Amnesty International’s report exposes the lawlessness, discrimination, and rights violations perpetrated by nations -most notably the US, Russia, China, the UK, and Israel- while asserting that a new history of humanity is being written by the people resisting these injustices.
The 406-page report, titled The State of the World’s Human Rights 2025/26, evaluates 144 countries. It emphasizes that the international legal framework was significantly undermined in 2025, largely driven by the actions of the USA, Israel, and Russia. The report highlights that despite ceasefires, Israel continued its genocidal actions through illegal settlements and the obstruction of aid, while expanding its military offensive into countries such as Lebanon and Iran.
As the world endures one of its darkest periods of institutional impunity and state violence, the report notes that resistance has spread in equal measure. Port workers across several European countries formed a global solidarity network, putting their bodies on the line to block arms shipments to Israel. Meanwhile, youth movements from Indonesia to Peru targeted systemic injustice, transforming the streets into “spaces of transformation” throughout 2025.
“Time to write the history of human rights”
In the report’s foreword, Agnés Callamard, Secretary General of Amnesty International, stated:
“As Amnesty International has long warned, a global environment where primitive ferocity could flourish has been long in the making. But in 2025, accelerants were recklessly poured over dry kindling, as sharp U-turns were taken away from the international order that had been imagined out of the ashes of the Holocaust and the utter destruction of world wars, and constructed slowly and painfully, albeit insufficiently, over these past 80 years.”
Callamard emphasized that resistance is also about clarifying what needs to be transformed, urging people to find the courage to change as the very structures built over the last 80 years face destruction:
“We must imagine a transformed and transformative human rights vision for the world that we are becoming, not merely defend human rights in terms of the world we once were. Together, we must then lead that transformation into existence, with all our creativity, determination and resilience. History is not just something that is done to us. It is also ours to make. And for the sake of humanity, it’s time to make human rights history.”
The report documented protester deaths resulting from the unlawful use of force in countries including Turkey, Angola, Cameroon, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Madagascar, Pakistan, and Peru. In nations such as Afghanistan, Belarus, Burkina Faso, China, Cuba, Mali, Myanmar, Nicaragua, North Korea, Russia, Uganda, and Venezuela, authorities reportedly used enforced disappearances of human rights defenders, activists, and journalists to spread fear. Many other countries, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, continued to resort to the death penalty.
Turkey: Rise in baseless investigations and convictions
The report brings to light allegations of torture and rights violations by law enforcement against protesters in Turkey, alongside a culture of impunity. It further highlights an increase in baseless investigations and convictions targeting human rights defenders, noting that executive interference in the judiciary has deepened. Key findings include:
The report notes legislative proposals aimed at criminalizing LGBTI+ and their advocates. Similar to Hungary, Turkey banned Pride Marches, where law enforcement used unlawful force. The report also recorded bans placed on LGBTI+ associations.
The report recorded the detention of hundreds of peaceful protesters following the detention of Ekrem İmamoğlu, Mayor of Istanbul and CHP presidential candidate. Unlawful force was documented during the March 19-26, 2025, protests sparked by operations against the CHP and İmamoğlu’s detention.
Despite European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) rulings and the Council of Europe’s 2022 infringement proceedings, figures such as Osman Kavala, Selahattin Demirtaş, and Figen Yüksekdağ remain imprisoned.
The report identified unlawful force by both the judiciary and law enforcement during protests following the prison sentence handed to Abdullah Zeydan, the elected mayor of Van Metropolitan Municipality.
Rights violations during May Day protests and subsequent house raids were highlighted. In 2025, 294 femicides were committed by men, while 297 women were found dead under suspicious circumstances.
Escalating violence in the Middle East and North Africa
The report underscores a surge in attacks by various actors across the Middle East. Notable findings include:
Israeli attacks in Gaza continued through 2025, killing approximately 27,000 Palestinians (60% of whom were women and children). Systematic destruction of housing and infrastructure decimated living conditions. An 18-year blockade was tightened, leaving half a million people facing famine and banning medical evacuations.
Israel conducted military strikes against Lebanon, Iran, Qatar, Syria, and Yemen. Targeting civilian sites in Iran (such as Evin Prison) was classified as a war crime. While a new era began in Syria with the fall of the Assad regime, sectarian massacres continued. In Yemen, the humanitarian crisis deepened following a cut in US aid.
Non-independent judiciaries in Egypt, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq handed down politically motivated prison sentences. Peaceful protests were crushed in Iran, Algeria, and Tunisia. Racial attacks and collective expulsions of Black refugees increased in Tunisia and Algeria, while Libya remained a spot for the torture and arbitrary detention of migrants.
Global impunity and the reluctance of states
By early 2026, the unlawful use of force by the US and Israel against Iran -violating the UN Charter- triggered retaliatory strikes against Israel and Gulf Cooperation Council countries. The US, Israel, and Russia further weakened international accountability mechanisms, specifically the International Criminal Court (ICC).
The Trump administration imposed sanctions on ICC staff and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, while Russian courts issued arrest warrants for ICC officials. Most states remained reluctant to activate mechanisms to block the aggressive actions of the US, Russia, Israel, or China.
In Brazil, police operations in impoverished neighborhoods of Rio de Janeiro resulted in over 120 deaths, mostly among Black residents. In Afghanistan, the Taliban escalated its oppressive policies, banning women from education, work, and travel.
Floods in Pakistan displaced millions, while New Delhi recorded the world’s most polluted air. Pacific islands face an existential threat from rising sea levels.
Activism against the flow of weapons to Israel expanded globally. Port workers in France, Greece, Italy, Morocco, Spain, and Sweden blocked shipment routes. An increasing number of states acknowledged that Israel is committing genocide, with many joining the “Hague Group” or contributing to South Africa’s case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
In 2026, the Spanish government maintained a principled stance against these violations.
With the end of Viktor Orbán’s conservative rule, a new era began in Hungary, but the silence of Péter Magyar and the Tisza Party, who won a majority in the elections, on LGBTQ+ rights raised questions. Johanna Majercsik, spokesperson for Budapest Pride, stated: “The most urgent issue is the restoration of the right to assembly.”
Source: Budapest Pride
In the Hungarian general elections on April 12, Victor Orbán’s far-right Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Alliance) party, which had been in power for 16 years, lost its grip on power. Péter Magyar and his Tisza (Respect and Freedom Party) party, which was initially close to Orbán but later split from Fidesz and adopted a center-right stance, achieved a victory.
According to the results from the election, with almost all the ballots counted, Tisza won 138 seats in the 199-member parliament. Having surpassed 133 seats indicates that Tisza has achieved a majority sufficient to amend the constitution.
Viktor Orbán, who served as Prime Minister of Hungary for 16 years until his electoral defeat in April 2026, became widely recognized for implementing a series of laws and policies targeting the LGBTQ+ community.
Orbán made an amendment on 2012 saying constitution recognizes only two sexes. In 2020, this was tightened to effectively ban adoption by same-sex couples. The Child Protection Act (Act LXXIX), which passed on June 2021 under the guise of protecting children, implicitly conflates LGBTQ+ individuals with child abusers. This legislation prohibits the “depiction or promotion” of homosexuality or gender reassignment to minors under 18 in education, media, and advertising. The law restricts TV programs showing LGBTQ+ content and books containing LGBTQ+ themes. Furthermore, in March 2025, Orbán government passed legislation that effectively banned LGBTQ+ Pride marches, allowing for the use of facial recognition technology to identify attendees
Budapest Pride: “The most urgent issue is the restoration of the right to assembly”
Spokesperson of Budapeşt Pride, Johanna Majercsik, evaluated the demands of Budapest Pride after the Hungary elections. Majercsik describe the collapse of Viktor Orbán’s 16-year rule as a path opened for Hungary to return to the rule of law. “A fair and just democracy cannot exist without human rights, including LGBTQ rights,” she said.
