Will the JİTEM trials be reopened?

Attorney Erdal Kuzu, noting that there is public expectation that cases involving unsolved political murders will be retried, stated, “Although the Ministry of Justice’s statements include phrases such as ‘there will be no unsolved cases left,’ it is understood that these statements apply only to cases that have not yet been barred by the statute of limitations. There is no indication that JİTEM cases or cases of unsolved murders will be reopened as a result of the ongoing negotiations between the current Kurdish political movement and the government.”

*The Dargeçit JİTEM Case

Following Akın Gürlek’s appointment as Minister of Justice by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, “unsolved murders” have returned to the public agenda. According to Gürlek’s statement, investigations will be conducted into 638 cases and 693 murders across 75 provinces. The Ministry, which until now has primarily focused on criminal cases, recently met first with the family of journalist Uğur Mumcu and then with the family of journalist Musa Anter. This has led to public speculation that the next phase in the “unsolved murders” case will involve political cases.

Cases were filed in 2008

In 2008, during the Ergenekon Trials, the matter was brought before the courts based on the testimony of a confidential witness codenamed “Aydos,” and lawsuits were filed against the relevant government officials and individuals. Some of the cases known to the public as the JİTEM trials were consolidated in 2010 into the JİTEM Main Trial. The Kızıltepe JİTEM Trial, however, continued to be heard separately. However, following the termination of the previous “Peace Process” in 2015 and amid the shifting political climate, the policy of impunity continued to prevail in cases involving these murders committed against Kurds. The Kızıltepe JİTEM Case was dismissed in 2019 on the grounds of the statute of limitations, and all defendants were acquitted. The main JİTEM case was also dismissed in 2025 on the grounds of the statute of limitations. Many other cases related to JİTEM that were tried separately met the same fate.

The final hearing in the Kızıltepe JİTEM case took place in 2019 at the Ankara 5th High Criminal Court. At that hearing, the court announced that the case had been dismissed due to the statute of limitations and that all defendants had been acquitted. Thus, the case—which was initiated in 2014 while negotiations were still ongoing and was characterized as a “confrontation trial”—had turned into an example of impunity and exoneration with the acquittal ruling.

At the time, Erdal Kuzu, one of the case’s attorneys, stated in a statement regarding the case that 12 people had been found in the wells, adding, “This decision is related to shifts in the balance of power. A retrial depends on the political climate. Due to the new alliance the AKP has formed since 2015, cases of this nature are being closed.”

However, in 2024, when Devlet Bahçeli went to the benches occupied by DEM Party members of Parliament to shake hands with them, and subsequently, during his party’s caucus meeting, called for Abdullah Öcalan to lay down arms and expressed expectations that new legal regulations regarding the peace process would be implemented, this brought the unsolved murders and related cases back into the spotlight. The families of the missing continue to seek justice in this matter. This situation raises the question of whether the political climate in Turkey has shifted in favor of peace once again with this new process.

JİTEM Trials
Main JİTEM Trial

The 11-defendant indictment prepared in 1999 and the 5-defendant indictment prepared in 2005 were merged in 2010 and came to be known as the “Main JİTEM Trial.” This case was later joined with the trial initiated in 2013 regarding the murder of writer-journalist Musa Anter, as well as the trial launched in 2019 concerning the tortured murder of Ayten Öztürk. There were 18 defendants in total in the main trial.

During the hearing held in Ankara on January 27, 2025, the court ruled to dismiss the JİTEM, Musa Anter, and Ayten Öztürk trial due to the statute of limitations, citing that 30 years had passed since the dates of the disappearances.

Kızıltepe JİTEM Trial

In 2014, a lawsuit was filed regarding the unlawful arbitrary execution or forced disappearance of 22 people in the Kızıltepe district of Mardin between 1992 and 1996. The charges of “establishing or managing an armed organization, membership in an armed organization, and premeditated murder” were brought against retired Colonel Hasan Atilla Uğur, then-Diyarbakır Provincial Gendarmerie Commander Colonel Eşref Hatipoğlu, Gendarmerie Commando Company Commander Ahmet Boncuk, Sergeant Major Ünal Alkan, and village guards Abdurrahman Kurğa, Mehmet Emin Kurğa, Ramazan Çetin, Mehmet Salih Kılınçaslan, and İsmet Kandemir.

The final hearing of the case involving nine defendants—four military personnel and five village guards—was held on Monday, September 9, at the Ankara 5th Heavy Penal Court. The court panel announced that the case was dismissed due to the statute of limitations and acquitted all defendants.

Dargeçit JİTEM Trial

In May 2026, the 1st Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation dismissed the “Dargeçit JİTEM Trial”—which was filed regarding 8 people and Sergeant Major Bilal Batırır who were forcibly disappeared in custody and killed in the Dargeçit district of Mardin between 1995 and 1996—on the grounds of the statute of limitations.

Other Trials

Other trials filed concerning JİTEM and unsolved murders that concluded with acquittals: the Derik Trial, the Nezir Tekçi Trial, the Görümlü Trial, the Vartinis Trial, the Cizre Trial, the Kızılağaç Trial, the Kulp Trial, the Lice Trial, and the Ankara Trial.

Has the political climate changed?

Speaking to Niha+ on the subject, attorney Erdal Kuzu highlighted the shift in the political climate between 2019 and 2024:

“It is impossible to say that the political climate at the time of the Kızıltepe JITEM trial is the same as that of 2019 and 2024. While in 2019 the state’s policies were shaped with the aim of eliminating Kurdish political movements, by 2024 steps had been taken toward resolving the Kurdish issue through nonviolent means, and a basis for communication had been established between the government and Kurdish political movements. Therefore, it is not possible to say that these two periods are the same. This situation is confirmed by information reflected in the public sphere.

It is possible to say that the state’s approach to the Kurdish issue changed in 2024. We can speak—at least at the level of rhetoric—of a process in which the elimination of armed struggle has expanded the political arena and paved the way for democratization. Whether this will materialize in practice, however, remains to be seen in the coming days. Yet we will see what concrete steps will be taken, to what extent the political arena will expand, and how much leeway the state will allow in this area through the practical measures to be implemented and the laws to be enacted in the coming period. In this sense, significant public expectations have been raised.”

*Attorney Erdal Kuzu

Expectations of people

In 2025, the Directorate for the Investigation of Unsolved Crimes was established within the Ministry of Justice. However, there are no signs that this newly established institution will launch a new investigation into the dismissed JİTEM cases. Attorney Kuzu made the following remarks on this matter:

“There is as yet no outward indication that the state will establish a new judicial mechanism regarding unsolved crime case files and matters related to JİTEM. Although the Ministry of Justice’s statements include phrases such as ‘there will be no remaining unsolved cases,’ it is understood that these statements apply only to cases that have not yet been barred by the statute of limitations. There is no indication that JİTEM cases or unsolved murder cases will be reopened as a result of the ongoing negotiations between the current Kurdish political leadership and the state authorities. However, if the process normalizes, weapons are completely removed from circulation, and political negotiations continue, the issue of coming to terms with the past will come to the forefront.”

However, it is also a well-known fact that as the situation and life return to normal, families will voice their demands for justice on this issue more forcefully, and their struggle in this regard will escalate.

“The state cannot remain silent”

Stating that the state cannot remain indifferent to the expectations of justice held by the relatives of the missing, Kuzu added the following:

“The perpetrators have still not been found, and the bodies remain unaccounted for. Expecting families to forget this pain goes against the natural course of life. It is well known that in countries where conflict resolution has taken place on a global scale, mechanisms for coming to terms with the past have been established. It would be natural for a similar situation to unfold in Turkey. We do not expect the political establishment to remain indifferent to demands that develop in this direction. However, we will all see in the coming days what method will be used and how this will unfold.

In 2019, we stated that the state had closed the files on unsolved murders and JİTEM cases within the framework of a political compromise, and that this was a political decision. In the process that has unfolded since 2024, it has become evident that this alliance within the state, while not yet beginning to dissolve, has undergone significant changes in certain respects. It can be said that bringing perpetrators—who hold no value for the state but are believed to have committed crimes against humanity—back before the courts would not come as a surprise in terms of the state’s efforts to restore public trust.”

Akbulut: “Anti-Kurdish racism must be recognised as a distinct form of racism”

Civan Akbulut, Chair of the Information Center on Anti-Kurdish Racism (IAKR), who stated that racism against Kurds is not officially recognized in Europe, noted that what is not named remains invisible and unpunished. Akbulut, noting that Kurdish asylum seekers face high rejection rates from European countries, said, “ The closer the political rapprochement with Ankara, the harder it becomes to have a Kurdish history of persecution recognised at all.”

Photo: The Amargi

Across Europe, “anti-Kurdish racism” remains one of the least acknowledged yet most pervasive forms of systemic discrimination. While general far-right sentiment and anti-immigrant hostility continue to rise, Kurds living in Europe face a double burden: a broader xenophobic climate as well as transnational persecution influenced by geopolitics and right-wing extremism.

