Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ have been imprisoned for 10 years

Former HDP Co-Chairs Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ have been held in prison for 10 years. While 15 bar associations and the lawyers representing them in the case are calling for the implementation of European Court of Human Rights rulings, DEM Party Co-Chairs Hatimoğulları and Bakırhan made statements in front of the prisons where the former co-chairs are being held.

Photo: AP

Former Co-Chairs of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ, have been held in prison for 10 years.

Marking the 10th anniversary of their imprisonment, 15 bar associations and lawyers representing the defendants have requested the release of 13 HDP politicians, including Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ. The appeal filed in Ankara calls for implementation of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) final rulings on rights violations.

The 15 regional bar associations and the lawyers for the “Kobani case” submitted the release request to the 22nd Criminal Chamber of the Ankara Regional Court of Justice.

The core arguments for this request rest on final ECHR rulings on rights violations, a decision by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe dated September 16, 2026, and Articles 19 and 90 of the Constitution.

Bakırhan: “For ten years, we have been making statements at the gates of prisons.”

On the 10th anniversary of their arrests, DEM Party Co-Chairs Tülay Hatimoğulları and Tuncer Bakırhan visited the prisons where the politicians are being held. Hatimoğulları visited Edirne Prison, where Selahattin Demirtaş is incarcerated, and Bakırhan visited Kandıra Prison in Kocaeli, where Figen Yüksekdağ is held, and delivered statements outside the facilities.

Hatimoğulları reported that, during their meeting, Demirtaş conveyed his greetings to the peoples of Turkey and affirmed that he would continue to support the “Peace and Democratic Society Process” despite his imprisonment, emphasizing that the detained politicians have not abandoned their efforts for peace. She stated that they would continue their struggle until all political prisoners are released.

Bakırhan remarked, “For ten years, we have been making statements at the gates of these prisons. Isn’t that enough by now? We do not want to come here to make statements in the eleventh year. By the eleventh year, our friends should be engaging in democratic politics alongside us. Figen Yüksekdağ should be able to demonstrate her commitment to peace outside these walls. Selahattin Demirtaş should be able to engage in politics together with his own people and his comrades.”

What happened during Demirtaş and Yüksekdağ’s leadership of the HDP?

Demirtaş and Yüksekdağ, who have been imprisoned since November 4, 2016, led a pro-Kurdish party in Turkey to surpass the electoral threshold for the first time; the HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party) secured 13.22% of the vote in the June 7, 2015, general elections. Although no party reached the 276 seats required to govern alone, the HDP won 80 seats in parliament. The AKP, in power since 2002, lost its parliamentary majority after these elections.

In the lead-up to the June 7 elections, Demirtaş made a statement from the podium of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on March 17, 2015, directed at Erdoğan: “We will not let you become president”, a remark that became a major topic of public discussion.

Two days before the elections, on June 5, ISIS carried out a bomb attack on an HDP rally held at the Istasyon Square in Diyarbakır, resulting in the deaths of five people.

The peace process that had been underway between the PKK and the state was effectively shelved on August 11, 2015, when President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared, “The ‘solution process’ is in the deep freeze.”

The period spanning the June 7 elections and the subsequent snap election on November 1 went down in history as one of the bloodiest and darkest eras in Turkey.

On July 20, 2015, an ISIS suicide attack targeted students from the SGDF (Federation of Socialist Youth Associations) in Suruç, Urfa, who were planning to deliver toys to children from Kobanê; 33 people lost their lives.

On July 22, 2015, two police officers were killed in their home in Ceylanpınar, and this event marked the de facto end of the “solution process.” However, it remains unknown who killed the police officers.

On October 10, 2015, 103 people lost their lives and more than 500 were injured in an ISIS-perpetrated bombing targeting a peace rally in front of the Ankara Train Station.

Although the blockades that followed the declaration of self-governance in Kurdish cities began and intensified primarily after November 1, they occurred between June and November.

The European Court of Human Rights demanded the release of Demirtaş and Yüksekdağ

Authorities launched an investigation into Selahattin Demirtaş after he called for a march toward the Sur district, where a curfew was in effect at the time.

Demirtaş, who faces accusations of engaging in PKK propaganda on 93 separate occasions, was the subject of an indictment seeking a 5-year prison sentence for “propagandizing for a terrorist organization.” This charge stems from a speech he delivered during a Newroz celebration in Istanbul in 2013, in which he allegedly “praised the PKK and its leader, Abdullah Öcalan.”

On September 7, 2018, Selahattin Demirtaş was sentenced to 4 years and 8 months in prison for “propagandizing for a terrorist organization.” However, the Office of the Chief Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation requested that this conviction be overturned. On December 22, 2020, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Demirtaş’s rights to freedom of expression and to stand for election had been violated.

On May 16, 2024, a verdict was reached in the “Kobani Case,” in which Selahattin Demirtaş, who has been in detention since 2016, was a defendant. The court ordered his continued detention and sentenced him to 28 years in prison.

When combined with his other legal cases, Demirtaş has been sentenced to a total of 42 years in prison.

Figen Yüksekdağ was taken into custody at her home in Ankara on November 4, 2016, as part of a “terrorism investigation” conducted by the Diyarbakır Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, and was subsequently sent to Diyarbakır. There, the 2nd Criminal Peace Judgeship heard her case and ordered her arrest that same day; she was later transferred to the Kocaeli F-Type Prison. On February 21, 2017, her parliamentary membership was revoked; subsequently, on March 9, 2017, the Office of the Chief Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation terminated her political party membership, in accordance with a provision in the Law on Political Parties stating that individuals convicted of “terrorist acts” cannot be members of political parties.

On May 16, 2024, in the “Kobani Case,” Yüksekdağ was sentenced to 30 years in prison.

On November 8, 2022, the ECHR ruled that the rights of former HDP members of parliament, including Yüksekdağ, to freedom of expression, liberty and security, and free elections had been violated. The Court called for necessary measures to secure the release of those applicants who remained in detention. The ruling became final on April 3, 2023.

A call from universities in Rojava: “Kurdish should be the language of education in all subjects”

During the integration process between the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) government in Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Kurdish-language education was limited to three hours per week. Academician Sardar Saadi, noting that the universities’ autonomous status has not been recognized, emphasized that Western countries such as Germany are acting “hypocritically” by turning a blind eye to the experience at universities in Rojava and Kobani.

Following the agreement reached on January 30, 2026, between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the future of Kurdish-language education in Northern and Eastern Syria is being debated. At the center of the debate are the number of Kurdish language class hours in schools and the status of Qamishlo University (known as Rojava University), Kobani University, and al-Sharq University in Raqqa. While the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) administration in Damascus seeks to integrate these universities into Syria’s state university system, the Kurdish people insist on the recognition of Kurdish as a language of instruction.

“Making Kurdish the language of education is our primary struggle”

Sardar Saadi, an academic who helped establish the Institute of Social and Human Sciences at Rojava University, previously served as the institute’s co-director, and continues his work at the university, noted in his assessment of the issue that while some courses have been accepted to a limited extent, Kurdish has not been recognized as the language of instruction:

“What we truly want, and what we are fighting for is for Kurdish to be the language of instruction in every subject. Especially at the university level: natural sciences, history, social sciences, philosophy, chemistry, physics… All of these should be taught in Kurdish. This is our primary struggle.”

Sardar Saadi

Saadi said that the Syrian Ministry of Education’s regulation, issued on August 27, 2026, limiting Kurdish language instruction in schools to three hours per week, was a policy meant to “erase Kurdish from daily life”:

“What the Syrian state wants is to affiliate Rojava University with the University of the Euphrates. Frankly, they do not accept these universities with their own status, their own administrative and autonomous rights. They are not saying, ‘If another university is established, let’s affiliate it with Rojava University.’”

Saadi said that students, faculty, and staff at Rojava University do not accept this affiliation and that the university is currently continuing its operations de facto. According to Saadi, approximately 5,000 students enrolled at the university this year.

“A form of genocide perpetrated by the government”

Stating that the Syrian state does not recognize the universities, does not allocate a budget for them, and does not accept the documents they issue, Saadi argued that Rojava is the biggest problem for the Damascus regime:

“This is not merely an administrative or technical issue; it is a deeply ideological, structural, and historical issue. The government established in Damascus is a jihadist government, and we must acknowledge this.”

Saadi, who states that the government’s policy is not merely about killing people but about destroying the local experience, language, and culture, describes this situation as “a form of genocide.”

“Why doesn’t the West accept the Rojava experience?”

Noting that Rojava has at least a decade of university experience, Saadi criticized the stance of Germany and other Western countries toward the university system in Rojava:

“Germany is spending millions of euros. It spends 800,000 euros just for a single conference. A total of 60 million euros in funding is being sent there to restructure higher education in Syria and for other projects. Not a single cent of this has gone to the universities in Rojava and Kobani.”