Majercsik mentioned that with a two-thirds majority, all anti-LGBTQ laws passed by the Orbán government can be repealed.
“The most urgent issue” said Majercsik, “is the restoration of the right of assembly. This is particularly urgent because we are holding the Budapest Pride March on June 27. But beyond that, the previous government passed numerous anti-queer laws that were enshrined in the Fundamental Law. With a two-third majority, however, these can also be repealed.”
“We know nothing about Magyar’s stance on legal gender and name changes”
Majercsik stated that the program of the TISZA Party that Péter Magyar was elected from makes no mention of the LGBTQ community:
“In his public speeches, he is rather vague when he says that everyone is free to love whomever they want, as long as they don’t break the law (as he stated at the international press conference on April 13). Alas, it is rather impossible to conclude from this whether he intends to use legislation to allow same-sex couples to marry and adopt, and we know nothing about his stance on legal gender and name changes.”
She stated that the LGBTQ+ community in Hungary feels fear, relief, distrust, hope at once at the moment. She lists the reasons why the community experience all these feelings at once as follows:
“The TISZA Party’s program makes no mention of the LGBTQ community, Péter Magyar is vague on this issue, and when Viktor Orbán intended to ban Pride marches last year, Magyar, our future prime minister, remained silent, he didn’t speak up for the LGBTQ people.”
People have zero toleration
Majercsik explaining more than 300,000 people took part in last year’s Pride march in Budapest, further said this can be considered an all-time record since they had estimated 35,000 participants in previous marches.She emphasized that this amount of people showed that people have no toleration to any disregard for fundamental rights.
“In 2025, the people sent a clear message to those in power that they would not tolerate the erosion of their fundamental rights, and they declared that the right to assembly belongs to everyone. Last year’s Pride march played a crucial role in the ousting of the Orbán regime: it was one of the key events where people gathered in huge numbers to express that they had had enough and wanted change.”
The Human Rights Association (İHD) issued a statement regarding the armed attacks carried out in schools in Urfa and Maraş on April 14 and 15, respectively: “These grave incidents are a consequence.”
On April 14, an armed attack was carried out by a student at the Siverek Ahmet Koyuncu Vocational and Technical High School in the Siverek district of Urfa. At least 16 people were injured. Following this, on April 15, another student carried out an armed attack at Ayser Çalık Secondary School in the Onikişubat district of Maraş. Media reports indicated that there were at least 9 dead and 20 injured in the Maraş attack.
Following these consecutive attacks, several education unions announced a 2-day strike and called on the public to join a “life vigil” in front of Provincial Directorates of National Education.
The Human Rights Association (İHD) released its statement today (April 16). The statement emphasized that the attacks in Urfa and Maraş have once again exposed structural problems regarding the protection of children’s fundamental rights.
“Violence has become an ordinary occurrence”
The İHD stated that violence has become normalized everywhere and has reached a level that threatens social life by becoming a culture in Turkey recently. The statement noted that the legitimization of violence stems from many factors, ranging from the language used by politicians and the media that glorifies violence and hatred to easy access to firearms:
“Targeting based on identity and belief, the language used against dissidents and political operations, discourse against LGBTIQ+ individuals, migrants, and refugees, combined with violence and hate speech generated via media and social media -when evaluated alongside institutionalized policies of impunity- pave the way for these and similar attacks. In other words, these grave incidents are a consequence.”
“The selective attitude of the judiciary and entrenched impunity legitimize violence”
In its statement, the İHD called on everyone using violent and hateful language, especially political actors and the media, to abandon this rhetoric. It urged the judicial system to stop being “selective” regarding violence and hate speech.
The Association pointed out a clear double standard: while the judiciary shows tolerance toward violence and hate speech aligned with government policies, it applies legal pressure and threats of prosecution against dissenting, rights-based, or minority-focused expressions. This approach, they argued, transforms hate speech into violent action and legitimizes violence against certain groups.
The statement also noted that TV programs, series, movies, and games that normalize conflict as a social relationship contribute to this normalization. It called for effective measures against violence and hate speech in written, visual, and social media.
“The right to life, the right to security, and the right to access a qualified, safe educational environment -especially for children- is an absolute obligation of the state. This obligation requires not only post-incident intervention but the implementation of policies that prevent violence, eliminate risks, and protect children under all circumstances.
According to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which Turkey is a party, children must be protected from all forms of violence. Despite this, the fact that educational spaces have become vulnerable to armed attacks reveals the inadequacy of protection mechanisms and the consequences of negligence.”
“Curriculum must be purged of discriminatory and militarist discourse”
Stating that these incidents are not individual acts of violence but the result of routinized policies of hate, the İHD listed its demands to prevent further occurrences:
The incidents must be investigated effectively and independently in all dimensions; impunity for those responsible must not be allowed.
Rights-based and holistic protection policies centered on children’s safety in schools must be established immediately.
Early warning and monitoring mechanisms to prevent violence against children should be set up and the curriculum must be cleaned of discriminatory and militarist discourse.
Long-term, accessible, and free psychosocial support must be provided to all children affected by these violent events.
The İHD also expressed that broadcast bans and practices preventing the public’s access to accurate information damage transparency and accountability, rendering the events invisible. The statement concluded that an effective struggle against such incidents is only possible in an environment where truths can be spoken openly.
The Association vowed to follow the legal process regarding the events in Urfa and Maraş and called on authorities to take effective measures to ensure such violations never happen again.
Veysi Polat, Öznur Değer, Murat Bayram ve Faruk Balıkçı, the journalists worked in Diyarbakır for years facing various pressures, assessed limitations and challenges of being a journalist in Diyarbakır.
140journos’ documentary “Şeytantepe,” about the Narin Güran murder, has reignited an old debate about what it means to practice journalism in Diyarbakır.
The Narin Güran murder case refers to the killing of 8-year-old Narin Güran, who lived in the rural Tavşantepe neighborhood of the Bağlar district in Diyarbakır province. Narin’s family reported her missing on August 21, 2024, and her body was found on September 8, 2024, inside a sack in the Eğertutmaz stream near the village. Many television channels and newspapers presented claims such as “forbidden relationship,” “the sister was also killed,” “brother was a drug user,” and “Hezbollah connection” as definitive information to the public without concrete evidence, but many of these were refuted in the judicial process, leading to the perpetrator’s identity remaining unknown.
Throughout the 1990s, journalists in Diyarbakır and the surrounding region were victims of “unsolved” murders, detained, tortured, and imprisoned; and the distribution of newspapers was banned. While “unsolved” murders were no longer as common in the 2000s, the judiciary and law enforcement agencies made it difficult for journalists to report from the field. Arrests, forced exile, and house arrests kept journalists away from their profession; newspapers, TV channels, radio stations and websites were shut down, leaving hundreds of journalists unemployed. Journalists who have been reporting from this region for years recounted the hardships they faced and the price of being present in the field.
Veysi Polat: The reality in field is harsh
Veysi Polat started journalism on 1991 in Diyarbakır. He and his uncle, who was a reporter at Özgür Gündem newspaper, were together attacked with a gun. He had to go to İstanbul continue his profession there. Polat who worked for many years in press organizations that came from the Özgür Gündem tradition, returned to Diyarbakır after 21 years and built a local news platform called Aborî.