In countries like Germany—home to the largest Kurdish diaspora in Europe, estimated at over one million people—this manifests in daily life, public institutions and on the streets. Incidents range from physical violence by ultranationalist groups to institutional neglect. In recent years, violent clashes and attacks targeting Kurdish community centers, cultural events, and individuals in cities such as Essen, Stuttgart, and Cologne have highlighted the growing threat posed by Turkish far-right networks, most notably the Grey Wolves (Bozkurtlar).

The Grey Wolves movement (Ülkü Ocakları) is decidedly anti-Semitic and anti-democratic and is combatively directed against Kurds, Armenians, Alevis, Ponto-Greek as well as other minorities and opposition members with a connection to Turkey.

Despite these growing dangers, attacks on Kurds are frequently filed simply as “foreign political disputes” or generic “politically motivated crime,” masking the specific anti-Kurdish nature of the violence. Furthermore, the persistent criminalization of Kurdish political expression in Germany is often enforced to maintain diplomatic alignments with Turkey. This criminalization may also cause tragic ends, for example, as the data shown in the press and public opinion, dozens of Kurdish refugees have ended their lives in Germany since 2023.

According to data from the “2024 Report on Anti-Kurdish Racism” presented to the Federal Parliament by the Information Center on Anti-Kurdish Racism (IAKR), which operates in Berlin, the capital of Germany, 217 documented cases of anti-Kurdish racism were recorded in 2024 alone. The report states that 37.8% of the incidents—including political acts, physical attacks, and discrimination (82 cases)—were linked to the symbols and rhetoric of far-right Turkish nationalist groups such as the “Ülkü Ocakları” (Grey Wolves).

To understand the mechanics of this phenomenon, lawyer and politician and chair of IAKR Civan Akbulut, who pointed out anti-Kurdish racism is a constitutional problem that functions across legal, political, and daily lives in Europe.

Chair of IAKR, Civan Akbulut, Photo: ANF

“Anti-Kurdish racism reaches everyday life”

According to Akbulut, anti-Kurdish racism begins with the fundamental denial of Kurdish identity, creating a baseline where verbal abuse, threats, and physical attacks become normalized.

Hightlighting that online platforms like TikTok and X have dropped the threshold for open hostility – by becoming almost part of the “normal tone” – which routinely spills over into schools, public offices, and workplaces, Akbulut also stresses that Kurds face a unique layer of risk.

Akbulut says that what is at stake are fundamental rights: Physical integrity in the face of attacks, and protection from discrimination.

“Anyone who visibly identifies as Kurdish has to reckon, in Europe, with none of this being guaranteed to them. Racism as a whole is a growing problem in Europe, one that has increased markedly in recent years. Anti-Kurdish racism is part of this development and intensifies along with it.”

“About 18,000 are attributed to Grey Wolves”

Akbulut points out that this domestic hostility is further interlocked by both European foreign policy, alongside immigration policy, which often overlooks the activities of ultranationalist groups out of geopolitical calculations toward Ankara, effectively allowing transnational racism to operate unpunished within European borders:

“The Grey Wolves are among the largest far-right movements in Germany and Europe; they are extremely capable of mobilising and prone to violence. In Germany alone, roughly 18,000 people are attributed to them, and for this movement Kurds are the central enemy. Added to this is a European politics that, out of geopolitical calculation towards Ankara, looks the other way. When the criminalisation and blanket suspicion propagated by the Turkish government seep, in part unquestioned, into European media, this shifts the public perception of Kurds. Anti-Kurdish racism operates transnationally, but its manifestation is a German and European problem. It takes place here, is permitted and applied by domestic politics, and largely goes unpunished.”

Anti-Kurdish Racism in Germany

IAKR Special Report No. 1 (January 2026) • Key Findings

The report argues that developments in Syria have significantly intensified hate speech, digital attacks, and discrimination targeting Kurdish communities in Germany, demonstrating the direct impact of international conflicts on the Kurdish diaspora.
43
People killed during the attacks on Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah
25
Civilian fatalities
155,000
Displaced civilians
1,500
Reported ISIS members who escaped following the Al-Shaddadi prison attack
400,000+
Population of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah before the attacks
10,000
ISIS detainees held in prisons across Northeast Syria
40,000+
ISIS-linked individuals and family members held in camps
54
Years of Assad family rule before its collapse

Key Findings of the Report

Alleged Bombardment of Civilian Areas
According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, residential neighborhoods and hospitals were deliberately targeted during the offensive.
Mass Displacement
Even the Syrian state news agency SANA acknowledged that at least 155,000 civilians were forced to flee their homes.
Violence Against Women
The report documents that videos showing the abuse of Kurdish female fighters triggered widespread international solidarity campaigns.
Regional Security Risks
Attacks on detention facilities reportedly enabled ISIS detainees to escape, creating significant international security concerns.
Impact on the Kurdish Diaspora
According to the report, military developments in Syria contributed to an increase in anti-Kurdish hate speech and digital attacks in Germany.

January 2026 Timeline

10 January

Following the collapse of negotiations between the Syrian transitional government and Kurdish forces, military operations intensified.

11 January

Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah were captured. According to the report, 43 people were killed, including 25 civilians.

Following Days

Videos documenting torture, executions, and abuse circulated widely on social media, prompting international condemnation.

13 January

The offensive expanded into DAANES-controlled areas. Following the attack on Al-Shaddadi Prison, approximately 1,500 ISIS members were reported to have escaped.
Source: Informationsstelle Antikurdischer Rassismus (IAKR), Special Report No. 1 – Incidents of Anti-Kurdish Racism in Germany, January 2026.

“Kurds learned to never rely on the state”

Akbulut defined the underlying problem in addressing this discrimination is the lack of official recognition:

“The category is missing, the awareness is missing. Kurdish society is under considerable pressure and is itself subjected to criminalisation, while Turkish right-wing extremists can run their associations and events largely undisturbed, which act as a catalyst against Kurds. This imbalance extends into the authorities themselves. Kurds have historically learned that they could never rely on the state, and this mistrust continues in Europe when complaints come to nothing or threats are not taken seriously.”

Akbulut drew attention to “one of the most powerful, and therefore most dangerous” one is that anti-Kurdish racism expresses itself is criminalisation, because it provides the justification for oppression and violence. “When Kurdish activism is sweepingly placed in the vicinity of ‘terror,’ a climate emerges in which every form of Kurdish self-organisation falls under blanket suspicion. Once someone has been marked as a security risk, almost anything can be legitimised against them” he continued.

Akbulut stated that in Europe, this criminalisation shows in raids on associations, in bans on flags and symbols, and in the fact that talks and events are cancelled on alleged security grounds or venues are withdrawn at short notice. He stressed the outward effect of this is those who constantly have to explain that they are not a security risk never even get to speak about the discrimination they face.

“Criminalisation reverses the roles: those affected are turned into suspects. That is a major problem” he said.

“Asylum assessments are not neutral”

Akbulut explains that Kurdish asylum seekers face exceptionally high rejection rates because European authorities routinely classify Turkey as a “safe country of origin” and falsely claim that Kurds face no group-based repression there. Akbulut, saying “They are granted protection considerably less often than other applicants”, highlighted this is not coincidental but structural:

“In the decisions, the finding recurs again and again that Kurds face no repression in Turkey on account of being Kurdish. This is simply false and contradicts reality, but it provides the basis for rejecting protection claims. These assessments are not neutral. The closer the political rapprochement with Ankara, the more favourable the official evaluation of the situation in Turkey turns out to be, and the harder it becomes to have a Kurdish history of persecution recognised at all. This does not only concern Kurds from Turkey. Kurds from Syria, Iraq and Iran also have a considerably harder time. And above all of this lies the general development. In the face of the shift to the right, agitation and an ever harsher policy of sealing off borders, refugees across Europe find it harder overall to obtain protection. Kurds stand at a point where all of these constrictions converge.”

“Anti-Kurdish racism interplay with sexism”

The impact of this discrimination is particularly severe for Kurdish women, who experience what Akbulut identifies as a textbook example of intersectional oppression. According to Akbulut, the hostility directed at Kurdish identity intersects with structural sexism, creating compounded dynamics of devaluation:

“Anti-Kurdish racism can therefore occur simultaneously and in interplay with sexism, ableism, queerphobia or classism. What is decisive is that these are not merely different experiences of oppression sitting side by side, but that they influence and reinforce one another. With Kurdish women this becomes very concrete: the racist enemy image of Kurds carries over into a devaluation of Kurdish women that is at once racist and sexist. Several logics of devaluation interlock here, and precisely for this reason the intersectional perspective is so important for our work.”

Because anti-Kurdish racism relies on the same core mechanisms as other forms of group-focused enmity—such as institutional neglect and criminalization—Akbulut emphasizes that cooperation is structurally necessary, as he further stated “Racism does not occur in isolation. Anyone fighting racism almost always encounters the same mechanisms that affect other groups too: devaluation, criminalisation, the looking-away of institutions.”

