While sex workers and trans women in Taksim are frequently subjected to attacks, threats and harassment against their identities, Saçak Collective, the solidarity network of trans sex worker women, responded to this situation with a statement published on their social media accounts.
Saçak Collective, which defends the rights and solidarity of trans sex workers, issued a strong written statement against the recent violence, harassment and threats against trans women and sex workers in the Taksim area. Addressing the public through social media channels, the collective reiterated their demand: “Attacks, threats and harassment against sex worker women and trans women in Taksim must end!”
“Sex work is not a crime”
In the statement, it was pointed out that trans women and sex workers are targeted because of their identities and labor. It was stated that the targeting and rhetoric such as “We will erase you from here” was not a personal outburst of anger, but rather a clear threat of violence aimed at completely eradicating marginalized groups from the public sphere.
The collective reminded that their existence, sex work and taking part in public sphere cannot be criminalized in any way and gave the following message:
“We were on these streets yesterday and we are on these streets today. We will not be silent against any power that tries to make us invisible, to expel us from the streets, to scare and isolate us. Sex work is not a crime. Being transgender is not a crime. Existing in the public sphere is not a crime. The actual crime is attacking, threatening, harassing women and trans women and trying to erase them from the streets through violence.”
“We will increase solidarity against violence”
Stating that the right to use the streets cannot be left to the initiative of anyone, the collective announced that they will not take threats for granted, they will not leave violence uncovered and they will not allow them to break the bond between women.
The statement concluded with the following decisive statements:
“You will not silence sex workers. You will not erase trans women from the streets. You will not be able to separate us from each other. We will not be afraid, we will not retreat, we will not shut up. We will increase solidarity and organization against violence in every area we are in, particularly Taksim.”
The bill, which aims to bring a 50-year conflict to a legal conclusion, sparked heated debates in the General Assembly of the Parliament. Following the vote, the bill was passed and became law.
Known to the public as the “Framework Law,” the “Draft Law on Strengthening National Solidarity and Social Integration”—which regulates the PKK’s disarmament and the legal status of PKK members—was passed by Parliament following a vote and became law. In the vote, which was conducted via electronic voting, 562 members of parliament cast their votes, with 468 voting in favor, 88 against, and 6 abstaining. Thus, the “Draft Law on Strengthening National Solidarity and Social Integration” passed the General Assembly of the Parliament and became law.
The General Assembly adjourned following the vote.
Debates on the legislation, known to the public as the “Framework Law,” began at 11:00 a.m.
In the General Assembly, the deputy group leaders of the various parties made statements regarding the bill. Bülent Kaya spoke on behalf of Yeni Yol, Turhan Çömez on behalf of the İYİ Party, Rahmi Aşkın Türeli on behalf of the CHP, Erkan Akçay on behalf of the MHP, Gülistan Kılıç Koçyiğit on behalf of the DEM Party, Murat Emir on behalf of the Yeni Party, and Abdulhamit Gül on behalf of the AKP.
The 12-article bill is expected to establish the legal framework for the new resolution process.
The “Draft Law on Strengthening National Solidarity and Social Integration”—known to the public as the “Framework Law”—which regulates the PKK’s disarmament and the legal status of PKK members, was adopted by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) Plenary following intense debates, and deliberations on its articles have begun.
In an electronic vote held in the General Assembly, the decision to proceed with the bill’s articles passed with 269 “Yes” votes against 28 “No” votes. While the ruling coalition (AKP and MHP) described the bill as “a historic state policy for a Turkey free of terrorism,” the İYİ Party strongly opposed it. The YENİ Party and the CHP, which announced they would vote “Yes” on the bill, noted that the process must be supported by steps toward democratization and justice. Thirty-three members of the YENİ Party parliamentary group declared they would vote “No.”
YENİ Party MPs who announced they will vote “No”
1. İzzet Akbulut
2. Hasan Öztürk
3. Sibel Suiçmez
4 Cemal Enginyurt
5 Süreyya Öneş Derici
6 Deniz Yavuzyılmaz
7 İbrahim Aslan
8 Hikmet Yalım Halıcı
9 Cumhur Uzun
10 Eylem Ertuğ Eryılmaz
11 Murat Çan
12 Servet Mullaoğlu
13 Salih Uzun
14 Uğur Bayraktutan
15 Şeref Arpacı
16 Murat Bakan
17 Seyit Torun
18 Mahmut Tanal
19 Fethi Açıkel
20 Elvan Işık Gezmiş
21 Melih Meriç
22 İsmail Atakan Ünver
23 Mehmet Tahtasız
24 Ümit Özlale
25 Mustafa Erdem
26 Ayşe Sibel Yanıkömeroğlu
27 Reşat Karagöz
28 Ayhan Barut
29 Barış Karadeniz
30 Fahri Özkan
31 Deniz Yücel
32 Seda Kaya Ösen
33 Ednan Arslan
Ekrem İmamoğlu, the detained Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (İBB) Mayor, issued a statement through his lawyers regarding the “framework law.” Noting that Turkey is at “one of the most significant turning points in its history,” İmamoğlu said that peace, tranquility, brotherhood, democracy, and the rule of law must be strengthened.
Imamoğlu expressed his support for the decision made by Özgür Özel, Chairman of the New Party, during this process. Stating that he believes in “the new political path he has opened, his great struggle, and his leadership,” Imamoğlu said he supports “the exceptional resolve he has demonstrated through all his warnings.”
Imamoğlu said, “I stand behind the decision he made today.”
The DEM Party, meanwhile, described the law as “the first step toward resolving the conflict.”
Ş. Can Atalay, the elected MP for Hatay, sent a message from Silivri Prison emphasizing the importance of a nonviolent political environment, while Tunç Soyer noted that the law is a key to “ending the era of blood and tears.”
Chronology of the Day
11:37 – 13:55
Pre-Session and Lobby Traffic
Devlet Bahçeli, Chairman of the MHP who initiated the process, arrived at Parliament. In the lobby, DEM Party Co-Chairs Tülay Hatimoğulları and Tuncer Bakırhan, alongside Imralı Delegation members Pervin Buldan and Mithat Sancar, approached Bahçeli and shook hands. Prior to this, AKP and CHP Group Chairmen also greeted Bahçeli.