Describing the West’s stance on universities as “hypocrisy,” Saadi described the experience at Rojava University as follows:

“Student councils, women’s councils, a 50 percent quota for women, a co-presidency system, a department of jineology, and the integration of jineology into all courses… It’s an incredible experience. This is a democratic, women-led experience unlike anything seen anywhere else in the world. Why doesn’t the West accept this experience? Why is Germany giving 60 million dollars to the Syrian state?”

“Global Scholars’ Network for Rojava Universities”

Saadi said they had established an academic solidarity network called the “Global Scholars’ Network for Rojava Universities” (GSNRU). Approximately 150 people, including academics from the world’s leading universities, signed on to the network. Saadi, who said their sole focus was to put pressure on Germany, noted that they had participated in various conferences for this purpose.

The Global Scholars’ Network for Rojava Universities is a solidarity initiative established by international scientists and academics to provide academic and institutional support to Rojava University and Kobani University in Northern and Eastern Syria. Established to raise international awareness and exert pressure for the preservation of Kurdish-language education and the official recognition of academic programs at universities in the region, this network will organize international academic solidarity campaigns, conferences, and petition drives.

According to Saadi, as part of the solidarity network’s activities, an event titled “Higher Education in Syria’s Transition Process” will be held on November 3 at Humboldt University in Berlin, followed by an event titled “International Conference on the Transformation of Higher Education in Syria” on November 24–26 at the German-Jordanian University. The events are being organized in partnership with Humboldt University of Berlin and the German-Jordanian University, along with the Berlin Institute for Empirical Integration and Migration Research (BIM) and the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD).

Saadi also explained that Turkey has been exerting pressure on many countries regarding these conferences and programs:

“Last month, I participated in a program at University College Cork (UCC) in Ireland. The Turkish Embassy sent a threatening letter asking, ‘Why are you doing this?’ Moreover, they linked this to the situation in Turkey. It has absolutely nothing to do with it. Rojava is not a geographical issue, nor is Kurdistan merely an issue confined to Turkey—it is a Middle Eastern issue. We don’t understand why Turkey is making such a fuss, or why it is resorting to pressure and threats, especially during this process. They aren’t just targeting us—they’re also going to the Germans, the Irish, and the Americans, asking, ‘Why are you working with them?’ They’ve previously exerted pressure on Bremen as well as on a university in the U.S. We see that Turkey is playing a very negative role in this process.”

What happened before?

Following the clashes that broke out in Aleppo in early January, the SDF lost a large portion of its territory in northeastern Syria as a result of a government offensive. On January 16, President Ahmed al-Shara issued a decree recognizing Kurdish as a “national language” alongside Arabic and permitting its teaching in schools. Decree No. 13 granted citizenship to all Syrians of Kurdish origin, including unregistered Kurds. The decree was regarded as the first official recognition of Kurdish national rights since independence. Kurdish was to be taught as an elective course or through cultural activities in regions where Kurds constitute a significant portion of the population. However, the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria deemed the decree insufficient.

Mazlum Abdi also stated that Decree No. 13 was insufficient regarding the Kurdish language, noting that Kurdish has been the language of instruction in Rojava for 15 years and has reached the university level.

On January 30, the SDF and the Syrian government announced an agreement outlining a permanent ceasefire and a framework for integration. In June, the Ministry of Education initiated the process of recognizing certificates issued under the Rojava administration and allowed students to take the 2026 and 2027 national exams. On the same day, the ministry announced that 38,000 teachers working under the Kurdish administration had been integrated into state institutions.

The dissolution of the SDF was announced on August 25. Two days later, on August 27, Education Minister Muhammad Abdurrahman Turku amended the implementing regulations of Decree No. 13. According to the regulation, Kurdish will be taught for three hours per week, and the grade will be included in the year-end score. Additionally, a one-hour Kurdish cultural activities class will be held each week.

Rojava University described the regulation as “a step backward” and called for its withdrawal. With the start of the new school year, students in Qamishlo and the surrounding area staged protests, demanding that Kurdish be made an official language of education rather than simply increasing the number of class hours.

Pressures on journalists are intensifying: “You cannot tell ‘Do not report this’ to a journalist”

Speaking about the pressures faced by journalists in Turkey, including detentions, investigations, arrests, and censorship, Dicle Fırat Journalists Association (DFG) Co-chair Selman Çiçek and journalist Tuğçe Yılmaz explained that these practices hinder journalists’ work and lead to self-censorship in their reporting.

Today, the monopolization of the press in Turkey and the measures taken to obstruct media outlets are making working conditions increasingly difficult for journalists. Beyond the investigations and lawsuits faced by journalists for their reporting, it has also become harder for citizens to access independent news.

Speaking to Niha+ on this issue, Selman Çiçek, co-chair of the Dicle Fırat Journalists Association (DFG), and journalist Tuğçe Yılmaz note that treating journalism as a crime, compounded by active censorship, makes the act of reporting even more challenging.

DFG Co-chair Selman Çiçek stated that Kurdish journalists have been subjected to such pressures for many years, and that they face these challenges more intensely than the broader press. Pointing out that the Mesopotamia Agency (Mezopotamya Ajansı) has faced access bans 44 times, compared to a single instance for the news outlet T24, Çiçek interprets this as evidence that the Kurdish press operates under more intense and persistent pressure:

“For many years, Kurdish journalists have been subjected to systematic and unlawful practices. News agencies and newspapers are shut down, journalists are arrested, and access to news reports is blocked. While other journalists in Turkey also face pressure, there are significant differences in the scope and continuity of these pressures. Yet, despite all this, Kurdish journalists continue to write and bring the truth to the public. The fact that the Mesopotamia Agency has managed to continue its operations, now through its 45th website, despite repeated access bans, serves as a concrete example of this resistance.”

Selman Çiçek

“These practices prevent journalists from carrying out their profession”

Çiçek also pointed out that detentions could have a long-lasting, chilling effect on fellow journalists. He added that the seizure of a journalist’s professional equipment, which is essential for their work, and the fact that such equipment is often returned in a damaged state following the legal proceedings, severely hinders the practice of journalism. Furthermore, Çiçek noted that measures such as the requirement to regularly report to authorities (signing in) and travel bans, which prevent journalists from leaving the country, also obstruct their freedom to report the news. “All these practices,” he stated, “not only restrict a journalist’s personal freedom but also prevent them from carrying out their profession.”

“They want to silence every kind of dissident voice”

Çiçek noted that access restrictions have increased significantly. Stating that such restrictions represent the most prominent form of pressure exerted on journalists, he added that 3,500 accounts were blocked in the month of September alone:

“Through these access restrictions, they aim to silence any dissenting voices. In doing so, they also foster self-censorship driven by the fear of censorship. They want to ensure that people do not offer criticism or speak out.”

Despite this grim reality, Selman Çiçek, recalling the 1990s, a period marked by the bombing of newspaper offices, the closure of news agencies via statutory decrees (KHKs), and the killing of journalists, emphasizes that, in this region, journalism is pursued not merely as a profession, but as a duty to bring the truth to the public.

Yılmaz: “Unfortunately, self-censorship has now become part of our routine”

Journalist Tuğçe Yılmaz, who has faced various pressures due to her profession, including lawsuits filed against her over her reporting and the blocking of her X (formerly Twitter) account without explanation, noted that this environment has influenced her approach to journalism.

Yılmaz described ensuring the safety of journalists as a critical priority in the current climate:

“I act with greater caution, taking the risks into account. While this could be seen as a step back, we are living through a period where ensuring our own safety has become one of our most critical priorities as journalists. Unfortunately, self-censorship has now become a part of our daily routine. The way I approach my reporting has changed; everything, from the choice of headlines to the accompanying images, can end up taking on a different format.”

Tuğçe Yılmaz

Yılmaz stated that the experiences of Bahadır Özgür, who was taken into custody for his reporting on the “fund” issue, and Murat Ağırel, who was taken into custody and subsequently arrested while already under house arrest, represent extremely harsh measures against journalists.

“Our excitement and curiosity take shape in this work”

Criticizing the normalization of these practices, Yılmaz dismisses the warnings he receives from those around him as thoughtless:

“Just as you wouldn’t tell a greengrocer, ‘Stop selling apples,’ you shouldn’t tell a journalist, ‘Don’t report on this.’ Our passion and our curiosity take shape through this work. I cannot recall a single week in recent years where I haven’t felt exhausted. I simply cannot get used to my colleagues or human rights defenders being taken into custody or arrested. Right now, being detained or arrested is treated as if it were a standard, routine measure.”

