The developments occurring since January 2026 involving attacks on Rojava in Syria as well as the strikes launched by Israel and the US against Iran starting on February 28 are also impacting the process reportedly ongoing in Turkey between Abdullah Öcalan and state or government authorities.

PKK guerrillas at a symbolic weapon burning ceremony / Photo: Channel8
Approximately one and a half years have passed since MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli’s statement on October 22, 2024, in which he referred to PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan by saying: “If the isolation is lifted, let him come and speak at the DEM Party group meeting in the TBMM, and let him shout that terrorism has completely ended and the organization has been disbanded.”
Since that date, in the period that the Turkish state has called “Terror-Free Turkey” and that is referred to in public discourse as the “Second Solution Process,” “Peace Process,” or simply “the Process,” the Kurdish side has come to the fore with concrete steps such as the dissolution of the PKK and the burning of weapons. On the state side, however, no concrete progress has yet been made regarding the legal regulations stated to be necessary for the continuation of the process. The establishment of a “process commission” with the participation of all parties in the Parliament except one party with a group, and the report prepared by this commission after a long working schedule, is the only concrete step that has stood out so far.
On the other hand, Bahçeli’s statement on March 24, 2026, at the TBMM group meeting — “There is no point in suffocating the process, rushing it, or inflaming the debates” — and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s harsh messages, especially after the Newroz celebrations, have increased the question marks regarding the course of the process.
DEM Party sources point to April and May while expressing their expectations for legal regulations, and the latest developments are bringing a comprehensive assessment of how the process has progressed from the past to the present back onto the agenda.
The 2015 Breaking Point: From the Solution Process to Security Policies
In fact, Öcalan and the PKK have repeatedly stated since 1993, and more intensively from 2000 onwards, that they wanted to solve the Kurdish issue through political means with a radical ideological transformation, and they declared that they regarded peace as a strategic issue. However, because Turkey approached a solution to the Kurdish issue due to internal and external conjunctural reasons, the dialogues and processes conducted so far have not reached a permanent solution.

In this context, the most remarkable period is the solution process carried out between 2012 and 2015. This solution process effectively ended with President Erdoğan’s statement on March 22, 2015: “I do not find the Dolmabahçe Consensus correct,” after the Syrian Kurds defeated ISIS in Kobani and it became clear that the AKP government would not be able to form a government in the June 2015 elections and that an agreement with the Kurdish political movement on “presidency” could not be made. Subsequently, in line with the “Collapse Plan” decision taken at the National Security Council (MGK) meeting in October 2014, comprehensive security operations were launched against the PKK and the Kurdish political movement in general. In the following nine years, not only North Kurdistan but also the South (Federated Kurdistan) and West (Rojava) parts were included, and the Kurdish people and the PKK became the target of an all-out war waged with all its might by the Turkish state.
While the state’s policies of “ending terrorism” that it had been pursuing for years in the Kurdish issue continued, unexpected statements came from the state front towards the end of 2024, and a meeting was held with Öcalan, who had been held under heavy isolation for 43 months. Thus, a new process in the Kurdish issue began to be discussed again.

October 1, 2024
Bahçeli shakes hands with DEM Party members in the Parliament.
A remarkable contact that took place on October 1, 2024, at the opening of the new legislative year of the TBMM, was interpreted as a harbinger of a “new political climate” in public opinion. Bahçeli went to the DEM Party rows and shook hands with Co-Chair Tuncer Bakırhan and other deputies. This gesture created wide repercussions both in the Parliament hall and in public opinion. When journalists asked about the meaning of this handshake, Bahçeli said, “We are entering a new era. While we want peace in the world, we must also establish peace in our own country.”
On the same day, in his speech at the General Assembly of the Parliament, President Erdoğan also used the expressions: “It must now be accepted as a fact. Today, against Israeli aggression, both at home and abroad, grounds for reconciliation must be brought to the fore rather than fields of conflict.”
October 22, 2024
Bahçeli’s call to Öcalan at the group meeting.
Following these statements, on October 22, 2024, at his party’s group meeting, Bahçeli directly addressed Öcalan and made the following call: “If the isolation is lifted, let him come and speak at the DEM Party group meeting in the TBMM, and let him shout that terrorism has completely ended and the organization has been disbanded. If he shows this determination and resolve, the way for the legal regulation regarding the use of the right of hope will be opened wide… Here is the challenge, we are ready for it.”
October 24, 2024
Ömer Öcalan shares message from İmralı.
On October 24, 2024, DEM Party Urfa MP Ömer Öcalan announced that they had met with Abdullah Öcalan in İmralı the previous day and shared Öcalan’s message: “The isolation continues. If the conditions are formed, I have the theoretical and practical power to pull this process from the ground of conflict and violence to the legal and political ground.”
October 30, 2024
Ahmet Özer’s arrest and trustee appointment.
However, these signs towards a solution and peace in the Kurdish issue were overshadowed by ongoing trustee appointments and ban decisions. The practices of the Ministry of Interior once again raised the question: “Is a solution really wanted in the Kurdish issue?”
Ahmet Özer, who was elected Mayor of Esenyurt within the scope of the “urban consensus” made between the CHP and the DEM Party in the local elections, was arrested on October 30, 2024, on charges of “membership in the PKK/KCK armed terrorist organization.” The next day, Istanbul Deputy Governor Can Aksoy was appointed as trustee in his place.
November 2024
Trustees appointed to DEM Party municipalities.
Subsequently, in November 2024, trustees were appointed one after another to the DEM Party municipalities of Mardin, Batman, Urfa Halfeti, Dersim, and Van Bahçesaray, on the grounds of “terrorism” sentences against the co-mayors.
November 21, 2024
New ban on lawyer visits to Öcalan.
On top of all this, on November 21, 2024, the lawyers of the Asrın Law Office, who had requested a meeting with Öcalan, learned that a new six-month ban on lawyer visits to their client Öcalan had been imposed on November 6.
November 26, 2024
Bahçeli repeats his call.
On November 26, Bahçeli said at his party’s TBMM Group Meeting: “We stand exactly behind what we have said since our group meeting on October 22, 2024. We expect face-to-face contact between İmralı and the DEM Group without delay, and we repeat our call with determination.”
December 28, 2024
DEM Party MPs visit İmralı.
After a long period, on December 28, 2024, DEM Party MPs Sırrı Süreyya Önder and Pervin Buldan met with Öcalan in İmralı. The next day, the delegation shared Öcalan’s message with the public: “Strengthening Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood again is a historic responsibility.”
December 30, 2024
KCK’s statement on the solution will.
Then, on December 30, 2024, KCK Executive Council Co-Chair Besê Hozat, in her statement to Medya Haber, said: “We stand behind the solution will shown by our Leadership. The Turkish state, the AKP-MHP government, the government and the opposition as a whole, the state itself must show a real solution will.”
January 2025
İmralı Delegation holds meetings in parliament.
Throughout January 2025, the İmralı Delegation held meetings with the parties with groups in the TBMM: MHP, AKP, CHP, Future Party, DEVA Party, Felicity Party, and New Welfare Party. After these meetings, the delegation met with Öcalan for the second time on January 22, 2025.
February 13, 2025
KCK announces letter from Öcalan.
On February 13, 2025, KCK Executive Council Co-Chair Cemil Bayık stated that they had received a letter from Öcalan and said, “We are carrying out a work to pull the Kurdish issue from the ground of war to the ground of democratization.” However, two days after this statement, on February 15, on the anniversary of Öcalan’s capture in Turkey, the Ministry of Interior appointed a trustee to Van Metropolitan Municipality.
February 18, 2025
Operations and arrests against HDK.
While these developments were taking place, on February 18, 2025, operations were carried out against the Peoples’ Democratic Congress (HDK). A total of 52 people, including political party executives, unionists, artists, and journalists, were detained; 30 of them were arrested on February 21. HDK Co-Spokesperson Meral Danış Beştaş criticized these operations by calling them “a conspiracy against peace.”
February 27, 2025
Öcalan’s “Call for Peace and Democratic Society”.
The DEM Party delegation met with Öcalan in İmralı on February 27, 2025. After the meeting, the delegation shared Öcalan’s message with the public in Istanbul.