He also drew attention to the Kurdish self-organisation being a long history, since Kurds have learned to help themselves when the state does not, and this is precisely a pattern that many marginalised groups know.

“Consistent anti-racism is needed”

To dismantle these systemic barriers, Akbulut outlines three essential political and legal actions:

First, anti-Kurdish racism must be recognised as a distinct form of racism. Without a category of its own, authorities, schools and courts cannot even record the relevant incidents, and what is not named remains invisible and unpunished.

Second, what is needed is consistent anti-racism instead of looking away. Racist actors must no longer be allowed to operate unchecked, and the Grey Wolves must be treated as what they are: a far-right movement. This cannot be separated from the larger picture. Anti-Kurdish racism grows in a climate in which racism as a whole is being normalised and the shift to the right is gaining momentum across Europe.

Third, and this is decisive, politics must stop adopting anti-Kurdish narratives itself. When criminalisation and blanket suspicion seep into European administrative practice and media language, racism is not being fought but administered and perpetuated.”

12 years after the Yazidi Genocide: 40 percent of the abducted Yazidis remains unknown

Twelve years have passed since ISIS, after capturing Mosul on August 3, 2014, turned its attention to Sinjar (Shingal), massacring thousands of Yazidis and abducting Yazidi women and children. According to data from May 4, 2026, 3,595 Yazidis abducted by ISIS have been rescued, while the fate of approximately 2,500 remains unknown.

It has been 12 years since the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) attacked Shingal, home to approximately 550,000 Yazidis, on August 3, 2014. Thousands of civilians were executed on the spot, tens of thousands were displaced, and Yazidi women and girls were abducted and raped. The Yazidis, who had endured 72 massacres by 2014, describe ISIS’s 2014 attacks and massacres against them as the “73rd ferman.”

Yazidis who fled the region following the attack sought refuge in camps in many areas, including Turkey, Syria, and the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq. According to a report by Rûdaw, approximately 2,500 homes have been built so far at the foot of Mount Sinjar (Shingal) for Yazidis who wish to build their homes there rather than in the valley. Although tens of thousands of Yazidis have returned to Shingal and the surrounding area, many still continue to live in camps far from their homeland.

SINJAR / YAZIDI GENOCIDE — IN DATA

12-Year Toll

According to official data from the Office for Rescuing Abducted Yazidis, the fate of 2,500 out of 6,417 Yazidis abducted in Shingal by ISIS remains unknown.

Attack date: August 3, 2014 Latest data update: May 4, 2026

6,417

Total Abducted Yazidis

3,595

Rescued from Captivity

~2,500

Fate Still Unknown

Current Status of the 6,417 Abducted Individuals

56%
39%
5%
Rescued (3,595) Fate unknown (~2,500) Other cases known to be killed/missing
Source: Official data from the Dohuk-based “Office for Rescuing Abducted Yazidis” (as of May 4, 2026). Percentage calculations were made based on the total number of abducted individuals (6,417).

Documents related to the Yazidis are kept on file in the archives of the United Nations (UN) ISIS Crimes Investigation Team (UNITAD)—established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2379—as well as in the archives of the Ministry of the Interior of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq and the Office for the Rescue of Those Abducted by ISIS.

In the Yazidi faith, the term “ferman” is used to describe the waves of massacres and forced displacement they have faced throughout history, effectively serving as a “death warrant.” The Yazidis say that, up until 2014, they had been subjected to similar persecution and massacres 72 times throughout history. For this reason, ISIS’s August 2014 attack on Shingal is referred to in various sources—and in the words of the Yazidis—as the “73rd Ferman.”

The Shingal Defense Forces

On June 10, 2014, ISIS seized Mosul without encountering any resistance. Having reinforced itself with military supplies left behind by the Iraqi army, it targeted the villages south of Mount Sinjar—where the Yazidis lived—on the night of August 3 of the same year. During the attack, thousands of Yazidis were killed, and women and children were taken captive and sold in slave markets; according to current data, 93 mass graves have been identified in Shingal and the surrounding area to date.

To rescue the hundreds of thousands of Yazidis trapped on Mount Sinjar as a result of ISIS’s attacks, members of the People’s Defense Forces (HPG) went to the region to fight, leading to the rescue of many Yazidis. Tens of thousands of Yazidis were able to escape thanks to a corridor opened by a 12-member HPG unit, after days of fighting, HPG fighters repelled ISIS and succeeded in evacuating the Yazidis to northern and eastern Syria.

The YBŞ (Yekîneyên Berxwedana Şengalê / Şengal Resistance Units) was founded by Yazidi youth within the same month after they were resettled in safe zones. During the Campaign to Liberate Shingal, women within the YBŞ announced at a conference in 2015 that they had organized themselves under the name YPJ-Şengal (Yekîneyên Parastina Jin ê Şengalê / Shingal Women’s Protection Units) to empower themselves.

Yazidis remaining in camps in Turkey

According to a report titled “Access to Services for Yazidis Living in Mardin and Batman,” published by the Hayata Destek Association in May 2020, 22,062 Yazidis sought refuge in Turkey between August and October 2014; following the continuation of ISIS attacks, this number exceeded 30,000. The report’s data indicates that the Yazidis settled either with relatives in Şırnak (5,675 people), Batman (2,857 people), Diyarbakır (5,360 people), Siirt (1,686 people), and Mardin (5,471 people), or in camps established by municipalities.

Following the appointment of a trustee to the Diyarbakır Municipality in 2016 and the subsequent closure of the camp in December 2016, some Yazidis returned to Shingal or Iraq, while others went to Germany, as a result, there are currently only a small number of Yazidis in Turkey.

The European Parliament had called it “genocide”

The European Parliament was the first to recognize ISIS’s attacks on the Yazidis as genocide in February 2016. UNITAD, established by a UN Security Council resolution, explicitly determined that the crimes committed in Shingal constitute the most serious international crimes, including genocide. Nearly 20 countries, including the United States, Ireland, Canada, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Armenia, the United Kingdom, and Portugal, have recognized the Yazidi genocide.

However, the “73rd ferman” has not yet been recognized as genocide by any international criminal court.

The Çilê Havînê festival before the attack

In the Yazidi faith, the 40-day fasting period that begins on June 25 ends on August 1. During this period, which is regarded as a symbol of patience, spiritual purification, and gratitude, the Yazidis devote themselves to worship by abstaining from food and drink from dawn until sunset during the hottest days of the year. This fasting period is known as Çilê Havînê (Summer Fast) in the Yazidi calendar. Another 40-day fasting period is Çilê Zivistanê (Winter Fast), observed during the winter months.

The festival celebrated on August 2, following the end of Çilê Havînê, was held just one day before August 3, 2014—the day ISIS launched its attack on Shingal.

Dr. Küçükçallı: “Imprisoning children without addressing the root causes will not solve the problem.”

Forensic Medicine Specialist Dr. Nevin Küçükçallı stated that in protecting juvenile delinquents, the state must fulfill its obligations as well as its social and moral responsibilities, and that there should be centers that include restorative and therapeutic measures to remove children from the cycle of violence.

Image: psikolektif.com

In Turkey, the number of juvenile delinquents has been increasing day by day in recent years. According to 2024 data, the number of cases reported to security forces reached 612,000. It appears that groups referred to as “new generation gangs” primarily exploit children.

Dr. Nevin Küçükçallı, a Forensic Medicine Specialist and member of the Turkish Medical Association, stated that the preconceived notion that children involved in crime are “criminals” must be abandoned, adding, “Moreover, we must stand against the language used in the media regarding children, which dehumanizes them.”

Reminding the state of its responsibilities in protecting children, Küçükçallı noted that there are societal and moral responsibilities, and that society should not dehumanize children.

“Our primary goal should never be to punish children, but to consider their best interests and protect them,” said Dr. Nevin Küçükçallı, answering niha+’s questions regarding juvenile delinquents and related practices.

About Nevin Küçükçallı

A graduate of Dokuz Eylül University, she is a forensic medicine specialist and Assistant Professor specializing in human rights violations. Member of the Turkish Medical Association and the Society of Forensic Medicine Specialists.

I’d like to start with the question, “Who is a child?”

Every person is a child until the age of 18. Childhood is not a fixed moment, but an ongoing stage of development. Empathy, abstract thinking, and impulse control mature over time through genetic and environmental factors. Recent studies show that brain changes continue from pre-adolescence until the mid-twenties.

Do all children, for example, infants and adolescents, have the same rights and freedoms?

According to the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, all children have certain rights and freedoms simply by virtue of being children, and states are obligated to protect children.

So, who is a juvenile delinquents?

According to the Child Protection Law, which came into effect in 2005, a child is one who is under investigation or prosecution, or against whom a security measure has been imposed, on the allegation of committing an act defined as a crime under the law. The Child Protection Law defines a child not as a criminal, but as one “drawn into crime” by risk factors.