11:58 – 14:01
Initial Statements by Group Deputy Chairmen and İYİ Party’s Motion
Taking the floor at the beginning of the session, AKP Group Deputy Chairman Abdulhamit Gül defined the process as the “spirit of Gallipoli,” while Gülistan Kılıç Koçyiğit from the DEM Party stated, “The winner of peace will be 86 million people.” Representatives from CHP, YENİ Party, and Yeni Yol emphasized that laying down arms alone would not suffice without democratization. The İYİ Party submitted a group motion to prevent the start of deliberations on the grounds that the bill was unconstitutional. The motion, presented by İYİ Party’s Turhan Çömez with harsh criticism stating “You chose the day the Treaty of Sèvres was signed (August 10) to deliberate this bill that will pardon terrorists,” was rejected upon voting.
14:06
İYİ Party’s Fierce Opposition: ‘It Is a Major Uprising’
İYİ Party Chairman Müsavat Dervişoğlu was the figure who delivered the harshest reaction to the process from the podium. Arguing that the law aims to integrate PKK leaders into politics, Dervişoğlu confirmed they would vote ‘No’, stating: “No matter what anyone calls this process, it is a major uprising against our national identity and republic. Who marketed Öcalan as an acceptable political guru?”
15:56
DEM Party: ‘This Law Is Not a Concession, the Homeland Is Shared’
DEM Party Co-Chair Tuncer Bakırhan stated that the bill is the “first step in conflict resolution,” adding: “This bill is not a concession; it is neither victory nor defeat. We are not opening the integrity of the country to debate. If the Kurds wanted to secede, we would not be here. The homeland is shared.” Bakırhan noted that although the law has shortcomings, they support it, and the real step must be taken through democratization when Parliament opens.
16:07 – 16:38
YENİ Party and CHP: ‘We Will Not Stand in the Way of Peace’
YENİ Party Chairman Özgür Özel criticized the process being conducted behind closed doors and the lack of democratic steps such as trustee appointments and ECtHR rulings. However, he stated, “We will not close the door opened for laying down arms; we will vote ‘Yes’.” Özel granted his MPs a free vote based on the sensitivities of their provinces. Speaking on behalf of the CHP, İnan Alp Akgün and Oğuz Kaan Salıcı also confirmed that the CHP would vote ‘Yes’, saying, “The time has come to secure the Republic through democracy.”
18:01 – 18:03
Ruling Bloc (MHP, AKP): ‘This Is Not an Amnesty’
MHP Deputy Chairman Feti Yıldız emphasized that the bill is not an amnesty and does not alter ongoing investigations or the nature of offenses. He stated, “The goal of the process is the rule of law and the strengthening of the internal front.” AKP Group Chairman Abdullah Güler shared that the prepared report was drafted “without a third-party external observer, by the children of this land,” and that the sole objective is to ensure violence is never discussed again.
What had happened?
The bill had been debated for 18 hours in the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s Justice Committee.
The bill bears the signatures of 367 members of parliament, including representatives from the AKP, CHP, MHP, DEM Party, HÜDA PAR, the New Path Group, and the DSP.
During the discussions, which were not without controversy, the AKP and MHP argued that the bill was the “product of a historic consensus” and did not constitute an “amnesty.”
The CHP and the New Party, however, emphasized that the process lacked a democratic dimension. The New Path Group, meanwhile, stated that the measure constituted a “conditional general amnesty.”
Seat distribution in Parliament
AKP 277, New Party 91, DEM Party 56, MHP 46, CHP 45, Good Party 29, New Path Party 20, HÜDA PAR 4, Prosperity Party 4, TİP 3, Democratic Regions Party (DBP) 2, EMEP 2, Felicity Party, Democratic Left Party, and Democratic Party each hold 1 seat. Ten members of Parliament are independents.
Parliament Scoreboard: Framework Law Vote
nihaplus Special Infographic Desk • Detailed Breakdown by Party and MP
TPAO has taken a 15% stake in the BP vehicle redeveloping Kirkuk. According to The National Context, it marks Turkey’s return to a geography where a century ago it held only a royalty right; yet the share structure keeps Ankara’s seat well short of a steering wheel.
Photo: The National Context
Turkey’s state oil company TPAO has acquired a 15% stake in BP Energy Company of Kirkuk Limited, the contractor vehicle for the redevelopment of the Kirkuk oil complex. An analysis published by The National Context describes this as the clearest commercial sign yet of Ankara’s return to a geography where it last held a formal economic interest a century ago.
The agreement was signed in Ankara by TPAO general manager Cem Erdem and BP upstream business development vice president Andrew McAuslan, in the presence of energy minister Alparslan Bayraktar, ahead of talks between President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi. It follows ConocoPhillips’s agreement earlier in the month to take a 42% interest in the same vehicle, concluded during al-Zaidi’s visit to Washington, and leaves BP with the remaining 43% and majority control.
The National Context states that the contract area covers the Baba and Avanah domes of the Kirkuk field together with Bai Hassan, Jambur and Khabbaz, with an initial gross recoverable resource above three billion barrels of oil equivalent. The transaction does not alter the contract framework: the fields remain Iraqi state property, North Oil Company and North Gas Company retain their operating roles, and the partners will book production and reserves according to the terms of the development and production contract. The signing came a day after the Iraq–Turkey crude oil pipeline agreement expired, with both governments stating that they now want a comprehensive energy cooperation agreement in its place.
Back to 1926
To measure the return, The National Context reaches back to the one earlier moment Turkey had money riding on this ground. Back then, the analysis notes, it wasn’t a business stake at all but a consolation prize for territory it had given up. The 1926 Ankara Treaty had Turkey accept the Brussels Line, which placed the old Mosul vilayet on the Iraqi side of the border. In exchange, Ankara was promised 10% of the oil royalties owed to the Iraqi government over a 25-year window, with a fallback option to trade the whole stream for a single £500,000 cheque. Crucially, that 10% bit only into royalties (not production, not exports, not profits) and it bought Turkey no piece of the Turkish Petroleum Company, an outfit the analysis describes as Turkish in name and nothing else.