In the message titled “Call for Peace and Democratic Society,” Öcalan used the following expressions: “In this climate formed by Mr. Devlet Bahçeli’s call, Mr. President’s demonstrated will, and the positive approaches of other political parties to the known call, I am making a call to lay down arms and I take on the historic responsibility of this call. Like every contemporary society and party whose existence has not been forcibly terminated, convene your congress and decide for integration with the state and society; all groups should lay down their arms and the PKK should dissolve itself.”
March 1, 2025
PKK announces a ceasefire.
Following Öcalan’s call, the PKK announced a ceasefire on March 1. In its statement, the PKK said: “To open the way for the implementation of the Call for Peace and Democratic Society, we declare a ceasefire effective from today. Beyond that, matters such as laying down arms can only be realized with the practical leadership of Leader Apo. We are ready to hold the party congress in the way Leader Apo wants. However, for this to happen, a secure environment must be formed and Leader Apo’s personal guidance and execution are required for the success of the congress.”
March 21, 2025
Newroz celebrations with millions of participants.
Afterwards, Kurds celebrated Newroz 2025 on March 21 with the participation of millions of people in four parts of Kurdistan and many cities around the world. The intensity of participation in Newroz was interpreted by the Kurdish press as support for Öcalan’s call.
March 19, 2025
Ekrem İmamoğlu detained and arrested.
After Newroz, the agenda was shaken by the arrest of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality President Ekrem İmamoğlu. İmamoğlu, who was detained on March 19, 2025, within the scope of investigations initiated on charges of “terrorism” and “corruption” regarding the “urban consensus,” was arrested on March 23, 2025. The Kurdish movement evaluated İmamoğlu’s arrest as a “provocative intervention” in the process.
April 15, 2025
Sırrı Süreyya Önder hospitalized and passes away.
Shortly after, DEM Party Istanbul MP and İmralı delegation member Sırrı Süreyya Önder was taken to the hospital on April 15 due to a heart condition he suffered in Istanbul. Önder fought for life in intensive care for 18 days but could not be saved and passed away on May 3, 2025. Thousands of people bid farewell to Önder on his final journey with the slogan “Our word to Sırrı will be peace.”
May 8, 2025
DEM Party statement on assassination suspicion.
Five days after the funeral, the DEM Party made a statement: “On April 2, the parking attendant noticed a sound coming from the tires while using Sırrı Süreyya Önder’s vehicle and took the vehicle to the service. In the examination, a sharp metal device made of iron that could puncture the left rear tire was found placed there.” After this information was shared, the question “Was an assassination carried out against Sırrı Süreyya?” began to be discussed in public opinion.
May 12, 2025
PKK decides to dissolve itself and lay down arms.
During the days when Önder’s mourning was observed, on May 12, 2025, the PKK announced that it had dissolved itself and laid down its arms. In its statement, the PKK said: “Our congress was held safely despite the difficult conditions in which conflicts continued, aerial and ground attacks continued, and the siege on our areas and the KDP embargo continued… The PKK has completed its historic mission. The 12th Congress of the PKK has decided to dissolve the organizational structure of the PKK and end the armed struggle method, thus ending the activities carried out under the name of the PKK.” Following this decision, many discussions for and against began in different circles, and the question “What steps will the state take?” settled on the agenda of society. In the statement from the KCK, it was announced that many forces that did not want the PKK to lay down arms wanted to meet with the KCK.
July 9, 2025
Öcalan’s first video call since 1999.
Öcalan made a new call on July 9, 2025. This time, however, his call was a video call. This was Öcalan’s first video appearance since 1999. In the video, Öcalan said, “I continue to defend the Call for Peace and Democratic Society dated February 27, 2025,” and stated, “As a general aspect of the process, the voluntary laying down of arms and the comprehensive commission work to be established by law in the TBMM are important.”
July 11, 2025
Peace and Democratic Society Group burns their weapons.
Based on Öcalan’s words in this video message — “Without falling into the sterility of ‘you first, me first,’ attention and sensitivity must be shown in taking steps” — the KCK took the first step. Under the leadership of KCK Executive Council Co-Chair Besê Hozat, the “Peace and Democratic Society Group,” consisting of 30 guerrillas, 15 of whom were women, burned their weapons on July 11, 2025, in a ceremony attended by many journalists and representatives of civil society organizations.
August 5, 2025
First meeting of the parliamentary commission.
Following this ceremony, a 51-member commission chaired by TBMM Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş, which included political parties with groups in the Parliament (except the İYİ Party), held its first meeting on August 5 regarding the solution process. The name of the commission was determined as the “National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission.”
August 10, 2025
Bahçeli’s statement on TV100.
On August 10, speaking to TV100, Bahçeli stated that the process would be completed by the end of the year and that the PKK’s burning of weapons carried a strong message, saying, “Weapons can be dug up again if buried; burning them means ‘we will never lay our hands on weapons again.’”
August 19, 2025
White Toros incident in front of the TBMM.
On August 19, a white Toros car was set on fire in front of the TBMM before the fourth meeting of the “National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission.”
August 28, 2025
DEM Party İmralı Delegation meets with Öcalan.
On August 28, the DEM Party İmralı Delegation met with Öcalan. In the statement, it was stated that Öcalan said in the meeting, “Democratic society, peace, and integration are the three key concepts of this process, and a result can be reached on this basis,” and that he emphasized “the need for a new stage in which steps are taken urgently in all dimensions.”
September 25, 2025
DEM Party statement on the legal phase.
On September 25, in its statement, the DEM Party said that the commission in the Parliament was about to complete the listening phase and stated, “With the opening of the Parliament, the first phase, which we can describe as the political and social phase, will give way to the second phase, which we describe as the legal phase.” The DEM Party announced that in the second phase of the process, the commission would focus on legislative work and that they had prepared proposals on issues such as the Transitional Period Law, Enforcement Law, changes in the TMK, TCK, and CMK, trustee regulations, democratization of local governments, combating discrimination, and education in the mother tongue.
October 1, 2025
President Erdoğan’s message of thanks.
On October 1, at the Opening Meeting of the 4th Legislative Year of the 28th Term of the TBMM, President Erdoğan thanked Devlet Bahçeli and the DEM Party for conducting the process.
October 7, 2025
Bahçeli proposes a delegation to meet Öcalan.
At the MHP Parliamentary Group Meeting on October 7, Bahçeli suggested that a delegation of commission members meet face-to-face with Öcalan and asked Öcalan to make a call for the SDF to lay down arms.
October 13, 2025
Asrın Law Office visits İmralı.
On October 13, lawyers from the Asrın Law Office visited Abdullah Öcalan on İmralı Island. Öcalan said, “The principle of hope is a step that the state must take. It needs to remove this burden. This is an issue that affects thousands of people.”
October 26, 2025
KÖH announces withdrawal to Media Defense Areas.
On October 26, at a press conference organized in Kandil under the name of the Kurdistan Freedom Movement (KÖH) Administration because the PKK had dissolved itself, it was announced that all guerrilla forces posing a conflict risk within Turkey’s borders were being withdrawn to the “Media Defense Areas.” On November 17, it was announced that the armed forces had also withdrawn from the Zap area in northern Iraq. The KÖH Administration stated that it believed “this new step would serve peace and democratization in Turkey.”
November 18, 2025
Bahçeli announces his intent to go to İmralı.
On November 18, Bahçeli announced in his MHP group speech that if no one met with Öcalan, he would go to İmralı with three of his friends.
November 21, 2025
CHP objects as the commission votes “Yes”.
On November 21, the CHP announced that it was against the commission’s meeting with Öcalan. On the same day, the commission’s eighteenth meeting was held. In the closed session of the meeting, the proposal to meet with Öcalan was accepted with the “Yes” votes of the AK Party, MHP, DEM Party, TİP, and EMEP.
November 24, 2025
Committee visits İmralı.
On November 24, a committee formed by the AK Party, MHP, and DEM Party from the “National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission” went to İmralı and met with Öcalan.
August 2, 2025
First clashes between SDF and Syrian transitional government forces.
Meanwhile, from August 2025 onwards, many developments with a high probability of affecting the process in Turkey took place in Syria and Rojava. The first clashes between armed forces affiliated with the Syrian transitional government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), whose backbone is formed by Kurds, occurred on August 2, 2025, near Deyr Hafir and El-Kefse. The clashes intensified in September around Aleppo and its surroundings.
December 26, 2025
Clashes begin in Şêx Meqsûd and Eşrefiye.