Could you discuss risk factors for children? What are they?

Deep poverty and inequalities in social distribution are the biggest risk factors for these children. School dropouts and low educational levels or broken family structures, which lead to isolation, often result in these children becoming estranged. These children then encounter neighborhood cultures and criminal organizations where crime is seen as prestigious, as a means of self-affirmation. For children living on the outskirts of cities, violence is often seen as a survival mechanism.

Can we say that the darkness mentioned in the words of Rakel Dink, the spouse of journalist Hrant Dink, who was murdered by 17-year-old Ogün Samast – “Nothing can be done without questioning the darkness that creates a murderer from a baby, my brothers and sisters…” – is among the risk factors?

Absolutely! We are talking about a system where poverty is deepening, no policies are being produced to address the inequality in social distribution, even providing a free meal for children isn’t being discussed, social rights are constantly being curtailed, access to education and healthcare is becoming increasingly difficult, and marginalization and violence are glorified. Without addressing the root causes that led the child to commit the crime, will the law solve the problem simply by imposing a 24-year prison sentence?

“We need to talk about the responsibilities of the state”

We see more juveniles pushed into crime in the media than before. Are their numbers increasing? What are the commonalities and differences between children who come to security forces as victims and those involved in crime?

In 2024, the number of children brought to security forces was 612,000, an increase of approximately 10% compared to 2023. However, what is striking is that while approximately 202,000 of these children were alleged to have been involved in crime, 279,000 entered the system as victims. In other words, the vast majority of children entering the legal system are not perpetrators of crime (33%), but victims (45%). The victimized children are the dark side of crime. Another interesting point is that the most frequent reason for children in both groups entering the system is through injury. So the real problem is the increasing violence.

On the other hand, instead of talking about victimized children, finding solutions for them, investigating the causes of increasing violence, and calling on the state to fulfill its responsibilities in these matters, people prefer to talk about these children. Taking responsibility and finding solutions is more difficult; blaming is easier.

Meanwhile, there’s also an effort lately to create a perception that the punishments for juvenile delinquents should be increased.

“Age alone is not enough”

How are sentences determined for the juvenile delinquents?

Article 31 of the Turkish Penal Code governs the determination of criminal responsibility based on age. Under this law, children under 12 have no criminal responsibility and cannot be prosecuted under any circumstances. For children aged 12-15 involved in crime, a forensic medical evaluation is required. If the forensic medical evaluation determines that the child has significant intellectual disability or mental illness, no criminal prosecution is initiated. If the forensic medical evaluation determines that the child does not have significant intellectual disability or mental illness, and that their perception and ability to direct their behavior are developed, the child is generally given a reduced sentence by half. For children aged 15-18, a reduced sentence of one-third is given without a forensic medical evaluation.

But is age alone sufficient to determine the criminal responsibility of a juvenile delinquents?

No, age alone is not sufficient for determining criminal responsibility. The child must also have reached the psychosocial maturity to intellectually understand the moral and legal consequences of their actions and the rules of society, and to direct their behavior accordingly.

If forensic medical assessments were conducted properly, the conditions and traumas that led the child to crime could be identified, and the child could receive timely psychosocial intervention. However, based entirely on subjective assessments, mostly printed evaluations are made stating that the child does not have a psychopathology that would affect their criminal responsibility, and children are sent to prison environments.

Considering that children are not adults, sending them to prison is not a solution. So what needs to be done to solve this problem?

We need to get rid of the preconceived notion that children who are drawn into crime are “criminals.” Moreover, we must stand against the language used in the media regarding children, which dehumanizes them.

Children are not adults. Their physical and psychosocial development is still ongoing. Before this development is complete, a child cannot and should not be expected to assume the legal consequences like an adult.

Once a child enters the system, we can encounter them again later because when a child enters prison, their role models are the people in the prison, and the primary language spoken is violence. Violence is a language learned and produced through exposure. In other words, sending children to prison environments perpetuates the cycle of crime. Our primary goal should never be to punish children, but to safeguard their best interests and protect them.

In addition to the state’s obligations in protecting children, we also have social and moral responsibilities. Children should not be demonized by society and should not be left alone within the system. It is much more difficult for isolated children to escape the cycle of violence.

In conclusion, the solution is not to punish the child. The solution is to eliminate the causes that push children into crime. This includes implementing social policies to prevent poverty, improving the quality of education and schools, conducting detailed and high-quality forensic medical and social service assessments, preventing children from being held in prison conditions, and prioritizing restorative and therapeutic measures to help children escape the cycle of violence. All of these are necessary for the child’s well-being, the protection of their future, and rescuing them from darkness.

FISA Chıld Rıghts Center
6 July 2026

In the first five months of 2026, at least 303 children died in Turkey from preventable causes

The FISA Children’s Rights Center has published an information note titled “Violations of Children’s Right to Life in Turkey,” covering the period from January to May 2026. According to the note, which was prepared by reviewing data from local and national online media, local sources, and human rights organizations, at least 303 children lost their lives in Turkey in the first five months of the year due to preventable causes.

The study collected data on violations of children’s right to life in 69 provinces. As in previous years, the highest number of child deaths was recorded in Urfa with 18 children. Urfa was followed by Antalya with 16 child deaths, and Maraş and Istanbul with 14 child deaths each.

At least 46 children have lost their lives due to negligence in public services

According to the information note, at least 46 children lost their lives in incidents that occurred in public institutions and/or due to the direct actions and/or negligence of public officials. Of the children who lost their lives, 22 died while receiving health services, 20 while receiving education services, 2 while receiving care services, and 2 while benefiting from local government services.

The FISA Children’s Rights Center emphasized that this situation is the most serious consequence of public services not being structured according to children’s specific needs and of protective, child-centered mechanisms not being implemented.

At least 257 children have lost their lives as a result of violence, workplace accidents, and negligence.

The center stated that at least 257 children lost their lives due to the state’s failure to fulfill its obligations to regulate, supervise, and develop preventive policies. These deaths were classified under the headings of violence, workplace fatalities, neglect, and other violations of the right to life.

According to the report, in the first five months of the year, at least 26 children committed suicide, at least 8 children lost their lives in incidents related to individual gun ownership, and at least 14 children died under suspicious circumstances.

Drowning and falling from height are not being prevented.

According to the information note, at least 39 children lost their lives in urban and rural open spaces in the first five months of 2026. Of these children, 31 drowned in dams, rivers, open waters where necessary precautions were not taken, and mostly in irrigation canals belonging to the State Hydraulic Works (DSI).

Of the 11 children who lost their lives in domestic accidents, 8 died as a result of falling from open windows and balconies.

The FISA Child Rights Center stated that despite drowning and falls from heights occurring systematically every year, effective policies are not being implemented, necessary precautions are not being taken, and risks are not being eliminated. Therefore, the same reasons will continue to lead to child deaths in 2026.

Children are dying in workplace accidents: At least 27 children in five months.

According to the report, at least 27 children lost their lives in work-related accidents in the first five months of 2026.

Of the 21 child laborers who lost their lives while working, 11 died in agricultural and livestock jobs, 3 died from falls from heights in construction, and 1 died while working in the industrial sector. It was determined that at least 2 of the deceased children were working within the scope of MESEM (Vocational and Technical Education Center).

Six of the children who lost their lives in workplace accidents died in risky temporary shelters in cities where they had gone with their families, who were seasonal agricultural workers. It was noted that all of these children were refugees.

Violence: at home, school, streets…

In the first five months of 2026, at least 24 children lost their lives as a result of violence. Thirteen of these deaths were due to peer violence, six to gender-based violence, four to domestic violence, and one to child homicide. The FISA Children’s Rights Center stated that this data shows that violence is produced within children’s homes, neighborhoods, schools, and closest relationships.

The center included the following assessment in its statement:

“Each child death serves as a reminder that different forms of violence feed off each other, and that protecting children’s right to life is only possible by addressing the structural problems that generate violence and strengthening effective child protection mechanisms.”

The Baloch man outside Number 10

Sometimes, it does not take thousands of words to describe the loneliness of a people. One Baloch refugee, sitting alone outside Number 10, says enough.

In the heart of London, directly opposite one of the world’s most powerful centres, one man has been sitting alone since 1 July.

His name is Aomar Karim.

He is a friend I met in exile.

A Baloch human rights activist, Karim sought political asylum in the United Kingdom four years ago. It had become impossible for him to continue his struggle in his homeland. But exile changes only where you live. It does not end the struggle.

Today, on the anniversary of the Sivas Massacre of 2 July 1993, I went to see him. More precisely, I went to stand beside him in solidarity.

I found Karim sitting directly opposite Number 10 Downing Street. Behind him there was a banner. Beside him, a few personal belongings. He sat quietly, watching the famous black door.