The cash didn’t even start moving until Baba Gurgur was discovered. The first payment landed in 1931: Iraq collected somewhere around £400,000 in royalties and passed roughly £40,000 up to Ankara, a figure that had climbed to about £223,000 by 1939. Turkish budget records show the 10% payments still running through 1952, with one last, smaller sum in 1954, which makes the frequently repeated claim that Turkey just cashed out for £500,000 either wrong or only half the tale. The math also limits how much the entitlement was ever worth: 10% of royalties, themselves only a sliver of gross sales, left Ankara with something nearer 1% of what the oil was really worth. Lord Curzon’s instinct that the territory mattered was vindicated within a year of the settlement, when Kirkuk turned out to hold one of the largest fields in the world.
Zoom out, the analysis suggests, and the real backdrop is the regional economy that the post-1918 lines carved up. It leans on Sarah Shields’s work on nineteenth-century Mosul, which shows a city whose merchant class looked outward along old, dense regional ties (toward Aleppo, Baghdad, Damascus and the Anatolian interior) rather than toward Europe or Istanbul, with only a small share of trade by value ever leaving that orbit. Aleppo connected the interior to Mediterranean shipping through Alexandretta, and the Baghdad Railway was an unfinished attempt to bind Anatolia, northern Syria and Mesopotamia through modern infrastructure. Kirkuk didn’t enter its oil age until 1927 so, the piece argues, today’s petroleum arrangements are being draped over a map that trade, caravans and railways had already knitted together long before.
The Fulcrum Doctrine
The National Context files the TPAO stake under what it calls the Fulcrum Doctrine: a setup in which Washington calls the strategic shots across Iraq, Syria and Turkey but hands the actual work to regional players, using energy and infrastructure as the levers.
Source: The National Context
The diplomatic architecture, it argues, tells the same story. Tom Barrack serves simultaneously as US ambassador in Ankara and as special envoy for Syria and for Iraq, and he described the three countries on taking the expanded role as the strategic fulcrum on which regional stability rests, requiring a single consistent American point of contact. Syria and Iraq were bolted onto the portfolio of the ambassador resident in Turkey, not the other way round, which makes Ankara the administrative hub of Washington’s northern Middle East. The economic side lines up with the diplomacy. June’s US–Iraq joint statement backed reviving the Kirkuk–Baniyas line out to the Mediterranean, and the Iraq–Syria pipeline deal inked in Washington this month puts a US-led consortium in charge of the engineering and the financing. The point of both the northern and western corridors, the piece says, is the same: to loosen Iraq’s reliance on the Strait of Hormuz.
Inside that frame, the analysis reads the Kirkuk line-up as a neatly parcelled set of jobs. Washington holds the strategic umbrella; the American and British firms bring the capital and the corporate machinery; Turkey brings the ground, the pipes and the regional access; and Iraq keeps the sovereignty and owns the oil. The 85% that BP and ConocoPhillips split between them also sets the hard ceiling on how far Turkey can go. TPAO gets a seat, the piece argues, because Turkish soil, ports and pipelines make Ankara the northern gateway nobody can route around. Yet, the share math is built so that a seat never becomes a steering wheel. That fits its longer-running case that Turkish leverage in the region runs through corridors, host geography and rights of approval, not through owning the outcome.
1926 against 2026
The analysis suggests that the comparison with 1926 should be handled with the same precision. A royalty cut and a block of company equity are different legal instruments, so reading “10% to 15%” as a straight upgrade misses the point. The jump means nothing in pure financial terms. According to The National Context, what actually repeats is the structure: In 1926, a bargain drawn up in London turned a Turkish land claim into a short-lived royalty trickle from outside the operating company, while later American pressure bought US firms a permanent 23.75% inside it.
In 2026, the same three ingredients (a Turkish state interest, British oil capital and Kirkuk crude) are stirred back into one vehicle, with BP presents the project as a return to the field its predecessor helped discover at Baba Gurgur. The one thing that’s genuinely moved, the piece concludes, is where Turkey stands in relation to the consortium: in 1926 it took a slice of Baghdad’s royalties from the outside, in 2026 it holds shares inside the contractor within an arrangement that remains Anglo-American in design and Iraqi in sovereignty. The borders drawn after 1918 are unchanged, while the energy, security and commercial systems that cross them increasingly operate as one connected space, with Turkey positioned as its northern hub.
The articles of the “framework law” prepared within the scope of the Peace and Democratic Society Process have been announced. In the proposal expected to be passed into law within a week, it was observed that Abdullah Öcalan and those who received life or aggravated life sentences before 2005 were excluded from the scope.
The articles included in the draft “framework law,” expected to be submitted to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) under the Peace and Democratic Society Process, were disclosed. The regulations of the bill titled “Law on the Strengthening of National Solidarity and Social Integration” were announced in a joint press conference held by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its nationalist ally, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).
AKP Group Chairman Abdullah Güler, AKP Deputy Chairman Abdülhamit Gül, and MHP Vice President Feti Yıldız also attended the press conference held at the Parliament. Güler announced the articles of the bill titled “Law on the Strengthening of National Solidarity and Social Integration” submitted to the Speaker’s Office of the Parliament. Stating that the “Strengthening of National Solidarity and Social Integration” bill consists of 12 articles, including the execution and enforcement articles, Güler said: “Necessary regulations will be made as needed. Furthermore, interviews will be held in İmralı with individuals such as academics and journalists, subject to a certain discipline and procedure.”
According to the articles in the proposal, those who received aggravated life sentences before 2005 or crimes leading to an aggravated life sentence obligation will be kept outside the scope of the law. In this context, the fact that Kurdish People’s Leader Abdullah Öcalan, who is the interlocutor of the process, was not included in the framework law sparked public reaction.
Kartal: “The current arrangement is not an appropriate decision”
Speaking to Mesopotamia Agency, Kurdistan People’s Congress (KONGRA-GEL) Co-Chair Remzi Kartal recalled Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Chairman Devlet Bahçeli’s rhetoric on the “right to hope,” saying: “If Leader Apo is not effective in this process, if he does not personally make a direct call, this process will not progress. The primary metric in the state’s approach to the Kurdish issue—for both the Freedom Movement and the people—is the state’s approach to Leader Apo. Leader Apo’s status, living conditions, and working conditions are the decisive metrics. If there is no reassuring development on this matter, and if familiar security policies are still being based upon, this situation will not build trust either in the Freedom Movement or among the people.”