Yılmaz added that instead of making jokes, such as telling journalists, “to not go and get themselves arrested,” people should offer solidarity to them and their families; she emphasized that turning such a serious matter into a joke only normalizes it.

“Tüm canlılara karşı sorumlusunuz”

Stating that he has no intention of abandoning his profession despite everything, Yılmaz noted that he draws his inspiration and motivation from figures like Hrant Dink, Musa Anter, and many other journalists who grew up on these lands:

“As journalists, we also bear a historical responsibility. You have a responsibility toward the public, toward everyone who reads and follows your work and, indeed, toward all living beings. I believe that nothing can prevent us from continuing our profession. My greatest source of motivation is giving a voice to those, both humans and animals, whose voices otherwise go unheard. When you encounter people from various walks of life in a courthouse, whose stories you have covered or whose lives you have touched, you realize once again that you are doing something right. I know that we will overcome these times as well.”

What happened?

Turkey has recently been facing an intense wave of censorship. Following the arrest of TELE1 Editor-in-Chief Merdan Yanardağ on charges of “espionage,” the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF) was appointed as a trustee to the channel on October 24, 2025.

“Tele2”, a YouTube initiative launched by TELE1 staff following the appointment of the trustee, was forced to cease operations on October 2, 2026, because it could not afford the 2 million TL license fee demanded by the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK).

Under an operation targeting LGBTI+ individuals, dubbed “My Family Is Safe” (Ailem Güvende) and led by Minister of Justice Akın Gürlek, hundreds of social media accounts, including those belonging to newspapers and journalists, were blocked. Journalist Tuğba Tekerek was arrested as part of these operations.

On September 30, the Istanbul 1st Criminal Judgeship of Peace ordered the shutdown of T24’s website and social media accounts, citing its coverage of LGBTI+ issues.

On the morning of October 14, 2026, it was announced that a trustee had been appointed to Halk TV, and police entered the broadcaster’s premises. On October 21, Halk TV’s account on X was blocked. Prior to this, journalists Şaban Sevinç and Mustafa Balcı were arrested on charges of “publicly disseminating misleading information” due to their posts and reports regarding an investigation into certain funding sources; meanwhile, journalists İsmail Saymaz and Murat Ağırel were placed under house arrest as a form of judicial control. Subsequently, on October 15, Halk TV columnist Bahadır Özgür was taken into custody on charges of “violating the confidentiality of an investigation” following a post he made on X concerning the same funding investigation. Ağırel was taken into custody on the morning of October 16, while he was still under house arrest.

İsmail Arı, a reporter for the newspaper BirGün, who had previously been arrested on March 22, 2026, on charges of “publicly disseminating misleading information,” spent 75 days in Sincan Prison, and was subsequently released in June, was arrested once again on October 23, with “risk of flight” cited as the reason.

Meanwhile, various media outlets, including the Mesopotamia Agency (MA), Yeni Yaşam newspaper, Jinnews, NuJINHA, and Ajansa Welat, have continued to face access bans, detentions, arrests, and intense pressure for years.

Most recently, the entire website of the Mesopotamia Agency (MA) was blocked on October 6, following a decision by a Criminal Peace Judgeship. The MA noted that this marked the 44th time an access ban had been imposed on the agency. On October 14, an access ban was also placed on the agency’s X (formerly Twitter) account. Additionally, the Instagram account “ajansawelat1,” belonging to Ajansa Welat, was blocked by the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK) on September 16, 2026.

In July, the BTK also imposed access bans on Ajansa Welat’s website and X account. During the same period, the BTK also imposed access bans on the websites and accounts of several other media outlets, including Azadiya Welat and Nûmedya24.

Verdict hearing in the Hakan Tosun murder trial: Life sentences for 2 defendants

The verdict hearing was held in the murder trial of journalist and ecology activist Hakan Tosun, who was killed in Esenyurt on October 13, 2025. The court sentenced the two detained defendants, Abdurrahman Murat and Adnan Şahin, to life imprisonment for intentional killing.

Hakan Tosun’s sister Öznur Tosun leaving the courthouse after the hearing. Photos: Gökçe Bayrak

Today (October 7), the 4th hearing of the case concerning the killing of journalist and ecology activist Hakan Tosun, who was beaten to death in Esenyurt, Istanbul, on October 13, 2025, took place at the Bakırköy 17th Assize Court.

At today’s verdict hearing, the 2 detained defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment under Article 81 of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK), “intentional killing.” In a press statement after the hearing, lawyers and the rights defenders following the case repeated their demand that the third person, against whom the family has filed a criminal complaint since the start of the process, also be put on trial.

Most journalists were not admitted to the hearing

Hakan Tosun’s family and friends, ecology activists, right-to-life defenders, journalists, politicians and many others gathered in front of the Bakırköy Courthouse to attend the hearing. Şükrü Kibar, brother of Reşit Kibar, a right-to-life defender killed in Artvin, also attended.

Before the hearing, large numbers of police, with drones and security shields, took positions in front of and inside the courthouse. It was announced that no one except Hakan Tosun’s family, including journalists, would be admitted to the hearing. The crowd that was not let into the courtroom held an open forum in front of the Bakırköy Courthouse before the hearing, broadcast live from the Instagram account “Justice for Hakan Tosun.”

Journalist Pınar Gayıp, who spoke, said: “As Hakan Tosun’s family and friends, we will continue our struggle to have all those responsible to stand trial, first and foremost Yusuf Özakdağ. Today the hearing of a murdered journalist will take place. A verdict is not expected today, yet we journalists, his colleagues, will not be admitted to the hearing.”

The hearing began at 10.40, with only Hakan Tosun’s family, lawyers, politicians and 4 journalists admitted. Other press workers followed the hearing from an additional room via the SEGBİS (video conferencing) system. The first to speak was Hakan Tosun’s mother, Fatma Tosun, who asked: “Why can the third person walk around freely on the street, who is behind him?” She repeated the demand that the third person in the case be tried. The family said, “I am here so that justice may be fully served.” The family’s lawyer Cemal Gürsel said: “Under Article 81 of the TCK, we request that they be tried for intentional killing without benefiting from any reduction.”

“They lie right to our faces”

The family’s lawyer Hakan Bozyurt stressed the importance of how the killing took place. He said that he had watched the footage previously submitted to the court many times and together with the expert reports, it shows there was no contact initiated by Hakan Tosun, while the footage shows that the defendant struck Hakan Tosun’s head violently and repeatedly and pulled his hair.

Bozyurt noted that the records also show defendants Adnan Şahin and Abdurrahman Murat leaving the scene by car, and Yusuf Özakdağ coming and watching Hakan Tosun from his motorcycle. He said of those claiming otherwise: “They lie right to our faces.” Blaming the police’s inadequacy for the fact that the footage proving the witness statements contradictory was not obtained at first, Bozyurt asked: “If there had been camera footage, we would have seen the truth more clearly. Why don’t the police do their job?”

As the way the killing was carried out was described in the courtroom, the family broke into tears and said “they tortured” Hakan.

Lawyer Bozyurt said that, considering the defendants’ criminal records, they should not receive a good-conduct reduction, and that he was requesting the heaviest sentence as a deterrent against rising crime in society.

Defense lawyer blamed Tosun, tension rose in the courtroom

Defendant Abdurrahman Murat then spoke and expressed his guilt, saying: “I would never have wanted such an incident to happen, I am very sorry, he provoked me repeatedly and said unspeakable things.” Saying he assumed the blow to the skull that caused Hakan Tosun’s death came from something else, Murat requested acquittal.

Defendant Adnan Şahin then spoke: “I am here because of names I did not know before. The only thing I did when the argument started was to take Abdurrahman away. The place I took Abdurrahman to was in front of his house. After that I did not act together with him. Abdurrahman goes to the scene a second time on his motorcycle; my only fault there is not calling an ambulance. Since I thought he had passed out drunk, I did not see any beating.”

Saying he agreed that the witness statements were wrong, Şahin said: “The witnesses are lying, they are trying to pin the blame on me to save Abdurrahman.”

Tension rose in the courtroom when Adnan Şahin’s lawyer, Mustafa Berkay Yılmaz, said Hakan Tosun had been thrown off the metrobus over an accusation of “rape.” Following the reaction of the family and lawyers, a voice called out, “Know your profession and speak accordingly.” Yılmaz then changed his claim, saying the incident was harassment. Yılmaz requested the defendant’s acquittal.

After a recess, at the verdict hearing that began at 12:00, detained defendants Abdurrahman Murat and Adnan Şahin were sentenced to life imprisonment under TCK Article 37/1 “Perpetration” and TCK Article 81/1 “Intentional Killing.”