At the same time, hundreds of tourists posed for photographs outside the iron gates of the Prime Minister’s residence, eager to capture another London landmark.

Yet almost nobody noticed the Baloch refugee sitting beneath his banner.

Except for one South Korean tourist.

She was the only person who stopped to ask what he was doing.

On one of the world’s busiest political streets, he was almost invisible.

“May someone hear our voices”

On 1 July, Aomar Karim began a three-day hunger strike. His aim is to bring the long-standing repression and human rights abuses in Pakistani-controlled Balochistan to the attention of the British government and the international community.

His demands are clear.

He is calling on the UK government to publicly condemn the life sentences handed down by Pakistan against Baloch human rights defenders Dr. Mahrang Baloch and Sibghatullah Shah Ji, and to urge the Pakistani authorities to drop all charges against them and other Baloch activists.

A people divided

The Baloch are one of the indigenous peoples of Southwest Asia. Their historical roots are often traced to the Medes, and they are widely regarded as being closely related to the Kurds.

Like the Kurds, their historic homeland has been divided among three states: Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. Their language, Balochi, belongs to the Indo-European language family and is distantly related to Kurdish.

And, like the Kurds, they have spent decades struggling for their identity, political rights and fundamental freedoms, particularly in the part of Balochistan controlled by Pakistan.

One of the most prominent figures in that struggle is physician and human rights defender Dr. Mahrang Baloch. Known internationally for campaigning against enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, she is one of the leading figures of the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (Baloch Unity Committee – BYC).

The Pakistani authorities arrested Dr. Mahrang Baloch in 2025 after years of attempting to criminalise her activism. In June 2026, she was sentenced to life imprisonment after being accused of responsibility for the death of a police officer during a protest in 2024.

How familiar that sounds.

A movement for rights treated as a crime.

Activists branded as terrorists to silence them.

People who disappear.

And despite everything, a people who refuse to give up.

A call to protect the Baloch people

From his place outside Downing Street, Aomar Karim says the Pakistani state, military and judiciary bear responsibility for grave human rights violations against the Baloch people.

His appeal to the United Kingdom and the international community is simple:
“Protect the Baloch people. Take action to end enforced disappearances. Hold those responsible for human rights violations accountable, and pressure Pakistan to release all detained Baloch political prisoners. The UK government should begin by unequivocally condemning the shameful life sentences imposed on Dr. Mahrang Baloch and Sibghatullah Shah Ji.”

The weight of silence

One man sitting alone across from Downing Street.

People who never looked up from their phones.

Tourists taking photographs.

The crowds flowing around him.

A silent protest that almost no one noticed.

As I left my friend there and made my way home that evening, I carried a lump in my throat and a weight in my heart. The heaviest burden was not simply his solitude—it was the silence that surrounded it, even in the midst of so many people.

Sometimes, it does not take thousands of words to describe the loneliness of a people.

One Baloch refugee, sitting alone outside Number 10, says enough.

CISST: Prison occupancy exceeds 138.5%

According to data released by CİSST, as of June 2026, among the 421,583 inmates in prisons, at least 200 are LGBT+, 476 are disabled, and 14,276 are foreign nationals.

The Civil Society Association for the Penitentiary System (CİSST) released prison statistics for June 2026. According to these statistics, as of June, the 402 prisons in Turkey are housing 421,583 people, exceeding their designed capacity by 138.5%.

Data shared by CİSST indicates that 64,705 of these inmates are pretrial detainees, while 4,673 are children under the age of 18. The statistics also highlight that among these inmates, there are at least 200 LGBT+ inmates, 476 inmates with disabilities, and 14,276 foreign nationals.

There are 891 infants in prisons

According to CİSST, which notes that 4.8% of the inmates in prisons are women, there are also 891 infants and children under the age of six in prisons. The statistics compiled by CİSST reveal that prisons are not merely places of incarceration but also spaces where the elderly, children, people with disabilities, and infants living with their mothers are housed.

Report · CİSST
Overview
421,583
Total prison population
402
Number of prisons
304,390
Total official capacity
38.5% over capacity
Distribution by Detention Type
In closed prisons 303,922
In open prisons 117,661
Legal Status and Special Groups
356,878
Convicted prisoners
64,705
Pre-trial detainees
(awaiting trial)
14,276
Foreign national prisoners
200+
LGBTI+ prisoners
Children and Women
4,673
Children aged 12–18 in prison
226 of them are girls
20,360
Women prisoners
891
Children aged 0–6 living with their incarcerated mothers
Age, Education and Work
6,680
Prisoners aged 65 and over
77,014
Prisoners continuing their education
58,500
Prisoners in insured employment
Prisoners with Disabilities (Total: 476)
Type of DisabilityNumber of People
Orthopedic disability252
Visual impairment96
Hearing impairment68
Speech and language disability34
Combined hearing and speech disability26
Daily Food Allowance (2025)
₺144
Adult convicted prisoners, detainees and on-duty staff
₺275
Juvenile convicted prisoners and detainees
₺275
Children held with mothers, breastfeeding and pregnant inmates
* Data compiled and published by CİSST.

May 1: A chronicle of the past 13 years

May 1st in Turkey, lastly celebrated in Taksim Square in 2012. We have compiled a chronicle of May 1st celebrations marked by police interventions and mass detentions against the ban on Taksim.

Photo: Murat Bay

Since 1976, May 1st in Turkey has been defined by the persistence of workers to reach Taksim Square. Following the “1977 May Day Massacre,” the square became both a symbol of labor rights and the country’s most contested protest site. Despite long-standing bans, unions and leftist organizations continue to claim Taksim as the traditional heart of May Day celebrations.

Here is a summary of the events following the ban on Taksim Square over the last 13 years:

May Day in Istanbul from 2013 to 2025: The Taksim ban, police interventions, mass detentions, and the ongoing struggle.
1,000+
Total detentions (at least)
13 years
Ongoing Taksim ban
100+
Total number of arrests
2013
Following its reopening in 2010, Taksim was banned once again. The Governor’s Office cited the “pedestrianization project” as the reason. Extraordinary security measures were taken across the city; bridges were raised, and roads were closed. Hours-long police interventions occurred in many areas, particularly Beşiktaş and Şişli. Even hospitals and homes were affected by tear gas. It was reported that 30,000 police officers were deployed to Taksim that day. According to the Governor’s Office, 25 protesters (3 serious), 6 journalists, and 22 police officers (3 serious) were injured.
72 detentions
2014
Taksim Square was completely cordoned off. Intense tear gas and water cannons were used throughout the day in Şişli, Mecidiyeköy, and surrounding areas. Health institutions and journalists were also impacted by the interventions.
171 detentions • 12 journalists injured
2015
Entry to Taksim was prohibited. Only a limited number of unions were allowed to lay wreaths at the monument. Interventions targeted small groups across the city. Allegations surfaced regarding police entering political party buildings.
203 detentions, 13 arrested
2016
Celebrations were moved to Bakırköy. Despite this, interventions continued against groups attempting to reach Taksim. Various political and union groups were redirected to alternative areas. A citizen named Nail Mavuş lost his life after being crushed due to an uncontrolled maneuver by a water cannon vehicle (TOMA).
231 detentions, 5 arrested
2017
The Taksim ban remained in effect. Groups gathering at various points in Istanbul were detained, including individuals attempting to hold sit-in protests.
165 detentions
2018
The Governor’s Office rejected all applications. The rally site was moved to Maltepe. Taksim was sealed off with barriers starting from the early hours of the morning.
84 detentions
2019
Interventions were carried out against groups gathering in Şişli. Detentions of those attempting to march toward Taksim continued throughout the day.
119 detentions
2020
Curfews under pandemic conditions were cited as grounds for restrictions. Reports included allegations of ill-treatment, assault, and reverse-handcuffing during detentions.
48 detentions
2021
Despite the curfew, groups attempting to march to Taksim faced harsh intervention. Union representatives were among those detained.
212 detentions
2022
After a two-year hiatus, a mass rally was held in Maltepe. Groups heading toward Taksim were once again blocked, leading to further detentions.
100+ detentions
2023
Numerous groups attempting to march to Taksim from Şişli and Beşiktaş were detained. There were attempts to prevent members of the press from recording the events.
80+ detentions
2024
The Constitutional Court (AYM) ruled that Taksim is a legitimate May Day site and declared the Governor’s ban a “rights violation.” Thousands gathered in Saraçhane to march to Taksim, but police blocked the route with barricades. The confrontation lasted approximately 1.5 hours, followed by house raids. In 2025, the court found the ban to be unlawful.
268 detentions, 77 arrested
2025
Operations were conducted against organizations calling for a Taksim gathering. Throughout the day, barricades in Mecidiyeköy were challenged amidst ongoing interventions. According to the Progressive Lawyers Association (ÇHD), a total of 419 people, including 10 children and 11 lawyers, were detained in Şişli.
419 detentions, 13 arrested
Source: Human rights organizations and press compilations.