In his evaluations regarding the process this morning to Sinan Burhan, Editor-in-Chief of Millet News Agency, MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli stated that the “right to hope” should be granted to Kurdish People’s Leader Abdullah Öcalan:
“Selahattin Demirtaş should return to his home, Ahmets to their duties, and Öcalan to the ‘right to hope.’ Turkey must find peace. Our goal is for Turkey and the region to attain peace.”
Kartal continued his remarks as follows:
“It may be handled this way at the initial stage by taking public sensitivities into account. However, this must definitely be resolved through other laws to be enacted and other steps to be taken in the coming period. The authorized bodies of the state and the Parliament need to be very clear on this matter. As the people and the movement, this is how we view it. Because if there is truly no development on this issue, returns to Turkey and participation in the legal-democratic process may face serious problems. Therefore, we do not view the current arrangement as an appropriate decision.”
The draft “framework law,” submitted to the Speaker’s Office of the Parliament and shared with the public, is expected to become law within a week.
CHP and HÜDAPAR also signed
AKP, MHP, DEM Party, HÜDA-PAR, and CHP signed the proposal expected to become law within a week. The bill will come before the Parliamentary Justice Commission on Friday, August 7, and discussions will begin. If accepted in the commission, the proposal will begin to be debated in the General Assembly of the Parliament.
“This law is a first step”
Following the signing meeting held in the DEM Party Parliament group room, DEM Party Co-Chairs Tülay Hatimoğulları and Tuncer Bakırhan held a press conference. Speaking first, Bakırhan said: “We had criticisms regarding the law. The law had shortcomings. Despite all this, we will grow this first step and socialize it. We will try to take it to the 86 million. In addition, we will defend and support to the end every democratic step, word, practice, and action that prevents the reproduction of conflict, primarily in the Parliament.”
Speaking after Bakırhan, Tülay Hatimoğulları stated that as DEM Party, they wanted this law to have the nature of a “core law”, adding: “The Kurdish issue is not a terrorism issue. We have always underlined this. The Kurdish issue is an economic issue. It is a social, political, and societal issue. Therefore, by handling this issue and this matter in this way, we consider this stage important in terms of the emergence of new laws that will pave the way for democratization while negotiation and dialogue continue in the upcoming process.”
Twelve years have passed since ISIS, after capturing Mosul on August 3, 2014, turned its attention to Sinjar (Shingal), massacring thousands of Yazidis and abducting Yazidi women and children. According to data from May 4, 2026, 3,595 Yazidis abducted by ISIS have been rescued, while the fate of approximately 2,500 remains unknown.
It has been 12 years since the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) attacked Shingal, home to approximately 550,000 Yazidis, on August 3, 2014. Thousands of civilians were executed on the spot, tens of thousands were displaced, and Yazidi women and girls were abducted and raped. The Yazidis, who had endured 72 massacres by 2014, describe ISIS’s 2014 attacks and massacres against them as the “73rd ferman.”
Yazidis who fled the region following the attack sought refuge in camps in many areas, including Turkey, Syria, and the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq. According to a report by Rûdaw, approximately 2,500 homes have been built so far at the foot of Mount Sinjar (Shingal) for Yazidis who wish to build their homes there rather than in the valley. Although tens of thousands of Yazidis have returned to Shingal and the surrounding area, many still continue to live in camps far from their homeland.
SINJAR / YAZIDI GENOCIDE — IN DATA
12-Year Toll
According to official data from the Office for Rescuing Abducted Yazidis, the fate of 2,500 out of 6,417 Yazidis abducted in Shingal by ISIS remains unknown.
Attack date: August 3, 2014Latest data update: May 4, 2026
6,417
Total Abducted Yazidis
3,595
Rescued from Captivity
~2,500
Fate Still Unknown
Current Status of the 6,417 Abducted Individuals
56%
39%
5%
Rescued (3,595) Fate unknown (~2,500) Other cases known to be killed/missing
Source: Official data from the Dohuk-based “Office for Rescuing Abducted Yazidis” (as of May 4, 2026). Percentage calculations were made based on the total number of abducted individuals (6,417).
Documents related to the Yazidis are kept on file in the archives of the United Nations (UN) ISIS Crimes Investigation Team (UNITAD)—established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2379—as well as in the archives of the Ministry of the Interior of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq and the Office for the Rescue of Those Abducted by ISIS.
In the Yazidi faith, the term “ferman” is used to describe the waves of massacres and forced displacement they have faced throughout history, effectively serving as a “death warrant.” The Yazidis say that, up until 2014, they had been subjected to similar persecution and massacres 72 times throughout history. For this reason, ISIS’s August 2014 attack on Shingal is referred to in various sources—and in the words of the Yazidis—as the “73rd Ferman.”
The Shingal Defense Forces
On June 10, 2014, ISIS seized Mosul without encountering any resistance. Having reinforced itself with military supplies left behind by the Iraqi army, it targeted the villages south of Mount Sinjar—where the Yazidis lived—on the night of August 3 of the same year. During the attack, thousands of Yazidis were killed, and women and children were taken captive and sold in slave markets; according to current data, 93 mass graves have been identified in Shingal and the surrounding area to date.
To rescue the hundreds of thousands of Yazidis trapped on Mount Sinjar as a result of ISIS’s attacks, members of the People’s Defense Forces (HPG) went to the region to fight, leading to the rescue of many Yazidis. Tens of thousands of Yazidis were able to escape thanks to a corridor opened by a 12-member HPG unit, after days of fighting, HPG fighters repelled ISIS and succeeded in evacuating the Yazidis to northern and eastern Syria.
The YBŞ (Yekîneyên Berxwedana Şengalê / Şengal Resistance Units) was founded by Yazidi youth within the same month after they were resettled in safe zones. During the Campaign to Liberate Shingal, women within the YBŞ announced at a conference in 2015 that they had organized themselves under the name YPJ-Şengal (Yekîneyên Parastina Jin ê Şengalê / Shingal Women’s Protection Units) to empower themselves.
Yazidis remaining in camps in Turkey
According to a report titled “Access to Services for Yazidis Living in Mardin and Batman,” published by the Hayata Destek Association in May 2020, 22,062 Yazidis sought refuge in Turkey between August and October 2014; following the continuation of ISIS attacks, this number exceeded 30,000. The report’s data indicates that the Yazidis settled either with relatives in Şırnak (5,675 people), Batman (2,857 people), Diyarbakır (5,360 people), Siirt (1,686 people), and Mardin (5,471 people), or in camps established by municipalities.
