titled “Violations of Children’s Right to Life in Turkey,” covering the period from January to May 2026. According to the note, which was prepared by reviewing data from local and national online media, local sources, and human rights organizations, at least 303 children lost their lives in Turkey in the first five months of the year due to preventable causes.
The study collected data on violations of children’s right to life in 69 provinces. As in previous years, the highest number of child deaths was recorded in Urfa with 18 children. Urfa was followed by Antalya with 16 child deaths, and Maraş and Istanbul with 14 child deaths each.
At least 46 children have lost their lives due to negligence in public services
According to the information note, at least 46 children lost their lives in incidents that occurred in public institutions and/or due to the direct actions and/or negligence of public officials. Of the children who lost their lives, 22 died while receiving health services, 20 while receiving education services, 2 while receiving care services, and 2 while benefiting from local government services.
The FISA Children’s Rights Center emphasized that this situation is the most serious consequence of public services not being structured according to children’s specific needs and of protective, child-centered mechanisms not being implemented.
At least 257 children have lost their lives as a result of violence, workplace accidents, and negligence.
The center stated that at least 257 children lost their lives due to the state’s failure to fulfill its obligations to regulate, supervise, and develop preventive policies. These deaths were classified under the headings of violence, workplace fatalities, neglect, and other violations of the right to life.
According to the report, in the first five months of the year, at least 26 children committed suicide, at least 8 children lost their lives in incidents related to individual gun ownership, and at least 14 children died under suspicious circumstances.
Drowning and falling from height are not being prevented.
According to the information note, at least 39 children lost their lives in urban and rural open spaces in the first five months of 2026. Of these children, 31 drowned in dams, rivers, open waters where necessary precautions were not taken, and mostly in irrigation canals belonging to the State Hydraulic Works (DSI).
Of the 11 children who lost their lives in domestic accidents, 8 died as a result of falling from open windows and balconies.
The FISA Child Rights Center stated that despite drowning and falls from heights occurring systematically every year, effective policies are not being implemented, necessary precautions are not being taken, and risks are not being eliminated. Therefore, the same reasons will continue to lead to child deaths in 2026.
Children are dying in workplace accidents: At least 27 children in five months.
According to the report, at least 27 children lost their lives in work-related accidents in the first five months of 2026.
Of the 21 child laborers who lost their lives while working, 11 died in agricultural and livestock jobs, 3 died from falls from heights in construction, and 1 died while working in the industrial sector. It was determined that at least 2 of the deceased children were working within the scope of MESEM (Vocational and Technical Education Center).
Six of the children who lost their lives in workplace accidents died in risky temporary shelters in cities where they had gone with their families, who were seasonal agricultural workers. It was noted that all of these children were refugees.
Violence: at home, school, streets…
In the first five months of 2026, at least 24 children lost their lives as a result of violence. Thirteen of these deaths were due to peer violence, six to gender-based violence, four to domestic violence, and one to child homicide. The FISA Children’s Rights Center stated that this data shows that violence is produced within children’s homes, neighborhoods, schools, and closest relationships.
The center included the following assessment in its statement:
“Each child death serves as a reminder that different forms of violence feed off each other, and that protecting children’s right to life is only possible by addressing the structural problems that generate violence and strengthening effective child protection mechanisms.”
Sometimes, it does not take thousands of words to describe the loneliness of a people. One Baloch refugee, sitting alone outside Number 10, says enough.
In the heart of London, directly opposite one of the world’s most powerful centres, one man has been sitting alone since 1 July.
His name is Aomar Karim.
He is a friend I met in exile.
A Baloch human rights activist, Karim sought political asylum in the United Kingdom four years ago. It had become impossible for him to continue his struggle in his homeland. But exile changes only where you live. It does not end the struggle.
Today, on the anniversary of the Sivas Massacre of 2 July 1993, I went to see him. More precisely, I went to stand beside him in solidarity.
I found Karim sitting directly opposite Number 10 Downing Street. Behind him there was a banner. Beside him, a few personal belongings. He sat quietly, watching the famous black door.