2013: The return of the ban

After allowing celebrations in 2010, the AKP government reimposed the ban in 2013. The Governor’s Office cited a “pedestrianization” project as the reason.

  • 30,000 officers were deployed.
  • Bridges of Galata and Unkapanı were dismantled to block access.
  • Police used tear gas and water cannons against groups in Beşiktaş and Şişli. Tear gas was fired at ambulances and into the garden of Şişli Etfal Hospital.
  • At least 72 people were detained.

2014, May 1

Taksim was closed to everyone except police and accredited journalists.

  • While small pro-government unions were briefly allowed to lay wreaths, others faced heavy intervention in Tarlabaşı, Şişli, and Beşiktaş.
  • 22 people were hospitalized with fractures, 12 journalists were injured by gas canisters and rubber bullets.
  • 171 people were detained.

2015, May 1

Unions like DİSK and KESK insisted on Taksim, but were blocked.

  • Police fired tear gas into the CHP district building in Beşiktaş.
  • 203 people were detained; 13 were officially arrested.

2016, May 1

Major unions (DİSK, KESK, TMMOB, TTB) decided to hold the main rally in Bakırköy for this year only. However, other leftist groups still marched toward Taksim.

  • 231 detentions and 5 arrests near Beşiktaş and Şişli.

2017, May 1

The Interior Minister announced Taksim would remain closed. Main unions moved to Bakırköy again.

  • 165 people attempting to reach Taksim were detained across various districts.

2018, May 1

Main unions moved to Maltepe, while socialist groups headed for Taksim.

  • The square was completely surrounded by barriers early in the morning; even journalists were barred.
  • 84 people were taken into custody.

2019, May 1

Groups gathered at Şişli Cevahir Mall to march to Taksim but were met with police intervention.

  • 119 people were detained.

2020, May 1

  • During the pandemic, 48 people were detained. Lawyers from ÇHD reported that detainees were subjected to “plastic handcuff torture,” beatings, and insults. One person’s arm was broken during the intervention.

2021, May 1

Despite a lockdown and rejected applications, unions tried to march from Dolmabahçe.

  • 212 people were detained, many of whom were dragged on the ground. DİSK President Arzu Çerkezoğlu was among those detained.

2022, May 1

After a two-year pandemic break, mass celebrations returned.

  • At least 100 people were detained while trying to reach the square from multiple points. The official rally was held in Maltepe.

2023, May 1

Groups from various unions and socialist parties attempted to walk from Şişli and Beşiktaş.

  • At least 80 people were detained.

2024: The Saraçhane barricade

Unions and the CHP gathered at Saraçhane to march to Taksim, citing a Constitutional Court ruling that the ban was illegal.

  • Police formed a massive barricade under the historic Bozdoğan Aqueduct.
  • Police used water cannons, tear gas, and rubber bullets.
  • 210 people were detained on the day, 47 more were taken in during house raids on May 3.
  • Governor Davut Gül stated, “The state may leave it for tomorrow, but it won’t let it go unpunished.”

2025, May 1

A new May 1st organizing committee declared “Taksim belongs to the people.”

  • Police operations targeted organizers on April 29 and 30, around 92 people were detained.
  • Protesters repeatedly challenged police barriers in Mecidiyeköy throughout the day.
  • 407 people were detained, 7 were arrested. Reports of reverse-handcuffing and police brutality were documented in Mecidiyeköy.

Suspicious refugee suicides in Germany: Are the camps safe enough?

Hogir Alay and Gökhan Kumak were found hanging from a tree in refugee camps in Germany. Alay and Kumak are just two of the Kurdish refugees who have reportedly committed suicide in German camps in recent years. These two suicides, which occurred in 2023 and 2024, raise questions about the safety of the refugee camps. The families are awaiting justice.

A refugee camp in Germany, Photo: planet-wissen.de

Hogir Alay and Gökhan Kumak are only two of the Kurdish refugees who have lost their lives in refugee camps in Germany in recent years. Hogir went from Mardin to Germany in 2022, and Gökhan went from Şırnak in 2023 to seek asylum. On this journey, which they embarked upon due to political pressure or the goal of building a better life, they spent a long time trying to reach Germany illegally. At the end of this period, they experienced difficult days in the camps they arrived at. After a while, their bodies were found hanging from trees inside the refugee camps. Alay’s body was found 24 days later in a wooded area within the garden of the camp where he stayed.

German authorities announced that both Alay and Kumak had committed suicide. However, according to their families, there was no reason for their children to take their own lives. Despite the time that has passed, they want the causes of their children’s deaths to be investigated. They claim there was negligence on the part of relevant institutions and individuals in Germany.

Why are refugees committing suicide in Germany?

According to data reflected in the press and public opinion, dozens of Kurdish refugees have ended their lives in Germany since 2023. 17-year-old Mustafa Baki from Kobanî, Mehvan Muhammed Süleyman from Duhok, 28-year-old Fethullah Aslan in a psychiatric institution in Berlin, and Mustafa Polat in Erfurt are just a few names on this list.

According to data from the refugee counseling center Pena-Ger, 32 suicide attempts occurred in the state of Saxony in 2024 alone. However, according to Pena-Ger, the real figures are much higher, as ethnic origin records are not kept and many cases go ‘undocumented.’

Between 1993 and 2018, 288 suicide cases were documented in refugee camps in Germany. Today, it is recorded that there are approximately 30 suicides and 400 attempts per year.

Hanging, jumping from heights, or overdosing

Refugees most often commit suicide in or around the camps where they stay, while their asylum process is ongoing or under the threat of deportation. This most frequently occurs in the form of hanging oneself from a tree, jumping from a height, or overdosing. It was announced that Gökhan Kumak and Hogir Alay also committed suicide by hanging themselves.

Hogir Alay’s body was found 24 days later

Hogir Alay lost his life on October 11, 2023. His body was found on November 4 by someone else staying at the AfA-Kusel refugee camp where he resided. In other words, Alay’s body emerged 24 days later. As stated in the investigation file, the location where the body was found was the wooded area right behind the gym inside the camp.

On October 11, Alay called his father several times, as well as his brother and his brother’s wife, but could not reach them. After this attempt, which took place around 18:00 on the same day, his family could never reach Hogir’s phone again.

Screen recordings showing Şiyar Alay’s correspondence with authorities via email

According to the family’s claim, during the following days when they could not hear from their child, they wrote an email to the refugee camp where Hogir stayed through their other child, Şiyar Alay, who is a refugee in Austria. In the official email written in response to Şiyar Alay dated October 25, it was explicitly stated that the police could not establish any contact with Hogir and that attempts made through Social Services (Sozialdienst) had been inconclusive.

In the file prepared regarding Alay’s death, according to the security guards of the camp, Alay’s last entry-exit record via ID card scan was made on October 11, 2023, at 16:27. It is stated that he entered the facility at that hour. It is noted that on October 17, 2023, he was reported missing because he could not be found in the accommodation facility during patrols.

Official Investigation Document of the Kaiserslautern Police Department

Alay’s brother Rêber Alay told Niha+: “On November 4, news came to us from the camp. They saw him and said he had lost his life. They realized it was him because he had an AK-47 tattoo on his chest. He had a tattoo on his chest.” In the investigation and autopsy reports, it is stated that because the body had remained outside for a long time, it had become unrecognizable, his identity could not be determined, and identification was only possible with the tattoo on his chest. The news of Hogir Alay’s death was officially conveyed to Turkey’s Consulate General in Mainz by the police on November 6, 2023, at 11:52.

Hogir Alay before going to Germany as a refugee

Rêber Alay rebels against this situation: “His feet are touching the ground. There are photos. Also, his body is very battered. Decayed. He must have been hanging for 24 days. If he is in the camp and in a visible place, how could this child have been hanging for 24 days? Thousands of people stay in 그 camp. During this time, camp authorities did not ask if this child was missing. They notified the police after it became clear he was dead. Something striking is that they say everyone who died hanged themselves. Don’t people who commit suicide try another method? This is a question mark. They are all diagnosed as dying from heart failure. It was said that Hogir died the same way. It was written that Hogir drank a lot, and there was two per mille alcohol in his blood. It is claimed that Hogir actually fainted before hanging himself, and died not from suffocation but from heart failure.”

Hogir Alay while at the refugee camp in Germany

He went through illegal routes

Hogir Alay went from Mardin to Germany through illegal routes a year and a half before he died, in 2022. According to his family’s account, while Hogir was in Mardin, he participated in protests for Kobanî and was investigated for this. In the face of both this investigation and the difficulties he experienced due to refusing mandatory military service, he decided to go to Germany with his wife. It is claimed that before his death, Hogir repeatedly complained about poor living conditions, discrimination, and violence perpetrated by security personnel and social workers, but these complaints were not forwarded to the relevant authorities.