Following the appointment of a trustee to the Diyarbakır Municipality in 2016 and the subsequent closure of the camp in December 2016, some Yazidis returned to Shingal or Iraq, while others went to Germany, as a result, there are currently only a small number of Yazidis in Turkey.
The European Parliament had called it “genocide”
The European Parliament was the first to recognize ISIS’s attacks on the Yazidis as genocide in February 2016. UNITAD, established by a UN Security Council resolution, explicitly determined that the crimes committed in Shingal constitute the most serious international crimes, including genocide. Nearly 20 countries, including the United States, Ireland, Canada, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Armenia, the United Kingdom, and Portugal, have recognized the Yazidi genocide.
However, the “73rd ferman” has not yet been recognized as genocide by any international criminal court.
The Çilê Havînê festival before the attack
In the Yazidi faith, the 40-day fasting period that begins on June 25 ends on August 1. During this period, which is regarded as a symbol of patience, spiritual purification, and gratitude, the Yazidis devote themselves to worship by abstaining from food and drink from dawn until sunset during the hottest days of the year. This fasting period is known as Çilê Havînê (Summer Fast) in the Yazidi calendar. Another 40-day fasting period is Çilê Zivistanê (Winter Fast), observed during the winter months.
The festival celebrated on August 2, following the end of Çilê Havînê, was held just one day before August 3, 2014—the day ISIS launched its attack on Shingal.
According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), Turkish border guards have been responsible for the deaths of nine civilians and the injury of 41 others since the beginning of 2026.
Foto: Wikipedia, (William John Gauthier)
In a statement, SOHR said that during July 2026, two Syrian civilians were killed and 27 others were injured as a result of shootings and acts of torture allegedly carried out by Turkish border guards while they were attempting to cross from Syria into Türkiye through irregular routes.
According to the organization, 11 people were injured in Raqqa, one civilian was killed and 16 others were injured in Hasakah, while one civilian was killed in Aleppo during the reporting period.
SOHR stated that, since the beginning of 2026, Turkish border guards have allegedly been responsible for the deaths of nine Syrian civilians and the injury of 41 others.
The organization’s figures indicate the following regional distribution:
Hasakah: 2 killed, 16 injured
Raqqa: 2 killed, 24 injured
Aleppo: 5 killed
In its statement, SOHR renewed its call for an end to attacks against civilians along the Syrian-Turkish border and urged respect for international humanitarian law and internationally recognized standards on the protection of civilians.
SOHR also condemned what it described as the excessive use of force against civilians attempting to cross the border and called for all those responsible for violations against civilians to be held accountable.
Human Rights Violations on the Syria-Türkiye Border (2014–2026)
Cases documented by human rights organizations and independent monitoring groups
According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), Turkish border guards have allegedly been responsible for the deaths of 9 Syrian civilians and the injury of 41 others since the beginning of 2026.
2014
14-year-old child shot near Kızıltepe
A Syrian Kurdish family fleeing from Damascus attempted to cross into Türkiye near Mardin’s Kızıltepe district. During the incident, the family’s 14-year-old son was shot in the back of his head and seriously injured.
Source: Bianet
2014
Saada Darwich killed near the border
Saada Darwich, 28, was killed by gunfire while attempting to cross from Rojava’s Derik region toward Türkiye, alongside her husband and children.
Source: Bianet
2016
HRW: Five killed, 14 injured
Human Rights Watch reported that Turkish border guards opened fire on Syrian civilians attempting to cross the border during March and April 2016, killing five people and injuring 14 others.
Source: Human Rights Watch
2016
SOHR: Eight civilians killed, including four children
SOHR reported that eight civilians, including four children, were killed near the border while fleeing clashes in Manbij. The Syrian opposition coalition reported that the number of deaths was 11.
Source: SOHR
2018
HRW: Shooting, abuse and pushbacks
Human Rights Watch documented allegations of shooting, ill-treatment and forced returns against Syrians attempting to cross into Türkiye.
Source: Human Rights Watch
2023
HRW: 234 civilians killed, 231 injured
According to data reviewed by Human Rights Watch, at least 234 civilians were killed and 231 people injured between 2015 and April 2023 in incidents involving Turkish border guards.
Source: Human Rights Watch
2023
Syrian lawyer killed while attempting to cross the border
SOHR reported that a Syrian lawyer attempting to enter Türkiye from Idlib was killed after being shot by Turkish border guards.
Source: SOHR
2026
Journalist Nujan Mala Hassan shot
According to the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), journalist Nujan Mala Hassan was wounded by live ammunition while covering protests near the Syria-Türkiye border.
Source: International Federation of Journalists
2026
SOHR: Nine killed, 41 injured
SOHR reported that nine Syrian civilians were killed and 41 others injured since the beginning of 2026. The organization called for an end to the excessive use of force against civilians.
Source: SOHR
Key figures
234
Civilians killed (HRW)
231
People injured (HRW)
9
Killed in 2026 (SOHR)
41
Injured in 2026 (SOHR)
Sources: Human Rights Watch (HRW), Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), Bianet.Figures are based on reports and statements published by these organizations.
The ALO 153 Solution Center of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (İBB), which previously provided services in Turkish, English, and Arabic, has added the Kurmancî dialect of Kurdish as of today.
The Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality has added the Kurmancî dialect of Kurdish to its multilingual service offerings.
The ALO 153 Solution Center, which operates under the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality’s Directorate of Public Relations, previously provided services in Turkish, English, and Arabic. As of today, the Kurmancî dialect of Kurdish has been added to the ALO 153 Solution Center.
With this new initiative, Kurdish speakers will also be able to access municipal services in their native language through the call center, where tens of thousands of people each day can submit requests, suggestions, and complaints without having to visit a municipal office.
Previously discussed in the Municipality Council
The implementation of this initiative had been brought up multiple times in the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Council.
There had been calls for this initiative to be expanded and implemented across all departments so that Kurds living in Istanbul could rise their concerns and complaints in their native language.
Beginning his public career as an academic, Ahmet Davutoğlu went on to serve as a foreign policy adviser, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Prime Minister, becoming one of the key political actors during some of the most critical turning points in Türkiye’s recent history.