At the same time, hundreds of tourists posed for photographs outside the iron gates of the Prime Minister’s residence, eager to capture another London landmark.
Yet almost nobody noticed the Baloch refugee sitting beneath his banner.
Except for one South Korean tourist.
She was the only person who stopped to ask what he was doing.
On one of the world’s busiest political streets, he was almost invisible.
“May someone hear our voices”
On 1 July, Aomar Karim began a three-day hunger strike. His aim is to bring the long-standing repression and human rights abuses in Pakistani-controlled Balochistan to the attention of the British government and the international community.
His demands are clear.
He is calling on the UK government to publicly condemn the life sentences handed down by Pakistan against Baloch human rights defenders Dr. Mahrang Baloch and Sibghatullah Shah Ji, and to urge the Pakistani authorities to drop all charges against them and other Baloch activists.
A people divided
The Baloch are one of the indigenous peoples of Southwest Asia. Their historical roots are often traced to the Medes, and they are widely regarded as being closely related to the Kurds.
Like the Kurds, their historic homeland has been divided among three states: Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. Their language, Balochi, belongs to the Indo-European language family and is distantly related to Kurdish.
And, like the Kurds, they have spent decades struggling for their identity, political rights and fundamental freedoms, particularly in the part of Balochistan controlled by Pakistan.
One of the most prominent figures in that struggle is physician and human rights defender Dr. Mahrang Baloch. Known internationally for campaigning against enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, she is one of the leading figures of the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (Baloch Unity Committee – BYC).
The Pakistani authorities arrested Dr. Mahrang Baloch in 2025 after years of attempting to criminalise her activism. In June 2026, she was sentenced to life imprisonment after being accused of responsibility for the death of a police officer during a protest in 2024.
How familiar that sounds.
A movement for rights treated as a crime.
Activists branded as terrorists to silence them.
People who disappear.
And despite everything, a people who refuse to give up.
A call to protect the Baloch people
From his place outside Downing Street, Aomar Karim says the Pakistani state, military and judiciary bear responsibility for grave human rights violations against the Baloch people.
His appeal to the United Kingdom and the international community is simple: “Protect the Baloch people. Take action to end enforced disappearances. Hold those responsible for human rights violations accountable, and pressure Pakistan to release all detained Baloch political prisoners. The UK government should begin by unequivocally condemning the shameful life sentences imposed on Dr. Mahrang Baloch and Sibghatullah Shah Ji.”
The weight of silence
One man sitting alone across from Downing Street.
People who never looked up from their phones.
Tourists taking photographs.
The crowds flowing around him.
A silent protest that almost no one noticed.
As I left my friend there and made my way home that evening, I carried a lump in my throat and a weight in my heart. The heaviest burden was not simply his solitude—it was the silence that surrounded it, even in the midst of so many people.
Sometimes, it does not take thousands of words to describe the loneliness of a people.
One Baloch refugee, sitting alone outside Number 10, says enough.
According to data released by CİSST, as of June 2026, among the 421,583 inmates in prisons, at least 200 are LGBT+, 476 are disabled, and 14,276 are foreign nationals.
The Civil Society Association for the Penitentiary System (CİSST) released prison statistics for June 2026. According to these statistics, as of June, the 402 prisons in Turkey are housing 421,583 people, exceeding their designed capacity by 138.5%.
Data shared by CİSST indicates that 64,705 of these inmates are pretrial detainees, while 4,673 are children under the age of 18. The statistics also highlight that among these inmates, there are at least 200 LGBT+ inmates, 476 inmates with disabilities, and 14,276 foreign nationals.
There are 891 infants in prisons
According to CİSST, which notes that 4.8% of the inmates in prisons are women, there are also 891 infants and children under the age of six in prisons. The statistics compiled by CİSST reveal that prisons are not merely places of incarceration but also spaces where the elderly, children, people with disabilities, and infants living with their mothers are housed.