On December 26, clashes began between armed forces affiliated with the Syrian transitional government and Kurdish security forces in the Şêx Meqsûd and Eşrefiye neighborhoods. The parties had signed an agreement on April 1, 2025, foreseeing that only Kurdish security forces would remain in the Kurdish neighborhoods and that the SDF would withdraw from the areas it controlled in Aleppo. However, afterwards, the Damascus side accused the SDF of not complying with the agreement and deployed Syrian army tanks near the neighborhoods.
December 27, 2025
SOHR reports Syrian government closing additional roads.
On December 27, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that the Syrian government had closed the additional roads leading to Şêx Meqsûd and Eşrefiye and was preventing civilians from accessing these areas.
January 4, 2026
SDF and Damascus administration meeting.
On January 4, 2026, a Kurdish delegation headed by SDF General Commander Mazlum Abdi met with officials of the temporary administration in Damascus. US-led international anti-ISIS coalition commander Kevin Lambert also attended the meeting. After the meeting, it was announced that the issue of SDF integration had been discussed and that meetings would continue until a conclusion was reached.
Early January 2026
Simultaneous meetings in Paris.
During the days when meetings with the SDF were held in Damascus, important meetings were also taking place in Paris. The meetings were represented by Syrian Foreign Minister Esad Şabani and Intelligence Chief Hussein Salameh for Syria, and by a delegation headed by Israel’s Washington Ambassador Yechiel Leiter for Israel. On behalf of the US, US Syria Special Envoy Tom Barrack and Trump’s advisors Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner attended the meetings. Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s presence in Paris at the same time drew attention. After the meetings, it was announced that agreements had been reached between Israel and Syria on some issues.
A few days later
SDF statement on the sabotaged Damascus meeting.
A few days later, SDF General Command member Sipan Hemo announced that the January 4 Damascus meeting had been sabotaged. Hemo said: “It was a very positive meeting. Because both sides had accepted the articles. Even the international powers wanted this development to be announced to the public. While we were talking about these, a state official whose name I will not mention entered. Seeing that the meeting was going positively, he took the intelligence officer and the Defense Minister with him and left. When they returned, they said, ‘We will not make any statement at this stage. Let’s leave it to the 7th or 8th.’ It was clear that a game was developing. But whether it was Şêx Meqsûd or another place was not yet clear. There was a smell of a game.”
Beginning of January 2026
Reuters reports on the Israel-Syria deal.
According to Reuters, a series of high-level closed-door meetings were held in Damascus, Paris, and Iraq at the beginning of January. In the Paris meeting, Syrian officials asked the Israeli side to cut its support for the SDF. It was stated that the Syrian government also brought up the idea of a limited operation in some areas controlled by the SDF and that it did not encounter any reservations. In return, it was claimed that Israel had made the Damascus administration accept a series of demands, especially the demilitarization of southern Syria. Neither Syria nor the US confirmed or denied Reuters’ report.
January 7, 2026
Kurdish security points declared military targets.
On January 7, 2026, the Syrian transitional government declared all Kurdish security points in the Şêx Meqsûd and Eşrefiye neighborhoods as “military targets,” and attacks on the neighborhoods increased. A major humanitarian crisis was experienced due to war crimes committed by armed persons affiliated with the Syrian Arab Army. The images of the lifeless body of Kurdish women’s security officer Deniz Çiya being thrown from a building with “Allahu Akbar” slogans created outrage among Kurds and drew strong reactions from human rights organizations.
January 8 – 11, 2026
Syrian Army takes control of Aleppo province.
Following the intense clashes, the Syrian Army entered the Eşrefiye Neighborhood on January 8, 2026, and the Şêx Meqsûd Neighborhood on January 11, 2026, declaring that control in Aleppo province was in the hands of the Syrian army.
January 9, 2026
EU delegation visits Damascus.
On January 9, 2026, EU Council President António Costa and EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen went to Damascus and met with Ahmed Şara. Von der Leyen announced a 620 million euro support package for Syria. While attacks on Kurdish neighborhoods continued, the EU’s visit to Damascus drew criticism in public opinion.
January 17, 2026
DEM Party delegation meets with Öcalan.
On January 17, 2026, the DEM Party delegation met with Öcalan in İmralı. Öcalan, stating that he was extremely concerned due to the clashes, evaluated this situation as an attempt to undermine the Peace and Democratic Society Process.
January 17, 2026
Syrian government declares a closed military zone.
On the same day, the Syrian government declared the area west of the Euphrates, including Raqqa under SDF control, a “closed military zone” and launched an attack on some areas of Tabqa. With the SDF’s announcement that it would withdraw to the east of the Euphrates, the Damascus administration announced that its forces had begun entering the city.
January 17, 2026
Meeting in Erbil.
On January 17, Mazlum Abdi, Autonomous Administration Foreign Relations Co-Chair İlham Ahmed, Tom Barrack, and KDP Chairman Mesud Barzani met in Erbil. In the statement made by the Kurdistan Regional Government Presidency after the meeting, it was stated that “Both sides agreed that the only way to solve the problems peacefully and to ensure peaceful coexistence among the components of the new Syria is dialogue.”
January 18, 2026
Syrian army enters Tabqa and Raqqa.
On January 18, the Syrian army took Tabqa, the Tabqa Dam, and the Tabqa Air Base. It also seized the entire eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor with all its towns and villages, as well as the oil and natural gas fields in the region. On the same day at noon, Arab tribal forces took control of Raqqa, and the Syrian army entered the city a few hours later.
January 18, 2026
Ceasefire and integration agreement.
On January 18, the SDF and the Syrian transitional government agreed on a ceasefire. According to the ceasefire agreement, the Syrian transitional government would take over the military and administrative control of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa provinces. In addition, the SDF would hand over control of all oil and natural gas fields in northeastern Syria and international border crossings to the Syrian transitional government, and civilian institutions in Hasakah province would be integrated into the Syrian state.
January 19, 2026
Rojava Delegation leaves the Damascus meeting.
On January 19, the Rojava Delegation headed by Mazlum Abdi met in Damascus with the Damascus Administration headed by Ahmed Şara and the US Syria Special Envoy Tom Barrack. The Rojava Delegation stated that they did not accept the new articles attempted to be added to the ceasefire agreement announced the previous day and the style attempted to be imposed as a fait accompli, and left the meeting.
January 20, 2026
Global solidarity actions for Rojava.
In his statement after the inconclusive meeting, Mazlum Abdi emphasized that protecting Kurdish regions against attacks by Damascus forces was a “red line.” With the Rojava administration’s decision to resist, Kurds took to the streets on January 20 in cities across the four parts of Kurdistan and Europe, and around the world. Solidarity actions with Rojava continued uninterrupted until February, with demands for Kurdish unity marking the actions.
January 22, 2026
Braid video circulates and sparks global protests.
Meanwhile, on January 22, a highly controversial video circulated on social media. In the video, Ramî El Deheş, who was in HTS, ISIS, and Turkey-backed paramilitary structures, said he had cut the braid of a deceased YPJ female fighter in Raqqa and “gifted it.” The video was met with anger and reaction in many parts of the world. Women launched a braid protest worldwide. Some women participating in the protest in Turkey were detained and arrested.
January 30, 2026
Comprehensive integration agreement announced.
On January 30, a statement was published regarding the meeting that Mazlum Abdi and İlham Ahmed held with transitional government officials in Damascus. The statement announced that a comprehensive agreement had been reached including gradual military and administrative integration between the Syrian transitional government and the SDF, the establishment of a military division consisting of three brigades affiliated with the SDF, the formation of a separate brigade within a division affiliated with Aleppo province for Kobani forces, the deployment of Interior Ministry forces in Hasakah and Qamishli, the integration of local institutions into the state, guarantees of civil and educational rights for Kurdish society, and the return of displaced persons.
February 16, 2026
Öcalan’s evaluation of the process.
On February 16, the DEM Party İmralı Delegation met with Öcalan. In the statement made by Öcalan through the delegation, he said: “The process we have left behind has proven our ability and power of negotiation to ensure the transition from a politics of violence and separation to democratic politics and integration in essence. The TBMM Commission report must be compatible with the basic social realities. In the future progress of the process, this quality of the commission report will be extremely important. A politics that approaches with the logic of ‘eliminating terrorism’ does not express a solution, but a lack of solution.”
February 17, 2026
Commission’s 60-page report is released.