Investigation document showing Hogir Alay’s official date of death

His brother Rêber Alay confirmed that his brother had problems with camp authorities: “One day, in front of everyone, Hogir says, ‘if I am killed here, either they killed me or I will kill the security guard.’ They couldn’t get along.” In the report prepared by the Hogir Alay Initiative, which was established to continue the search for justice after Hogir Alay’s death, it is stated that Alay complained about constant room changes and psychological pressure during his stay at the camp. It is alleged that security personnel subjected him to systematic harassment and physical attacks.

Last location information taken from Hogir Alay’s phone

Complaints were not forwarded on the grounds of “protecting the institution’s reputation”

The claim that Alay wanted to convey these complaints to the management unit, but the translators at the camp refused to translate these statements on the grounds of “protecting the reputation of the institution,” is included in the file. In the investigation file, criminal records regarding Hogir Alay’s past and turmoils in his private life have been added by the authorities as ‘psychological factors triggering suicide.’ However, according to refugee rights defenders and the family, the personal crises an individual is in do not alleviate the camp management’s responsibility to ‘protect the right to life’; on the contrary, it increases the obligation of supervision and protection toward an individual at risk.

The case is closed quickly in Germany

It is understood from the information reflected in the investigation file that an autopsy of Hogir Alay was performed in Germany. The autopsy was conducted on November 9, 2023, at the Institute of Forensic Medicine at Saarland University in Homburg. Regarding the family’s claims that an autopsy was not performed, the Kaiserslautern Chief Public Prosecutor stated in a 2025 letter that this claim does not reflect the truth, emphasizing that comprehensive autopsy and toxicology reports are available in the file.

Despite this, the family demands an autopsy in Turkey as well: “After he came to Turkey, we didn’t think of anything at first. Then after thinking a bit, we took him out of the ground. We had an autopsy done. According to the autopsy, it is said his front teeth had fallen out. One of his bones was broken, his heart and some of his organs were decomposed, some were missing. It is said the higher board of the Forensic Medicine Institute in Turkey will give the final result. A year and a half later, after the autopsy, Germany sent its own autopsy to the prosecutor here. What do the authorities here say now? We will put Germany’s and our own autopsy side by side. Let’s see what comes out. In the end, they also made their own autopsy reports like the one in Germany. Now they also say Hogir hanged himself,” says Rêber Alay.

From the preliminary autopsy report of the Istanbul Forensic Medicine Institute regarding Hogir Alay

His father Abdülvahap Alay filed a criminal complaint with German institutions through the Kızıltepe Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office. In the complaint, he claims that there was no possibility of their child committing suicide and that he might have been a victim of murder. Despite this application, the Zweibrücken Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office stated that Hogir took his own life, claiming that he did not commit suicide under the influence of someone else, but due to his internal problems. Furthermore, it noted that there was no information or findings regarding the possibility of him being killed by others and closed the investigation it conducted on the grounds that no criminal situation was detected.

In the investigation file in question, it is stated that no direct connection could be established between Alay’s past frictions with security personnel and the death event. The German prosecutor’s office points to the fact that Hogir Alay personally declared in his statement dated August 4, 2023, that he had “made peace with the security personnel” as evidence that conflicts within the camp had no link to the suicide decision. According to the information provided by Rêber Alay, some of his brother’s personal belongings and phone have not yet been delivered to them. The investigation opened in Turkey continues.

Kumak: They will kill me

Gökhan Kumak, like Hogir Alay, committed suicide in the camp where he lived in Germany. Kumak went to Germany through illegal routes in January 2023. He was 34 years old. He was a long-haul truck driver. He used to carry cargo to and from Iran and Iraq. According to his family’s account, he decided to go to Germany saying, “I don’t have a profession, I can’t see a future, let me go to Germany, maybe I’ll get residency and build a good life for myself.” After staying in the first camp where refugees are accepted for the first 8 months, Kumak was sent to a camp called a heim where he would stay permanently. Kumak, who stayed here for 6 months, constantly called his family during this time, claiming that he would be killed. The family states that their child’s psychology deteriorated greatly due to this situation. His brother Eser Kumak told Niha+: “Before he died, he called my father. He says, ‘I’m afraid the German police will bring trouble upon me. They will kill me, they will burn me.’ Something happened to him in the heim, I don’t know that. He suffered a lot in the camp. He said the German police set Afghans upon him.”

Before losing his life, Gökhan calls his father and says that they have ruined his psychology, that it is a very serious matter, and asks them to save him.

Gökhan lost his life on April 2, 2024.

However, his family was informed on April 9: “One day we couldn’t get news. He had a friend. I called him, I told him we couldn’t reach my brother. I said, don’t you see Gökhan? He said, ‘don’t call me,’ he said, ‘I don’t know where Gökhan is.’ There was someone else next to him. He said, his voice came to me, ‘tell them the police came and took Gökhan and Gökhan died.’ The other kid said, ‘don’t involve me, don’t involve me, don’t call me,’ and after day he blocked me. He was an Afghan boy. But he was using a number from Turkey.”

Gökhan Kumak

Eser Kumak stated that official authorities from Germany did not reach them. Gökhan Kumak’s body, like Hogir Alay’s body, was seen hanging from a tree in the forest. It was sent to Turkey on April 14, 2024. In the autopsy performed, it was written that he had a heart attack. However, the family does not believe this finding. Eser Kumak states that due to the heavy situation they experienced, they could not think to request an autopsy in Turkey as well. The family provided the information that no investigation has been opened in Turkey regarding Gökhan Kumak.

Someone from Germany calls the family: Don’t go to the ECHR On April 18, 2026, someone who identified herself as Ute Classen and stated she was a social service official in the city of Bad Wildungen sent voice messages to the family via WhatsApp from Germany. In the voice recording sent in German, the person states that Gökhan had psychological problems, that everyone tried to help him, but he committed suicide nonetheless. The voice recording also says, “I would not recommend you to apply to the European Court, because here in Bad Wildungen, nothing happened to justify this.”

Gökhan Kumak

Pena-Ger: Suicide attempts of refugees are not being recorded

Pena-Ger is a non-profit non-governmental organization providing online counseling services for refugees throughout Germany. Dealing with the files of Gökhan Kumak and Hogir Alay, the organization is preparing to restart the legal process for both files. According to Pena-Ger, a series of death cases occurring among Kurdish refugees in Germany in recent years, which are mostly evaluated as suicides, are known. However, according to the organization, there is no precise statistical record specific to this group, and they argue that this lack of data points to a more fundamental problem: that suicides or suicide attempts among refugees in general are not systematically recorded in Germany.

According to DRK Rheinland-Pfalz, which operates as part of the Red Cross in the German state of Rhineland-Palatinate, a large portion of these cases remain invisible because they are not recognized or documented as a result of structural problems. This invisibility leads political decision-makers to not take the need for adequate psychosocial support for refugees seriously enough, and this situation leads to serious consequences. The organization states that despite this, structural patterns are identified through individual cases and media and civil society reports.

“Problems of Kurdish refugees remain invisible”

Pena-Ger draws attention to another point: neither the German Federal Statistical Office nor the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees makes a distinction based on ethnic origin. Therefore, the specific problems experienced by Kurdish refugees in particular remain statistically invisible. Especially collective accommodation centers, deportation detention, and similar restrictive conditions negatively affect psychological health. Isolation, lack of privacy, and constant fear of deportation deepen existing crises and increase suicidal thoughts. At the same time, the psychological problems of refugees are frequently distorted in the public eye through a security perspective.

Pena-Ger believes the causes of the suicide cases and attempts are structural. In addition to inadequate psychological support, the failure to forward complaints, insufficient protection mechanisms, and staff shortages, it is stated that living conditions within the acceptance system lead to re-traumatization. Long asylum processes, collective housing, lack of privacy, and constant uncertainty deepen existing traumas. The legal situation regarding access to health services is also thought to be a critical factor. It is stated that the Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz (AsylbLG) seriously restricts access to psychotherapy in particular. In the first 36 months, only acute illnesses are treated. This leads to many refugees being unable to access the necessary treatment.

Beybûn Şeker from Pena-Ger states that as an institution, they try to offer active support: “Every day we encounter people who experience suicidal thoughts or live in deep despair without support. In Germany, the mental health of refugees usually comes to the agenda for a short time only after sensational events. Millions of refugees are portrayed as threats by being generalized, but this is not the solution.”

The state of human rights: Resistance against systemic injustice globally

Amnesty International’s report exposes the lawlessness, discrimination, and rights violations perpetrated by nations -most notably the US, Russia, China, the UK, and Israel- while asserting that a new history of humanity is being written by the people resisting these injustices.

The 406-page report, titled The State of the World’s Human Rights 2025/26, evaluates 144 countries. It emphasizes that the international legal framework was significantly undermined in 2025, largely driven by the actions of the USA, Israel, and Russia. The report highlights that despite ceasefires, Israel continued its genocidal actions through illegal settlements and the obstruction of aid, while expanding its military offensive into countries such as Lebanon and Iran.