Report · CİSST
Overview
421,583
Total prison population
402
Number of prisons
304,390
Total official capacity
38.5% over capacity
Distribution by Detention Type
In closed prisons303,922
In open prisons117,661
Legal Status and Special Groups
356,878
Convicted prisoners
64,705
Pre-trial detainees (awaiting trial)
14,276
Foreign national prisoners
200+
LGBTI+ prisoners
Children and Women
4,673
Children aged 12–18 in prison
226 of them are girls
20,360
Women prisoners
891
Children aged 0–6 living with their incarcerated mothers
Age, Education and Work
6,680
Prisoners aged 65 and over
77,014
Prisoners continuing their education
58,500
Prisoners in insured employment
Prisoners with Disabilities (Total: 476)
Type of Disability
Number of People
Orthopedic disability
252
Visual impairment
96
Hearing impairment
68
Speech and language disability
34
Combined hearing and speech disability
26
Daily Food Allowance (2025)
₺144
Adult convicted prisoners, detainees and on-duty staff
₺275
Juvenile convicted prisoners and detainees
₺275
Children held with mothers, breastfeeding and pregnant inmates
May 1st in Turkey, lastly celebrated in Taksim Square in 2012. We have compiled a chronicle of May 1st celebrations marked by police interventions and mass detentionsagainst the ban on Taksim.
Photo: Murat Bay
Since 1976, May 1st in Turkey has been defined by the persistence of workers to reach Taksim Square. Following the “1977 May Day Massacre,” the square became both a symbol of labor rights and the country’s most contested protest site. Despite long-standing bans, unions and leftist organizations continue to claim Taksim as the traditional heart of May Day celebrations.
Here is a summary of the events following the ban on Taksim Square over the last 13 years:
May Day in Istanbul from 2013 to 2025: The Taksim ban, police interventions, mass detentions, and the ongoing struggle.
1,000+
Total detentions (at least)
13 years
Ongoing Taksim ban
100+
Total number of arrests
2013
Following its reopening in 2010, Taksim was banned once again. The Governor’s Office cited the “pedestrianization project” as the reason. Extraordinary security measures were taken across the city; bridges were raised, and roads were closed. Hours-long police interventions occurred in many areas, particularly Beşiktaş and Şişli. Even hospitals and homes were affected by tear gas. It was reported that 30,000 police officers were deployed to Taksim that day. According to the Governor’s Office, 25 protesters (3 serious), 6 journalists, and 22 police officers (3 serious) were injured.
72 detentions
2014
Taksim Square was completely cordoned off. Intense tear gas and water cannons were used throughout the day in Şişli, Mecidiyeköy, and surrounding areas. Health institutions and journalists were also impacted by the interventions.
171 detentions • 12 journalists injured
2015
Entry to Taksim was prohibited. Only a limited number of unions were allowed to lay wreaths at the monument. Interventions targeted small groups across the city. Allegations surfaced regarding police entering political party buildings.
203 detentions, 13 arrested
2016
Celebrations were moved to Bakırköy. Despite this, interventions continued against groups attempting to reach Taksim. Various political and union groups were redirected to alternative areas. A citizen named Nail Mavuş lost his life after being crushed due to an uncontrolled maneuver by a water cannon vehicle (TOMA).
231 detentions, 5 arrested
2017
The Taksim ban remained in effect. Groups gathering at various points in Istanbul were detained, including individuals attempting to hold sit-in protests.
165 detentions
2018
The Governor’s Office rejected all applications. The rally site was moved to Maltepe. Taksim was sealed off with barriers starting from the early hours of the morning.
84 detentions
2019
Interventions were carried out against groups gathering in Şişli. Detentions of those attempting to march toward Taksim continued throughout the day.
119 detentions
2020
Curfews under pandemic conditions were cited as grounds for restrictions. Reports included allegations of ill-treatment, assault, and reverse-handcuffing during detentions.
48 detentions
2021
Despite the curfew, groups attempting to march to Taksim faced harsh intervention. Union representatives were among those detained.
212 detentions
2022
After a two-year hiatus, a mass rally was held in Maltepe. Groups heading toward Taksim were once again blocked, leading to further detentions.