On February 17, in the 60-page report prepared by the “National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission,” topics such as the dissolution of the PKK and the process of laying down arms, and social integration were included. It was stated that legal regulations were tied to the condition of “the actual finalization of the PKK’s laying down of arms and its detection by the executive organ.”
February 28, 2026
US and Israel launch air strikes on Iran.
On February 28, 2026, the US and Israel launched large-scale air strikes on Iran. In the strikes, many high-level Iranian officials, including Iran’s religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, were killed. In response, Iran’s missile attacks on US bases in the region and Israeli territory turned the war into a regional and multidimensional crisis.
February 22, 2026
Formation of the Iranian Kurdistan Political Forces Alliance.
On February 22, Kurdish parties in Iran united under the name “Rojhilat Political Forces Alliance” (Iranian Kurdistan Political Forces Alliance) and formed a common front against the Iranian regime. The coalition, which included structures such as PJAK, KDP-İ, PAK, Komala, and Xebat, increased the number of parties to 6 with the participation of the Iranian Kurdistan Revolutionary Workers’ Community on March 4. Meanwhile, while claims that the US and Israel were seeking a possible alliance with the Kurds were confirmed by US sources, the Kurdish political movement’s distant and cautious statements so far drew attention.
March 4, 2026
DEM Party delegation’s meeting in Ankara.
On March 4, the DEM Party delegation held a meeting in Ankara with Interior Minister Mustafa Çiftçi and Justice Minister Akın Gürlek on legal regulations.
March 11, 2026
Passing of Salih Müslim.
On March 11, PYD Co-Presidency Council member Salih Müslim passed away in a hospital in Hewler where he had been receiving treatment for some time due to kidney failure. A funeral ceremony with the participation of thousands of people was held for Müslim in Qamishli.
March 21, 2026
Newroz celebrations and Erdoğan’s reaction.
On March 21, Kurds celebrated Newroz with the participation of millions in many cities around the world. Öcalan’s message was read at the celebrations. In his message, Öcalan emphasized that religious, sectarian, and cultural wars had continued in the Middle East for a thousand years, and stated that “the divisions created by policies of suppression, denial, and enmity in the region today provide an excuse for imperialist interventions.” Öcalan said, “On the occasion of Newroz, it is in our hands to turn this year into a real year of freedom for all the peoples of the Middle East and to make the tradition of friendship and solidarity among peoples dominant.”
On the other hand, before and after the Newroz celebrations, a total of 170 people were detained in 15 cities on charges of “making propaganda for an organization” and “violating the Law on Meetings and Demonstrations,” and 12 of those detained in Istanbul were arrested. President Erdoğan defended the detentions and arrests by calling them “provocations trying to undermine the process.” Erdoğan described the opening of posters of Abdullah Öcalan at the celebrations and the carrying of yellow, red, and green colors in the areas as “playing with the sensitive nerves of the nation.”
March 27, 2026
Öcalan evaluates the Iran crisis.
On March 27, the DEM Party İmralı Delegation met with Öcalan. Öcalan said: “This great problem we are trying to solve should not be approached narrowly. Because there are deep hegemonic plans over the Middle East. While positive developments have been experienced to some extent along with the painful situation in Syria, now the Iran war is on the agenda. Three lines have emerged in the Iran war: The first is the US-Israel line. The second is the line aimed at protecting the status quo led by Britain and some international and regional powers. The third is the line of democracy and common life that we have developed with the Peace and Democratic Society Process we defend. The developments in Iran have once again revealed the justification and importance of the process being carried out in Turkey.”
March 28, 2026
AKP’s preparation for a legal commission.
On March 28, it was announced that a commission consisting of lawyers would be established under the chairmanship of AKP Group Deputy Chairman Abdulhamit Gül. AKP officials stated: “A temporary code law is targeted to be brought to the Parliament’s agenda in June or July; it will not be a general amnesty or omnibus law.”
Hegemony Competition in the Middle East
The process, which has spread over 1.5 years, began with Bahçeli’s handshake that broke the mold. As in previous periods when the possibility of a solution to the Kurdish issue increased with the start of the dialogue process, a tense picture emerged in this process as well due to military operations, trustee appointments, and arrests that continued despite the ceasefire. Especially the attacks in Rojava by both HTS and Turkey-backed groups constituted the most fragile stages of the process. On the other hand, the Turkish state’s discourses towards ending the conflicts with the PKK also continued. While the question of why the process came to the agenda at this time continues to be discussed in public opinion, the answer to the question requires first looking at analyses regarding the third world war and the new balances taking shape in the Middle East.

According to evaluations, with the collapse of the real socialist system, the world entered the process of a third global war; a re-sharing and hegemony struggle began among global powers. In this struggle, the basic basis of the strategic moves of hegemonic powers lies in the reality of which power focus will have control over the energy and trade monopoly. The ongoing Iran war is not evaluated separately from this context.
On this basis, one of the main transmission routes of energy is the Middle East, and the region’s energy reserves still serve as a strategic depot on a global scale. Although the limited nature of fossil fuels directs dominant actors to follow different agendas, the Middle East energy and trade route continues to maintain its strategic value for global powers. The new developments and conflicts experienced in Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey also lie behind this strategic value.
The picture revealed by the wars experienced in the last 15 years, some of which are still ongoing (especially the war picture in Syria, which is the heart of the region in terms of energy geopolitics), shows that the US-Israel alliance, which has gained the upper hand in the hegemony war, prefers to establish influence over existing structures rather than drawing new borders or establishing new states as in previous world wars. In the new order that this alliance has envisioned for the Middle East, states that “act independently” with their military and economic capabilities (at this stage, Turkey and Iran) are being weakened, made dependent, and forced to accept the roles assigned to them. Ethnic and religious identities that have suffered for years from the pressure of these monist central states in the region are being tried to be turned into “useful instruments” in the process. As a result, while an “energy and trade control order operating under Israeli patronage” is being tried to be shaped in the Middle East, the complex and dynamic structure of the region also brings many impossibilities and possibilities into the realm of possibility.
Why Was the Door of İmralı Knocked?
While the cards are being reshuffled in the Middle East, it can be said that Turkey felt the need to meet with İmralı due to internal and external conjunctural reasons. However, the fact that the call came directly and for the first time from the MHP leader, who is seen as one of the protective elements of the state, brought to the agenda the comments that the call was made to İmralı because “the survival of the state” was in question.

While it is expressed in various media organs that the “state’s survival” problem stems from the new Middle East order being shaped, the reasons for Turkey’s entry into a dialogue process with İmralı are listed as follows:
The first and fundamental reason is that Turkey sees the possibility of the de-facto autonomy of Rojava in Syria gaining official status in the new regional order as a risk for itself (Turkey’s 100-year Kurdish paranoia). Because this means a Kurdistan that will extend 910 km along Turkey’s entire south. In Turkey, there is a concern that this situation will affect its own map in the future. The Turkish state therefore knew that it could not participate in a process where Rojava’s international dimension was discussed while at war with the Kurds.
The second reason is that Turkey, as a country that “acts independently” in the Middle East, is concerned that “after Iran, it will be our turn.” Because Turkey’s past actions such as breaking the economic embargo on Iran, and sometimes moving away from the Western pole in the Syrian war and doing business with Russia and Iran, are among the reasons for this concern.
On the other hand, the third reason is the failure of the “Collapse Plan” initiated after the “solution table” was overturned in 2015, which aimed to end the Kurdish movement. In this war process, especially after the July 2016 coup attempt, the Turkish state, which was criticized for putting aside all the rules that make a state a state, turned into a coalition of non-normative forces. Ultimately, while political and military balances in the Middle East were shaking, Turkey, having entered an economic, legal, and social crisis in the past 10 years and weakened, was caught in this earthquake. Turkey’s calculation is to overcome this earthquake with Kurdish peace and to put the state back in order.
The fourth reason is the “imperial goals” of the AKP wing of the state. Due to Syria’s multi-identity structure, the Sunni Shara government can only gain legitimacy by recognizing the Kurds. While the position of the Kurds within Syria is being discussed, the Sunni Turkish state, which wants to establish influence over the Sunni Syrian transitional government, also aims to form a Sunni region under its own leadership (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria) instead of the weakening “Shiite crescent” (Iran, old Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis in Yemen). However, the Turkish state is aware that as long as the war with the Kurds continues, this goal cannot go beyond a wish. Turkey guarantees that this Sunni region will not have problems with Israel (with the Abraham Accords), while also promising the US, which wants the region to be opened to trade, a stable region without war with the Kurds.