Journalist Veysi Polat at Hafız Akdemir commemoration. Source: Aborî
Polat, stating security politics, judgement processes, social sensitivities and local dinamics in Diyarbakır severely restricts the journalist’s freedom of movement, told that the reality in the field was harsh and that the space to convey that reality was limited. stated that practicing journalism in a city directly affected by the Kurdish issue, requires every news to be thought for at least few times, every sentences to be regulated, and said “Not only what you write, but also what you do not write is becomes a responsibility.”
Polat explaining the difference between doing journalism in Diyarbakır and in Western cities through the lens of “the weight of the profession,” stated that when he returned to Diyarbakır from Istanbul after 21 years, he realized that the meaning, risks, and burden of journalism had changed when the geography changed.
How is a local new is altered to another?
Polat stated that he believes information transferred from the local to the central level is often either diminished or transformed, emphasizing that this transformation often passes through political, institutional, and ideological filters:
“Especially in central media, the reflex of not harming the relationship between the institutions and government can prevent the news from being reported as it is. This leads either to overt censorship or a more sophisticated form of ‘cover-up’. As a result, the news may reflect not the event itself, but the version that the center wants to see.”
Polat reminding an example happened on 90s, “When the news of a citizen, a shepherd in the rural area of Cizre, being killed in a security forces operation reached the center, it was transformed into a completely different identity and presented as ‘a PKK member neutralized in the operation.’ However, information and photographs from the field show that the truth is much more stark and shocking. The image of a person being dragged behind an armored vehicle, tied by their feet, is a document of the truth. But that image is ignored because it doesn’t fit the narrative constructed by the center. Our decision to publish it with the headline ‘Humanity is being dragged’ at that time was actually to show the truth as it was,” he said.
Hacı Lokman Birlik was killed during a conflict between him and the Turkish army on October 3, 2015 in Cizre, Şırnak. His dead body was tied to an armoured police vehicle and he was dragged to death behind the vehicle. One of the pro-AKP newspaper Sabah claimed the dragging of a body was a universally acceptable procedure to verify whether a bomb was attached to the body.
News about dragging and killing of Hacı Lokman Birlik on Özgür Gündem, with the headline “Humanity is being dragged”. Source: X/@Code644
The reality in local is experienced more rawly and more directly, while the mainstream media often softens this harshness, and sometimes makes it completely invisible.
The Narin Güran case: Being the one who reports correctively, not just first
Polat states that how cases like Narin Güran are reported directly affects the geography, language, and framing of the news. “If a similar incident had occurred in Istanbul, the news flow would likely have proceeded in a more institutional, distant, and controlled manner,” he said. Noting that media headquarters in major cities have stronger editorial oversight mechanisms, better access to diverse sources, and faster fact-checking processes, Polat explained that in a place like Diyarbakır—where political and social sensitivities are intense—the process works differently:
“We saw reports that began as a simple missing child case in the early days evolve into a different dimension within a short time through various allegations, dark connections, and leaked information. Specifically, the leaking of certain information and documents from law enforcement and judicial sources to specific media outlets revealed a picture where relationship networks, rather than journalistic reflexes, were the determining factor.”
Polat highlighted two fundamental issues at this point: “First, the lack of a healthy distance in the relationship between the journalist and the news source strengthens a practice based on transmission rather than interrogation. This can turn the journalist into a producer of information rather than just its carrier. Second is information pollution and manipulation. Especially in sensitive cases, information served piece-by-piece can serve to direct public opinion rather than enlighten it. This creates serious perceptual confusion in society.”
Stating that both the political atmosphere and the source structure in Diyarbakır can create a ground more open to such interventions, Polat emphasized that the issue boils down to the core principle of journalism: Being the one who reports correctly, not just the one who reports first.
“Journalism was a struggle for survival”
Comparing today’s conditions with those of the 1990s and early 2000s, journalist Polat noted that Diyarbakır existed within an extraordinary atmosphere during the periods when the Kurdish issue was most intense. Describing a process in the early 90s where human rights were suspended and life was devalued, Polat explained that journalism then was not just a profession but a struggle for survival:
“People were being shot in the back of the head in broad daylight, villages were being burned, forced migrations were occurring, and enforced disappearances and torture were becoming part of daily life. Practicing journalism in such an environment was truly like wearing a ‘shirt of fire.’ The fact that on June 8, 1992, while walking from home to the newspaper office with my uncle, journalist Hafız Akdemir, we were attacked and he lost his life, is enough to explain the darkness of that era.”
Polat noted that while journalists could be massacred in the middle of the street in those years, the primary difference today is that such an overt and large-scale practice of physical elimination no longer exists. Pointing out that things are possible today that were not in the 90s, Polat said, “Thanks to digital media, news can spread much faster, and opportunities arise to make one’s voice heard through alternative channels. It is not as easy as it once was to completely blackout a story.”
Journalism is now a more heavily monitored profession
However, he explained that this situation has not eliminated pressure; rather, the methods have changed, and journalism is restricted today through different tools:
“Obstructions while following news in the field, detentions, lawsuits, long judicial processes, digital access bans, and pressures exerted through social media have come to the forefront. Direct violence has been replaced by a monitoring mechanism that appears more ‘legal’ and ‘administrative’ but has an undeniable impact. Today, while journalism is faster and more accessible on one hand, it is a profession that is more closely watched and more easily targeted on the other.”
Öznur Değer: Diyarbakır, a city that turns written fate into struggle
Öznur Değer began her career as a female journalist six years ago in Diyarbakır. For her, practicing journalism in Diyarbakır means extracting a new story from every inch of a city that has been the center of special warfare policies and state pressure since the 90s.
Journalist Öznur Değer. Source: Yeni Yaşam Newspaper
Değer states that Diyarbakır is a place where there is an attempt to alter the city’s sociology—politically, socially, economically, and culturally—ranging from drugs and prostitution to assimilation and moral decay. She also notes that it is a place where the consequences of the Kurdish issue manifest in their severest form:
“From children collecting scrap paper on the streets to the Peace Mothers crying out for peace; from families waiting for their loved ones in front of prisons to mothers searching for the bones of their children; from mothers keeping watch over their children’s graves so they won’t be desecrated to women arrested for shouting ‘Jin, jiyan, azadî’ (Woman, Life, Freedom) in the field—Amed is a deeply political place.”
“The journalists most obstructed by police are women journalists”
For Değer, being a female journalist in Diyarbakır means overcoming walls of fear with courageous pens:
“While many of our colleagues were massacred in the 90s just for reporting the truth, and more recently, while Nagihan Akarsel in Sulaymaniyah and Cihan Bilgin in Rojava were murdered for their persistence in the truth, we are practically shuttling between the police headquarters, the courthouse, and the prison. On one hand, we reveal the dimensions of ‘special warfare’ through our reports on the women most affected by it; on the other, we are investigated and prosecuted because of those very reports.”
Emphasizing that many female journalists, herself included, have been tried and arrested due to the stories they uncovered, Değer noted that they are also subjected to numerous restrictions:
“Our agency, JINNEWS, which serves as an example to the world as a women’s news agency, has been blocked by the BTK (Information and Communication Technologies Authority) numerous times, and its digital media accounts have been shut down.”