As the world endures one of its darkest periods of institutional impunity and state violence, the report notes that resistance has spread in equal measure. Port workers across several European countries formed a global solidarity network, putting their bodies on the line to block arms shipments to Israel. Meanwhile, youth movements from Indonesia to Peru targeted systemic injustice, transforming the streets into “spaces of transformation” throughout 2025.

“Time to write the history of human rights”

In the report’s foreword, Agnés Callamard, Secretary General of Amnesty International, stated:

“As Amnesty International has long warned, a global environment where primitive ferocity could flourish has been long in the making. But in 2025, accelerants were recklessly poured over dry kindling, as sharp U-turns were taken away from the international order that had been imagined out of the ashes of the Holocaust and the utter destruction of world wars, and constructed slowly and painfully, albeit insufficiently, over these past 80 years.”

Callamard emphasized that resistance is also about clarifying what needs to be transformed, urging people to find the courage to change as the very structures built over the last 80 years face destruction:

“We must imagine a transformed and transformative human rights vision for the world that we are becoming, not merely defend human rights in terms of the world we once were. Together, we must then lead that transformation into existence, with all our creativity, determination and resilience. History is not just something that is done to us. It is also ours to make. And for the sake of humanity, it’s time to make human rights history.”

The report documented protester deaths resulting from the unlawful use of force in countries including Turkey, Angola, Cameroon, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Madagascar, Pakistan, and Peru. In nations such as Afghanistan, Belarus, Burkina Faso, China, Cuba, Mali, Myanmar, Nicaragua, North Korea, Russia, Uganda, and Venezuela, authorities reportedly used enforced disappearances of human rights defenders, activists, and journalists to spread fear. Many other countries, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, continued to resort to the death penalty.

Turkey: Rise in baseless investigations and convictions

The report brings to light allegations of torture and rights violations by law enforcement against protesters in Turkey, alongside a culture of impunity. It further highlights an increase in baseless investigations and convictions targeting human rights defenders, noting that executive interference in the judiciary has deepened. Key findings include:

  • The report notes legislative proposals aimed at criminalizing LGBTI+ and their advocates. Similar to Hungary, Turkey banned Pride Marches, where law enforcement used unlawful force. The report also recorded bans placed on LGBTI+ associations.
  • The report recorded the detention of hundreds of peaceful protesters following the detention of Ekrem İmamoğlu, Mayor of Istanbul and CHP presidential candidate. Unlawful force was documented during the March 19-26, 2025, protests sparked by operations against the CHP and İmamoğlu’s detention.
  • Despite European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) rulings and the Council of Europe’s 2022 infringement proceedings, figures such as Osman Kavala, Selahattin Demirtaş, and Figen Yüksekdağ remain imprisoned.
  • The report identified unlawful force by both the judiciary and law enforcement during protests following the prison sentence handed to Abdullah Zeydan, the elected mayor of Van Metropolitan Municipality.
  • Rights violations during May Day protests and subsequent house raids were highlighted. In 2025, 294 femicides were committed by men, while 297 women were found dead under suspicious circumstances.

Escalating violence in the Middle East and North Africa

The report underscores a surge in attacks by various actors across the Middle East. Notable findings include:

  • Israeli attacks in Gaza continued through 2025, killing approximately 27,000 Palestinians (60% of whom were women and children). Systematic destruction of housing and infrastructure decimated living conditions. An 18-year blockade was tightened, leaving half a million people facing famine and banning medical evacuations.
  • Israel conducted military strikes against Lebanon, Iran, Qatar, Syria, and Yemen. Targeting civilian sites in Iran (such as Evin Prison) was classified as a war crime. While a new era began in Syria with the fall of the Assad regime, sectarian massacres continued. In Yemen, the humanitarian crisis deepened following a cut in US aid.
  • Non-independent judiciaries in Egypt, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq handed down politically motivated prison sentences. Peaceful protests were crushed in Iran, Algeria, and Tunisia. Racial attacks and collective expulsions of Black refugees increased in Tunisia and Algeria, while Libya remained a spot for the torture and arbitrary detention of migrants.

Global impunity and the reluctance of states

By early 2026, the unlawful use of force by the US and Israel against Iran -violating the UN Charter- triggered retaliatory strikes against Israel and Gulf Cooperation Council countries. The US, Israel, and Russia further weakened international accountability mechanisms, specifically the International Criminal Court (ICC).

  • The Trump administration imposed sanctions on ICC staff and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, while Russian courts issued arrest warrants for ICC officials. Most states remained reluctant to activate mechanisms to block the aggressive actions of the US, Russia, Israel, or China.
  • In Brazil, police operations in impoverished neighborhoods of Rio de Janeiro resulted in over 120 deaths, mostly among Black residents. In Afghanistan, the Taliban escalated its oppressive policies, banning women from education, work, and travel.
  • Floods in Pakistan displaced millions, while New Delhi recorded the world’s most polluted air. Pacific islands face an existential threat from rising sea levels.
  • Activism against the flow of weapons to Israel expanded globally. Port workers in France, Greece, Italy, Morocco, Spain, and Sweden blocked shipment routes. An increasing number of states acknowledged that Israel is committing genocide, with many joining the “Hague Group” or contributing to South Africa’s case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
  • In 2026, the Spanish government maintained a principled stance against these violations.

[Click here for the full report]

IHR: Events in Urfa and Maraş are a consequence of violence policies

The Human Rights Association (İHD) issued a statement regarding the armed attacks carried out in schools in Urfa and Maraş on April 14 and 15, respectively: “These grave incidents are a consequence.”

On April 14, an armed attack was carried out by a student at the Siverek Ahmet Koyuncu Vocational and Technical High School in the Siverek district of Urfa. At least 16 people were injured. Following this, on April 15, another student carried out an armed attack at Ayser Çalık Secondary School in the Onikişubat district of Maraş. Media reports indicated that there were at least 9 dead and 20 injured in the Maraş attack.

Following these consecutive attacks, several education unions announced a 2-day strike and called on the public to join a “life vigil” in front of Provincial Directorates of National Education.

The Human Rights Association (İHD) released its statement today (April 16). The statement emphasized that the attacks in Urfa and Maraş have once again exposed structural problems regarding the protection of children’s fundamental rights.

“Violence has become an ordinary occurrence”

The İHD stated that violence has become normalized everywhere and has reached a level that threatens social life by becoming a culture in Turkey recently. The statement noted that the legitimization of violence stems from many factors, ranging from the language used by politicians and the media that glorifies violence and hatred to easy access to firearms:

“Targeting based on identity and belief, the language used against dissidents and political operations, discourse against LGBTIQ+ individuals, migrants, and refugees, combined with violence and hate speech generated via media and social media -when evaluated alongside institutionalized policies of impunity- pave the way for these and similar attacks. In other words, these grave incidents are a consequence.”

“The selective attitude of the judiciary and entrenched impunity legitimize violence”

In its statement, the İHD called on everyone using violent and hateful language, especially political actors and the media, to abandon this rhetoric. It urged the judicial system to stop being “selective” regarding violence and hate speech.

The Association pointed out a clear double standard: while the judiciary shows tolerance toward violence and hate speech aligned with government policies, it applies legal pressure and threats of prosecution against dissenting, rights-based, or minority-focused expressions. This approach, they argued, transforms hate speech into violent action and legitimizes violence against certain groups.

The statement also noted that TV programs, series, movies, and games that normalize conflict as a social relationship contribute to this normalization. It called for effective measures against violence and hate speech in written, visual, and social media.

“The right to life, the right to security, and the right to access a qualified, safe educational environment -especially for children- is an absolute obligation of the state. This obligation requires not only post-incident intervention but the implementation of policies that prevent violence, eliminate risks, and protect children under all circumstances.

According to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which Turkey is a party, children must be protected from all forms of violence. Despite this, the fact that educational spaces have become vulnerable to armed attacks reveals the inadequacy of protection mechanisms and the consequences of negligence.”

“Curriculum must be purged of discriminatory and militarist discourse”

Stating that these incidents are not individual acts of violence but the result of routinized policies of hate, the İHD listed its demands to prevent further occurrences:

  1. The incidents must be investigated effectively and independently in all dimensions; impunity for those responsible must not be allowed.
  2. Rights-based and holistic protection policies centered on children’s safety in schools must be established immediately.
  3. Early warning and monitoring mechanisms to prevent violence against children should be set up and the curriculum must be cleaned of discriminatory and militarist discourse.
  4. Long-term, accessible, and free psychosocial support must be provided to all children affected by these violent events.

The İHD also expressed that broadcast bans and practices preventing the public’s access to accurate information damage transparency and accountability, rendering the events invisible. The statement concluded that an effective struggle against such incidents is only possible in an environment where truths can be spoken openly.

The Association vowed to follow the legal process regarding the events in Urfa and Maraş and called on authorities to take effective measures to ensure such violations never happen again.

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