“The struggle is not over”

As the family left the courthouse after the verdict, Hakan Tosun’s sister Öznur Tosun said: “It won’t bring my brother back, but this time justice was served. Now it is the turn of everyone who had a hand in this to answer before justice. Until that day, our struggle will continue.”

In the press statement held after the hearing, the demands for the trial of the third person came to the fore. The lawyers of Hakan Tosun’s family said that despite presenting concrete evidence, no action had been taken regarding the third person, and that although a verdict had been reached for two people, the struggle would continue. During the statement, slogans such as “Don’t whitewash, question, deliver justice” and “Hakan is here, his camera is recording” were chanted.

Şükrü Kibar, brother of ecology defender Reşit Kibar, also spoke at the press statement, saying he wanted justice for everyone: “At least today we saw that there is a light. This light will shine until the third person is also tried. We stand by each other without fear.”

Istanbul Bar Association Deputy President Av. Rukiye Leyla Süren said:

“Hakan Tosun was a comrade known to all of us, who struggled precisely for the rule of law to be restored for the environment, for people, for animals, that is, for this country. This time we had to say ‘justice for Hakan Tosun.’

“I learned a lot from Hakan”


Oruç Karacık, a fellow campaigner of Hakan Tosun, also described Hakan to Niha+:

“I first met Hakan at the Kaz Mountains protest, and since Hakan was at every event, we became quite close. We went to many protests on buses arranged by the municipality, and in my car. Hakan’s greatest quality was that he truly kept his camera recording, never steering anyone and never judging anyone. He would prepare what everyone said as a documentary and present it exactly as it was. I saw him share his own opinion only when we were very close. In other words, he was a person who didn’t steer anyone. I learned a lot from Hakan.”

Giving his thoughts on the hearing, Karacık said: “We understood it was an organized massacre. I feel the police and security forces were involved too. I see that even on the metrobus there was filming, that he was being followed even there. Two life sentences is a good thing, but the struggle must continue.”

Murder of Hakan Tosun

Journalist and documentary maker Hakan Tosun was killed in the middle of the street in Esenyurt, Istanbul, on October 10, 2025. Footage from the moment of his killing reached the press and social media. During the investigation, three people detained on allegations of destroying evidence were released under judicial control. The detained defendants Abdurrahman Murat and Adnan Şahin were tried for “intentional killing.”

The first hearing, on May 6, 2026, was held at the Bakırköy 17th High Criminal Court. At the first hearing, the continued detention of the two defendants was ordered.

The second hearing was held at the same court on July 8, 2026. At this hearing too, continued detention of the two detained defendants was ordered. Camera footage was shown in the courtroom. The family’s lawyer said the footage shows Tosun moving when Abdurrahman Murat came up to him. In his defense, Murat said, “I pray.” The hearing was adjourned to September 22.

At the 3rd hearing on September 22, 2026, the prosecution requested that the two detained defendants be punished as joint perpetrators for “intentional killing” and that their detention continue. At this hearing, where a verdict was expected, the defendants attended via SEGBİS. The defendants’ lawyers did not attend. The hearing was therefore adjourned to October 7.

Reactions to operations targeting LGBTI+: “We will not yield to this September 12 mentality!”

Politicians, legal professionals, political parties, and rights advocates have reacted to the operations targeting LGBTI+ associations, venues, and activists. Statements issued asserted that the operation was political and that the existence of the LGBTI+ community was being targeted.

Last night, police conducted simultaneous operations targeting LGBTI+ associations, venues, and activists under the name “My Family is Safe.”

In a post on his social media account, Justice Minister Akın Gürlek announced that the operations were centered in five provinces and covered a total of fifteen provinces, and that legal proceedings were initiated against 162 individuals, nine associations, and thirteen businesses.

Politicians, legal professionals, political parties, and rights advocates reacted to the operations targeting LGBTI+ associations, activists, and venues.

DEM Women’s Assembly: We will never remain silent in the face of attacks!

The Women’s Assembly of Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) stated, “We do not accept the attacks—involving detentions, searches, seizures, and access blocks—targeting LGBTI+ associations, rights defenders, and digital media outlets.”

The statement continued as follows:

“This operation, dubbed ‘My Family is Safe,’ is—as the name implies—an operation aimed at subjugating society. It is clear evidence of the persistent pursuit of policies rooted in monism and sexism.

Every day, women are subjected to violence and murdered within families that are labeled ‘safe.’ Diverse sexual identities do not constitute a security threat to this country, to families, or to society.

The real security issue is the violence, impunity, and discrimination that threaten the lives of women and LGBTI+ individuals.

You cannot keep society safe by silencing human rights defenders, stoking hate crimes, blocking broadcasts, and targeting the freedom of association.

Justice must be for everyone, not just for a single individual or group. The duty of the Ministry of Justice is not to suppress human rights defenders, journalists, LGBTI+ individuals, and democratic organizations, but to safeguard the rights and freedoms of all.

Societal security is achieved not through repression and bans, but by guaranteeing equality, freedom, justice, and the right to life.

As advocates of a shared and equal life together, we will never remain silent in the face of attacks against LGBTI+ individuals!

Those detained must be released immediately!

Justice for all, freedom for all, an equal life for all!”

DEM Party MPs Saki and Konukçu issued statements on their social media accounts, reacting to the state’s “policy of impunity.”

In a post on X, DEM Party Istanbul MP ​​Özgül Saki said, “You attack people and the spaces where they show solidarity using fabricated charges.”

Stating that the common denominator among the associations and individuals targeted is their opposition to the “familialist, moralistic, and hate-generating policies” imposed by the government, Saki remarked that, under the guise of “protecting the family,” the government seeks to confine society to a single way of life, target LGBTI+ individuals, and criminalize those fighting for their rights.

DEM Party Istanbul MP ​​Kezban Konukçu also stated that the government, under the guise of “protecting the family,” paves the way for the killing of women and LGBTI+ individuals and encourages this through policies of impunity.

She declared, “Despite hate, Long live life!”

IHD: We will not yield to the September 12 mentality!

In a statement regarding the operations, the Central LGBTI+ Commission of the Human Rights Association (IHD) declared, “We will not yield to the September 12 mentality.”

Stating that the current situation is not a judicial investigation but rather a political operation—one that aims to eliminate LGBTI+ individuals and independent civil society while forcing society into a monolithic family model under the guise of “protecting the family and children”—the IHD emphasized this “continuity,” noting: “The state mindset of September 12—which shut down associations, banned publications, and demonized those who were different—is being perpetuated today under the name ‘My Family is Safe’ (Ailem Güvende).”

The association concluded: “We stand with LGBTI+ individuals, people living with HIV, and human rights defenders! We will not yield to the September 12 mentality!”

New Party Member Gökçen: It harms social peace

New Party Izmir Deputy Gökçe Gökçen expressed her reaction with the following words:

“The targeting of LGBTI+ rights defenders amounts to both the penalization of identities and existence and the simultaneous implementation of two bills that failed to pass in parliament. The ‘agent of influence’ law did not pass, and the law against ‘promoting homosexuality’ (!) did not pass.”

“A cheap copy-and-paste example of hate campaigns devised and planned in other countries is being staged in our country, causing great harm to social peace.”

“The banning of a band you listen to, the targeting of an artist whose concert you plan to attend, your child being exposed to workplace fatalities by the ministry, the arrest of a politician you voted for, and the raids conducted on these associations are not isolated incidents; on the contrary, the legitimacy established for one reinforces the others. Therefore, a holistic struggle for rights and freedoms is vital today—and is, in truth, a struggle for dignity.”

Karaca: The Minister of Justice is fueling hatred and discrimination

EMEP Deputy Chairperson and Antep MP Karaca reacted to Akın Gürlek, stating, “Imagine a Minister of Justice who criminalizes the constitutional right to organize, personally fuels hatred and discrimination, and spearheads the state-sponsored escalation of hatred and hostility!”

Stating that these operations are conducted to force society into the mold of the “acceptable family” and “acceptable citizen,” Karaca said, “Defending the rights of LGBTI individuals to live and organize means defending the rights and freedoms of everyone in this country.”

Karaca affirmed that they would continue to defend the right to life, equality, constitutional freedoms, and the right to organize against the politics of hatred, repression, and the usurpation of the right to organize, and demanded the release of those detained.

ÖHD and ÇHD also shared their reactions

The Association of Lawyers for Freedom (ÖHD) stated that the detentions constitute a violation of fundamental rights and freedoms, particularly the freedoms of expression and association.

Noting that the operations coincided with the anniversary of the September 12 coup, the ÖHD remarked, “These events serve as a reminder of just how alive the state’s practices of repression and criminalization directed at diverse identities and lifestyles remain.”