Attack on journalists in 2024, Diyarbakır. Source: MLSA
Değer also stated that as female journalists, they are engaged in a tough struggle against other journalists to counter the increasingly masculinized language of the press, noting that the journalists most obstructed by police in the field are, once again, women. Having worked as a journalist in Ankara for a period, Değer explained that Ankara is the place where the policies implemented in Diyarbakır are decided:
“I saw both the memory, the legacy, and the values of a people in Amed -along with the struggle to protect them- and I saw Ankara as the place where the decisions for the policies produced there are made. For me, one was a city writing a fate (giving the orders), while the other was a place turning that written fate into a struggle.”
“MKG makes the labor of women journalists visible”
In Diyarbakır, a city with a dense population of Kurdish and politically active people, Değer says the greatest solidarity network for female journalists is the Mesopotamia Women Journalists Association (MKG):
“MKG not only puts a spotlight on the difficulties, pressures, and problems faced by women journalists and prepares monthly reports on them, but it also works to establish a female language in the press and make the labor of women journalists -who are often marginalized- visible. In this sense, it transforms their experiences into solidarity by giving presence to women’s voices and colors, weaving together the organized struggle of women journalists.”
Değer notes that the Narin Güran case has turned into a sensationalist soap opera—a result of the sociological decay bred by “special warfare.” She states, “Rather than uncovering how and by whom Narin was murdered, many journalists, especially those coming from outside, focused on allegations of a ‘forbidden affair’ between Narin’s mother and uncle, evolving the incident into a dimension that veils the truth.”
Değer argues that if the same situation had occurred in Istanbul, the identity of a child’s killer would not remain in mystery, and the judiciary would display a different, more analytical stance:
“The fact that this happened in Kurdistan and has a political background has significant impacts. Indeed, Galip Ensarioğlu’s words in the early days of the incident, which exonerated the event and potential perpetrators, remain fresh in our memory. In Istanbul, the media—which in Amed pursued tabloid sensationalism day and night—would have focused on the perpetrators. Here, many facts were distorted by prioritizing historical, cultural, and tribal factors. Instead, the incident should have been handled as a social problem from the very beginning, pursuing the truth and all the power dynamics and elements in the background.”
Stating that journalists carry historical responsibility and conscientious obligations, Değer said the only way forward is to shout the truth fearlessly.
Murat Bayram: There is a special police group in Diyarbakır that only deals with journalists
Murat Bayram began his journalism career in 2010. After years of working for both international media and outlets broadcasting from the Kurdistan Region, Bayram now manages Botan International, which provides training for journalists and produces news in Diyarbakır. According to Bayram, practicing this profession in Diyarbakır inevitably means acquiring a political identity:
Journalist Murat Bayram
“It starts with the assumption among social, religious, and other groups that you are directly a propaganda tool. Both Kurds and the government perceive you as highly partisan. They may perceive you as a potential propaganda tool or a terrorist.”
As he worked in Istanbul for a time, Bayram noted that one can blend into the crowd while following news there. In Diyarbakır, however, he noted that there is a specific police group that only deals with journalists, who are attending every press conference, photographing journalists, knowing them by name, knowing where they work, and knowing which stories they cover, and that the pressure is more intense:
“When I first started in 2010, we would go to a story with 40-50 people. With so many journalists, you didn’t stand out much. Now, when we go to a press briefing, only 3-5 cameras show up. Everyone handles their work by gathering news from social media and agencies. This causes the existing pressure to be felt more clearly.”
“The Press Advertising Agency does not support the Kurdish language”
Bayram, who also prepares reports on the structure and problems of Kurdish media in Turkey, stated that while there are over 20 million Kurds in Turkey, there is only one news agency and only four websites broadcasting daily in Kurdish. He noted that before the end of the resolution process in 2015-2016, there were 9 television channels in Diyarbakır producing Kurdish programs, with at least 4 broadcasting exclusively in Kurdish. Currently, only Zarok TV and one local newspaper broadcast in Kurdish in Diyarbakır. Pointing out that TRT has the largest presence in Diyarbakır with over 40 media representatives, Bayram said, “It is understandable that TRT exists; what is not understandable is that only TRT exists. The only television making Kurdish news programs is the state’s television.”
Bayram mentioned that the Press Advertising Agency is the biggest sponsor of local media, yet all local newspapers are exclusively in Turkish. He explained that this is because Kurdish is not among the languages supported by the agency for publishing.
“For a Kurdish media institution to survive, it needs an economic resource,” says Bayram. According to his accounts, Google Ads does not support Kurdish in Turkey, and Kurdish media cannot receive payments from the Press Advertising Agency:
“When it’s in Kurdish, you cannot receive the advertisements that the state publishes using our own taxes. Kurdish podcasts were listed among Turkish podcasts. Kurdish music is still evaluated in the Turkish music category.”
Bayram expressed that producing Kurdish content is devalued as if it were mere volunteer work: “Reporters for Kurdish media are not exempt from rent, food costs, or vehicle costs. But while they are putting in the labor, they are exempted from receiving the wages for that labor.”
Faruk Balıkçı: In local media, you are in the ‘kitchen’ of the work
Faruk Balıkçı, who began his career at Anadolu Agency, has served as the Diyarbakır representative for outlets such as Milliyet and Hürriyet newspapers, IMC TV, and Doğan News Agency. Having worked for both national and local media for many years, Balıkçı stated that Diyarbakır is the regional center for journalism. He noted that due to the impact of wars in Iraq and Syria and the long-standing environment of conflict, Diyarbakır journalists have, in a sense, become ‘war correspondents’:
“Because of its central location and being a place where news prioritized by Turkey occurs, journalists do not just do local journalism. They simultaneously do international journalism. This makes the journalists here more effective.”
Journalist Faruk Balıkçı. Source: bianet
Balıkçı, who previously worked in mainstream media, explained that the readership and sphere of influence change between national and local newspapers:
“When you voice a local problem or negativity, officials take it into account and correct it the next day. This is important for the local area and makes one happy from a journalistic perspective. In a national newspaper, because you report on more general news, you have to access more restricted information. But if you are a local journalist, you have to exert more effort to voice the many problems experienced in the locality or region.”
Balıkçı stated that a local journalist reporting on local issues also serves a supervisory role by pointing out shortcomings.
Explaining that a journalist working for media that appeals to the general public only produces the news, while centers like Istanbul shape it, Balıkçı said: “It’s not like that in local media. In local media, you are in the kitchen of the work. You can write and present what you see in the format you want. Nothing else touches your story.”
“In this regard, local media provides more alternatives. You are freer in local media because you are in the kitchen of the work.”
Deniz Xelat Büyükkaya discusses how Rojhelat has once again become the frontline of Iran’s war against its Kurdish population, amid nationwide protests and economic collapse.
Photo of protests in Iran.
by Deniz Xelat Büyükkaya
Rojhelat (Eastern Kurdistan) or the Kurdish regions of western Iran, have once again become a key site of political tension, state repression and regional security concern. Over the past few years, Rojhelat has faced intensified government repression, increased protest activity, and rising geopolitical pressure related to regional conflicts. Latest developments show that Rojhelat remains one of the most politically sensitive regions inside Iran.
Iran has been facing nationwide protests since late 2025 because of economic collapse, rising inflation, and shortages of basic goods, fueling growing anger toward the government. The government has responded to protests with extreme repression: mass arrests, shootings of protesters, internet shutdowns, executions and death sentences.
