Kurds

Deniz Xelat Büyükkaya discusses how Rojhelat has once again become the frontline of Iran’s war against its Kurdish population, amid nationwide protests and economic collapse.

by Deniz Xelat Büyükkaya

Rojhelat (Eastern Kurdistan) or the Kurdish regions of western Iran, have once again become a key site of political tension, state repression and regional security concern. Over the past few years, Rojhelat has faced intensified government repression, increased protest activity, and rising geopolitical pressure related to regional conflicts. Latest developments show that Rojhelat remains one of the most politically sensitive regions inside Iran.

Iran has been facing nationwide protests since late 2025 because of economic collapse, rising inflation, and shortages of basic goods, fueling growing anger toward the government. The government has responded to protests with extreme repression: mass arrests, shootings of protesters, internet shutdowns, executions and death sentences.

Rojhelat: A Centre of Protest Movements

Rojhelat—especially the provinces of Kurdistan, Kermansah, West Azerbaijan, and Ilam—has long been considered by Tehran a politically sensitive border region. As a result, the Iranian state has often approached Kurdish activism through a security-focused framework shaped by fears of separatism and cross-border insurgency. Also, the region was already the centre of the nationwide “Jin, Jiyan Azadi (Woman, Life, Freedom)” movement that erupted in late 2022 after the death of Kurdish woman Jina (Mahsa) Amini in police custody.

By late 2025, Kurdish monitoring organisations reported that Iranian security forces had intensified surveillance and arrest campaigns across Rojhelat, targeting activists, journalists, and ordinary citizens. The Washington Kurdish Institute’s 2025 Annual Report notes that in November 2025 alone, 51 Kurds were detained in Iran, representing 45 percent of all recorded arrests nationwide that month.

According to Kurdistan Tribune, Kurdish regions have long been centres of anti-government protest, and state responses have often been violent. During the recent demonstrations, Rojhelat was among the most heavily affected, with security forces responding aggressively.

Many people were arrested without clear charges or proper legal procedures. This has drawn concern from international human rights organisations about fairness and legal rights in Iran’s response to political opposition. Kurdish cities often show strong political mobilisation. This is partly because of ethnic marginalisation, economic difficulties, and long-standing political grievances. In addition, Rojhelat is considered one of the less economically developed parts of Iran.

Cross-Border tension

The situation in Rojhelat cannot be completely understood without considering cross-border dynamics between Iran and Başur (Iraqi Kurdistan). While repression in Rojhelat increased, developments across the border in Başur also made the situation more tense. In March 2026, Iranian forces carried out drone strikes targeting Kurdish opposition positions in Iraqi Kurdistan, including an attack on an opposition headquarters in the town of Dekala that wounded members and damaged facilities.

These attacks were part of a broader campaign against Kurdish groups that Iran accuses of operating across the border. According to regional media reports, several Kurdish opposition sites in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah provinces, including the Koya district and nearby mountain areas, were targeted during the escalation.

Iranian officials justified these operations as necessary responses to “separatist groups” threatening national security.

Human rights concerns

Human rights organisations report that Iran has significantly increased its use of the death penalty in recent years. According to Iran Human Rights (IHR), in 2024, at least 975 executions were recorded. The number reportedly increased to around 1,500 executions in 2025, the highest level in decades.

Ethnic minorities seem to be affected more by these policies. According to a report by Hengaw around 150 Kurdish prisoners were executed in 2025. In early 2026, Hengaw also reported that at least 257 Kurdish civilians were killed during a crackdown linked to protests, including 20 children and 19 women. Many of them were accused of security-related crimes, but human rights groups often criticise the lack of fair trials and transparency in Iran’s judicial system.

Because of these numbers, many Kurds believe that the Iranian government treats Kurdish regions mainly as a security issue instead of solving political and social problems.

Economic marginalisation and the Kolbar

In addition to political repression, economic conditions in Kurdish border areas are also very difficult. Rojhelat has some of the highest unemployment rates in Iran, especially among young people. Because of this, many residents work as kolbars. Kolbars are Kurdish porters who carry goods across mountain borders between Iran and neighbouring countries. The work is very dangerous and often illegal, but many people rely on it to earn living.

According to the Kurdistan Human Rights Network (KHRN) dozens of kolbars are killed each year by Iranian border forces, while many others are injured or arrested. Kurdish activists say that kolbar work continues because there are not enough stable job opportunities in the region. For many Kurdish families in border cities, kolbar work has become a symbol of the broader economic marginalisation faced by Rojhelat.

An unresolved political question

Despite decades of political tension, the Kurdish question in Iran remains unresolved. Kurdish activists continue to demand cultural rights, Kurdish language education, economic development, and greater political representation. However, Iranian authorities have continued to restrict Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights. In 2025, expressions of Kurdish identity were often treated as security offences. The Kurdish language is still largely excluded from formal education, and cultural activists promoting Kurdish language or traditions have faced arrests and intimidation.