Photo: Social media
One of the most influential figures in Türkiye’s politics over the past two decades, Ahmet Davutoğlu has announced his retirement from active politics. His political career—from academia to the prime ministership—has been marked by dramatic shifts in foreign policy, widespread human rights violations during curfew periods, urban destruction documented in civil society reports, and controversial security policies that have become part of the country’s political history through his own public statements.
As the chief architect of the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) foreign policy, Davutoğlu entered the highest levels of government. His political legacy remains closely associated with some of the deepest crises in Türkiye’s domestic and foreign policy.
Former Turkish Prime Minister and Future Party (Gelecek Partisi) leader Ahmet Davutoğlu announced that he is withdrawing from politics and that his party will cease its political activities.
In a written statement, Davutoğlu said that in 2021 they had sought to establish an alliance among three conservative parties in response to an electoral system that effectively made political alliances necessary. After those efforts failed, he said they joined an alliance that balanced the main opposition party “to prevent the dangers of revanchism arising from polarization and to create common ground for social reconciliation.”
He continued:
“After the 2023 elections, we made every possible sacrifice—including our party’s name—in order to ensure that alternative conservative politics would be represented in the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye as a parliamentary group and would emerge as a strong political alternative for the future. We first formed a parliamentary group together with the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi), and later under the name New Path Party (Yeni Yol Partisi). From the very beginning, we worked to transform this parliamentary group into a single party by first uniting internally and then, if possible, incorporating other conservative parties as well. Where a merger proved impossible, we sought to establish an organic alliance. Unfortunately, these efforts also failed.”
Davutoğlu argued that “the widespread erosion of political ethics and the transfer of members of parliament regardless of party affiliation have made it increasingly difficult to build a strong political alternative and have weakened our parties’ standing in the eyes of society.”
He continued: “At the point we have reached today, we see that the political system in general—and party politics in particular—has reached a profound impasse. On the one hand, power has become increasingly monopolized; on the other, fragmentation has rendered alternative political forces ineffective. The corruption that began at the highest levels of politics has spread, regardless of party affiliation, to political cadres, civil society organizations, and ultimately every layer of society. The existing political mechanisms have largely exhausted their capacity for self-correction.”
Davutoğlu announced his decision to withdraw from party politics and terminate the Future Party’s political activities with the following words:
“In light of these assessments, and following consultations with our party’s authorized bodies and the colleagues who have carried the Future Party to this day, we have decided to withdraw from party politics and end the political activities of the Future Party in order not to become part of the contaminated political climate. This is not a decision of surrender. It is a decision to establish moral distance. It is not an abandonment of politics, but rather a call for everyone to rethink politics.”
From academia to the center of power
Born in 1959 in the Taşkent district of Konya Province, Ahmet Davutoğlu pursued an academic career in international relations.
Known for his work on international relations, strategy, and foreign policy, Davutoğlu developed an approach arguing that Türkiye should make more effective use of its historical and geographical position in international affairs. This vision was most clearly articulated in his influential book Strategic Depth.
Following the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) rise to power in 2002, Davutoğlu entered government as Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s chief foreign policy adviser.
In 2009, he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, giving him the opportunity to translate his academic ideas directly into state policy.
During this period, Türkiye’s foreign policy came to be defined by the doctrine of “Zero problems with neighbors.”
From “Zero problems with neighbors” to regional intervention
At the heart of Davutoğlu’s foreign policy vision was the idea that Türkiye should strengthen its relations with neighboring countries and act as a stabilizing regional power.
During the period when relations with Syria improved, Ankara and Damascus significantly expanded their economic and diplomatic ties. However, the popular uprising that began in Syria in 2011 and rapidly evolved into a civil war became the greatest test of this policy. Türkiye soon adopted a much more confrontational stance toward the government of Bashar al-Assad.
The government’s direct involvement in Syria’s internal affairs—guided by the symbolic slogan of the time, “We will pray at the Umayyad Mosque”—marked one of the most controversial turning points in Turkish foreign policy. During this period, the political, logistical, and military support provided to armed opposition groups in Syria effectively made Türkiye a direct party to the conflict.
Security policies and controversial statements
As the Syrian civil war deepened, ISIS emerged as one of the region’s most significant security threats. Türkiye came under both domestic and international criticism over border security, the movement of foreign fighters, and ISIS’s presence within the country.
Some of the statements Davutoğlu made during this period became the subject of intense public debate regarding the state’s approach to ISIS and the limits of its security policies.
While assessing the organization’s rapid territorial expansion in the Middle East, Davutoğlu said that “ISIS may be seen as a radical, terrorist organization, but (…) the situation there reflects earlier grievances and anger that have produced a broad reaction across a wide front.” Although he did not literally describe ISIS members as “angry young men,” these remarks were widely summarized and remembered by the public under that characterization.
Another statement that drew widespread attention came after the 10 October 2015 Ankara Train Station Massacre. Speaking during a television interview, Davutoğlu said:
“We have a list of suicide bombers currently in Türkiye. However, under the rule of law, we cannot arrest them before they carry out an attack.”
The statement, which was widely paraphrased in public discourse as “We cannot arrest suicide bombers before they blow themselves up,” triggered intense criticism, particularly in the aftermath of the Ankara Train Station Massacre.
From the peace process to renewed armed conflict
One of the defining turning points of Ahmet Davutoğlu’s tenure as prime minister was the collapse of the Kurdish peace process and the resumption of armed conflict.
The Peace Process, which began in 2013, entered a new phase with the Dolmabahçe Declaration in 2015. However, escalating violence during the summer of 2015 led to extensive security operations across predominantly Kurdish cities.
During the clashes in Sur, Cizre, Nusaybin, and several other districts, numerous civilians lost their lives, residential areas were heavily damaged, and thousands of people were displaced. As prime minister, Davutoğlu was one of the government’s highest-ranking political officials responsible for the security policies implemented during this period.
Human rights organizations criticized the government’s handling of the curfews, the protection of civilians, forced displacement, and the large-scale destruction of urban areas.
The Civilian Toll of Curfews
Field reports and data compilations by civil society organizations—the Human Rights Foundation of Türkiye (TİHV) and the Human Rights Association (İHD)—clearly documented the devastating impact of the operations on the civilian population:
Civilian Deaths
321
According to the Human Rights Foundation of Türkiye (TİHV), at least 321 civilians lost their lives during the period when curfews were most extensively imposed, between 16 August 2015 and 16 August 2016.