Rojhelat: A Centre of Protest Movements
Rojhelat—especially the provinces of Kurdistan, Kermansah, West Azerbaijan, and Ilam—has long been considered by Tehran a politically sensitive border region. As a result, the Iranian state has often approached Kurdish activism through a security-focused framework shaped by fears of separatism and cross-border insurgency. Also, the region was already the centre of the nationwide “Jin, Jiyan Azadi (Woman, Life, Freedom)” movement that erupted in late 2022 after the death of Kurdish woman Jina (Mahsa) Amini in police custody.
By late 2025, Kurdish monitoring organisations reported that Iranian security forces had intensified surveillance and arrest campaigns across Rojhelat, targeting activists, journalists, and ordinary citizens. The Washington Kurdish Institute’s 2025 Annual Report notes that in November 2025 alone, 51 Kurds were detained in Iran, representing 45 percent of all recorded arrests nationwide that month.
According to Kurdistan Tribune, Kurdish regions have long been centres of anti-government protest, and state responses have often been violent. During the recent demonstrations, Rojhelat was among the most heavily affected, with security forces responding aggressively.
Many people were arrested without clear charges or proper legal procedures. This has drawn concern from international human rights organisations about fairness and legal rights in Iran’s response to political opposition. Kurdish cities often show strong political mobilisation. This is partly because of ethnic marginalisation, economic difficulties, and long-standing political grievances. In addition, Rojhelat is considered one of the less economically developed parts of Iran.
Cross-Border tension
The situation in Rojhelat cannot be completely understood without considering cross-border dynamics between Iran and Başur (Iraqi Kurdistan). While repression in Rojhelat increased, developments across the border in Başur also made the situation more tense. In March 2026, Iranian forces carried out drone strikes targeting Kurdish opposition positions in Iraqi Kurdistan, including an attack on an opposition headquarters in the town of Dekala that wounded members and damaged facilities.
These attacks were part of a broader campaign against Kurdish groups that Iran accuses of operating across the border. According to regional media reports, several Kurdish opposition sites in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah provinces, including the Koya district and nearby mountain areas, were targeted during the escalation.
Iranian officials justified these operations as necessary responses to “separatist groups” threatening national security.
Human rights concerns
Human rights organisations report that Iran has significantly increased its use of the death penalty in recent years. According to Iran Human Rights (IHR), in 2024, at least 975 executions were recorded. The number reportedly increased to around 1,500 executions in 2025, the highest level in decades.
Ethnic minorities seem to be affected more by these policies. According to a report by Hengaw around 150 Kurdish prisoners were executed in 2025. In early 2026, Hengaw also reported that at least 257 Kurdish civilians were killed during a crackdown linked to protests, including 20 children and 19 women. Many of them were accused of security-related crimes, but human rights groups often criticise the lack of fair trials and transparency in Iran’s judicial system.
Because of these numbers, many Kurds believe that the Iranian government treats Kurdish regions mainly as a security issue instead of solving political and social problems.
Image: Fazel Hawramy/Rudaw
Economic marginalisation and the Kolbar
In addition to political repression, economic conditions in Kurdish border areas are also very difficult. Rojhelat has some of the highest unemployment rates in Iran, especially among young people. Because of this, many residents work as kolbars. Kolbars are Kurdish porters who carry goods across mountain borders between Iran and neighbouring countries. The work is very dangerous and often illegal, but many people rely on it to earn living.
According to the Kurdistan Human Rights Network (KHRN) dozens of kolbars are killed each year by Iranian border forces, while many others are injured or arrested. Kurdish activists say that kolbar work continues because there are not enough stable job opportunities in the region. For many Kurdish families in border cities, kolbar work has become a symbol of the broader economic marginalisation faced by Rojhelat.
An unresolved political question
Despite decades of political tension, the Kurdish question in Iran remains unresolved. Kurdish activists continue to demand cultural rights, Kurdish language education, economic development, and greater political representation. However, Iranian authorities have continued to restrict Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights. In 2025, expressions of Kurdish identity were often treated as security offences. The Kurdish language is still largely excluded from formal education, and cultural activists promoting Kurdish language or traditions have faced arrests and intimidation.
At the same time, the Iranian government continues to view Rojhelat mainly through a security perspective because of concerns about territorial integrity and armed opposition. As Iran faces both internal dissent and regional pressure, Rojhelat is likely to remain an important indicator of the country’s political stability. For now, the Kurdish regions of Iran remain caught between protest movements, state repression, economic hardship, and regional geopolitical tensions.
In her solo exhibition “neither carnation nor frog,” Banu Cennetoğlu invites us to think about fatherhood, rights, boundaries, loss, and power.
From the exhibition “neither carnation nor frog”. Photo: artfulliving.com
Artist Banu Cennetoğlu’s solo exhibition “ne karanfil ne kurbağa” (neither carnation nor frog) was shown in Bursa at İMALAT-HANE between October 25, 2025 and January 20, 2026, curated by Yavuz Parlar. It is now viewable online at https://nknk-erika.imalat-hane.com.
Cennetoğlu is known for her long, research-based projects rooted in personal and collective memory. In a previous work, she engraved the book “Yüreğimi Dağlara Nakşettim” which is based on the diaries of Gurbetelli Ersöz, Turkey’s first female editor-in-chief, onto 145 limestone tablets. In this new exhibition, she looks at three connected ideas: power, reputation, and denial.
Banu Cennetoğlu’s work is rooted in long, careful research and draws on both personal and shared memory. Her practice often focuses on how knowledge is produced, organized, and circulated. In this exhibition, she thinks through ideas of fatherhood, rights, boundaries, loss, and power — alongside the slipperiness of both speaking and making promises. The exhibition was curated by Yavuz Parlar. The emails, arguments, and personal outpourings that Cennetoğlu and Parlar exchanged during their collaboration didn’t just shape the exhibition, they also became a companion publication called nknk-erika.
The exhibition itself didn’t come together through a typical curatorial process. Instead, it grew naturally out of the back-and-forth between the two. It started as a digital exchange, messages sent without any fixed goal in mind. Once they decided to just begin, a simple rhythm took over: each day, one would send something to the other, and the other would respond.
“The personal is also political”
In the exhibition, the figure of the father — and everything connected to it — serves as a research space that stretches from personal experience to collective memory, and from there to apologies that can never quite be made.
The exhibition also helps us remember the grief and pain carried by children who lost their fathers, fathers killed in the struggle against the system, against what might be called the “state as father”: a power and authority that defines and enforces the rules.
In a conversation with Sina Ergün, Cennetoğlu describes the exhibition like this:
“Starting from a personal place, I’d describe it roughly as a state of being haunted. Setting aside fathers and forms of fatherhood that have managed to be different, for me, fatherhood is, both personally and socially, a way of existing that is self-satisfied, certain of itself, arrogant, and apparently without doubt about the unwritten rules it considers absolute truth.
And to keep that certainty going, three things are essential: power, reputation, and denial. A structure that loves, protects and spreads these things, that punishes those who object, wants to ‘correct’ them, and feels entitled to cross other people’s boundaries, all while claiming it’s for their own good.”
Photo: artfulliving.com
Looking at fathers and children who have experienced loss in the Kurdish conflict
Viewing the exhibition and reading the conversation afterward brings to mind the enormous cost of grief carried by fathers who lost their children — and children who witnessed their fathers’ deaths — in the struggle against political violence in Kurdistan. This cost, for any hope of peace, democracy, and living together, is immense and raw. These losses leave an indescribable pain and emptiness, felt most deeply within families and close communities.