At the same time, the Iranian government continues to view Rojhelat mainly through a security perspective because of concerns about territorial integrity and armed opposition. As Iran faces both internal dissent and regional pressure, Rojhelat is likely to remain an important indicator of the country’s political stability. For now, the Kurdish regions of Iran remain caught between protest movements, state repression, economic hardship, and regional geopolitical tensions.

A quantitative analysis of international media coverage of Iranian Kurds between February 28 and March 22, 2026, reveals a pattern that speaks less to increased visibility and more to the nature of that visibility: Kurds were covered more — but largely through the voices of others.

Following the February 28 launch of US-Israeli strikes on Iran, Kurdish political actors entered the international media agenda. The period was further amplified when, on March 5, President Donald Trump told Axios: “If the Kurds want to attack Iran, I think that’s wonderful. I’m totally in favor of it.” That statement turned global attention toward Iranian Kurdish organizations.

Yet Kurdish groups had already reached an agreement among themselves weeks earlier. The Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan — bringing together PJAK, IKDP, PAK, Komala and Xebat — was formed on February 22, thirteen days before Trump’s remarks. The coalition’s founding drew almost no attention from international mainstream media until Trump spoke. In March, the Komala Party joined, bringing the number of member organizations to six.

Once Trump’s statement focused international attention on the Kurds, coverage surged. Of more than fifty records analyzed, approximately seventy percent were published between March 1 and 8 — the first eight days of the war. Between March 9 and 22, independent Kurdish-focused coverage fell to single digits, with Foreign Policy’s March 17 analysis standing as a near-solitary exception.

The peak came between March 3 and 7. On March 3, CNN was the first to report — citing multiple anonymous sources — that the CIA was working to arm Kurdish forces. That same day, the Wall Street Journal noted that Trump was open to supporting armed militias, with Kurdish forces along the Iran-Iraq border described as holding significant military capacity. Reuters reported, citing three sources, that Iranian Kurdish militias were in discussions with the US about how and where to strike Iranian security forces. On March 5, Bloomberg reported that Israel was working to open the way for Kurdish forces to take positions in northwest Iran, citing a senior Israeli military official. Al Jazeera published a detailed explainer: “Which Kurdish groups is the US rallying to fight Iran?” On March 7, Chatham House published its analysis: “Kurdish groups in Iran face a risky dilemma amid an unclear US endgame.” The Kurdish-focused content published across those five days exceeded the combined total of the two preceding weeks and the two that followed.

Then, on March 7–8, Trump reversed course. Asked about the possibility of Kurds establishing a new autonomous region in Iran and whether they would join the war, he said: “We’re very friendly with the Kurds, but we don’t want to make the war any more complex than it already is. I’ve decided I don’t want the Kurds going in.”

The conditions Kurdish groups themselves had put forward were central to this outcome. According to Axios, one Kurdish opposition official stated: “We cannot move until the skies above us are clear” — a demand for an arrangement comparable to the no-fly zone that enabled Kurdish autonomy in Iraq after 1991. CNN reported that Kurdish groups also sought political guarantees from the Trump administration before committing to action. Komala Secretary-General Abdullah Mohtadi summarized these conditions to Die Zeit: “We will not send our forces to the slaughterhouse.”

On March 4, Kurdish groups issued a joint denial directly contradicting media reports of a ground offensive. PAK stated: “Claims that our forces have crossed into Rojhilat are baseless. We categorically deny these reports — no such movement took place.” PJAK, PDKI and Komala issued similar statements the same day. The coalition’s first joint communiqué, released on March 2, was not a declaration of military action but a political appeal to Iranian armed forces in Kurdish regions: “Separate yourselves from the remnants of the Islamic Republic.” PDKI President Hijri had stated on March 1: “We will continue our struggle until free and democratic elections are held.” The Kurdistan Regional Government’s Interior Ministry also announced that its territory would not be used as a base for operations against neighboring countries. Trump’s reversal on March 7–8 confirmed that the conditions Kurdish groups had set would not be met.

Independence referendum and Rojava: a comparative frame

Two earlier turning points offer context for understanding Kurdish visibility in international media.

In 2017, the Kurdistan independence referendum drew extensive international coverage — but structured around the near-unanimous opposition of major powers (the US, Russia, the UK, Turkey, Iran) rather than around Kurdish political demands. An academic study published in the British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies documented that in Egyptian online media, the referendum was framed as “a Zionist plan directed by the US and Israel to redraw the region.” That framing was the dominant pattern across regional Arab media in 2017. By 2026, the dynamic had inverted: Israeli support was no longer presented as a threat but as an operational reality — yet Kurds remained objects of great-power planning rather than subjects of their own story.

In January 2026, the Syrian Transitional Government’s attacks on Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo — dozens killed, hospitals struck, tens of thousands displaced — drew comparatively limited international coverage. The gap in intensity and framing between that period and February–March 2026 is stark. What it reveals is a pattern: international media interest is triggered not by violence against Kurds, but by Kurdish inclusion in great-power plans.

The comparative picture across three periods: In 2017, Kurds were covered as political actors — but in the shadow of international opposition. In January 2026, as a humanitarian crisis — but with limited attention. In February–March 2026, as a strategic instrument — and with great intensity. Visibility and subject position took different forms in each period.