The fifth reason is that the construction bourgeoisie, which has grown around the AKP for 23 years, has reached its limits within Turkey and needs a conflict-free environment together with the AKP to open up to the virgin lands of Syria. Indeed, in May 2025, a strategic 7 billion dollar cooperation agreement was signed between the Syrian Energy Ministry and Turkey’s Kalyon Holding and Cengiz Holding, Qatar’s UCC, and the US’s Power International companies. On August 6, 2025, a 4 billion dollar agreement was also made for Damascus International Airport with a consortium including Kalyon Construction, Cengiz Construction, and TAV Construction with the Syrian Civil Aviation Authority.
Reasons on the Kurdish Side
On the other hand, the question “Why now?” is answered more clearly from the Kurdish side when looking at the period after Abdullah Öcalan was brought to Turkey in 1999. Öcalan states both in the books he wrote and in the İmralı meeting notes that the PKK carried the influences of real socialism and that the PKK also experienced an ideological crisis after the collapse of the Soviets. In this context, he expresses that the PKK’s struggle will be continued with a new paradigm.
This transformation, which Öcalan calls the “democratic, ecological, women’s freedom paradigm,” takes the struggle for “democratic modernity” against capitalist modernity as its basis. Within the framework of this understanding, Öcalan opens the goal of having a state to discussion; he emphasizes that overthrowing power will not bring freedom and that seizing the state does not liberate society. He now defines revolution not as overthrowing power but as transforming mentality and way of life. Öcalan states that they have given up establishing a state, that they will give weight to social organization, that they will take confederal organization as a basis, that they aim for a structuring based on democratic autonomy in every country where Kurds live, and that they propose a Middle East Peoples’ Confederation for the Middle East. He also defines armed struggle as no longer a basic method but as one of the “self-defense” tools.

At the stage reached, Öcalan evaluates the struggle for existence and the struggle for freedom as struggles that require different tools. Both Öcalan and the PKK state that the PKK, which proved the existence of the Kurds, has completed its duty and that the PKK has therefore been dissolved. They express that the weapon is not needed in order to deepen and spread the free sociality that they think was insufficient due to the war. In this framework, the basic reasons based on 25 years of past for Öcalan and the PKK to start this dialogue process are ideological.
The conjunctural reasons on the Kurdish side can be listed as follows:
First, while the Middle East is once again a battlefield, non-normative state forces are in the field, and Turkey does not recognize any war convention, Öcalan and the PKK are trying to eliminate the risk of Kurds suffering a massacre like the Tamils in Sri Lanka or the Palestinians in Gaza. In this regard, they want to prevent armed struggle from leading to a massacre by being used as a “terrorism” pretext in this process.
Second, Öcalan does not want the de-facto autonomous status that Rojava has had since 2012 to be blocked on the grounds of the PKK, which is on the “terrorism list” of many countries. He aims to prevent the “terrorism” pretext from being brought up in the negotiations to be held with the Damascus government so that the 14-year canton experience can be transferred to the democratic structuring of post-Assad Syria.
Third, seeing the tendency of dominant powers to use the ethnic and religious identities oppressed in the region in the new Middle East design, Öcalan and the PKK want to prevent the Kurds from being used as a “card.” In this direction, they aim to position the Kurds as a “third way” with intervention power in a chaotic environment. The Kurdistan Freedom Movement defines this “third way” not as taking sides in the fight between dominant powers, but as the construction of an alternative democratic society in the name of the peoples. Öcalan frequently states through the İmralı Delegation that he wants to protect the Kurds from war.
Fourth, Öcalan and the PKK think that Kurdistan, which was divided between four countries after the First World War (Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria), and the Kurds, who were put in a disadvantaged position by this division, have been politicized with 52 years of PKK struggle, and that this people with high mobilization can turn the division into an advantage and democratize the four countries where Kurds live. For this reason, they see a disarmed environment as essential.
What Is Turkey Waiting For?
Many sociologists, politicians, and journalists from the region who follow the Middle East and the Kurdish movement state that the nature of the Turkish state’s response to the steps taken by Öcalan has become more visible in the developments in Rojava and Syria. In the evaluations made, Turkey’s attitude adopted in the political and military picture that emerged in Syria after Assad is interpreted as preventing the formation of a new Kurdish status area that may arise against regional developments.
In the analyses, it is expressed that the reason for the state not taking steps in the process is the developments in Rojava, but after the formation of a consensus ground between the Rojava Autonomous Administration and Damascus, the issues of Shengal and Mexmûr were brought to the agenda this time. It is commented that these areas are used as a reason in Turkey’s policy production in terms of both political position and field military and diplomatic mobility. In recent times, it is stated that the agenda of Turkish officials includes the developments in Rojhilat Kurdistan and Iran, and in some evaluations, it is mentioned that steps regarding the Kurdish issue will not be taken until the course of the conflicts in Iran becomes clear. In this context, according to sources close to the government in Türkiye newspaper, unnamed sources conveyed that President Erdoğan spoke with US President Trump on the phone immediately after the Iran War and conveyed Turkey’s message that it “would not allow ‘terrorist organizations’ to be used for an attack on Iran.”
Difficulties and Risks of the Process
First of all, as can be seen, the peace in Öcalan’s mind and the peace in Turkey’s mind are different from each other. Öcalan’s approach to peace is not tactical but strategic. The Kurdistan Freedom Movement is also in synchronization with Öcalan in this approach. However, Turkey expresses the “peace” discourse for pragmatic and conjunctural reasons. When the possibility of sabotage by non-normative state forces clustered within the Turkish state and regional powers is also taken into account, this process turns into a process that must be carried out very carefully.

In the past few months, against the attacks in Rojava, the Kurdish base has expressed the importance of unity in every platform. Many politicians warn that if the Kurds do not develop common alliances and do not institutionalize their national unity permanently, their gains will be in danger.
On the other hand, according to Öcalan, peace is not only the silencing of weapons; it also means the construction of a democratic, ecological, and gender-liberatory way of life. In this sense, the Kurdish movement faces the test of demonstrating the ability to carry out peace negotiations and the struggle for democracy simultaneously; and at the same time, to carry out the social construction struggle that Öcalan mentioned. Social problems that Kurdistan is struggling with today, such as poverty, unemployment, and the increasing use of drugs among young people, are the most difficult stages of this test.
Immediately after the 2026 Newroz, Devlet Bahçeli’s statements regarding the legal regulations related to the process that they should not be rushed once again raised question marks in public opinion, and now the eyes have turned to the content of the legal regulations expected to be issued in April and May.
Note: This news is a direct translation from GROK AI.
Turkey’s new Kurdish resolution “process”: A timeline of events

Diyarbakır Newroz celebrations 2026 / Photo: Ömer Demir, Ajansa Welat
It has been nearly a year and a half since MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli made his statement referring to Abdullah Öcalan, calling for him to “come to the TBMM and speak at the DEM Party group meeting, and declare that terrorism has ended and the organization has been disbanded, provided his isolation is lifted.” Since that day, although many issues have been discussed in this process—which the government calls a “Terror-Free Turkey,” but which is generally referred to by some as the “Second Solution Process,” by others as the “Peace Process,” and by some simply as the “Process”—so far, only the Kurdish side has taken steps. Aside from the state and ruling wing establishing a “process” commission with the participation of all parties with parliamentary groups except one, and this commission preparing a report following a long-term working schedule, there have not yet been any concrete developments regarding the legal regulations stated to be necessary for the continuation of the process.
Many developments have taken place under the heading of the “process” from October 1, 2024, to March 31, 2026. Below, we present the comprehensive chronological information we have prepared on the subject.
October 1, 2024
Bahçeli shakes hands with DEM Party members in the Parliament.
A remarkable contact that took place on October 1, 2024, at the opening of the new legislative year of the TBMM, was interpreted as a harbinger of a “new political climate” in public opinion. Bahçeli went to the DEM Party rows and shook hands with Co-Chair Tuncer Bakırhan and other deputies. This gesture created wide repercussions both in the Parliament hall and in public opinion. When journalists asked about the meaning of this handshake, Bahçeli said, “We are entering a new era. While we want peace in the world, we must also establish peace in our own country.”
On the same day, in his speech at the General Assembly of the Parliament, President Erdoğan also used the expressions: “It must now be accepted as a fact. Today, against Israeli aggression, both at home and abroad, grounds for reconciliation must be brought to the fore rather than fields of conflict.”