The long-term effects of this pain and absence don’t stay private. They become part of how children who lived through it see and remember the world, and through them, part of society itself. When past suffering goes unaddressed, when those responsible are never held accountable, the sense of justice fades. And with it, so does mutual trust and the hope of sharing a future together.
Looking again at Kurdish fathers and children who have experienced such loss should be understood as an act of rebuilding memory. On one hand, it means examining the fractures in the father-child relationship through a political and social lens. On the other, it means listening to the memories of children who lost their fathers to state forces — memories filled with absence, grief, and pain. This can be read either as a wound that never fully heals, or as a genuine act of resistance.
It is also worth remembering that these children are now the adults of today and tomorrow people who carry and keep reproducing an emotional memory tied to a specific period of history.
Looking at the roots of the Kurdish conflict through the inner lives of children who were left carrying the consequences of what their fathers went through will also shed light on how these collective experiences keep being reproduced inside individual lives.
As the poet Hasan Hüseyin Korkmazgil wrote – and as this exhibition reminds us – fatherhood, where the personal is as social as the social is personal, is “neither carnation nor frog.”
“Yüreğimi Dağlara Nakşettim” was exhibited at Lausanne Art Museum. Photo: ANF
About Banu Cennetoğlu
Banu Cennetoğlu works across disciplines, using archival methods to question how memory is shaped, and how knowledge is produced, shared, and consumed. Her solo exhibitions have been shown at institutions including Kunsthal Charlottenborg, Copenhagen (2025); Sylvia Kouvali, Athens (2024); K21 Ständehaus, Kunstsammlung Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf (2019); Sculpture Center, New York (2019); Chisenhale Gallery, London (2018); Bonner Kunstverein (2015); Salonul de proiecte, Bucharest (2013); and Kunsthalle Basel (2011). She has participated in numerous group exhibitions and biennials in Berlin, Istanbul, Liverpool, Gwangju, Athens, and Venice, as well as Manifesta 8 in Murcia, documenta 14 in Athens/Kassel, and the 58th Carnegie International in Pittsburgh. Cennetoğlu is the founder of BAS, an artist-run initiative in Istanbul focused on artist books and printed matter, and serves as an advisor at the Rijksakademie in Amsterdam. She lives and works in Istanbul.
Emami and Talebi stated that the “Iran War,” which has temporarily subsided with a two-week ceasefire, has deepened the fault lines within Iranian society, and that what is currently visible is not “promising.”
On February 28, the US and Israel began attacking Iran. As of April 8, a two-week ceasefire has been declared. But people are still debating the war’s effects and what comes next. We spoke with sociologist Dr. Mehrdad Emami and Iranian journalist Reza Talebi about what’s happening inside Iran and how it’s affecting ordinary people.
Dr. Emami pointed out that before the war, millions of Iranians were protesting side by side against the government. These protests, led mostly by middle and working class people, were strong enough that some called it a near-revolutionary moment. “In many central areas, Iranians were protesting hard, demanding the government be brought down. The state responded with a massacre,” he said.
He also noted that in the December-January protests, a royalist movement (Pahlavism, supporters of the old Shah monarchy) had a growing influence. Many satellite TV channels broadcasting from outside Iran are pro-Pahlavi and backed by the West. Emami said it was predictable that after the Mahsa Amini protests, this far-right nationalist movement would become more organized than leftist or pro-freedom groups. He also blamed the left and feminists for failing to produce a strong leading figure after the Amini protests.
Pahlavism is making divisions worse
Emami noted that according to official figures, over 3,000 people have been killed in the war so far, as a massive trauma for society. He argued that the Pahlavi movement is deepening existing splits:
“Iranian nationalists who spent years calling leftists and feminists traitors are now supporting the continuation of the war alongside the US and Israel. And even though millions of Iranians oppose the current government, being bombed every day pushes people toward wanting peace, not regime change. When your home is damaged and your life is at risk, the most urgent thing becomes stopping the war.”
He also noted a shift among minority communities (Kurds, Baluch, Arabs and others) who have historically been oppressed both under the Shah and under the Islamic Republic.
“These regions were actually at the center of the most recent uprisings, partly because they are resource-rich but their people remain poor. Yet in the December–January protests, turnout in these regions was low, which drew criticism from the nationalist groups leading those protests. As the result, groups that had been coming together in recent movements are now more fragmented than before.”
“Don’t underestimate political Islam”
Emami warned against dismissing political Islam in Iran:
“The left lost the 1979 revolution partly for this reason,” he said. He pointed to the Iran-Iraq war, which lasted 8 years, longer than expected, because the Iranian state at that time was young and still seen as somewhat legitimate, both at home and internationally. The world hadn’t yet seen its true nature.”
He also said that even some pro-war Pahlavi supporters are now split, because Iranians can see that the US is killing civilians and bombing Iran’s infrastructure. “Over time it has become clear that the US main goal is to weaken Iran’s oil, nuclear, and military capabilities, not to liberate its people” he said.
“This war is being fought more in the media than on the ground”
Journalist Reza Talebi said it’s sad that Iranians are stuck between two bad options for information: Iran’s official state media, which can’t go beyond slogans and denial, and international media driven mainly by profit. He added that print journalism in Iran is barely surviving, and most people are now entirely dependent on social media.
“Tension levels are high”
Talebi also spoke about the situation of Kurds and other minority communities living in Iran, and what might happen next:
“I don’t have a full picture of everything being discussed about Kurds, Turks, Arabs, and Baluch people in Iran, but the social and ethnic divisions are nothing new, and they aren’t just caused by the war.
These divisions do get deeper in wartime, of course, and they can lead to new conflicts. Tension levels are high. On top of the divisions between Kurds, Turks, Arabs, and Baluch, there are also splits between religious and secular people, and even if these cracks aren’t fully visible right now, they are very dangerous. If things aren’t handled carefully, situations similar to Syria or Afghanistan are possible.
I can’t see a clear future for Iran, and I also can’t pretend to be an expert on everything. I could be wrong but what I see doesn’t look hopeful. Iranian society is fragile and unpredictable. Maybe shared suffering can create some kind of balance.”
Despite snowy weather, villagers in Kargapazar (in Bingöl province, eastern Turkey) held a protest against a planned Geothermal Power Plant (GPP) project. They carried a banner reading “No to Geothermal.”
A US-based company called Ignis H2 Energy wants to build a geothermal power plant (GPP) in the Karlıova district of Bingöl. The project would affect 6 villages in the area. The problem is it would be built on an active earthquake fault line, just like a similar project the same company is pushing in nearby Varto.
Despite the snowfall, the people of Kargapazar village held their protests against the geothermal energy project on April 10th.
During the demonstration held in front of the Social Aid and Solidarity Association, a banner with “No to Geothermal Energy” was displayed.
Mehmet Ali Harmancı, a member of the Kargapazar Ecology Platform, stated that the project would negatively impact their living areas and the pastures used for agriculture and livestock. Harmancı emphasized that this project is directly related to expansionist and imperialist policies and institutions, explaining that natural resources are being targeted because of these policies.
Earthquake risk threatens thousands of lives
Following Harmancı’s statement, Kasım Demiralp, a member of the Kargapazar Ecology Platform, read a press release, stating that the GPP project was being carried out disregarding scientific facts:
“The geography we live in is a region with active fault lines and a high risk of earthquakes. Despite this sensitive structure, the desire to drill dozens of geothermal wells seriously endangers not only nature but also human lives. These projects, carried out by ignoring scientific facts, could lead to irreversible consequences.”