100+ detentions
2023
Numerous groups attempting to march to Taksim from Şişli and Beşiktaş were detained. There were attempts to prevent members of the press from recording the events.
80+ detentions
2024
The Constitutional Court (AYM) ruled that Taksim is a legitimate May Day site and declared the Governor’s ban a “rights violation.” Thousands gathered in Saraçhane to march to Taksim, but police blocked the route with barricades. The confrontation lasted approximately 1.5 hours, followed by house raids. In 2025, the court found the ban to be unlawful.
268 detentions, 77 arrested
2025
Operations were conducted against organizations calling for a Taksim gathering. Throughout the day, barricades in Mecidiyeköy were challenged amidst ongoing interventions. According to the Progressive Lawyers Association (ÇHD), a total of 419 people, including 10 children and 11 lawyers, were detained in Şişli.
419 detentions, 13 arrested
Source: Human rights organizations and press compilations.
2013: The return of the ban
After allowing celebrations in 2010, the AKP government reimposed the ban in 2013. The Governor’s Office cited a “pedestrianization” project as the reason.
30,000 officers were deployed.
Bridges of Galata and Unkapanı were dismantled to block access.
Police used tear gas and water cannons against groups in Beşiktaş and Şişli. Tear gas was fired at ambulances and into the garden of Şişli Etfal Hospital.
At least 72 people were detained.
2014, May 1
Taksim was closed to everyone except police and accredited journalists.
While small pro-government unions were briefly allowed to lay wreaths, others faced heavy intervention in Tarlabaşı, Şişli, and Beşiktaş.
22 people were hospitalized with fractures, 12 journalists were injured by gas canisters and rubber bullets.
171 people were detained.
2015, May 1
Unions like DİSK and KESK insisted on Taksim, but were blocked.
Police fired tear gas into the CHP district building in Beşiktaş.
203 people were detained; 13 were officially arrested.
2016, May 1
Major unions (DİSK, KESK, TMMOB, TTB) decided to hold the main rally in Bakırköy for this year only. However, other leftist groups still marched toward Taksim.
231 detentions and 5 arrests near Beşiktaş and Şişli.
2017, May 1
The Interior Minister announced Taksim would remain closed. Main unions moved to Bakırköy again.
165 people attempting to reach Taksim were detained across various districts.
2018, May 1
Main unions moved to Maltepe, while socialist groups headed for Taksim.
The square was completely surrounded by barriers early in the morning; even journalists were barred.
84 people were taken into custody.
2019, May 1
Groups gathered at Şişli Cevahir Mall to march to Taksim but were met with police intervention.
119 people were detained.
2020, May 1
During the pandemic, 48 people were detained. Lawyers from ÇHD reported that detainees were subjected to “plastic handcuff torture,” beatings, and insults. One person’s arm was broken during the intervention.
2021, May 1
Despite a lockdown and rejected applications, unions tried to march from Dolmabahçe.
212 people were detained, many of whom were dragged on the ground. DİSK President Arzu Çerkezoğlu was among those detained.
2022, May 1
After a two-year pandemic break, mass celebrations returned.
At least 100 people were detained while trying to reach the square from multiple points. The official rally was held in Maltepe.
2023, May 1
Groups from various unions and socialist parties attempted to walk from Şişli and Beşiktaş.
At least 80 people were detained.
2024: The Saraçhane barricade
Unions and the CHP gathered at Saraçhane to march to Taksim, citing a Constitutional Court ruling that the ban was illegal.
Police formed a massive barricade under the historic Bozdoğan Aqueduct.
Police used water cannons, tear gas, and rubber bullets.
210 people were detained on the day, 47 more were taken in during house raids on May 3.
Governor Davut Gül stated, “The state may leave it for tomorrow, but it won’t let it go unpunished.”
2025, May 1
A new May 1st organizing committee declared “Taksim belongs to the people.”
Police operations targeted organizers on April 29 and 30, around 92 people were detained.
Protesters repeatedly challenged police barriers in Mecidiyeköy throughout the day.
407 people were detained, 7 were arrested. Reports of reverse-handcuffing and police brutality were documented in Mecidiyeköy.