October 22, 2024
Bahçeli’s call to Öcalan at the group meeting.
Following these statements, on October 22, 2024, at his party’s group meeting, Bahçeli directly addressed Öcalan and made the following call: “If the isolation is lifted, let him come and speak at the DEM Party group meeting in the TBMM, and let him shout that terrorism has completely ended and the organization has been disbanded. If he shows this determination and resolve, the way for the legal regulation regarding the use of the right of hope will be opened wide… Here is the challenge, we are ready for it.”
October 24, 2024
Ömer Öcalan shares message from İmralı.
On October 24, 2024, DEM Party Urfa MP Ömer Öcalan announced that they had met with Abdullah Öcalan in İmralı the previous day and shared Öcalan’s message: “The isolation continues. If the conditions are formed, I have the theoretical and practical power to pull this process from the ground of conflict and violence to the legal and political ground.”
October 30, 2024
Ahmet Özer’s arrest and trustee appointment.
However, these signs towards a solution and peace in the Kurdish issue were overshadowed by ongoing trustee appointments and ban decisions. The practices of the Ministry of Interior once again raised the question: “Is a solution really wanted in the Kurdish issue?”
Ahmet Özer, who was elected Mayor of Esenyurt within the scope of the “urban consensus” made between the CHP and the DEM Party in the local elections, was arrested on October 30, 2024, on charges of “membership in the PKK/KCK armed terrorist organization.” The next day, Istanbul Deputy Governor Can Aksoy was appointed as trustee in his place.
November 2024
Trustees appointed to DEM Party municipalities.
Subsequently, in November 2024, trustees were appointed one after another to the DEM Party municipalities of Mardin, Batman, Urfa Halfeti, Dersim, and Van Bahçesaray, on the grounds of “terrorism” sentences against the co-mayors.
November 21, 2024
New ban on lawyer visits to Öcalan.
On top of all this, on November 21, 2024, the lawyers of the Asrın Law Office, who had requested a meeting with Öcalan, learned that a new six-month ban on lawyer visits to their client Öcalan had been imposed on November 6.
November 26, 2024
Bahçeli repeats his call.
On November 26, Bahçeli said at his party’s TBMM Group Meeting: “We stand exactly behind what we have said since our group meeting on October 22, 2024. We expect face-to-face contact between İmralı and the DEM Group without delay, and we repeat our call with determination.”
December 28, 2024
DEM Party MPs visit İmralı.
After a long period, on December 28, 2024, DEM Party MPs Sırrı Süreyya Önder and Pervin Buldan met with Öcalan in İmralı. The next day, the delegation shared Öcalan’s message with the public: “Strengthening Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood again is a historic responsibility.”
December 30, 2024
KCK’s statement on the solution will.
Then, on December 30, 2024, KCK Executive Council Co-Chair Besê Hozat, in her statement to Medya Haber, said: “We stand behind the solution will shown by our Leadership. The Turkish state, the AKP-MHP government, the government and the opposition as a whole, the state itself must show a real solution will.”
January 2025
İmralı Delegation holds meetings in parliament.
Throughout January 2025, the İmralı Delegation held meetings with the parties with groups in the TBMM: MHP, AKP, CHP, Future Party, DEVA Party, Felicity Party, and New Welfare Party. After these meetings, the delegation met with Öcalan for the second time on January 22, 2025.
February 13, 2025
KCK announces letter from Öcalan.
On February 13, 2025, KCK Executive Council Co-Chair Cemil Bayık stated that they had received a letter from Öcalan and said, “We are carrying out a work to pull the Kurdish issue from the ground of war to the ground of democratization.” However, two days after this statement, on February 15, on the anniversary of Öcalan’s capture in Turkey, the Ministry of Interior appointed a trustee to Van Metropolitan Municipality.
February 18, 2025
Operations and arrests against HDK.
While these developments were taking place, on February 18, 2025, operations were carried out against the Peoples’ Democratic Congress (HDK). A total of 52 people, including political party executives, unionists, artists, and journalists, were detained; 30 of them were arrested on February 21. HDK Co-Spokesperson Meral Danış Beştaş criticized these operations by calling them “a conspiracy against peace.”
February 27, 2025
Öcalan’s “Call for Peace and Democratic Society”.
The DEM Party delegation met with Öcalan in İmralı on February 27, 2025. After the meeting, the delegation shared Öcalan’s message with the public in Istanbul.
In the message titled “Call for Peace and Democratic Society,” Öcalan used the following expressions: “In this climate formed by Mr. Devlet Bahçeli’s call, Mr. President’s demonstrated will, and the positive approaches of other political parties to the known call, I am making a call to lay down arms and I take on the historic responsibility of this call. Like every contemporary society and party whose existence has not been forcibly terminated, convene your congress and decide for integration with the state and society; all groups should lay down their arms and the PKK should dissolve itself.”
March 1, 2025
PKK announces a ceasefire.
Following Öcalan’s call, the PKK announced a ceasefire on March 1. In its statement, the PKK said: “To open the way for the implementation of the Call for Peace and Democratic Society, we declare a ceasefire effective from today. Beyond that, matters such as laying down arms can only be realized with the practical leadership of Leader Apo. We are ready to hold the party congress in the way Leader Apo wants. However, for this to happen, a secure environment must be formed and Leader Apo’s personal guidance and execution are required for the success of the congress.”
March 21, 2025
Newroz celebrations with millions of participants.
Afterwards, Kurds celebrated Newroz 2025 on March 21 with the participation of millions of people in four parts of Kurdistan and many cities around the world. The intensity of participation in Newroz was interpreted by the Kurdish press as support for Öcalan’s call.
March 19, 2025
Ekrem İmamoğlu detained and arrested.
After Newroz, the agenda was shaken by the arrest of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality President Ekrem İmamoğlu. İmamoğlu, who was detained on March 19, 2025, within the scope of investigations initiated on charges of “terrorism” and “corruption” regarding the “urban consensus,” was arrested on March 23, 2025. The Kurdish movement evaluated İmamoğlu’s arrest as a “provocative intervention” in the process.
April 15, 2025
Sırrı Süreyya Önder hospitalized and passes away.
Shortly after, DEM Party Istanbul MP and İmralı delegation member Sırrı Süreyya Önder was taken to the hospital on April 15 due to a heart condition he suffered in Istanbul. Önder fought for life in intensive care for 18 days but could not be saved and passed away on May 3, 2025. Thousands of people bid farewell to Önder on his final journey with the slogan “Our word to Sırrı will be peace.”
May 8, 2025
DEM Party statement on assassination suspicion.
Five days after the funeral, the DEM Party made a statement: “On April 2, the parking attendant noticed a sound coming from the tires while using Sırrı Süreyya Önder’s vehicle and took the vehicle to the service. In the examination, a sharp metal device made of iron that could puncture the left rear tire was found placed there.” After this information was shared, the question “Was an assassination carried out against Sırrı Süreyya?” began to be discussed in public opinion.
May 12, 2025
PKK decides to dissolve itself and lay down arms.
During the days when Önder’s mourning was observed, on May 12, 2025, the PKK announced that it had dissolved itself and laid down its arms. In its statement, the PKK said: “Our congress was held safely despite the difficult conditions in which conflicts continued, aerial and ground attacks continued, and the siege on our areas and the KDP embargo continued… The PKK has completed its historic mission. The 12th Congress of the PKK has decided to dissolve the organizational structure of the PKK and end the armed struggle method, thus ending the activities carried out under the name of the PKK.” Following this decision, many discussions for and against began in different circles, and the question “What steps will the state take?” settled on the agenda of society. In the statement from the KCK, it was announced that many forces that did not want the PKK to lay down arms wanted to meet with the KCK.
July 9, 2025
Öcalan’s first video call since 1999.
Öcalan made a new call on July 9, 2025. This time, however, his call was a video call. This was Öcalan’s first video appearance since 1999. In the video, Öcalan said, “I continue to defend the Call for Peace and Democratic Society dated February 27, 2025,” and stated, “As a general aspect of the process, the voluntary laying down of arms and the comprehensive commission work to be established by law in the TBMM are important.”
July 11, 2025
Peace and Democratic Society Group burns their weapons.