Demiralp also pointed out that drilling and injection operations carried out on fault lines pose an earthquake risk and threaten the living spaces of thousands of people.
“Our right to a healthy life cannot be disregarded for the sake of any self-interest.”
The statement also emphasized that the GPP project would pollute underground water resources, render agricultural areas unproductive, and negatively impact livestock farming and the ecosystem.
Demiralp emphasized that Article 56 of the Constitution, which states “Everyone has the right to live in a healthy and balanced environment,” cannot be disregarded for the sake of any project, company, or interest.
Their demand was to stop the geothermal projects immediately. “Nothing should proceed without the consent of local people” said Demiralp.
Mazlum Özdemir, one of the coordinators of Kurdish Monitoring, divides demands regarding the Kurdish language under two heading directed at the state and at Kurdish society: “Demands directed at the state can quite clearly be formulated as the removal of all legal and practical barriers placed before the Kurdish language in the public sphere.”
*Kurdish Language Day event in Şırnak / Photo: Yeni Yaşam Newspaper
Mazlum Özdemir, one of the coordinators of the Kurdish Monitoring platform, which is established in 2024 to track bans and restrictions on the use of Kurdish in the public sphere, spoke about the assimilation policies that have persisted in Turkey since the founding of the Republic, as well as the initiative’s goals. Özdemir said that the state structure shaped around Turkish national identity has systematically disregarded Kurds and the Kurdish language, and that they therefore view all violations as a serious matter that must be documented.
Kurdish Monitoring, launched in 2024 by a group of journalists, records the pressures exerted against the Kurdish language. Noting that the assimilation policy applied since the founding of the Republic has targeted Kurds, Özdemir says: “In order to institutionalize the Republic of Turkey’s structure, which was built upon the Turkish ethnic nation, all other ethnic, religious, and cultural identities were disregarded, subjected to assimilation, and exposed to massacre. Kurds and the Kurdish language received their share of this as well.” In this context, Özdemir recalls that the Law on the Maintenance of Order and other laws enacted during the Republican era denied the very existence of Kurds and banned Kurdish from the public sphere, adding: “The aim was to assimilate and eliminate Kurdish, just like all other languages spoken on these lands.”
This policy effectively continues to this day
Mazlum Özdemir emphasizes that despite some legal adjustments made after the 1990s, the use of Kurdish remains banned: “Starting from the 1990s, certain legal regulations were made and some of the barriers before Kurdish were lifted — but both legally and in physical, practical terms, the use of Kurdish in Turkey is banned. People are attacked and killed for speaking Kurdish in the street. Artists and attendees are detained and arrested for singing Kurdish songs at weddings. Kurdish-language concerts are banned by governors or mayors. The ‘right of mothers to speak Kurdish with their children in prison,’ which President Erdoğan has repeatedly claimed to have lifted and boasted about, is still banned. Kurdish publications cannot enter prisons; books written in Kurdish are blocked by prison administrations and cannot be sent outside.”
We aimed to make systematic repression visible
Describing how the initiative came about, Özdemir says: “We want the barriers to the use of Kurdish in Turkey to become visible, and to show that a systematic policy of obstruction is being applied.” He notes that while this situation is known to the public, it is often forgotten amid the intensity of the daily news agenda: “In the chaos of the day, these things often remain as stories we read and move past. Yet this is a serious violation against a language, and they need to be brought together in a systematic way — because the obstruction itself is systematic. It is not isolated or sporadic. These barriers and bans arise as the result of a policy and an ideological approach.”
Stating that they currently share their reports with the public and the media, Özdemir adds that they will also share them with national and international institutions: “The issue has an international dimension as much as a national one. Turkey is a country that has for years sought to become a member of the European Union and has undertaken certain efforts toward that goal. It is important to present, in the form of systematic reports, how a country seeking membership in the Union approaches human rights and language rights.”
Mazlum Özdemir emphasizes that they collect their data entirely from open sources: “News published in conventional media and social media, along with statements and reports released by civil society organizations, make up our sources.” However, he adds that the pressures faced by the Kurdish language are far greater than what appears in these outlets: “We also know from our daily experience that the reactions shown to people speaking Kurdish among themselves on the street or on the phone, or speaking Kurdish at school, at the grocery store, or at the hospital, are very rarely reflected anywhere. There are barriers and pressures that arise from covert racism.” Despite this, Özdemir notes that their physical and technical infrastructure remains limited, saying they currently document violations under only four main headings: “We report violations in the areas of media, prisons, public space, and culture and arts.”
The state spread assimilation through all public instruments
Describing the tools of assimilation policy, Özdemir argues that the state denied the Kurdish language through schools, media, and academia. “The Republic’s assimilation policy was shaped around the premise that Kurdish did not exist — and when that could no longer be sustained, around the premise that it was not a language. Once that became the policy, its instruments had to be set in motion. Schools became an important tool for banning Kurdish from the public sphere. Media emerges as another instrument. And these have now merged with today’s digital technology,” he says.
He goes on to describe how this process operated:
“Schools, media, academia, and all other instruments spent years propagandizing this and putting this policy into practice. Kurdish was prevented from becoming a language of education; children who spoke Kurdish at home were unable to speak it at school, and when they did, they faced systematic pressure from teachers. Teachers would assign one student among their peers the task of finding out whether children were speaking Kurdish at home — and when that student heard or saw children speaking Kurdish at home, they would report it to the teacher, causing those other children to be punished and beaten.”
Özdemir notes that this mechanism of repression was also sustained through the media: “Universities and the publications they produced spent years propagandizing that Kurds do not exist and that Kurdish is not a language. The media was used as a platform through which these policies were reproduced and disseminated.”
The warning of ‘self-assimilation’
According to Özdemir, despite all these pressures, Kurdish resisted assimilation for many years. However, he says that in recent times the concept of “self-assimilation” has also entered the conversation. “Particularly over the last 20 years, Kurds have begun using the concept of self-assimilation almost as much as assimilation itself,” he says. He explains the reason as follows: “For many years, Kurdish put up serious resistance to assimilation. Yet, particularly over the last 20 years — though it existed before as well — Kurds have begun using the concept of self-assimilation almost as frequently as assimilation. Because for some time now, certain voices have been suggesting that assimilation has been ‘successful,’ and it is acknowledged that self-assimilation is also being observed on a significant scale.”
Noting that even in villages, parents speaking Turkish with their children illustrates the extent of self-assimilation, Özdemir says: “When there is no Kurdish-language education in schools, when Kurdish television and digital media are banned and blocked, and when extra effort is made to ensure Turkish-language media reaches everywhere in response — it should come as no surprise that such an outcome would follow.”
Demands: To the state and to society
Mazlum Özdemir groups the demands regarding the Kurdish language under two headings: those directed at the state and those directed at Kurdish society. He lists the responsibilities that fall to the state as follows:
“Demands directed at the state can quite clearly be formulated as the removal of all legal and practical barriers placed before the Kurdish language in the public sphere. That is: Kurdish must become a language of education and be present at all levels of schooling; official space must be opened for Kurdish in all public institutions and organizations; barriers before Kurdish-language media must be eliminated; and the obstruction of cultural and artistic activities must come to an end. In short, all barriers must be removed and active encouragement must be provided so that Kurdish is officially recognized, becomes widespread, and can be learned and taught.”