Coverage by outlet

US media formed the dominant block. CNN produced at least seven separate Kurdish-focused pieces, five of them concentrated between March 3 and 5. Axios published four reports. Reuters and AP each produced one critical exclusive. US media’s Kurdish coverage intensity outpaced the combined output of all other countries.

Israeli media — Haaretz, Times of Israel, Channel 12, i24NEWS, Ynet — formed the second largest block in both volume and substance, though with a markedly different editorial frame.

In European media, BBC Persian’s Jiyar Gol interview with PJAK leadership — conducted inside tunnels near the border — and BBC World Service’s interview with a PAK fighter were the standout pieces. Die Zeit published an interview with Komala Secretary-General Abdullah Mohtadi; the piece’s reach came largely through citations in Chatham House and Al Arabiya. InsideOver conducted the most direct leader interview on the European continent, speaking with PDKI President Hijri on March 8.

Arabic-language media in this analysis was represented only by Al Jazeera English and Al Arabiya English. The Arabic-language services of both outlets, along with Asharq Al-Awsat, Al-Quds Al-Arabi, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, BBC Arabic, Sky News Arabia, and Gulf media, fell outside the scope of this study.

Who spoke, who was silenced

When all records in the dataset are coded by source type, approximately fifty percent relied on anonymous US or Israeli officials. CNN’s March 3 report cited “multiple people familiar with the plan”; Axios’s March 5 piece cited two separate US-Israeli officials; Reuters’s March 6 exclusive cited three anonymous sources.

Direct interviews with Kurdish leaders totaled nine over 22 days: Abdullah Mohtadi (CNN, IranWire, Die Zeit, Al Arabiya, Atlantico, Newsweek), PJAK Co-Chair Amir Karimi (CNN, Axios, AFP, Al Arabiya), PJAK Co-Chair Peyman Viyan (Channel 12), Khabat Secretary-General Babasheikh Hosseini (Al Jazeera), IKDP official Muhammed Azizi (Fox News), Komala Central Committee member Koosar Fattahi (CBS), PDKI President Mustafa Hijri (InsideOver, CSM). The distribution is telling: Mohtadi received the most direct coverage, while PJAK generated the most reporting — yet PJAK was most often reported through anonymous sources or US officials rather than its own leadership.

Iranian state media’s terminology passed into mainstream international coverage with almost no critical framing: “separatist terrorist forces.” In Al Jazeera’s March 5 report, Press TV’s characterization — “anti-Iran separatist forces” — and the IRGC statement carried by IRNA were presented side by side, directly and without contextual challenge.

Thematic focus

Five themes emerge from the dataset.

The US-Israel-Kurdish strategic relationship was the dominant theme, accounting for approximately forty percent of all records. This framing positioned Kurds as objects of the story: coverage focused not on what they were doing, but on what great powers intended to do with them.

Military capacity and ground offensive speculation formed the second major theme — fighter numbers, arms levels, border crossing preparations. The retracted March 4 ground offensive story was this theme’s most concrete and most problematic example.

Historical betrayal and distrust was the third theme, structuring Haaretz’s March 7 analysis, the Chatham House report, the Atlantic Council assessment and France 24’s “pawn” piece.

The predicament of Iraqi Kurds was the fourth theme — the tension between the KRG’s declared neutrality and Iran’s actual strikes.

Kurdish civilian experience and human rights was the most conspicuous absence. Hengaw’s warnings about civilian casualties, strikes in Kurdish cities, women’s organizing — the presence of HPJ received a line or two. HPJ Commander Roken Nereda had not spoken on record to any international outlet before AFP’s March 8 field report.

Disinformation: one story, five outlets

March 4 stands as this period’s best-documented media failure. i24NEWS reported — without footage and citing an unnamed CPFIK official — that PJAK fighters were taking positions in the mountains south of Marivan. Axios and Fox News ran the same story almost simultaneously. Channel 12 correspondent Barak Ravid first confirmed it citing a US official, then walked it back the same day: “There are conflicting reports.” All Kurdish parties denied it. Five outlets published or amplified the same unverified claim; the retraction did not reach the speed or scale of the original.

Notes

This study was compiled and organized using data gathered by the Claude AI model.

The analysis focused on English-language content and English-language media outlets. This methodological limitation creates several important gaps.

Non-English-language media fell outside the scope of the study. How outlets such as Le Monde, Libération, Le Figaro, Corriere della Sera, El País, NHK, Dawn, South China Morning Post and The Hindu covered — or did not cover — Kurds during this period was not examined.

Arabic-language media was represented in this study only through Al Jazeera English and Al Arabiya English. The Arabic-language services of both outlets, along with Asharq Al-Awsat, Al-Quds Al-Arabi, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, BBC Arabic, Sky News Arabia and Gulf media, fell outside the scope of this study.

English-language outlets behind paywalls — the Financial Times, The Economist, and certain Haaretz content — could not be fully accessed. For these outlets, the accurate description is "could not be reached," not "did not publish."