Based on Öcalan’s words in this video message — “Without falling into the sterility of ‘you first, me first,’ attention and sensitivity must be shown in taking steps” — the KCK took the first step. Under the leadership of KCK Executive Council Co-Chair Besê Hozat, the “Peace and Democratic Society Group,” consisting of 30 guerrillas, 15 of whom were women, burned their weapons on July 11, 2025, in a ceremony attended by many journalists and representatives of civil society organizations.
August 5, 2025
First meeting of the parliamentary commission.
Following this ceremony, a 51-member commission chaired by TBMM Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş, which included political parties with groups in the Parliament (except the İYİ Party), held its first meeting on August 5 regarding the solution process. The name of the commission was determined as the “National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission.”
August 10, 2025
Bahçeli’s statement on TV100.
On August 10, speaking to TV100, Bahçeli stated that the process would be completed by the end of the year and that the PKK’s burning of weapons carried a strong message, saying, “Weapons can be dug up again if buried; burning them means ‘we will never lay our hands on weapons again.’”
August 19, 2025
White Toros incident in front of the TBMM.
On August 19, a white Toros car was set on fire in front of the TBMM before the fourth meeting of the “National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission.”
August 28, 2025
DEM Party İmralı Delegation meets with Öcalan.
On August 28, the DEM Party İmralı Delegation met with Öcalan. In the statement, it was stated that Öcalan said in the meeting, “Democratic society, peace, and integration are the three key concepts of this process, and a result can be reached on this basis,” and that he emphasized “the need for a new stage in which steps are taken urgently in all dimensions.”
September 25, 2025
DEM Party statement on the legal phase.
On September 25, in its statement, the DEM Party said that the commission in the Parliament was about to complete the listening phase and stated, “With the opening of the Parliament, the first phase, which we can describe as the political and social phase, will give way to the second phase, which we describe as the legal phase.” The DEM Party announced that in the second phase of the process, the commission would focus on legislative work and that they had prepared proposals on issues such as the Transitional Period Law, Enforcement Law, changes in the TMK, TCK, and CMK, trustee regulations, democratization of local governments, combating discrimination, and education in the mother tongue.
October 1, 2025
President Erdoğan’s message of thanks.
On October 1, at the Opening Meeting of the 4th Legislative Year of the 28th Term of the TBMM, President Erdoğan thanked Devlet Bahçeli and the DEM Party for conducting the process.
October 7, 2025
Bahçeli proposes a delegation to meet Öcalan.
At the MHP Parliamentary Group Meeting on October 7, Bahçeli suggested that a delegation of commission members meet face-to-face with Öcalan and asked Öcalan to make a call for the SDF to lay down arms.
October 13, 2025
Asrın Law Office visits İmralı.
On October 13, lawyers from the Asrın Law Office visited Abdullah Öcalan on İmralı Island. Öcalan said, “The principle of hope is a step that the state must take. It needs to remove this burden. This is an issue that affects thousands of people.”
October 26, 2025
KÖH announces withdrawal to Media Defense Areas.
On October 26, at a press conference organized in Kandil under the name of the Kurdistan Freedom Movement (KÖH) Administration because the PKK had dissolved itself, it was announced that all guerrilla forces posing a conflict risk within Turkey’s borders were being withdrawn to the “Media Defense Areas.” On November 17, it was announced that the armed forces had also withdrawn from the Zap area in northern Iraq. The KÖH Administration stated that it believed “this new step would serve peace and democratization in Turkey.”
November 18, 2025
Bahçeli announces his intent to go to İmralı.
On November 18, Bahçeli announced in his MHP group speech that if no one met with Öcalan, he would go to İmralı with three of his friends.
November 21, 2025
CHP objects as the commission votes “Yes”.
On November 21, the CHP announced that it was against the commission’s meeting with Öcalan. On the same day, the commission’s eighteenth meeting was held. In the closed session of the meeting, the proposal to meet with Öcalan was accepted with the “Yes” votes of the AK Party, MHP, DEM Party, TİP, and EMEP.
November 24, 2025
Committee visits İmralı.
On November 24, a committee formed by the AK Party, MHP, and DEM Party from the “National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission” went to İmralı and met with Öcalan.
August 2, 2025
First clashes between SDF and Syrian transitional government forces.
Meanwhile, from August 2025 onwards, many developments with a high probability of affecting the process in Turkey took place in Syria and Rojava. The first clashes between armed forces affiliated with the Syrian transitional government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), whose backbone is formed by Kurds, occurred on August 2, 2025, near Deyr Hafir and El-Kefse. The clashes intensified in September around Aleppo and its surroundings.
December 26, 2025
Clashes begin in Şêx Meqsûd and Eşrefiye.
On December 26, clashes began between armed forces affiliated with the Syrian transitional government and Kurdish security forces in the Şêx Meqsûd and Eşrefiye neighborhoods. The parties had signed an agreement on April 1, 2025, foreseeing that only Kurdish security forces would remain in the Kurdish neighborhoods and that the SDF would withdraw from the areas it controlled in Aleppo. However, afterwards, the Damascus side accused the SDF of not complying with the agreement and deployed Syrian army tanks near the neighborhoods.
December 27, 2025
SOHR reports Syrian government closing additional roads.
On December 27, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that the Syrian government had closed the additional roads leading to Şêx Meqsûd and Eşrefiye and was preventing civilians from accessing these areas.
January 4, 2026
SDF and Damascus administration meeting.
On January 4, 2026, a Kurdish delegation headed by SDF General Commander Mazlum Abdi met with officials of the temporary administration in Damascus. US-led international anti-ISIS coalition commander Kevin Lambert also attended the meeting. After the meeting, it was announced that the issue of SDF integration had been discussed and that meetings would continue until a conclusion was reached.
Early January 2026
Simultaneous meetings in Paris.
During the days when meetings with the SDF were held in Damascus, important meetings were also taking place in Paris. The meetings were represented by Syrian Foreign Minister Esad Şabani and Intelligence Chief Hussein Salameh for Syria, and by a delegation headed by Israel’s Washington Ambassador Yechiel Leiter for Israel. On behalf of the US, US Syria Special Envoy Tom Barrack and Trump’s advisors Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner attended the meetings. Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s presence in Paris at the same time drew attention. After the meetings, it was announced that agreements had been reached between Israel and Syria on some issues.
A few days later
SDF statement on the sabotaged Damascus meeting.
A few days later, SDF General Command member Sipan Hemo announced that the January 4 Damascus meeting had been sabotaged. Hemo said: “It was a very positive meeting. Because both sides had accepted the articles. Even the international powers wanted this development to be announced to the public. While we were talking about these, a state official whose name I will not mention entered. Seeing that the meeting was going positively, he took the intelligence officer and the Defense Minister with him and left. When they returned, they said, ‘We will not make any statement at this stage. Let’s leave it to the 7th or 8th.’ It was clear that a game was developing. But whether it was Şêx Meqsûd or another place was not yet clear. There was a smell of a game.”
Beginning of January 2026
Reuters reports on the Israel-Syria deal.
According to Reuters, a series of high-level closed-door meetings were held in Damascus, Paris, and Iraq at the beginning of January. In the Paris meeting, Syrian officials asked the Israeli side to cut its support for the SDF. It was stated that the Syrian government also brought up the idea of a limited operation in some areas controlled by the SDF and that it did not encounter any reservations. In return, it was claimed that Israel had made the Damascus administration accept a series of demands, especially the demilitarization of southern Syria. Neither Syria nor the US confirmed or denied Reuters’ report.
January 7, 2026
Kurdish security points declared military targets.
On January 7, 2026, the Syrian transitional government declared all Kurdish security points in the Şêx Meqsûd and Eşrefiye neighborhoods as “military targets,” and attacks on the neighborhoods increased. A major humanitarian crisis was experienced due to war crimes committed by armed persons affiliated with the Syrian Arab Army. The images of the lifeless body of Kurdish women’s security officer Deniz Çiya being thrown from a building with “Allahu Akbar” slogans created outrage among Kurds and drew strong reactions from human rights organizations.
January 8 – 11, 2026
Syrian Army takes control of Aleppo province.
Following the intense clashes, the Syrian Army entered the Eşrefiye Neighborhood on January 8, 2026, and the Şêx Meqsûd Neighborhood on January 11, 2026, declaring that control in Aleppo province was in the hands of the Syrian army.
January 9, 2026
EU delegation visits Damascus.