He also draws attention to the responsibilities of Kurdish society and politics: “In parallel with these steps, Kurds themselves must use Kurdish in every area of their daily and public lives and resist assimilation as they have in the past. As for Kurdish politics — beyond reminding the state of its duties and responsibilities on this matter, it must also be criticized for not using Kurdish more within its own internal mechanisms, and public pressure must be built to push it toward taking steps in that direction. Because while the state bears responsibility for assimilation, Kurdish society and the political movement bear responsibility for self-assimilation.”
“This is probably the first time that the France Foreign Ministry communicated with a shareholder who fired a journalist in order to please a good client,” said Čubrilo-Filipović, the journalist dismissed by Le Figaro.
Milica Čubrilo-Filipović, Photo: The Association of Independent Electronic Media (ANEM)
Journalist Milica Čubrilo-Filipović was dismissed earlier this year from the France-based Le Figaro, where she had worked for eight years.
In an interview with the Serbian publication Vreme, Čubrilo-Filipović stated that her dismissal was triggered by Frédéric Mondoloni, the Political Director of the France Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who informed a shareholder of Dassault—the company that owns Le Figaro—that they had a “politically active” correspondent in Belgrade.
According to a report by N1, Čubrilo-Filipović claimed to have received written confirmation of these statements from her editor [the World section editor], adding that what was written there had also been verbally communicated to her by the deputy director of the newsroom. Čubrilo-Filipović further noted that the trade union supported her stance and that her case sets a precedent.
In her remarks to N1, Čubrilo-Filipović also shared: “A few years ago, I asked my colleagues how free they were regarding their reporting. They told me there were certain limits. One of these was that the government should not be criticized in countries where Rafale fighter jets are sold.”
The Dassault Group also operates in the aerospace and defense sector (Dassault Aviation). Furthermore, in 2024, the Serbian government signed an official contract to purchase Rafale fighter jets manufactured by Dassault Aviation.
In his statement to N1 regarding the allegations of Čubrilo-Filipović’s dismissal, Philippe Gélie, Deputy Managing Editor of Le Figaro, said in summary:
“I understand that she accuses us of trampling on press freedom and presents herself as a victim of this alleged behaviour. We asked Ms. Čubrilo, and not for the first time, to respect our standards of journalistic quality, in order to limit the amount of editing and rewriting required for her work. We also asked her to refrain from political activism, which violates the obligation of journalistic neutrality and could affect the reputation of Le Figaro.”
While journalism organizations such as the Serbia-based ANEM (Association of Independent Electronic Media), NUNS (Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia), and the SJN (SafeJournalists Network) have drawn attention to Čubrilo-Filipović’s dismissal, no statements regarding the issue have been seen from other professional journalism bodies, most notably the France-based RSF (Reporters Without Borders).
Who is Milica Čubrilo-Filipović?
Born in Carthage, Tunisia, in 1969, Milica Čubrilo-Filipović is a Serbian former diplomat and journalist. She earned her undergraduate degree in law from Panthéon-Assas University in France in 1992, followed by a master’s degree in anthropology from the Sorbonne University in 1993.
Čubrilo-Filipović served as Le Figaro’s Balkans correspondent from 2000 to 2003. Between 2003 and 2006, she worked as the Director of the National Tourism Organisation of Serbia. She held the position of Serbia’s Minister of Diaspora in 2007-2008 and later served as the Serbian Ambassador to Tunisia from 2010 to 2013. Stepping away from politics in 2014, she returned to Le Figaro in 2018, where she worked until January 2026.
“The student protests marked the first point of disagreement”
Niha+ reached out to Milica Čubrilo-Filipović to ask about the allegations she raised and the events surrounding her dismissal. Noting that she was told her “political past” was the reason for her termination, Čubrilo-Filipović stated that this was merely an excuse for Le Figaro.
Čubrilo-Filipović stated, “My political background is just an excuse for them. They knew very well that I had posts in the government during the post-Milošević period, a time when many in the diaspora returned to help the country. It was Figaro itself that asked me to come back in 2018. I had already worked with them from 2000 to 2003. Since 2018, there had never been any conflict regarding my past. The disagreements began with the outbreak of tremendous protests in Serbia led by students.”
Noting that her first disagreement with Le Figaro’s management dates back to when students cycled to Strasbourg, home to the Council of Europe, to protest the Vučić government, Čubrilo-Filipović said: “The editor-in-chief changed the word ‘students’ in my article to ‘demonstrators,’ claiming I had too much ‘empathy’ for the students. Just like that, the whole point was gone. We had our second and final disagreement over an article I wrote about the Serbs in Kosovo, where I insisted that they were caught in the crossfire. On one side was Albin Kurti, who is in the process of creating an Albanian-centric Kosovo; on the other was the Belgrade-controlled, corrupt, and criminal Srpska Lista.”
Claim: “The request came from the France Foreign Ministry“
Čubrilo-Filipović, pointing out French President Emmanuel Macron’s support for Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, continued:
“It must be underlined that Macron has shown immense support for Vučić in recent years, and especially over the past year. Macron was one of the few European Union heads of state (alongside Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán) to invite Vučić to his country while the wave of protests in Serbia was ongoing.”
Macron and Vučić, Photo: a2 News
Milica Čubrilo-Filipović stated that press freedom in France is becoming increasingly limited. She noted that the situation she experienced is unprecedented:
“Press freedom in France is becoming increasingly limited. This is probably the first time where the France Foreign Ministry (following a possible intervention from Belgrade) communicated with a shareholder and the latest fired a journalist in order to please a good client. This is a doubly scandalous ignorance of media independence.”
Additionally, Čubrilo-Filipović points out that she has never written about the Rafale fighter jets purchased by Serbia.
“The regime in Serbia is attempting to silence independent voices“
Noting that press freedom is also being restricted in Serbia, Čubrilo-Filipović said that the government is attempting to shut down several independent media outlets:
“Press freedom in Serbia is becoming worse day by day. The regime is doing its best to silence every independent voice. Another example of this is their negotiations with United Media, an international corporation, and their attempts to shut down the only remaining independent media outlets. Namely the N1 and Nova television stations, as well as the Radar, Nova, and Danas newspapers.
This situation reminds me of the Milošević era, when the international press was expelled from the country and journalists were no longer granted visas. Back to the 90s… Furthermore, on 29 March, many journalists covering the local elections were beaten up right before the eyes of the police.”
France-Serbia trade is expanding
Photo: South China Morning Post
Čubrilo-Filipović also addressed the trade relations and investments between France and Serbia. Noting that the initial payments for the purchased fighter jets were made last December, she continued:
“The French government and Dassault are more than happy to continue doing business with the Serbian government, regardless of the regime. The initial payment for the 12 Rafale fighter jets, which the country absolutely does not need, was made to Dassault last December.
The total value of this deal, signed in August 2024, is 2,7 billion euros. Meanwhile, French companies continue to sign new contracts in Serbia. We can point to companies like Alstom, Egis, Vinci, and Veolia in railway and metro projects for example.”
In 2018, Vinci took over the operations and modernization rights of the Belgrade Nikola Tesla Airport under a 25-year concession. The total value of the investment was announced as €1.46 billion.
Veolia, alongside Japan’s Itochu and the Marguerite Fund, is spearheading a project to close Belgrade’s Vinča landfill and replace it with a modern waste-to-energy facility.
Meanwhile, Egis and Alstom are bringing the planned Belgrade metro project to life. Backed by funding from the French government, the massive infrastructure project is being executed by French engineering firms.
Additionally, the France-based tire manufacturer Michelin operates a factory in the Serbian city of Pirot, while the energy and technology company Schneider Electric has its R&D and Software Center located in Novi Sad.