“Defending LGBTI+ rights is not a crime; on the contrary, it is a requirement of a democratic society,” the ÖHD said, calling for an end to the detentions and repressive measures.

The Istanbul Branch of the Progressive Lawyers Association (ÇHD) also stated in a post on its X account: “Members serving on the executive and supervisory boards of LGBTI+ associations have been detained in home raids. Association offices are being raided. We stand with LGBTI+ individuals against these attacks that usurp the freedom of association through hate-stoking, moralistic, and family-centric policies!”

SKM: Those detained should be released immediately

In a statement, the Socialist Women’s Assemblies (SKM) asked, “Which family?”

“The male-dominated, heterosexist state is attempting to bring into line—through attacks involving detentions and arrests—anyone who does not fit into the ‘family’ structure where women and LGBTI+ individuals are murdered, subjected to violence, and exploited every day,” the SKM stated, adding, “You cannot erase our existence through detentions, arrests, or bans.”

They called for the immediate release of those detained.

Seriously ill prisoner Mehmet Sait Yıldırım suffers heart attack

The release of seriously ill prisoner Mehmet Sait Yıldırım has been postponed for the third time by the Prison Administration and Observation Board. Following the board hearing, Yıldırım suffered a heart attack, underwent an angiogram, and had two stents fitted in his heart.


Held at İzmir Kırıklar No. 1 F-Type Closed Prison, Mehmet Sait Yıldırım (75), a seriously ill prisoner who has spent 33 years behind bars, has had his release blocked for a third time by the Prison Administration and Observation Board.

According to his lawyers, Yıldırım suffered a heart attack on August 24 after appearing before the Prison Administration and Observation Board. He was taken to hospital and yesterday (August 25) underwent an angiogram, during which two stents were placed in his heart.

According to bianet’s report, Yıldırım’s lawyers, Aryen Turan and Ali İhsan Güven, met with him for five minutes at around 4:40 p.m. today in the Coronary Intensive Care Unit on the 6th floor of İzmir City Hospital.

According to information conveyed to bianet by lawyer Ali İhsan Güven, Yıldırım appeared before the Administration and Observation Board at around 10:00 a.m. on August 24. Güven said the hearing was tense, adding that Yıldırım was once again pressured to “show remorse,” as in previous board hearings, and that an argument ensued.

Güven said that after Yıldırım returned to his cell he suffered a heart attack, and that he was transferred to hospital after his cellmate, Rohat Caruş, alerted prison staff.

According to Güven, Yıldırım was first taken to a hospital in Buca but, because it had no ward for prisoners, he was transferred to İzmir City Hospital. At around 11:00 a.m. yesterday he underwent an angiogram and had two stents fitted in his heart. According to bianet’s report, one of the main arteries leading to his heart was blocked, and Yıldırım narrowly survived a serious, life-threatening condition. Lawyer Güven said his health was now stable and that they had been told he could be discharged today.

According to his lawyers, Yıldırım’s release has been postponed for another three months.

Yıldırım: “Be honest and hang me”

Güven also told bianet that during the board hearing, Yıldırım had said the following:

The State Security Court sentenced me to death. It was commuted to life imprisonment. Now you, as the board, want to carry out the death sentence handed down by the State Security Court. Be honest, build a gallows here in the morning and hang me.

His release had already been postponed twice

Mehmet Sait Yıldırım was detained in 1993 on charges of PKK membership and sentenced to life imprisonment in 1995. Suffering from cardiovascular disease, COPD, hypertension, and other chronic conditions, he is classified among the seriously ill prisoners, and despite his grave health problems he has remained in prison for 33 years.

During the 2013–2015 peace process, Yıldırım was part of a five-member group of prisoners formed at the request of Abdullah Öcalan and publicly known as the “İmralı secretariat.” Owing to his health problems, he stayed on İmralı Island for only nine days before being transferred to another prison. He later recounted his experiences in a book titled Nine Days on İmralı. He spent a significant part of his imprisonment in a single-person cell, held in isolation.

Although Mehmet Sait Yıldırım’s prison term ended on February 27, 2025, he was not released, with the Prison Administration and Observation Board citing that he was not of “good conduct” and “showed no remorse.” Reconvening on November 25, the board once again blocked his release. It set a date nine months later (August 25, 2026) for the next assessment.

After his release was postponed for a second time in November, Yıldırım gave the following statement to bianet through his lawyer Demirer:

“My death sentence, which I received in 1996, was commuted to life imprisonment. After 30 years, I should have been released by now, but they won’t let me go. My release is being postponed for a second time on the pretext that I am not of good conduct. I said it when I appeared before the board too, in effect, you want to carry out the death sentence. If you are so determined to apply the death penalty, be honest: take me out to the yard and hang me on the gallows. Let me know I was sentenced to death, and you, too, say it openly, ‘we executed him.’”

Ayşegül Doğan’s parliamentary question

DEM Party Şırnak MP and Party Spokesperson Ayşegül Doğan submitted a written parliamentary question to the Speaker’s Office on July 28, to be answered by Justice Minister Akın Gürlek, concerning prisoner Yıldırım, whose health has been steadily deteriorating.

In her applications and in the question submitted to Parliament, Doğan noted that Yıldırım, who has not been released even though his conditional release period expired months ago, suffers from numerous chronic illnesses including heart disease, COPD, hypertension, and lung ailments, and that a blood clot had formed in his right eye in early July. The question stated that Yıldırım had been subjected to a demand for examination while handcuffed during his transfer, that his treatment had been delayed, and that his vision problems were ongoing.

Doğan also applied to the Parliamentary Human Rights Inquiry Commission, requesting answers on whether Yıldırım’s release would be reassessed, whether an investigation had been launched into the alleged handcuffed examination during his hospital transfer, and the number of ill prisoners whose release has been postponed on “good conduct” grounds. She further called for an on-site review of Yıldırım’s health conditions, a determination of whether it is medically appropriate for him to remain in prison, and the assurance of uninterrupted access to health services.


Kurds are being abducted in Raqqa, tortured and forced to flee

Unidentified individuals in Raqqa are abducting Kurds and demanding money from their families. These individuals take those they abduct to unknown locations and subject them to severe torture. As a result, tens of thousands of Kurdish families have been forced to flee Raqqa.

A view from Raqqa during the period it was under SDF control, Photo: Hawarnews

Some time ago, at around 11:00 a.m., Elî Mihemed was abducted in front of his home in Raqqa. When Mihemed stepped outside, he saw several people waiting for him in a black car with no license plate. These men were armed and resembled those who have recently been abducting Kurds in Raqqa. They ordered Mihemed to come with them. Making him leave behind his belongings and his phone, they put him in the car and took him away.

Mihemed is just one of nearly 10 people abducted in Raqqa over the past month and a half.

According to eyewitnesses and sources in Raqqa familiar with the matter, the group in question has for some time been operating at around 11:00 a.m., using the same method by which they abducted Mihemed. They subject those they abduct to severe torture, photograph them, send the photos to their families, and demand money from them.

According to the information available, all of those abducted are Kurds.

According to information given to Niha+ by two witnesses to the events in Raqqa, many Kurdish families have left the city since the abductions began. According to the sources, they allege that the aim of this is to cleanse Raqqa of Kurds.

Citing security concerns, these sources did not want their names disclosed. For the same reason, we have also changed the names of those who were abducted.

70 percent of the Kurdish neighborhood has fled

Raqqa lies in northern Syria on the banks of the Euphrates River. A strategic city, Raqqa is located 160 km east of Aleppo. It has been home to many civilizations.

Between 2014 and 2017 the city was under the control of ISIS, which described it as its “capital.” In 2017 the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), with the support of U.S. forces, liberated it from ISIS. Thousands of ISIS members surrendered. Those who surrendered were placed in camps.

Raqqa city map

Raqqa remained under SDF control until January 2026, but at the end of 2025 and the beginning of 2026, following attacks on the Kurdish neighborhoods of Aleppo and on Rojava, it was handed over to the interim Damascus administration.

According to the census conducted between 2011 and 2021, close to 60,000 Kurds lived in Raqqa. However, in the process that began after the Syrian war, many Kurds were forced to migrate from there. When the SDF took control of Raqqa, some of them returned. With the clashes at the start of 2026, it is reported that all the residents of the city’s Kurdish neighborhood fled. Afterward, some returned to the homes they had abandoned.

With the recent abductions, 70 percent of the Kurds in that same neighborhood have been forced to flee. In the past, Raqqa as a whole was estimated to have a Kurdish population of 40 percent and an Arab population of 60 percent. At present, however, the proportion of Kurds remaining in the city is reported to be between 5 and 10 percent.