On January 9, 2026, EU Council President António Costa and EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen went to Damascus and met with Ahmed Şara. Von der Leyen announced a 620 million euro support package for Syria. While attacks on Kurdish neighborhoods continued, the EU’s visit to Damascus drew criticism in public opinion.
January 17, 2026
DEM Party delegation meets with Öcalan.
On January 17, 2026, the DEM Party delegation met with Öcalan in İmralı. Öcalan, stating that he was extremely concerned due to the clashes, evaluated this situation as an attempt to undermine the Peace and Democratic Society Process.
January 17, 2026
Syrian government declares a closed military zone.
On the same day, the Syrian government declared the area west of the Euphrates, including Raqqa under SDF control, a “closed military zone” and launched an attack on some areas of Tabqa. With the SDF’s announcement that it would withdraw to the east of the Euphrates, the Damascus administration announced that its forces had begun entering the city.
January 17, 2026
Meeting in Erbil.
On January 17, Mazlum Abdi, Autonomous Administration Foreign Relations Co-Chair İlham Ahmed, Tom Barrack, and KDP Chairman Mesud Barzani met in Erbil. In the statement made by the Kurdistan Regional Government Presidency after the meeting, it was stated that “Both sides agreed that the only way to solve the problems peacefully and to ensure peaceful coexistence among the components of the new Syria is dialogue.”
January 18, 2026
Syrian army enters Tabqa and Raqqa.
On January 18, the Syrian army took Tabqa, the Tabqa Dam, and the Tabqa Air Base. It also seized the entire eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor with all its towns and villages, as well as the oil and natural gas fields in the region. On the same day at noon, Arab tribal forces took control of Raqqa, and the Syrian army entered the city a few hours later.
January 18, 2026
Ceasefire and integration agreement.
On January 18, the SDF and the Syrian transitional government agreed on a ceasefire. According to the ceasefire agreement, the Syrian transitional government would take over the military and administrative control of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa provinces. In addition, the SDF would hand over control of all oil and natural gas fields in northeastern Syria and international border crossings to the Syrian transitional government, and civilian institutions in Hasakah province would be integrated into the Syrian state.
January 19, 2026
Rojava Delegation leaves the Damascus meeting.
On January 19, the Rojava Delegation headed by Mazlum Abdi met in Damascus with the Damascus Administration headed by Ahmed Şara and the US Syria Special Envoy Tom Barrack. The Rojava Delegation stated that they did not accept the new articles attempted to be added to the ceasefire agreement announced the previous day and the style attempted to be imposed as a fait accompli, and left the meeting.
January 20, 2026
Global solidarity actions for Rojava.
In his statement after the inconclusive meeting, Mazlum Abdi emphasized that protecting Kurdish regions against attacks by Damascus forces was a “red line.” With the Rojava administration’s decision to resist, Kurds took to the streets on January 20 in cities across the four parts of Kurdistan and Europe, and around the world. Solidarity actions with Rojava continued uninterrupted until February, with demands for Kurdish unity marking the actions.
January 22, 2026
Braid video circulates and sparks global protests.
Meanwhile, on January 22, a highly controversial video circulated on social media. In the video, Ramî El Deheş, who was in HTS, ISIS, and Turkey-backed paramilitary structures, said he had cut the braid of a deceased YPJ female fighter in Raqqa and “gifted it.” The video was met with anger and reaction in many parts of the world. Women launched a braid protest worldwide. Some women participating in the protest in Turkey were detained and arrested.
January 30, 2026
Comprehensive integration agreement announced.
On January 30, a statement was published regarding the meeting that Mazlum Abdi and İlham Ahmed held with transitional government officials in Damascus. The statement announced that a comprehensive agreement had been reached including gradual military and administrative integration between the Syrian transitional government and the SDF, the establishment of a military division consisting of three brigades affiliated with the SDF, the formation of a separate brigade within a division affiliated with Aleppo province for Kobani forces, the deployment of Interior Ministry forces in Hasakah and Qamishli, the integration of local institutions into the state, guarantees of civil and educational rights for Kurdish society, and the return of displaced persons.
February 16, 2026
Öcalan’s evaluation of the process.
On February 16, the DEM Party İmralı Delegation met with Öcalan. In the statement made by Öcalan through the delegation, he said: “The process we have left behind has proven our ability and power of negotiation to ensure the transition from a politics of violence and separation to democratic politics and integration in essence. The TBMM Commission report must be compatible with the basic social realities. In the future progress of the process, this quality of the commission report will be extremely important. A politics that approaches with the logic of ‘eliminating terrorism’ does not express a solution, but a lack of solution.”
February 17, 2026
Commission’s 60-page report is released.
On February 17, in the 60-page report prepared by the “National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission,” topics such as the dissolution of the PKK and the process of laying down arms, and social integration were included. It was stated that legal regulations were tied to the condition of “the actual finalization of the PKK’s laying down of arms and its detection by the executive organ.”
February 28, 2026
US and Israel launch air strikes on Iran.
On February 28, 2026, the US and Israel launched large-scale air strikes on Iran. In the strikes, many high-level Iranian officials, including Iran’s religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, were killed. In response, Iran’s missile attacks on US bases in the region and Israeli territory turned the war into a regional and multidimensional crisis.
February 22, 2026
Formation of the Iranian Kurdistan Political Forces Alliance.
On February 22, Kurdish parties in Iran united under the name “Rojhilat Political Forces Alliance” (Iranian Kurdistan Political Forces Alliance) and formed a common front against the Iranian regime. The coalition, which included structures such as PJAK, KDP-İ, PAK, Komala, and Xebat, increased the number of parties to 6 with the participation of the Iranian Kurdistan Revolutionary Workers’ Community on March 4. Meanwhile, while claims that the US and Israel were seeking a possible alliance with the Kurds were confirmed by US sources, the Kurdish political movement’s distant and cautious statements so far drew attention.
March 4, 2026
DEM Party delegation’s meeting in Ankara.
On March 4, the DEM Party delegation held a meeting in Ankara with Interior Minister Mustafa Çiftçi and Justice Minister Akın Gürlek on legal regulations.
March 11, 2026
Passing of Salih Müslim.
On March 11, PYD Co-Presidency Council member Salih Müslim passed away in a hospital in Hewler where he had been receiving treatment for some time due to kidney failure. A funeral ceremony with the participation of thousands of people was held for Müslim in Qamishli.
March 21, 2026
Newroz celebrations and Erdoğan’s reaction.
On March 21, Kurds celebrated Newroz with the participation of millions in many cities around the world. Öcalan’s message was read at the celebrations. In his message, Öcalan emphasized that religious, sectarian, and cultural wars had continued in the Middle East for a thousand years, and stated that “the divisions created by policies of suppression, denial, and enmity in the region today provide an excuse for imperialist interventions.” Öcalan said, “On the occasion of Newroz, it is in our hands to turn this year into a real year of freedom for all the peoples of the Middle East and to make the tradition of friendship and solidarity among peoples dominant.”
On the other hand, before and after the Newroz celebrations, a total of 170 people were detained in 15 cities on charges of “making propaganda for an organization” and “violating the Law on Meetings and Demonstrations,” and 12 of those detained in Istanbul were arrested. President Erdoğan defended the detentions and arrests by calling them “provocations trying to undermine the process.” Erdoğan described the opening of posters of Abdullah Öcalan at the celebrations and the carrying of yellow, red, and green colors in the areas as “playing with the sensitive nerves of the nation.”
March 27, 2026
Öcalan evaluates the Iran crisis.
On March 27, the DEM Party İmralı Delegation met with Öcalan. Öcalan said: “This great problem we are trying to solve should not be approached narrowly. Because there are deep hegemonic plans over the Middle East. While positive developments have been experienced to some extent along with the painful situation in Syria, now the Iran war is on the agenda. Three lines have emerged in the Iran war: The first is the US-Israel line. The second is the line aimed at protecting the status quo led by Britain and some international and regional powers. The third is the line of democracy and common life that we have developed with the Peace and Democratic Society Process we defend. The developments in Iran have once again revealed the justification and importance of the process being carried out in Turkey.”
March 28, 2026
AKP’s preparation for a legal commission.
On March 28, it was announced that a commission consisting of lawyers would be established under the chairmanship of AKP Group Deputy Chairman Abdulhamit Gül. AKP officials stated: “A temporary code law is targeted to be brought to the Parliament’s agenda in June or July; it will not be a general amnesty or omnibus law.”