Scope of the Curfews
369 Times
Curfews were imposed 369 times between 2015 and 2019 across 11 provinces and 51 districts. In some locations they lasted for weeks or even months, including uninterrupted curfews exceeding 100 days in Diyarbakır’s Sur district.
Forced Displacement and Destruction
~500,000
Approximate number of people who were forcibly displaced. Urban neighborhoods and historic city centers were devastated during clashes involving the use of heavy weaponry.
Violations of Fundamental Rights
1.5 Million+
More than 1.5 million people living in areas under curfew faced restricted access to water, food, and healthcare. The rights to life, education, health, and housing were systematically violated.
Sur and the “Toledo” remark
One of the areas most severely affected by the clashes was the historic Sur district of Diyarbakır, renowned for its rich cultural heritage and centuries-old urban fabric.
The destruction of Sur and the subsequent reconstruction projects became the subject of extensive public debate.
Among the most controversial statements of the period was Davutoğlu’s pledge:
“We will turn Sur into Toledo.”
The remark sparked criticism from many who argued that it reflected an approach prioritizing urban redevelopment over preserving the district’s historical and cultural identity.
The Ankara Train Station Massacre
The attack targeting a peace rally outside Ankara’s main railway station on 10 October 2015 became one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in Türkiye’s history.
More than one hundred people were killed and hundreds more were injured.
In the aftermath of the massacre, public debate extended beyond the perpetrators themselves to include questions surrounding intelligence failures, security shortcomings, and the state’s obligation to protect the right to life.
Following the attack, Davutoğlu stated:
“We conducted polling after the terrorist attack in Ankara, and there is an upward trend in our support.”
Like his earlier remarks concerning ISIS, this statement provoked widespread public criticism.
In later years, responding to criticism directed at him, Davutoğlu argued that he had never personally used the phrase “angry young men” to describe ISIS. He also maintained that his comments regarding suicide bombers and post-attack polling had been taken out of context and distorted as part of a campaign to discredit him.
Academics for peace
Davutoğlu’s term as prime minister was also marked by intense debate over freedom of expression, press freedom, and academic freedom.
The appointment of government trustees to media outlets, legal proceedings against journalists, and investigations targeting academics drew criticism regarding Türkiye’s democratic standards.
Following the publication of the Academics for Peace declaration titled “We Will Not Be a Party to This Crime” in 2016, criminal and administrative investigations were launched against its signatories.
In subsequent years, the Constitutional Court of Türkiye ruled in several cases that the proceedings against some of the signatory academics had violated their right to freedom of expression.
The period reignited broader debates over how the balance should be drawn between state security policies and fundamental freedoms, particularly freedom of expression and academic independence.
Departure from power
Davutoğlu stepped down as Chairman of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Prime Minister in 2016. His departure was widely viewed as more than a routine leadership change; it marked a significant political turning point that reflected shifting power dynamics within the ruling party.
One of the defining episodes of this process was the publication of the document that became known as the “Pelican Brief” (Pelikan Bildirisi), an anonymous manifesto sharply criticizing Davutoğlu and widely regarded as a catalyst for his resignation.
In the years that followed, Davutoğlu increasingly advocated for the rule of law, judicial independence, stronger democratic institutions, and the restoration of institutional checks and balances.
However, this new political stance continued to be evaluated in light of the policies implemented during the years in which he had served in government.
A new party
In 2019, Davutoğlu founded the Future Party (Gelecek Partisi).
The party presented itself as an alternative conservative political movement, emphasizing the rule of law, the separation of powers, judicial independence, and the strengthening of democratic institutions.
Despite these ambitions, the Future Party struggled to establish itself as a major political force. In later years, Davutoğlu sought cooperation with other conservative opposition parties, ultimately participating in parliamentary alliances in an effort to consolidate an alternative political bloc.
Following the 2023 general elections, these efforts resulted in the formation of a parliamentary group first with the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) and later under the banner of the New Path Party (Yeni Yol Partisi). Nevertheless, attempts to unite the conservative opposition under a single political organization ultimately proved unsuccessful.
A contested political legacy
Ahmet Davutoğlu’s political career is closely associated with one of the most transformative and contentious periods in Türkiye’s recent history.
As the principal architect of the AKP’s foreign policy, he played a central role in shaping Türkiye’s regional strategy through the doctrine of “Strategic depth” and the policy of “Zero problems with neighbors.” Yet the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, Ankara’s direct involvement in the conflict, and the subsequent deterioration of regional relations fundamentally altered that vision.
His tenure as prime minister also coincided with the collapse of the Kurdish peace process, prolonged curfews and security operations in predominantly Kurdish cities, the Ankara Train Station Massacre, and widespread debates over human rights, freedom of expression, and democratic governance.
While Davutoğlu has consistently argued that some of his most controversial statements were taken out of context and that his later political agenda sought to strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law, critics continue to hold him politically responsible for many of the policies implemented during his years in office.
With his announcement that he is withdrawing from politics and bringing the Future Party’s political activities to an end, Davutoğlu closes a chapter that remains one of the most debated in contemporary Turkish political history.
The Ahmet Davutoğlu Era: Key Turning Points
2002
Entered government as Chief Foreign Policy Adviser.
2009
Appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the “Zero Problems with Neighbors” policy was officially introduced.
2011
With the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, Türkiye adopted an “open-door” policy at the border and embraced a more interventionist approach toward the Syrian government.
Summer 2015
The Peace Process collapsed. Extensive curfews and military operations began across predominantly Kurdish cities.
10 October 2015
The Ankara Train Station Massacre, the deadliest terrorist attack in Türkiye’s history, took place.
Early 2016
Following the publication of the “We Will Not Be a Party to This Crime” declaration, investigations and dismissals targeting the Academics for Peace began.
May 2016
Following the process associated with the “Pelican Brief,” he was sidelined from the center of power and stepped down as Prime Minister and AKP Chairman.
2019
Founded the Future Party (Gelecek Partisi), launching a new political movement.
According to research conducted by KONDA, 41 percent of society finds the arrest of comedian Deniz Göktaş “wrong,” while 34 percent said they find it “right.”