“They say the Kurds are guests here”

After being abducted, Mahmûd Derwîş was released once he paid the money demanded of him. He, too, left Raqqa after his release, like the others. His abductors had threatened him, saying either you leave the city, or we kill you.

Some of those abducted are threatened with the abduction of their family members.

A significant portion of those who flee are forced to sell their goods and property at far below their value. Derwîş, too, had to sell his house, worth 60,000 dollars, for 40,000 dollars.

One of the sources who did not want to be named said that people are selling their shops, their harvests, and their cars and leaving Raqqa: “People think, ‘Let me lose my property rather than my life.’”

According to another source, the thinking of those carrying this out is that “the Kurds are guests here” and that they should therefore migrate away.

Recalling the “Arab Belt” project of the Baath regime era, under which Arabs were settled in Kurdish areas, the same source noted that what is being done now is similar to it. He said the aim behind it is to bring about a demographic change in the areas where Kurds live.

According to information provided by this source, in the past week to ten days three more people in Raqqa have been contacted and asked to leave the city.

What is the interim government doing?

One source says that only a single group is carrying this out, while another says there are two or three separate groups.

According to the allegations, these individuals identify themselves as members of the security forces (asayish), and for this reason they claim that no one can interfere with them.

These individuals call people from hidden numbers or from foreign country numbers.

When they abduct someone, they demand close to 250,000 dollars. However, some are only able to escape their hands for 20,000 or 30,000 dollars.

The money in question is sent through a digital currency system called Sham Cash. This is a system that the interim Damascus administration has accepted for paying the salaries of its civil servants.

As thousands of public-sector workers in Syria tried to collect their salaries this April, ahead of the Eid al-Fitr holiday, many found that they could not access a faulty application they had been asked to download a few months earlier.

The application, called Sham Cash, has become the Syrian government’s preferred method for distributing salaries, paying bills, and transferring money. But users say the app does not work, and experts say it is far from secure.


Made mandatory for public-sector workers, the Sham Cash app raises urgent concerns about digital security.

In January, Syrian public-sector workers were quietly instructed to download an app called “Sham Cash” in order to receive their salaries.

The Sham Cash app can only be downloaded from its own website and is not available in the iOS store (App Store). This means the app is not secure, because it has not passed the strict security-verification tests that apps listed in official stores must undergo.

Reports that appeared in the press in January also indicate that the app is linked to transfers coming from the “Cham Bank” in Idlib — an internationally unrecognized currency exchange registered in Turkey. Funds transferred through Sham Cash do not pass through the Central Bank of Syria or the global banking system.

By April, the app had been made entirely mandatory. But it is overshadowed by technical failures, questionable financial links, and an alarming lack of transparency. As frustration grew among users, SMEX’s Digital Forensics Unit investigated what was actually happening behind the scenes.

The unknown developer behind Sham Cash

The absence of any publicly available information about the company behind Sham Cash raises serious concerns about transparency and accountability. Because there is no known or officially registered developer, there is no party to be held responsible in cases of data breaches, fraud, or financial loss.

The app also contains no clearly stated Terms of Use, Privacy Policy, or any indication of legal jurisdiction, which makes seeking legal recourse nearly impossible.

Because Sham Cash has no connection to any legal or verifiable company, its security protocols cannot be assessed. This significantly increases the risk that malware or spyware could compromise users’ devices.

Since it has no officially registered owner, the misuse or sale of sensitive user data, including personal information, financial details, and transaction histories, cannot be tracked or audited.

A source who provided information to Niha+ noted that this app is one accepted by the interim Damascus administration, so when money is sent through it, the government ought to be able to trace it.

A committee has been formed

According to the information available, a three-member committee has been formed to deal with the matter and find solutions to the problems facing Kurds in Raqqa. According to information provided by this committee, 4,000 families have so far fled Raqqa. Some of them went to Kobanê, and others to Hasakah.

One source claims that the number of those abducted and threatened is far higher. According to this source, some do not share their cases publicly because they do not want their names made known.

Mourning on the solution’s eve

The possibility of social peace has been discussed for two years, and various steps have been taken. However, the mourning at Koşuyolu Park reminds us that the past is not completely behind us.

Photo: Yekta Armanc Hatipoğlu / niha+

The city is quite still for a Friday. Yet, upon entering Koşuyolu Park, it is as if the entire movement of the city has flowed here. Hundreds of people, families of guerrillas, their friends, comrades…

Small groups of people are in different areas of the park. Some are talking to each other, some are showing others something on their phone, and others sit quietly for a long time. Despite the mobility in the area, there are no loud conversations.

The news of guerrillas who had earlier lost their lives was received these days. They are being mourned these days, when the possibility of social peace is being discussed.

Mass condolence gatherings were held in İstanbul, Van, Diyarbakır, Mardin, and many other places. Among them was Koşuyolu Park in Diyarbakır’s Bağlar district. Condolence ceremonies for 49 PKK members were held there.

Diyarbakır, in the last two years since peace was discussed, is more hopeful than in previous periods. However, there is also doubt. The insecurity created in past years, the state’s delayed steps, and the fact that politicians, especially Selahattin Demirtaş, are still being held in prison add doubt to the hope.

Almost two years have passed since the President of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Devlet Bahçeli, shook hands with Tuncer Bakırhan, the Co-President of the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Parti), in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) on October 1, 2024.

Most recently, on August 10th, the “Law on Strengthening National Solidarity and Social Integration,” publicly known as the “Framework Law,” was accepted by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and published in the Official Gazette on August 18th.

Those who come to the condolence tents visit the families, then move on to other parts of the park. Food is distributed from hand to hand. Those present take on a part of the necessary tasks.

Almost everyone has the same dignified expression on their faces. While condolences are offered to the families, alongside the sorrow, gratitude for the struggle their children endured is also palpable.

Families sit at a table, with photos of their children in front of them and a rose in front of each photo, accepting condolences amid chants of “Şehîd Namirin.” In a covered area featuring banners reading “Em şehîdên azadiyê bi bîr tînin,” signed by MEBYA-DER, and “Our martyrs are our honor,” in a covered area.

The photographs standing side by side depict different faces and different life stories, yet they are all united by the same struggle.

The police are there, too. Armored vehicles marked “TEM,” water cannons, police buses… Unlike what we’ve been used to in previous years, they’re waiting a little “further back.” Despite this, there’s a stark contrast between the armored vehicles and the condolence gathering inside the park. On one side, the state’s law enforcement apparatus; on the other, tables where families who have lost their children are sitting.

The possibility of social peace has been discussed for two years, and various steps have been taken. However, the mourning at Koşuyolu Park serves as a reminder that the past has not been fully left behind.

Photos: Yekta Armanc Hatipoğlu / Niha+

Will the JİTEM trials be reopened?

Attorney Erdal Kuzu, noting that there is public expectation that cases involving unsolved political murders will be retried, stated, “Although the Ministry of Justice’s statements include phrases such as ‘there will be no unsolved cases left,’ it is understood that these statements apply only to cases that have not yet been barred by the statute of limitations. There is no indication that JİTEM cases or cases of unsolved murders will be reopened as a result of the ongoing negotiations between the current Kurdish political movement and the government.”

*The Dargeçit JİTEM Case

Following Akın Gürlek’s appointment as Minister of Justice by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, “unsolved murders” have returned to the public agenda. According to Gürlek’s statement, investigations will be conducted into 638 cases and 693 murders across 75 provinces. The Ministry, which until now has primarily focused on criminal cases, recently met first with the family of journalist Uğur Mumcu and then with the family of journalist Musa Anter. This has led to public speculation that the next phase in the “unsolved murders” case will involve political cases.

Cases were filed in 2008

In 2008, during the Ergenekon Trials, the matter was brought before the courts based on the testimony of a confidential witness codenamed “Aydos,” and lawsuits were filed against the relevant government officials and individuals. Some of the cases known to the public as the JİTEM trials were consolidated in 2010 into the JİTEM Main Trial. The Kızıltepe JİTEM Trial, however, continued to be heard separately. However, following the termination of the previous “Peace Process” in 2015 and amid the shifting political climate, the policy of impunity continued to prevail in cases involving these murders committed against Kurds. The Kızıltepe JİTEM Case was dismissed in 2019 on the grounds of the statute of limitations, and all defendants were acquitted. The main JİTEM case was also dismissed in 2025 on the grounds of the statute of limitations. Many other cases related to JİTEM that were tried separately met the same fate.

The final hearing in the Kızıltepe JİTEM case took place in 2019 at the Ankara 5th High Criminal Court. At that hearing, the court announced that the case had been dismissed due to the statute of limitations and that all defendants had been acquitted. Thus, the case—which was initiated in 2014 while negotiations were still ongoing and was characterized as a “confrontation trial”—had turned into an example of impunity and exoneration with the acquittal ruling.

At the time, Erdal Kuzu, one of the case’s attorneys, stated in a statement regarding the case that 12 people had been found in the wells, adding, “This decision is related to shifts in the balance of power. A retrial depends on the political climate. Due to the new alliance the AKP has formed since 2015, cases of this nature are being closed.”

However, in 2024, when Devlet Bahçeli went to the benches occupied by DEM Party members of Parliament to shake hands with them, and subsequently, during his party’s caucus meeting, called for Abdullah Öcalan to lay down arms and expressed expectations that new legal regulations regarding the peace process would be implemented, this brought the unsolved murders and related cases back into the spotlight. The families of the missing continue to seek justice in this matter. This situation raises the question of whether the political climate in Turkey has shifted in favor of peace once again with this new process.

JİTEM Trials
Main JİTEM Trial

The 11-defendant indictment prepared in 1999 and the 5-defendant indictment prepared in 2005 were merged in 2010 and came to be known as the “Main JİTEM Trial.” This case was later joined with the trial initiated in 2013 regarding the murder of writer-journalist Musa Anter, as well as the trial launched in 2019 concerning the tortured murder of Ayten Öztürk. There were 18 defendants in total in the main trial.

During the hearing held in Ankara on January 27, 2025, the court ruled to dismiss the JİTEM, Musa Anter, and Ayten Öztürk trial due to the statute of limitations, citing that 30 years had passed since the dates of the disappearances.

Kızıltepe JİTEM Trial

In 2014, a lawsuit was filed regarding the unlawful arbitrary execution or forced disappearance of 22 people in the Kızıltepe district of Mardin between 1992 and 1996. The charges of “establishing or managing an armed organization, membership in an armed organization, and premeditated murder” were brought against retired Colonel Hasan Atilla Uğur, then-Diyarbakır Provincial Gendarmerie Commander Colonel Eşref Hatipoğlu, Gendarmerie Commando Company Commander Ahmet Boncuk, Sergeant Major Ünal Alkan, and village guards Abdurrahman Kurğa, Mehmet Emin Kurğa, Ramazan Çetin, Mehmet Salih Kılınçaslan, and İsmet Kandemir.

The final hearing of the case involving nine defendants—four military personnel and five village guards—was held on Monday, September 9, at the Ankara 5th Heavy Penal Court. The court panel announced that the case was dismissed due to the statute of limitations and acquitted all defendants.

Dargeçit JİTEM Trial

In May 2026, the 1st Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation dismissed the “Dargeçit JİTEM Trial”—which was filed regarding 8 people and Sergeant Major Bilal Batırır who were forcibly disappeared in custody and killed in the Dargeçit district of Mardin between 1995 and 1996—on the grounds of the statute of limitations.

Other Trials

Other trials filed concerning JİTEM and unsolved murders that concluded with acquittals: the Derik Trial, the Nezir Tekçi Trial, the Görümlü Trial, the Vartinis Trial, the Cizre Trial, the Kızılağaç Trial, the Kulp Trial, the Lice Trial, and the Ankara Trial.

Has the political climate changed?

Speaking to Niha+ on the subject, attorney Erdal Kuzu highlighted the shift in the political climate between 2019 and 2024:

“It is impossible to say that the political climate at the time of the Kızıltepe JITEM trial is the same as that of 2019 and 2024. While in 2019 the state’s policies were shaped with the aim of eliminating Kurdish political movements, by 2024 steps had been taken toward resolving the Kurdish issue through nonviolent means, and a basis for communication had been established between the government and Kurdish political movements. Therefore, it is not possible to say that these two periods are the same. This situation is confirmed by information reflected in the public sphere.

It is possible to say that the state’s approach to the Kurdish issue changed in 2024. We can speak—at least at the level of rhetoric—of a process in which the elimination of armed struggle has expanded the political arena and paved the way for democratization. Whether this will materialize in practice, however, remains to be seen in the coming days. Yet we will see what concrete steps will be taken, to what extent the political arena will expand, and how much leeway the state will allow in this area through the practical measures to be implemented and the laws to be enacted in the coming period. In this sense, significant public expectations have been raised.”

*Attorney Erdal Kuzu

Expectations of people

In 2025, the Directorate for the Investigation of Unsolved Crimes was established within the Ministry of Justice. However, there are no signs that this newly established institution will launch a new investigation into the dismissed JİTEM cases. Attorney Kuzu made the following remarks on this matter:

“There is as yet no outward indication that the state will establish a new judicial mechanism regarding unsolved crime case files and matters related to JİTEM. Although the Ministry of Justice’s statements include phrases such as ‘there will be no remaining unsolved cases,’ it is understood that these statements apply only to cases that have not yet been barred by the statute of limitations. There is no indication that JİTEM cases or unsolved murder cases will be reopened as a result of the ongoing negotiations between the current Kurdish political leadership and the state authorities. However, if the process normalizes, weapons are completely removed from circulation, and political negotiations continue, the issue of coming to terms with the past will come to the forefront.”

However, it is also a well-known fact that as the situation and life return to normal, families will voice their demands for justice on this issue more forcefully, and their struggle in this regard will escalate.

“The state cannot remain silent”

Stating that the state cannot remain indifferent to the expectations of justice held by the relatives of the missing, Kuzu added the following:

“The perpetrators have still not been found, and the bodies remain unaccounted for. Expecting families to forget this pain goes against the natural course of life. It is well known that in countries where conflict resolution has taken place on a global scale, mechanisms for coming to terms with the past have been established. It would be natural for a similar situation to unfold in Turkey. We do not expect the political establishment to remain indifferent to demands that develop in this direction. However, we will all see in the coming days what method will be used and how this will unfold.

In 2019, we stated that the state had closed the files on unsolved murders and JİTEM cases within the framework of a political compromise, and that this was a political decision. In the process that has unfolded since 2024, it has become evident that this alliance within the state, while not yet beginning to dissolve, has undergone significant changes in certain respects. It can be said that bringing perpetrators—who hold no value for the state but are believed to have committed crimes against humanity—back before the courts would not come as a surprise in terms of the state’s efforts to restore public trust.”

Akbulut: “Anti-Kurdish racism must be recognised as a distinct form of racism”

Civan Akbulut, Chair of the Information Center on Anti-Kurdish Racism (IAKR), who stated that racism against Kurds is not officially recognized in Europe, noted that what is not named remains invisible and unpunished. Akbulut, noting that Kurdish asylum seekers face high rejection rates from European countries, said, “ The closer the political rapprochement with Ankara, the harder it becomes to have a Kurdish history of persecution recognised at all.”

Photo: The Amargi

Across Europe, “anti-Kurdish racism” remains one of the least acknowledged yet most pervasive forms of systemic discrimination. While general far-right sentiment and anti-immigrant hostility continue to rise, Kurds living in Europe face a double burden: a broader xenophobic climate as well as transnational persecution influenced by geopolitics and right-wing extremism.

In countries like Germany—home to the largest Kurdish diaspora in Europe, estimated at over one million people—this manifests in daily life, public institutions and on the streets. Incidents range from physical violence by ultranationalist groups to institutional neglect. In recent years, violent clashes and attacks targeting Kurdish community centers, cultural events, and individuals in cities such as Essen, Stuttgart, and Cologne have highlighted the growing threat posed by Turkish far-right networks, most notably the Grey Wolves (Bozkurtlar).

The Grey Wolves movement (Ülkü Ocakları) is decidedly anti-Semitic and anti-democratic and is combatively directed against Kurds, Armenians, Alevis, Ponto-Greek as well as other minorities and opposition members with a connection to Turkey.

Despite these growing dangers, attacks on Kurds are frequently filed simply as “foreign political disputes” or generic “politically motivated crime,” masking the specific anti-Kurdish nature of the violence. Furthermore, the persistent criminalization of Kurdish political expression in Germany is often enforced to maintain diplomatic alignments with Turkey. This criminalization may also cause tragic ends, for example, as the data shown in the press and public opinion, dozens of Kurdish refugees have ended their lives in Germany since 2023.

According to data from the “2024 Report on Anti-Kurdish Racism” presented to the Federal Parliament by the Information Center on Anti-Kurdish Racism (IAKR), which operates in Berlin, the capital of Germany, 217 documented cases of anti-Kurdish racism were recorded in 2024 alone. The report states that 37.8% of the incidents—including political acts, physical attacks, and discrimination (82 cases)—were linked to the symbols and rhetoric of far-right Turkish nationalist groups such as the “Ülkü Ocakları” (Grey Wolves).