In its July 2026 Barometer, KONDA included the case of comedian Deniz Göktaş, who was arrested on July 3 on charges of “inciting the public to hatred and hostility.”
In the study conducted on July 11–12 with 1,895 people, interviewees were asked whether they agreed with the statement, “I find Göktaş’s arrest right.”
While 22 percent of the participants stated they found Göktaş’s arrest “definitely wrong,” 19 percent said they found it “wrong.”
Fifteen percent of the interviewees answered “definitely right” and 19 percent answered “right.”
Survey participants were also asked about the statement, “Anything can be the subject of humor.” Only 16 percent of the interviewees said “I agree” with this statement.
Additionally, the research included analyses of which party participants would prefer to vote for if an election were held today, whom they want to govern Türkiye, potential Presidential election scenarios between President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and detained Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (İBB) Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, as well as between Erdoğan and Özgür Özel, and an analysis of Erdoğan’s report card grade.
What had happened?
Göktaş was investigated on allegations of “insulting the President” and “degrading religious values” due to statements he used in his stand-up show titled “Ölü Deniz” (The Dead Sea), which was published on YouTube on June 24. Detained at Istanbul Airport on July 2, Göktaş was arrested the following day and sent to the Çorlu Karatepe High-Security Penal Execution Institution in Tekirdağ.
A new wave of operations targeting law enforcement officers has been carried out in the Gülistan Doku case. In a statement posted on his social media account, Akın Gürlek announced that 18 people had been detained in simultaneous operations conducted across 15 provinces.
Fotoğraf: Elif Tuna / csgorselarsiv.org
As part of the investigation into the disappearance of Munzur University student Gülistan Doku, who went missing on January 5, 2020, another detention operation took place on Monday (July 27). During the operation, 18 law enforcement personnel who had been involved in the investigation process were taken into custody.
Coordinated by the Erzurum and Dersim Chief Public Prosecutor’s Offices, teams from the Erzurum Provincial Gendarmerie Command carried out simultaneous raids in the early morning hours across 15 provinces: Nevşehir, Istanbul, Isparta, Bilecik, Bursa, Çanakkale, Ordu, Aydın, Diyarbakır, Kayseri, Ankara, Erzincan, Eskişehir, İzmir and Antalya. According to a statement made by Justice Minister Akın Gürlek on his X account, searches were conducted at 21 addresses, and 18 of the 19 suspects for whom detention orders had been issued were taken into custody.
Suspicion of misconduct and tampering with evidence
Analyses of testimonies, along with technical, digital and field work, produced findings indicating that some law enforcement personnel who had served in Dersim committed misconduct and tampered with evidence during the judicial process carried out after Doku’s disappearance.
Those detained include one deputy police chief, one police superintendent, one chief inspector, one inspector, one senior police officer, 10 police officers, one computer operator and three retired police officers.
In the investigation concerning allegations that Doku’s disappearance resulted in a murder, it was reported that indications suggesting evidence had been concealed by certain public officials were being examined in all their aspects.
Former Governor Sonel at Erzurum Courthouse
On the same day, former Dersim Governor Tuncay Sonel, who is currently in custody, along with his protection officer Şükrü Eroğlu and retired police officer Gökhan Ertok, were referred to the Erzurum Courthouse to have their statements taken in connection with new evidence.
Sonel, Eroğlu and Ertok, at Erzurum Courthouse
Following examinations conducted by the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, it was reported that correspondence between Sonel and Ertok, a dismissed police officer held in custody in the same case file, was being assessed within the scope of the offenses of “destroying, concealing or altering evidence of a crime,”“unlawfully obtaining personal data,”“deprivation of liberty,”“intentional injury,”“robbery” and “destroying or altering data in an information system.”
Gülistan Doku
What Happened?
Gülistan Doku, a second-year student in the Department of Child Development at Munzur University, disappeared on January 5, 2020, after leaving the dormitory where she was staying. Her family filed a missing person report with the Provincial Police Directorate the following day.
Camera footage reviews showed Doku boarding a minibus, but where she got off could not be determined.
After Gülistan Doku disappeared, searches were conducted for days in the Munzur River and in the Uzunçayır Dam Reservoir in Dersim, where her phone had last transmitted a signal. However, despite the reservoir being drained, no trace of Gülistan was found.
Zeinal Abakarov, Doku’s ex-boyfriend and the last person she had contact with, was detained in Antalya in 2022, two years after the incident, and was released under judicial control measures by the court to which he was brought.
June 2024:Ebru Cansu, appointed to the Tunceli Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office by a decree of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK), took up the case again. A special team was formed from JASAT, and approximately 700 hours of security camera footage and license plate recognition system records were re-examined.
2025: A secret witness statement that emerged reportedly said that Doku’s body had been moved more than once and accused the governor’s son of raping Gülistan Doku and killing her by shooting her.
April 14, 2026:Tuncay Sonel, then Governor of Tunceli, his son Mustafa Türkay Sonel, Doku’s ex-boyfriend Zeinal Abakarov and his mother and father, the mother and father of fugitive suspect Umut Altaş, dismissed police officer Gökhan Ertok, Sonel’s then-protection officer Şükrü Eroğlu, Provincial Special Administration employee Erdoğan Elaldı, and Munzur University officials responsible for the cameras, Savaş Gültürk and Süleyman Önal, were detained. Everyone except Gültürk and Önal was arrested. A red notice was issued for Umut Altaş, who was in the United States, and he was later apprehended and arrested there.
April 25, 2026: As part of the investigation, Dersim State Hospital IT staff B.Y. and Y.E. were detained.
July 21, 2026: Simultaneous operations were carried out in Elazığ, Malatya, Ankara, Istanbul and Dersim. A total of 15 people were detained, including three doctors, one nurse, one IT staff member, five data-entry personnel, former Governor Sonel’s wife Handan Sonel, IT company owner Mehmet Aca, who is believed to have tampered with Doku’s phone, one businessman and two village guards.
July 24: Among the suspects detained as part of the investigation, village guard Fatih Özmen was arrested, while Okan Yarıcı was released under judicial control.
July 25: Tuncay Sonel’s wife Handan Sonel and Mehmet Aca, the owner of the IT company, alleged to have tampered with Doku’s phone, were arrested, while village guard Yılmaz Arslan was released under judicial control.