To understand the mechanics of this phenomenon, lawyer and politician and chair of IAKR Civan Akbulut, who pointed out anti-Kurdish racism is a constitutional problem that functions across legal, political, and daily lives in Europe.

Chair of IAKR, Civan Akbulut, Photo: ANF

“Anti-Kurdish racism reaches everyday life”

According to Akbulut, anti-Kurdish racism begins with the fundamental denial of Kurdish identity, creating a baseline where verbal abuse, threats, and physical attacks become normalized.

Hightlighting that online platforms like TikTok and X have dropped the threshold for open hostility – by becoming almost part of the “normal tone” – which routinely spills over into schools, public offices, and workplaces, Akbulut also stresses that Kurds face a unique layer of risk.

Akbulut says that what is at stake are fundamental rights: Physical integrity in the face of attacks, and protection from discrimination.

“Anyone who visibly identifies as Kurdish has to reckon, in Europe, with none of this being guaranteed to them. Racism as a whole is a growing problem in Europe, one that has increased markedly in recent years. Anti-Kurdish racism is part of this development and intensifies along with it.”

“About 18,000 are attributed to Grey Wolves”

Akbulut points out that this domestic hostility is further interlocked by both European foreign policy, alongside immigration policy, which often overlooks the activities of ultranationalist groups out of geopolitical calculations toward Ankara, effectively allowing transnational racism to operate unpunished within European borders:

“The Grey Wolves are among the largest far-right movements in Germany and Europe; they are extremely capable of mobilising and prone to violence. In Germany alone, roughly 18,000 people are attributed to them, and for this movement Kurds are the central enemy. Added to this is a European politics that, out of geopolitical calculation towards Ankara, looks the other way. When the criminalisation and blanket suspicion propagated by the Turkish government seep, in part unquestioned, into European media, this shifts the public perception of Kurds. Anti-Kurdish racism operates transnationally, but its manifestation is a German and European problem. It takes place here, is permitted and applied by domestic politics, and largely goes unpunished.”

Anti-Kurdish Racism in Germany

IAKR Special Report No. 1 (January 2026) • Key Findings

The report argues that developments in Syria have significantly intensified hate speech, digital attacks, and discrimination targeting Kurdish communities in Germany, demonstrating the direct impact of international conflicts on the Kurdish diaspora.
43
People killed during the attacks on Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah
25
Civilian fatalities
155,000
Displaced civilians
1,500
Reported ISIS members who escaped following the Al-Shaddadi prison attack
400,000+
Population of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah before the attacks
10,000
ISIS detainees held in prisons across Northeast Syria
40,000+
ISIS-linked individuals and family members held in camps
54
Years of Assad family rule before its collapse

Key Findings of the Report

Alleged Bombardment of Civilian Areas
According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, residential neighborhoods and hospitals were deliberately targeted during the offensive.
Mass Displacement
Even the Syrian state news agency SANA acknowledged that at least 155,000 civilians were forced to flee their homes.
Violence Against Women
The report documents that videos showing the abuse of Kurdish female fighters triggered widespread international solidarity campaigns.
Regional Security Risks
Attacks on detention facilities reportedly enabled ISIS detainees to escape, creating significant international security concerns.
Impact on the Kurdish Diaspora
According to the report, military developments in Syria contributed to an increase in anti-Kurdish hate speech and digital attacks in Germany.

January 2026 Timeline

10 January

Following the collapse of negotiations between the Syrian transitional government and Kurdish forces, military operations intensified.

11 January

Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah were captured. According to the report, 43 people were killed, including 25 civilians.

Following Days

Videos documenting torture, executions, and abuse circulated widely on social media, prompting international condemnation.

13 January

The offensive expanded into DAANES-controlled areas. Following the attack on Al-Shaddadi Prison, approximately 1,500 ISIS members were reported to have escaped.
Source: Informationsstelle Antikurdischer Rassismus (IAKR), Special Report No. 1 – Incidents of Anti-Kurdish Racism in Germany, January 2026.

“Kurds learned to never rely on the state”

Akbulut defined the underlying problem in addressing this discrimination is the lack of official recognition:

“The category is missing, the awareness is missing. Kurdish society is under considerable pressure and is itself subjected to criminalisation, while Turkish right-wing extremists can run their associations and events largely undisturbed, which act as a catalyst against Kurds. This imbalance extends into the authorities themselves. Kurds have historically learned that they could never rely on the state, and this mistrust continues in Europe when complaints come to nothing or threats are not taken seriously.”

Akbulut drew attention to “one of the most powerful, and therefore most dangerous” one is that anti-Kurdish racism expresses itself is criminalisation, because it provides the justification for oppression and violence. “When Kurdish activism is sweepingly placed in the vicinity of ‘terror,’ a climate emerges in which every form of Kurdish self-organisation falls under blanket suspicion. Once someone has been marked as a security risk, almost anything can be legitimised against them” he continued.

Akbulut stated that in Europe, this criminalisation shows in raids on associations, in bans on flags and symbols, and in the fact that talks and events are cancelled on alleged security grounds or venues are withdrawn at short notice. He stressed the outward effect of this is those who constantly have to explain that they are not a security risk never even get to speak about the discrimination they face.

“Criminalisation reverses the roles: those affected are turned into suspects. That is a major problem” he said.

“Asylum assessments are not neutral”

Akbulut explains that Kurdish asylum seekers face exceptionally high rejection rates because European authorities routinely classify Turkey as a “safe country of origin” and falsely claim that Kurds face no group-based repression there. Akbulut, saying “They are granted protection considerably less often than other applicants”, highlighted this is not coincidental but structural:

“In the decisions, the finding recurs again and again that Kurds face no repression in Turkey on account of being Kurdish. This is simply false and contradicts reality, but it provides the basis for rejecting protection claims. These assessments are not neutral. The closer the political rapprochement with Ankara, the more favourable the official evaluation of the situation in Turkey turns out to be, and the harder it becomes to have a Kurdish history of persecution recognised at all. This does not only concern Kurds from Turkey. Kurds from Syria, Iraq and Iran also have a considerably harder time. And above all of this lies the general development. In the face of the shift to the right, agitation and an ever harsher policy of sealing off borders, refugees across Europe find it harder overall to obtain protection. Kurds stand at a point where all of these constrictions converge.”

“Anti-Kurdish racism interplay with sexism”

The impact of this discrimination is particularly severe for Kurdish women, who experience what Akbulut identifies as a textbook example of intersectional oppression. According to Akbulut, the hostility directed at Kurdish identity intersects with structural sexism, creating compounded dynamics of devaluation:

“Anti-Kurdish racism can therefore occur simultaneously and in interplay with sexism, ableism, queerphobia or classism. What is decisive is that these are not merely different experiences of oppression sitting side by side, but that they influence and reinforce one another. With Kurdish women this becomes very concrete: the racist enemy image of Kurds carries over into a devaluation of Kurdish women that is at once racist and sexist. Several logics of devaluation interlock here, and precisely for this reason the intersectional perspective is so important for our work.”

Because anti-Kurdish racism relies on the same core mechanisms as other forms of group-focused enmity—such as institutional neglect and criminalization—Akbulut emphasizes that cooperation is structurally necessary, as he further stated “Racism does not occur in isolation. Anyone fighting racism almost always encounters the same mechanisms that affect other groups too: devaluation, criminalisation, the looking-away of institutions.”

He also drew attention to the Kurdish self-organisation being a long history, since Kurds have learned to help themselves when the state does not, and this is precisely a pattern that many marginalised groups know.

“Consistent anti-racism is needed”

To dismantle these systemic barriers, Akbulut outlines three essential political and legal actions:

“First, anti-Kurdish racism must be recognised as a distinct form of racism. Without a category of its own, authorities, schools and courts cannot even record the relevant incidents, and what is not named remains invisible and unpunished.

Second, what is needed is consistent anti-racism instead of looking away. Racist actors must no longer be allowed to operate unchecked, and the Grey Wolves must be treated as what they are: a far-right movement. This cannot be separated from the larger picture. Anti-Kurdish racism grows in a climate in which racism as a whole is being normalised and the shift to the right is gaining momentum across Europe.

Third, and this is decisive, politics must stop adopting anti-Kurdish narratives itself. When criminalisation and blanket suspicion seep into European administrative practice and media language, racism is not being fought but administered and perpetuated.”

Privacy overview

Niha+ respects your digital footprint within the framework of independent journalism principles and reader privacy. While browsing our site, cookies are used to provide you with an uninterrupted reading experience and to secure the technical infrastructure of our platform. You can manage your cookie preferences as you wish by using the menu on the left. For detailed information on how your personal data is processed, please review our Privacy Agreement and KVKK Clarification Text.